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A bst r a c t
The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new region of instability. The former 
republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are situated in a strategic region that has 
garnered the attention of numerous actors in a competition for influence in Central 
Asia. It also saw the entrance of a most unlikely player: Israel.
Since 1948, Israeli foreign policy has been directed at guaranteeing the security of the 
nation. Israel responded to the emergence of an independent Central Asia by 
evaluating the region’s potential to impact its security and engaging the region to 
prevent the emergence of hostile regimes.
Israel’s strategic objectives in the region were to block Iranian inroads and to expand 
Israel’s sphere of influence in order to secure the survival of the Israeli state. By 
constructively engaging Central Asia in diplomatic, economic, and security relations, 
Israel exerted its influence over the region. In the first ten years of independence, 
Israel achieved all its objectives.
This thesis examines the reasons behind Israel’s interests and evaluates its successes. 
It will explain what threat perceptions drove Israel’s relationship with these states and 
evaluate these possible threats. This will be accomplished through an examination of 
the relationship and an evaluation of its successes in the advancement of Israeli 
national security interests.
The focus of this study will be on the complex and multifaceted relations between 
Israel and the republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This study will examine 
Israel’s multifaceted relationship with these two republics within the framework of 
Israel’s overall nation security policy and foreign policy objectives. This thesis will 
explore and evaluate Israel’s principal relations with these states, including diplomatic 
relations, development assistance, commercial relations, and security cooperation. 
These aspects of the relationship will be explored in order to trace Israel’s interest and 
exposure.
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It is my intention to provide clear and coherent analysis throughout this study; the 
following measures were taken to facilitate that process.
For the sake of clarity, I have used the most common and clearly understood English 
language spellings of names and places originally written in a variety of languages 
and scripts.
The writing of this thesis benefited my MA dissertation (SOAS, 1999). The 
arguments in that work served as a starting point to inform some of the basic notions 
used in the examinations of Israeli-Uzbek and Israeli-Kazakh relations presented in 
this thesis. A veiy preliminary version of chapter four appeared as “The Impact of 
Israeli Foreign Policy in Central Asia: The Case of Uzbekistan,” in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus 4, no. 28 (2004): pp. 70-81.
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Ch a p t e r  O n e : In t r o d u c t io n
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created instability in Central Asia. 
The republics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are situated in an area where several 
regional powers converge: Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The 
region is also rich in minerals, perhaps even containing enough hydrocarbon resources 
to rival those of the Persian Gulf. Highly strategic, Central Asia has attracted the 
attention of its neighbors and more distant powers. In the competition for influence in 
Central Asia, a renewed ‘Great Game,’ a most unlikely player has joined the struggle: 
the State of Israel.
Since Israel was created, it has crafted a foreign policy whose primary 
objectives include guaranteeing the security of the nation. Israel has engaged its 
regional Muslim neighbors because of their potential to adversely affect the national 
security of the Jewish state. When nominally Muslim republics were formed in 
Central Asia, Israel immediately attempted to build relationships with them in order to 
advance its traditional foreign policy objectives and to safeguard its national security.
Israel’s strategic objective in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was to prevent the 
emergence of regimes that would be hostile to Israeli interests. Through a policy of 
constructive engagement with the republics, Israel hoped to accomplish four main 
goals: block the expansion of Iran’s sphere of influence into Central Asia, halt the 
proliferation of Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), prevent the spread
of militant Islamist extremism, and ensure that the new governments in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan did not align against Israel on the issue of Palestine. In order to 
accomplish these and other objectives, Israel created strong relationships with the 
republics through diplomatic relations, development assistance, economic and 
commercial relations, and security cooperation. As a result of its strategy and 
engagement, Israel had achieved all its strategic policy goals in the region by the end 
of the first ten years of Central Asian independence.
The focus of this study will be on the complex, multifaceted, and significant 
relations between the State of Israel and the newly independent states of Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan. It is a case study of these two republics to explore and explain 
Israel’s regional policies. This thesis examines the reasons behind Israel’s interests 
and evaluates its successes. It details what threat perceptions drove Israel’s 
relationship with these states and evaluates those threats. Several aspects of the 
relationships which Israel developed with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are analyzed in 
order to evaluate Israel’s success in each of the two case studies. Through the 
framework of Israel’s overall national security policy and foreign policy objectives, 
Israeli policy towards Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be explored.
ISRAEL’S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dramatically altered the geopolitical 
landscape throughout the world. In Israel, the unfolding events in Central Asia were 
being watched with particular interest. Israel’s greatest fear at the time was that the 
new republics would fall under the sway of Iran’s fiery brand of revolutionary Islam 
and adopt Teheran’s fierce opposition to the very existence of the Jewish State.
Israel’s policy of constructive engagement 011 many levels sought to prevent Iranian 
influence from spreading to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Israeli leaders were also concerned about the potential proliferation of Soviet- 
era WMDs, their components, and technologies. The fact that when Kazakhstan 
gained its independence it became a de facto nuclear power certainly raised serious 
concerns throughout Israel’s foreign policy community. The Soviet Union’s large- 
scale biological warfare program and special nuclear materials were also perceived as 
a threat. Israel’s policy intended to prevent these weapons and technologies from 
falling into the hands of Israel’s enemies, especially Iran.
A third concern regarding Central Asia was that in the absence of Soviet 
control, Islamist extremism— particularly Iranian-backed fundamentalism—would 
sweep through the region. Such a development would create an unfriendly 
atmosphere and severely complicate Israel’s ability to engage the new republics for 
the purposes of building relationships. It would probably also threaten the large 
Jewish communities in the region. Through building successful relationships via 
diplomacy, trade and investment, and security cooperation, Israel attempted to prevent 
the emergence of conditions that would be hospitable for the spread of militant 
political Islam.
At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was still considered to be an illegal terrorist organization, and the 
Oslo Accords (1993) were still two years away. Israel was afraid that the ‘Muslim’ 
Central Asian republics would support the Arab negotiating position and side with the 
rejectionist front of ‘hard-line’ states, so Israel acted to ensure that Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan did not align against Israel on the issue of Palestine. The memory of 
Soviet support for belligerent Arab regimes was still fresh, and it was feared that the
new republics would also develop into independent belligerent regimes. The region’s 
large mineral wealth could easily support the emergence of new petro-powers that 
might subsidize frontline Arab intransigence. It was essential that Israel keep the new 
republics from aligning completely with their neighbors’ rejectionist stance and 
therefore Israel attempted to secure Uzbek and Kazakh neutrality on the issue of 
Palestine.
FOCUS OF THE STUDY
This thesis examines Israel’s relationship with the Central Asian republics of 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan during the first ten years of their independence, from 
1991 to 2001. The focus is solely on Israel’s relationship with the republics and not 
vice versa. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s relationships with Israel during this period 
would require a different focus, approach, and analysis.
The time period covered in this thesis is framed by two major events: the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States. The thesis begins with the creation of the successor republics in Central Asia 
that emerged from the chaos of the Soviet collapse and focuses on their formative 
years. The beginning of a dramatic new period in the international politics of Central 
Asia is marked by the attacks in America on 11 September 2001. The launch of the 
US-led global war on terror, the presence of American and coalition military forces in 
Central Asia, and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (December 
2001) sparked new and renewed interest in the region from such great powers as the 
United States, Russia, and China. Furthermore, it signaled the beginnings of 
independent and assertive foreign policy by both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Israel’s relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the focus of this 
thesis for several reasons. First, Israel’s relationships with Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan were the most serious and well-developed of its relationships with the 
five Central Asian republics, and as such they are the most illustrative examples of 
Israeli strategic policy in the region. Israel developed the closest ties with Tashkent 
and Almaty because Israeli policy makers focused their energies and efforts on 
building relationships with what were considered the two most important republics. 
Uzbekistan was the most geopolitically strategic and populous state in the region. It 
had a history of religious activism and was home to the largest Jewish community in 
Central Asia. Kazakhstan, the region’s largest state geographically, boasted the most 
promising economy in Central Asia. That it gained independence as a de facto 
nuclear power added significantly to its importance.
The second reason for this close examination of Israel’s relationship with 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is that they were the locus of Israel’s diplomatic presence 
in Central Asia. As a small nation, Israel cannot establish embassies in eveiy country 
with which it has diplomatic relations. Israel’s embassy in Tashkent is also accredited 
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and the embassy in Almaty also represents Israeli interests in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Although outside the period of this study, as of 2006 an Israeli 
ambassador to Turkmenistan had been appointed, but he is resident at the Foreign 
Ministry in Jerusalem.1
Because of Israel’s emphasis in its foreign policy on developing strong 
relationships with these two republics, there is a significant amount of information 
and data available from a variety of sources. Although there is considerably less 
material available regarding Israel’s relationships with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
1 Ofer Moreno (Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the State of Israel to the Republic of 
Uzbekistan), interview with the author, 13 March 2006, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Turkmenistan, were they to be included in this study it was feared that the present 
work would become unwieldy. After chapters two and three, which examine the core 
concepts of Israeli national security policy and their application in Central Asia, the 
analysis is focused on the case studies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
In order to facilitate the analysis of Israeli-Uzbek and Israeli-Kazakh relations 
in chapters four through six, the relationships have been separated into three periods 
corresponding to the contours of the relationships. There are striking similarities in 
the pace, intensity, and level of Israeli interactions with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
over the course of the ten-year period examined in this thesis. In both republics, the 
relationship rapidly grew very close, then experienced a quiet interlude for several 
years, and then increased in pace and intensity.
Israel engaged Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan immediately after they became 
independent. This first phase of the relationships witnessed the creation of diplomatic 
relations, the swift establishment of economic and commercial ties, and security 
cooperation. In Uzbekistan, phase I took place from 1991-1994, whereas in 
Kazakhstan it lasted from 1991-1995. This was then followed by a period that was 
characterized by a lack of engagement. In this second phase, there were few high- 
level visits between the nations and rarely were any bilateral agreements signed. In 
the case of both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, trade and investment continued but no 
security cooperation is known to have taken place. It is noteworthy that in neither 
case did the relationship fundamentally suffer; the lull in the relationship did not lead 
to deterioration. Phase II lasted from 1995-1997 in Uzbekistan and from 1996-1998 
in Kazakhstan. The third phase was a period of re-engagement during which the
relationships with Tashkent and Almaty were re-invigorated. More interaction and 
official visits took place during this last phase than in any other under examination in 
this study. The third phase occurred in Uzbekistan during the years 1998-2001 and in 
Kazakhstan during the years 1999-2001.
L a y o u t
This introduction is followed by six chapters which address Israeli national 
security policy, Israeli policy towards Central Asia, Israel’s relationship with 
Uzbekistan, and Israel’s relationship with Kazakhstan. Chapter two provides an 
introduction to the core concepts of Israeli national security policy and is intended to 
lay the foundation for the discussions and analysis in later chapters. It begins with a 
brief look at Israel’s traditional foreign policy concerns. This is followed by sections 
dealing with the creation of national policies in Israel and an examination of the four 
components that have affected the creation and implementation of Israeli national 
security policies. The chapter then concludes with an assessment of six tenets of 
Israeli national security policy.
Chapter three details Israeli policy towards Central Asia. It discusses Israel’s 
strategic policy objectives, its perceptions, and misunderstandings of the region, and 
then evaluates the concerns, threats, and opportunities presented by the emergence of 
an independent Central Asia. This information will provide a framework for the 
discussions and analyses in the case studies on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The issue 
of how Israel administers foreign development assistance is also explored.
Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan is the focus of chapter four. Israeli- 
Uzbek relations are examined in the areas of diplomatic and political relations, 
development assistance, commercial relations, and security cooperation. In the case
of Uzbekistan, Israeli development assistance was used to further diplomatic aims; 
therefore, it is addressed in conjunction with the sections dealing with diplomatic and 
political relations. These areas are described in each of the three phases in order to 
track their development over the course of the relationship. This is complemented 
with sections on the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Israeli-Uzbek relations and an 
analysis of Uzbekistan’s voting patterns in the UN General Assembly on resolutions 
related to the Middle East and considered hostile to Israel.
The discussion of Israel’s relationship with Kazakhstan is spread over two 
chapters. The first phase of Israel’s relationship with Kazakhstan (1991-1995) is 
addressed in chapter five. This chapter deals with the events leading to the formation 
of Israeli-Kazakli ties and the first several years of the relationship. Chapter six 
continues the discussion and analysis of the relationship through phases II and III. An 
examination of the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Israeli-Kazakh ties and a 
section that analyzes of Kazakhstan’s UN General Assembly voting history on 
relevant resolutions conclude the chapter.
In the final chapter, the conclusions are discussed and several issues for the 
further study of this topic are noted. Some larger questions are explored briefly: What 
does Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan tell us about Israel’s 
interactions with other non-Arab Muslim states? Can this inform our understanding 
of Israel’s other relationships? Can the methods with which Israel engaged 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan be applied elsewhere? As this thesis will demonstrate, 
Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the first ten years of 
independence was truly unique and without parallel.
U se  o f  D a t a
In chapters four through six, two sets of data are used in measuring the 
development of Israel’s relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The first data 
set used in chapters four through six is the voting position of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan 011 United Nations General Assembly resolutions related to the Middle 
East and considered hostile to the State of Israel that were passed during the 
timeframe covered in this thesis. These data are analyzed in chapters four 
(Uzbekistan) and six (Kazakhstan) to help demonstrate the political development of 
the Israeli-Uzbek and Israeli-Kazakh relationships. The data are drawn from two 
sources: the resolutions were adapted from the American-Israeli Cooperative 
Enterprise, and the voting positions were taken from the official United Nations 
Bibliographic Information System.
These data have been tabulated in appendix one of this thesis, which lists the 
resolution number, date of the vote, title of the resolution, vote tally, and what vote 
was cast by the delegations from Israel, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. For reference, 
the votes cast by the delegations from the United States and Iran are included in the 
chart. This is intended to give the reader a point of comparison, and they are 
referenced only briefly in the text; anymore would require a separate treatment. In the 
UN General Assembly, a delegation may cast one of several types of votes on a 
resolution: in favor, against, or abstain. It is also possible that they cast no vote. 
When this is the case, the delegation in question either chose not to vote or was not 
present for the vote. It is not possible to know with certainty whether a delegation 
was present for voting on the resolution when they cast 110 vote, though in some 
instances circumstantial evidence suggests that the delegation deliberately chose not 
to vote. The strongest evidence for their deliberate choice not to vote occurs when
their votes were recorded on resolutions which came up either just before or after the 
resolution in question. At the least, this suggests that the delegation in question was 
present in the building, although this cannot be known with certainty.
The second set is trade data. Israel’s total exports to and imports from 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are used to help indicate the level of trade that existed 
during each year under examination. These figures are drawn from two publications 
of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics: the yearly Statistical Abstract o f  Israel and 
Foreign Trade Statistics Monthly. A breakdown of Israel’s total trade per month from 
May 1992 through December 2001 for each of the case studies is provided in 
appendix two of this thesis.
There are several points which should be noted regarding these data. Before 
May 1992, Israeli exports to and imports from the Newly Independent States (NIS) 
were aggregated by the Central Bureau of Statistics and recorded under the single 
entry of “Former Soviet Union.” From May 1992 onward, separate figures were 
recorded for trade with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Second, the Central Bureau of 
Statistics recorded data in the calendar year in which the goods were released by 
Israeli customs and then passed into the domestic Israeli market.2 The final point to 
note about these data is that the trade figures used in this thesis refer to direct, 
bilateral trade.
NOTES ON SOURCES: ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE
Examining Israeli national security doctrine and its foreign policy on the 
Central Asian republics is a complicated undertaking for two main reasons. The first
2 This author has found that this fact did not significantly affect the analysis or conclusions of this 
thesis.
reason is the lack of open source material that documents Israel’s national security 
policy.3 While the absence of public and official documents detailing the national 
security policy and strategic objectives of the Israeli government and military 
certainly complicates any analysis, it does not make it impossible. There are works 
by a variety of authors that illuminate Israel’s strategic thinking and national security 
doctrines.4 These studies have been written by Israelis as well as non-Israelis and 
generally fall into two broad categories: those written by individuals who have 
previously been involved in the formulation of national security policies, and 
analytical works authored by academics and policy observers.
W o r k s  W r it t e n  b y  F o r m e r  P r a c t it io n e r s
An important collection of works dealing with Israeli national security has 
been written by retired Israeli military commanders and governmental leaders who 
participated in the formulation and implementation of the state’s national security
3 Gal Luff who has examined Israel’s evolving and maturing security policies, has noted the absence of
such primary source material, writing that there “is no definitive document in the public domain 
stating Israel’s national security doctrine.” {AH Quiet on the Eastern Front? Israel’s National 
Security Doctrine After the Fall o f  Saddam [Washington, DC, March 2004], p. 2, n. 3.)
4 O f the many works available, some of the more useful documents include; Alon Ben-David, “Israel’s
Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (September 2004), pp. 24-28; Yoav 
Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic Doctrine (Santa Monica, 1981); Ed Blanche, 
“Israel Addresses the Threats of the New Millennium,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 
and March 1999 (parts one and two); Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. 
Bacevich, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington, DC, 1998); 
Michael Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest 
for Absolute Security,” in The Making o f  Strategyk Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson 
Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (New York, 1994), pp. 534-578; Dan Horowitz, 
“The Concept of National Security and the Prospect for Peace in the Middle East,” in Dynamics 
o f  a Conflict: Reexamination o f  the Arab Israeli Conflict, ed. Gabriel Scheffer (Atlantic 
Highlands, 1975); Efraim Inbar, “Contours of Israel’s New Strategic Thinking,” Political 
Science Quarterly (Spring 1996): pp. 41-64; Efraim Inbar, “Israel’s Strategic Environment in 
the 1990s,” Journal o f  Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (March 2002): pp. 21-38; Luft, All Quiet on 
the Eastern Front, Bard E. O’Neill, “The Defense Policy of Israel,” in The Defense Policies o f  
Nations, ed. Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (Baltimore, 1994), pp. 371-402; David 
Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview,” Middle East Review 
o f  International Affairs 5, no. 3 (September 2001): pp. 1-17; Alvin Rubinstein, “Israelis Ponder 
Their Long-Term Security,” Orbis 45, no. 2 (Spring 2001): pp. 259-280; Israel Tal, National 
Security: The Israeli Experience (Westport, CT, 2000); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence Without the 
Bomb: The Politics o f  Israeli Strategy> (Lexington, MA, 1987); and Avner Yaniv ed., National 
Security and Democracy in Israel (Boulder, Colorado, 1993).
policies. Examples of these authors include Benjamin Netanyahu, Ephraim Sneh, and 
Israel Tal, formerly the Prime Minister, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Assistant 
Minister of Defense respectively. Their works, written after they left their positions 
in the Israeli government, are of great use to the observer of Israeli national security 
policy because the authors are often able to convey the perspectives they had as 
participants but which can be contextualized now that they have gotten some distance 
on the events. Because they are written several years after the events, the reflections 
of the authors often take a more theoretical and abstract approach, providing the 
reader with a more nuanced understanding of these complex issues. In this regard, 
General Tal’s National Security: The Israeli Experience is especially useful.
A c a d e m ic  a n d  P o l ic y  S o u r c e s
The material written by former practitioners is augmented by assessments 
written by academics and policy observers, as well as by military and security 
analysts. There is a prolific body of work on the subject of Israeli strategy and 
national security doctrines by authors such as Efraim Inbar, Avner Yaniv, Amikam 
Nachmani, Aharon Klieman, Dan Horowitz, Bard O’Neill, and Michael Handel. The 
work of these authors, and others like them, is of particular use for several reasons. 
First, because these authors have not been personally involved in the formulation or 
implementation of state policies, their understandings and conclusions may not be as 
colored or influenced by personal and professional vestiture in the outcomes of the 
foreign and national security policy decision-making process as the practitioners’ 
might be. However, many of these authors have participated in the general national 
security debate within Israel. Second, some of these works have been written by 
authors whose thinking— for one reason or another— often closely reflects the
thinking of those in the Israeli government who were responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of foreign and national security policies. As a result, these works 
offer another insight into understanding the thinking of Israeli national security 
planners but from a slightly different viewpoint. Finally, because they are primarily 
academic authors, they attempt to provide us with an empirical analysis based upon 
observation of the formulation of national security policy.
O b je c t iv it y  a n d  N a t io n a l  S e c u r it y
It is important to note that authors within Israel who write on issues related to 
national security are often required to submit the material to government censors in 
order to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of information that could prove detrimental 
to Israeli national security. This requirement is most often enforced with media 
organizations and not as much with academic and policy analyses. O f course, some 
authors may in fact ‘self-censor’ their work. After a veiy close and thorough reading 
of the materials used in this thesis, this author has found no discrepancies in the 
critical analyses of the issues relating to Israeli national security that would question 
the legitimacy of their arguments. In fact, those works written by Israeli authors in 
Israel are at times more critical and discerning than those written from abroad—which 
demonstrates both the intensity and rigor of the debate that surrounds issues of 
national security and the extreme importance such issues are given within policy 
circles in Israel.
NOTES ON SOURCES: ISRAELI POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
While there are virtually no public and official documents that detail Israel’s 
national security policy, there are even fewer documents that detail Israeli foreign
policy regarding the Central Asian republics. However, information on Israel’s 
national security policy can be found in the large body of works written by former 
practitioners, insiders, and analysts. This is not the case for Israeli foreign policy in 
the Central Asian republics: to date, only a handful of authors have written about 
Israel and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. These include Robert 
Freedman, Biilent Aras, and Jacob Abadi. Other authors, including Philip Robins, 
Carol Saivetz, and Raphael Israeli,5 have touched on the role Israel has played, 
usually by examining the relationship between the Middle East and Central Asia 
within larger studies.
In the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Freedman wrote “Israel and 
Central Asia: A Preliminary Analysis.”6 In this short article, Freedman provides a 
cogent assessment of Israel’s relationship with Central Asia and highlights some 
initial trends. Although there are many strengths in this piece, it was based on only 
the first year of independence and many factors have since had an impact on Israel’s 
relationship with the Central Asian republics. Several of these factors had yet to be 
identified when Freedman published his article.
Biilent Aras has written two short works on the subject of Israeli-Central 
Asian relations. The first was a 1998 article in Middle East Policy entitled “Post-Cold 
War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia” in which he provides
n
a good introduction to the subject.' The second piece, appearing as a chapter entitled 
“Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia” in his 2002 book The New
3 Philip Robins, “The Middle East and Central Asia,” in The New Central Asia and its Neighbours, ed.
Peter Ferdinand (London, 1994). Carol R. Saivetz, “Central Asia: Emerging Relations with the
Arab States and Israel,” in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. 
Hafeez Malik (London, 1994). Raphael Israeli, “Return to the source: the republics of Central 
Asia and the Middle East,” Central Asia Suivey 13, no. 1 (1994): pp. 19-31.
6 Robert O. Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia: A Preliminary Analysis,” Central Asia Monitor, no. 2
(1993): pp. 16-20
7 Biilent Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia,” Middle East
Policy 5, no. 4 (January 1998): pp. 68-81.
Geopolitics o f  Eurasia and Turkey’s Position, is for the most part a repetition of his 
early work on the subject with some minor updates.8 Aras’ work highlights several 
issues that would play important roles in Israeli strategy policy towards the region; 
however, he does not go very deeply into an explanation of their origins.
The last author who has written specifically on the subject is Jacob Abadi. 
The chapter “Israel and the Great Game in Asia,” from his 2004 book Israel’s Quest 
fo r  Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy,9 is largely based 
on an earlier article Abadi published in the Journal o f Third World Studies.10 Abadi 
provides good insights into Israel’s relationships with the Central Asian republics. 
Whereas Freedman and Aras were writing about events as they happened, Abadi’s 
analysis was written several years later; the passage of time has been a benefit in his 
discussion of the issues surrounding the relationships between Israel and the 
republics. The result is a good overview of how Israeli policy towards the Central 
Asian republics was a component of its larger strategy in Asia.
The works by these three authors comprise the bulk o f the major academic 
writing on this subject prior to the completion of this thesis. To supplement this small 
body of literature, this author obtained primary source documents while conducting 
field research in the Central Asian republics. These documents, plus interviews 
conducted by the author throughout Central Asia and in Israel, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, offered critical insights into Israel’s relationship with 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The interviews collected data that were critical to the 
completion of this thesis. Many interviewees requested not to be identified because of 
their position, employer, or because they were not authorized to comment for
8 Billent Aras, The New Geopolitics o f  Eurasia and Turkey's Position (London, 2002).
9 Jacob Abadi, Israel’s Quest fo r  Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy
(London, 2004).
10 Jacob Abadi, “Israel’s Quest for Nonnalization with Azerbaijan and the Muslim States of Central
Asia,” Journal o f  Third World Studies 19, no. 2 (fall 2002): pp. 63-88.
attribution; I have honored those requests and have tided not to rely very heavily on 
such sources. Other analytical articles and policy assessments that appeared in a 
number of less frequently consulted publications and smaller circulation sources were 
also utilized. While this has posed challenges, it has not compromised the quality of 
the research or the analysis and conclusions presented in this study.
A large number of other sources were consulted, including foreign media 
translations
Due to the nature of the researching recent political history, this thesis has 
made significant use of contemporaneous media and analytical reporting. The sources 
for this research included period news and media reports, personal interviews with 
political actors, analysts, and observers, and primary source documents. Media 
reports and official statements serve an important function as this is frequently the 
means with which governments communicate their positions. Such communications 
and statements convey the direct messages and intentions that official players wish to 
be known, and these positions often form the bases of policy formulation. This tells 
us what the players in question want to convey to their multiple audiences. It is 
important to note that this differs from researching what actually took place during 
official meeting and closed-door exchanges. Such research will become available in 
the future when the actors involved either publish their memoirs or when archives 
receive their personal papers and files. At the time that this thesis was being 
researched, neither of those events had yet to come to pass, with only a few notable 
exceptions as highlighted in subsequent chapters.
The primary language employed in the research of this thesis was English. To 
accommodate the variety of languages used in the regions examined in this work, a 
number of methods were used. These included official foreign media translations
provided by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the British 
Broadcasting Corporation Summary o f  World Broadcasts (BBC SWB), BBC 
International Reports, BBC Monitoring, and the Open Source Center (OSC), and 
commercial operators and publications such as the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database 
(NIS NTD), East View Information Services, and Mideast Mirror. These services 
offered essential translations of contemporaneous print reports and radio and 
television broadcasts from Hebrew, Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Arabic sources. 
Official primary source documents written in several languages were translated into 
English. Some documents were provided directly to the author, while still more were 
obtained by others on my behalf. When this occurred, it was done because many 
documents I would have otherwise had no access to, and therefore asked others for 
their assistance in obtaining specifics materials. A number of interviews were 
conducted with individuals who preferred to speak only in Russian (and on several 
occasions other languages) in order to not misspeak, and on such occasions I was 
accompanied by a skilled translator.
Ch a p t e r  T w o : Isr a e l i N a t io n a l  Se c u r it y  Po l ic y :
C o r e  C o n c e pt s
Israeli national security policy is the culmination of over 50 years of Israeli 
interaction with its regional neighbors and the international community as well as an 
even deeper Jewish history predating the creation of the modern Jewish state. The 
state’s national security perceptions and its corresponding policies “have been 
determined primarily by the threats that its leaders have perceived from the 
international environment. The content of these threat perceptions, in turn, has been a 
product of historic, geographic, and demographic factors,” 11
This chapter seeks to establish a framework for understanding Israeli national 
security policy. This will be accomplished through a three-step process. In order to 
understand what is meant by national security in Israel, it is first essential to become 
familiar with some of the primary foreign policy concerns which occupy Israeli 
decision makers. This chapter will begin with a brief examination of three of Israel’s 
primary foreign policy concerns: security among its neighbors; international 
acceptance and recognition; and regional integration.
This very brief foreign policy overview will be followed by a concept 
arguably unique to the State of Israel, the notion of national security as national 
survival. This concept, an outgrowth of the collective experiences of Zionism, the
11 Bard E. O ’Neill, “The Defense Policy of Israel,” in The Defense Policies o f  Nations, ed. Douglas J.
Murray and Paul R. Viotti (Baltimore, 1994), p. 371.
Holocaust, the Diaspora, and the founding of the state, is essential to understanding 
the origins and strategic logic behind Israeli national security policy.
This chapter will conclude with an introduction to the tenets of Israeli national 
security policy. For the purposes of this study, I have identified six interrelated and 
complementary national security components, which, when taken together, will 
illuminate the discussions of Israel’s relationships with the republics of Central Asia 
in subsequent chapters. The six national security tenets I have identified are as 
follows: (1) situational permanency; (2) deterrence and power projection; (3) self- 
reliance; (4) great power associations; (5) emphasis on intelligence; and (6) strategic 
initiative.
It is the hope of this author that this chapter will lay the theoretical 
groundwork that will enable a clear and thorough analysis of Israel’s strategic 
interaction with the Muslim former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
* * * * *
Historically Israel is a country that has faced numerous ongoing serious and
severe threats to its national security. Because Israel was bom in war and has existed
in a state of continual preparation for conflict ever since, Israeli leaders have always
known that the state’s veiy survival is at stake. One observer has asserted when
writing on Israel’s national security doctrine that “no state in the post-Second World
War era has been more concerned with its national security than Israel— and it is not
1hard to fathom why.” Israel is a nation preoccupied with national security and 
defense, and Martin Sicker states in the opening sentence of his book Israel’s Quest
12 David Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview,” Middle East 
Review o f  International Affairs 5, no. 3 (September 2001): p. 71.
fo r  Security, “the dominant and most characteristic motif of Israeli political life is the 
perennial quest for security, in the most fundamental sense of the term.” 13 It has 
weathered at least half a dozen major conventional wars, and to date has never lost a 
conflict with any of its adversaries.14 It has been forced to deal with sustained 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaigns, often times combating militants 
supported by its hostile neighbors.
Many of the security dilemmas threatening Israeli security have historically 
come from the hostility and animosity of its Arab—primarily Muslim—neighbors, 
most of whom continue to refuse to recognize Israel’s very right to exist. Over the 
years, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority have recognized Israel’s 
right to exist and made separate peace deals with Israel; however, this has not resulted 
in the full peace and normalization leading to regional integration that has been the 
objective of the Israeli leadership. Furthermore, the other regional states’ refusal to 
recognize Israel has been exacerbated throughout the Arab and Muslim world by 
Israel’s occupation of Arab and Palestinian land. The 18-year occupation of southern 
Lebanon (which ended in May 2000) and the continued 38-year occupation of 
Palestinian territory15 have fueled terrorist and guerrilla actions. It is from within this 
threat environment that Israeli decision makers have crafted a policy with which to 
defend the national security of the Jewish state.
13 Martin Sicker, Israel’s Quest fo r  Security (London, 1989), p. 1.
14 The Israeli evacuation of southern Lebanon in May of 2000 led some Arab and Iranian observers to
believe that the Israelis had been forced to leave their self-described security zone in defeat. 
The “impression in the Arab world was of a Hezbollah—and, through it, an Iranian—victory”; 
however, this was despite the fact that “the IDF held the advantage in the field during the actual 
fighting.” See Ephraim Sneh, Navigating Perilous Waters (London, 2005), p. 62.
15 As of this writing, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is limited to portions of the West
Bank; the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally evacuated all military and 
Jewish settlements in Gaza in the autumn of 2005.
TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS
Aharon Klieman notes in Israel & the World After 40 Years, his study of the 
status of Israel’s relations with the international community, that no nation possesses 
only one single national interest. Israel is clearly no exception to this observation; 
however, according to Klieman, Israel is noteworthy in that “Israel’s definition of its 
national interest is distinctive on at least two counts.” The first of these distinctions is 
that, in his assessment, “Israeli foreign relations are dictated by no less than seven 
vital ‘issue areas’ or clusters of primary objectives. In existence since the 1948 
declaration of the state, these core diplomatic aims are legitimacy, peace, security, 
developing commerce, constructive engagement in international projects, and finally, 
links with world Jewry.” The last of Klieman’s primary objectives also doubles as his 
second distinction of Israeli foreign policy concerns. As the world’s first and only 
Jewish state, Israel has an unbreakable connection to the Jewish Diaspora and the 
legacy of Jewish history. The importance of this link will be discussed in greater 
depth later in this chapter. 16
Klieman’s decision to position legitimacy before either peace or security is 
not a reflection of the relative weight legitimacy holds over that of either peace or 
security. Rather, it is merely recognition that international legitimacy, a fundamental 
attribute historically denied to Israel since the state’s creation in 1948, is still absent. 
International recognition has typically been a formality for other nations since the end 
of the Second World War; however, in the case of Israel it has served as a barometer 
of world opinion. Nations have often withdrawn their recognition in response to 
developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The most notable examples of this were the 
mass loss of recognition among Soviet-bloc nations— except Romania—following the
16 Aharon Klieman, Israel & the World After 40 Years (London, 1990), p. 5.
1967 war and the widespread suspension of relations by sub-Saharan African nations 
in the aftermath of the 1973 war.17
The belief that security could lead to regional integration and acceptance has 
long been the driving foreign policy goal of Israeli leaders. This was interpreted to be 
the most assured course of action to achieve lasting peace and stability. In 1975 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin encapsulated Israel’s desire quite succinctly when he 
stated
“Israel’s position is [that] we want peace, a real one.
We want boundaries of peace that will make Israel 
capable of defending itself by itself. We do not want a 
peace agreement that ends up as peace on a piece of 
paper. We want peace based on the realities of relations 
between the peoples of all the countries involved in the 
area.” 18
F o r e ig n  P o l ic y  a n d  N a t io n a l  S e c u r it y
Israel of course possesses many foreign policy objectives, and many
eventually return to national security. Such realpolitik can be found in nearly every
national system, and Israel is far from unique in this matter. However, what
differentiates Israel from other nations’ foreign policy is the primacy of national
security within the perceptive framework through which all other decisions are made
in Israeli foreign policy. In seeking to explain the reasons for this primacy, one
author stated the following:
One might say that the concern over physical security is 
a national obsession in Israel and from an Israeli 
perspective, with good reason. Israel came into 
existence less than three years after the end of World
17 Klieman, Israel & the World, p. 10. Russia first cut diplomatic relations with Israel in “February
1953—following a bomb blast in the compound of its Tel Aviv embassy,” see Michael Brecher, 
Israel, the Korean War and China: Images, Decisions and Consequences (Jerusalem, 1974), p. 
26.
18 Bernard Reich, “Israeli National Security Policy: Issues and Actors,” in Israeli National Security
Policy: Political Actors and Perspectives, ed. Bernard Reich and Gershon R. Kieval (London, 
1988), p. 8, quoting Yitzhak Rabin, interview, US News & World Report, 23 June 1975, p. 30.
War II and its accompanying Holocaust that slaughtered 
almost the entirety of European Jewry, some six million 
men, women, and children. Shortly after the Jewish 
state was established, in addition to the survivors of the 
Holocaust who came to Israel, there was an influx of 
more than a million Jews from the Islamic world, 
primarily the Arab countries, where they had lived in a 
subjected and insecure status for more than a 
millennium. Accordingly, it is the rare family in Israel 
that has not suffered from the horrors of slaughter and 
persecution within recent memory.19
For the puiposes of this study, the discussion of Israel’s foreign policy 
concerns will be limited to only those directly relating to national security; a full and 
complete analysis of Israel’s myriad foreign policy concerns and objectives is much 
beyond the scope of this present work. Three Israeli foreign policy objectives are 
discussed below: the goal of security among its neighbors; international acceptance 
and recognition; and regional integration. These three policies comprise the primary 
issues Israel’s founders perceived as the major objectives to the achievement of 
Israel’s place in the world. According to Tal, “the founders knew that the long 
process of the Return to Zion would come about in three stages: a war to defend the 
Zionist enterprise, including its physical and national existence; the establishment of 
peace; and finally, establishment and integration in the region, while preserving its 
uniqueness as the state of the Jewish People, with the goal of becoming an exemplary 
state.”20
S e c u r it y  A m o n g  It s  N e ig h b o r s
Of these foreign policy objectives, there is no single greater Israeli concern 
than acquiring the permanence and security of the state. In the absence of security,
according to Israeli leaders, there can be neither legitimacy nor peace. Simply put,
19 Sicker, Israel's Quest fo r  Security, p. 1.
20 Israel Tal, National Security: The Israeli Experience, trans. by Martin Kett (London, 2000), p. 41.
“Peace is greatly desired, but security is more important; any peace settlement that
9 1would compromise or undermine Israel’s security is unacceptable.” Security with 
its Arab neighbors has always come to be understood in Israel as a precondition for 
acceptance, recognition, and integration into the region.
As a besieged nation, or “garrison state,” one of the central tenets of Israeli 
national security policy has been deterrence and power projection (see below). When 
the Arab states cease trying to destroy the state and stop their attempts to reverse the 
events of 1948, Israeli national security thinking posits that eventually those 
belligerent Arab states will extend to Israel international recognition and regional 
acceptance. Heller argues that “security policy could serve the political objective of 
peace only in the sense that entrenched Israeli military superiority could deter Arab 
adversaries from initiating war and, if deterrence prevailed long enough, compel them 
eventually to despair of war as an option.”22 He continues by quoting Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin speaking “45 years after the War of Independence, ‘the longer Israel is 
successful in deterring an Arab leader or coalition from being tempted to initiate a 
war, the better become the longer-term prospects for peace.’”23
The State of Israel was created only to be attacked the very next day by the 
armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and by a force of Palestinian 
irregulars. After refusing to accept the United Nations Partition Plan and refusing to 
recognize the Jewish State, all of its Arab contiguous neighbors plus Iraq launched a 
preemptive war to expunge the newly created state. After their unsuccessful bid to 
defeat the nascent state, the Arab states did not make peace with Israel despite their 
military failure, and what came next was a cessation of open hostilities— as a result,
21 Michael Handel, Israel’s Political-Militaiy Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), p. 64.
22 Mark A. Heller, Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy (London, 2000), p. 12.
23 Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 12, citing Yitzhak Rabin, “Deterrence in an Israeli Security
Context,” in Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge, JCSS Study 
2, ed. Aharon Klieman and Ariel Levite (Tel Aviv, 1993), p. 9.
Israel exists in “a perpetual state of ‘dormant war’.”24 It would be more than 30 years 
until the first of the belligerent states, Egypt, sued for peace with Israel. In the case of 
Egypt, what Israel received in exchange for recognition and acceptance was not the 
full-relations foreign policy and national security which Israeli leaders had wanted, 
but rather a very cold peace. This was clearly not what Israeli leaders such as Rabin 
had in mind.
In t e r n a t io n a l  A c c e p t a n c e  a n d  R e c o g n it io n
The drive to finally secure international recognition has been a continual 
ambition of Israel and Israeli leaders ever since the creation of the state. In one sense, 
Israel has repeatedly been denied the almost de facto status which every other post­
colonial state created after the Second World War was afforded. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Israeli leaders have had to deal with the withdrawal 
of recognition from a variety of nations in response to developments in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. As mentioned, Soviet-bloc countries and nations in sub-Saharan 
Africa have at certain points in time withdrawn their recognition in order to express 
their displeasure with Israeli policies25— this development was especially difficult for 
Israeli foreign policy officials. Following the 1967 war, “Israel’s diplomatic 
relationships have declined... especially as a result of the substantial ruptures with the 
African states at the time of the 1973 war.”26
Achieving a lasting peace settlement has been viewed by Israeli national 
security planners as a prerequisite to acceptance, recognition, and integration. 
Recognition is a precursor to integration; once Israel was no longer ostracized both in
24 Dan Horowitz, “The Concept o f National Security,” in National Security and Democracy in Israel,
ed. Anver Yaniv (London, 1993), p. 11.
25 The renunciation of recognition on the part of African nations was also the result of intensive Arab
diplomacy to force oilier nations to declare their allegiance over the Arab-Israeli conflict.
26 Reich, “Israeli National Security Policy,” p. 2.
the international community and within the Middle East, it was believed, regional 
integration would follow. This position was validated after the signing of the Oslo 
Accords. The number of countries which extended recognition to Israel rose to an all- 
time high. Following Oslo, the number of nations officially recognizing Israel and 
engaging in official relations increased by 29 countries, including Turkmenistan.27 
By 25 July 1995, nearly two years after Oslo, over 155 countries had diplomatic 
relations with Israel, including all the Central Asian states.28
R e g io n a l  In t e g r a t io n
In many respects, the permanency to which Israeli leaders aspire is an 
outgrowth of international recognition and security. Regional integration would come 
from security for the State of Israel and international recognition and acceptance of its 
legitimacy. As mentioned previously, the peace that Israel desires would be one that 
would allow for full trade and relations between peoples. It would entail cultural, 
commercial, and educational exchanges. As Prime Minister Rabin stated over 30 
years ago, Israel did not want simply a cessation of hostilities for the primary reason 
that that alone would not secure permanency for the Jewish state. True and durable 
security would only come about after full acceptance, recognition, and integration of 
Israel and the Jewish people within the larger Middle East.
This as yet unattained goal remains the primary objective for a significant 
number of Israeli leaders within the national security establishment. Throughout 
Israeli history, a variety of policies have been attempted in order to advance this goal, 
from engagement with the countries of the periphery to unilateral disengagement. As 
shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, Israel’s interaction with the Central
27 Gad Yaacobi, Breakthrough: Israel in a Changing World (London, 1996), Appendix G, pp. 215-218.
28 Gad, Breakthrough, Appendix G, pp. 215-218.
Asian republics during the time first decade of independence continues this general 
policy trend in a successful maimer.
THE CREATION OF NATIONAL POLICIES
When considering the creation and implementation of national strategies or 
foreign policies, it is important to note that such initiatives do not precede 
international crises or geopolitical developments. This truism is even more relevant 
when the development in question—such as the collapse of Soviet centralized control 
and the emergence of an independent Central Asia—is unforeseen, as shall be detailed 
in greater depth in subsequent chapters.
Nations create policies as a reaction to developments, which is considerably 
different from contingency planning. In the Israeli case, such an example of 
contingency planning can be seen in the failure of the 2000 Camp David negotiations 
with the Palestinian Authority. Even before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah in 
September 2000, Israeli national security planners, the IDF General Staff, and military 
intelligence (Aman) prepared for a “renewed round of violence”29 in the Palestinian 
territories. At the time “IDF Chief of Staff Lt General Shaul Mofaz warned... that the 
army would not hesitate to use force”30 to defend against Palestinian threats to Jewish 
settlements. As a result, the IDF deployed four battalion-sized “anti-guerrilla/anti­
terrorist units to endangered locations.”31 In this case, the military, as the ultimate 
guarantor of Israeli national security and national survival, was able to read events as 
they were occurring and take immediate action to defend the state.
29 David Eshel, “Looking into the Future... What are Israel’s Options?” Ja n e’s Defence Weekly, 16
August 2000, http://www.janes.com.
30 Eshel, “Looking into the Future,” http://www.janes.com.
31 Eshel, “Looking into the Future,” http://www.janes.com.
NATIONAL SECURITY AS NATIONAL SURVIVAL
In Israel “the matter of security is perceived as a fundamental requirement of 
Israel’s very existence, and it has been the main national consideration ever since the 
War of Independence.”32 Israeli policy makers have tended to view issues relating to 
national security as questions of national survival and thus as a zero-sum game in 
which the State of Israel either wins, or it loses. As losing in this sense means the 
destruction of the State, Israel must never lose: “The clear knowledge that Israel 
would not get a ‘second chance,’ that if it is defeated once it will not rise again, has 
added force, as if o f a divine injunction, to the perceived obligation of Israeli society 
to devote itself to the range of security-related issues.”33 The formation of its 
relationship with Central Asia was no different. Current thinking at the collapse of 
the Soviet Union held that developing positive relations with the new republics was 
paramount to the survival of the state. Then Army Chief of Staff General Ehud Barak 
stated that the “new Muslim republics in Asia don’t seem... something that will add 
to our health, at least in the long term.”34
General Israel Tal, former Assistant Minister of Defense and accomplished 
armored division commander, asserts in his book National Security: The Israeli 
Experience that in Israel “the concept of security deals with existence.”35 He wrote, 
“Israel’s security doctrine is its basic and permanent plan for preparedness, 
deployment, and war in the defense of the national existence of the State of Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people.”36 In his July 1973 groundbreaking study of the 
subject, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Harvard’s Michael Handel writes that
32 Tal, National Security, p. 40.
33 Tal, National Security, p. 40.
34 Daniel Pipes, “The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East,” in
Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgy>zstan, and 
Turkmenistan, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York, 1994), p. 48.
35 Tal, National Security, p. 44.
36 Tal, National Security, p. 42.
security of the state is the primary and overarching concern in Israeli political military 
doctrine: “The basic assumption underlying the Israeli political military doctrine is the 
understanding that the central aim o f  Arab countries is to destroy the State o f Israel 
whenever they fee l able to do so, while doing everything to harass and disturb its
3 7 * *peaceful life.” While this understanding reflects the time in which it was written, 
but it is not entirely inappropriate today, it very aptly states the perception of Israeli 
planners.
In 1973, Israel faced hostile Arab neighbors which had fought four wars 
against the nascent state as well as hosting a variety of militant Palestinian guerrilla 
and terrorist organizations. As Handel was writing in the summer of 1973, his 
assertion that the central tenet of Israeli security doctrine that hostile neighbors would 
strike when they could was validated three months later when Egypt and Syria 
launched the October War, catching Israel completely by surprise.
What follows below is a discussion of four components which have had an 
impact on both the creation and implementation of Israeli national security policy. 
These four factors are the links with Zionism; the impact of the Holocaust; the role of 
the Diaspora; and the notion of Israel as the Jewish sanctuary. In order to understand 
how and why the concept of national security is so deeply interrelated with the notion 
of national survival, it is essential to acknowledge the lasting impression these four 
factors have had on Israeli decision making.
T h e  L in k s  w it h  Z io n is m
It is crucial to note that the conceptual notion of Israeli security is inextricably 
tied to that of Zionism. Tal links the premise of national security as national survival
37 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, p. 64 [emphasis in original].
with the ideological underpinnings of Zionism. According to Tal, “The Zionist idea, 
which engendered the state of the Jews, posited that this state must be a sovereign 
shelter and fortress for the entire Jewish people, a center of moral and physical 
strength under obligation to protect them, directly and indirectly, wherever they may 
be.”38 This critical interconnection is crucial for understanding the relationship 
between Israel and the Central Asian republics, especially those with Jewish Diaspora 
communities. This facet of the relationship will be explored in the relevant chapters 
that follow.
We can understand that national security policy in Israel is conceptualized and 
perceived not just as national survival for the State of Israel, but rather as the survival 
of the Jewish people. As a result, through this fundamental principle the notion of 
national security in Israel does not simply mean the safety and resilience of the 
territory and state institutions of the State of Israel; national security— in the Israeli 
understanding of the term— is the safety and surety of the Israeli state and the Jewish 
nation. Bard O’Neill summarized Dan Horovitz aptly when he wrote:
The centrality of security... was an outgrowth of an 
essentially pessimistic view of the international 
environment held by Israeli personalities of various 
ideological and political persuasions. Such pessimism 
was rooted in the conception that survival involved not 
just the safeguarding of the state but the physical 
existence of all the Jews in Israel as well. This 
conception, in turn, derived from the unhappy historical 
experiences of the Jews.39
38 Tal, National Security, p. 40.
39 O’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 374, summarizing Dan Horovitz, “Is Israel a Garrison Stale?”
Jerusalem Quarterly (summer 1977): p. 69.
The Impact o f  the Holocaust
The single greatest of the ‘unhappy historical experiences of the Jews’ referred 
to in the passage cited above is Nazi Germany’s genocide of Europe’s Jews during the 
Second World War. The systematic murder of over six million Jews has made it 
impossible to consider the origins of Israeli concepts of national security without 
discussion of the impact of the Holocaust. The abiding trauma of the Holocaust on 
Jewish and Israeli collective memory cannot be emphasized enough. This horrific 
episode in Jewish history has cast an enduring imprint on the security perceptions of 
all Israelis and Jews alike. As Martin Sicker crucially notes, “[I]t is the rare family in 
Israel that has not suffered from the horrors of slaughter and persecution within recent 
memory.”40 Israeli leaders have not been spared this impact and their understandings 
of the national security of the Jewish people have been reflected in their decision­
making processes since the creation of the state in 1948.41 When compounded with 
their responsibility for guiding the Israeli nation through the process of the 
establishment of a new country as it comes to terms with the trauma of the 
industrialized genocide while surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on pushing Israel 
into the sea, led to a further calcification in the threat perceptions of Israel’s national 
security planners. “The fact that the State of Israel has a significance for the future of 
the Jewish people, beyond that of the citizens of Israel itself, places an extraordinary 
burden of historical responsibility on Israel’s leaders, a responsibility for Jewish 
security that is rarely understood and appreciated by non-Jews.”42
According to Bard O ’Neill, “[T]wo aspects of the Holocaust left a lasting 
impression on those who would be charged with the responsibility for formulating
40 Sicker, Israel’s Quest fo r  Security, p. 1.
41 O’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 378.
42 Sicker, Israel's Quest fo r  Security, p. 1.
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national security policy for Israel.” The first of these aspects O ’Neill cites is the 
“basic question of survival.” The experience of the Holocaust and Nazi Germany’s 
attempt to exterminate the Jewish people led Israeli leaders to interpret that “security 
had come to mean the very existence of a people.” No other people in history had 
been subjected to such systematic and industrialized mass murder such as that which 
occurred during the Holocaust. In this sense, Jewish and Israeli leaders came to find 
the security of the Jewish nation was inseparable from the survival of the Jewish 
people. Within living memory of many of the people who emerged as leaders of 
Israel and its national security apparatuses, the veiy existence of the Jewish people 
had been nearly extinguished. 43
This link with the survival of the Jewish people naturally leads O’Neill to his 
second connection between Israeli national security thinking and the Holocaust, 
which is the fact that the security and survival of the Jewish people cannot be 
guaranteed by any outside powers. The Jewish people alone are the only ones who 
will act every time to defend the state against all outside threats, or as Israel’s first 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion famously said, “What matters is not what the 
Gentiles say, but what the Jews do.”44
In practice, this means that Israel cannot and will not depend upon any outside 
nation to come to its defense. The stakes are too high—the very existence of a people 
who have historically been persecuted and nearly exterminated— for such a serious 
matter to be handled by anyone other than by the Jewish people themselves. The 
Holocaust demonstrated in the starkest terms possible that no other nation would act 
to stop or prevent the annihilation of the Jewish people. As O ’Neill wrote, “[T]he
43 O’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 373.
Jacob Abadi, Israel's Quest fo r  Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy 
(London, 2004), p. xi.
experience of the Holocaust led to the further conclusion that physical security was 
too important to be left to others, since, even in moments of extreme peril, 
sympathetic friends may be indecisive.”45 This Israeli perception of how the world 
would act would be confirmed in the years to come. One example was the failure of 
friendly states to sell Israel the proper aims it needed to defend itself when the state 
was first created. The belief that only Israel can and will act as its security guarantor 
was reinforced when American President Richard Nixon withheld military assistance 
to Israel during the 1973 war when Israel felt it was most at risk of failing to counter 
the combined Arab assault.
There exists debate over what exactly transpired during the 1973 war with 
respect to “whether or not the United States deliberately held up supplies.” However, 
that debate notwithstanding, there was most definitely a perception in Israel that 
correlated to “anxious moments when the first few days of fighting drastically 
reduced... [Israeli aims] inventories.” European refusal to allow the transshipment of 
munitions and materiel during the 1973 war and Japan’s endorsement of “the Arab 
demand that the occupied territories be returned” further strengthened the firmly held 
belief among Israeli national security planners that only Israel would act to defend 
itself. This notion will be further developed later in this chapter. 46
T h e  R o l e  o f  t h e  D ia s p o r a
Prior to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Jewish people had lived 
in exile, dispersed throughout the world. This fact deeply affected the underlying 
concepts of national security in Israel for several reasons. First, it underscored the
45 O ’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 373.
46 O ’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 381-382.
urgency with which the Jewish people must act to guarantee their own security. 
History had demonstrated that no other power would act to protect world Jewry. 
Second, it reinforced the desire to achieve a lasting settlement and home for the 
Jewish people. The trauma of exile and the Holocaust calcified the exigency of the 
situation. This is reflected in the deep responsibility that Israeli leaders have taken to 
guarantee the security and safety of the state. Third, the Diaspora has had an impact 
on the State of Israel’s national security policies through the enshrinement of self- 
reliance.
Finally, the experiences of the Diaspora47 have solidified the “deep-rooted... 
feelings of communal solidarity based on the fundamental distinction between Jews 
and non-Jews, and the abiding distrust of foreigners and outsiders.” Heller has argued 
that “Israeli policy makers were influenced by the habits of thought and action 
instilled by centuries of Jewish communal life in the Diaspora.” In addition, Heller 
asserts that “Israel’s condition of isolation was seen as a continuation of the 
traditional Jewish condition of isolation and vulnerability in a hostile environment.” 
Some have expressed the opinion that this has led to the strong national security tenets 
which are detailed below. However, “whatever the objective reality of Israel’s 
condition,” it can be argued that the experiences of the Diaspora have had an impact 
on the Israeli perception of their environment as hostile and unforgiving.48
47 For more on the role of the Diaspora in bolstering Israeli policy in Central Asia, see Andrey 
Vasilyevich Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel: Ways of Economic Rapprochement,” 
http://www.transcaspian.ni/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html (accessed 22 June 2001; site 
discontinued) and Avi Machlis, “Azerbaijan courts Jews, Israel to win favor with U.S.,” Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, 1 February 2000.
4S Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 13.
The Only Permanent Ally
Ultimately, the Jewish Diaspora is the only permanent ally of the State of 
Israel.49 Israel has been supported unconditionally through continued immigration of 
Jews from around the world and financial support of Jews from abroad. Following 
the substantial Soviet arms deal to Egypt in 1955, Israeli national security and military 
leaders took dramatic steps to adjust the imbalance of amis in the region. O ’Neill 
states that “contributions from Jews outside Israel helped to defray the costs”50 of 
meeting this new challenge. In seeking to reach parity, Israel also depended on 
German reparations, American loans, and significant international debt. This 
assessment of the Diaspora as the only permanent ally of the Jewish state in part can 
be understood as a result of that condition of isolation discussed above and the notion 
of self-reliance reinforced during exile that no other power would act to defend the 
Jewish people.
I s r a e l  A s  t h e  J e w is h  Sa n c t u a r y
The factors discussed previously in this section—the links with Zionism, the 
impact of the Holocaust, and the role of the Diaspora—have all contributed to the 
formation of the concept of Israel as a sanctuary for the Jewish people. It is the only 
place in the world dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of world Jewry. 
History has proven time and again that no other actor or state will always act in the 
interests of the Jewish people. It is only Israel, the world’s first and only Jewish state, 
which will always act to safeguard the Jewish people, anywhere in the world.
As a result of these unique factors, the sense of permanence and drive to 
establish regional integration and lasting peace are paramount. All of these stem from
49 Tal, National Security, p. 40.
50 O’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 378.
ensuring the security of the state and the Jewish people. This can only be achieved
through eternal vigilance, continued preparedness to fight to defend the state, and an 
unceasing advancement of national interests.
As components of a national ethos, these factors comprise not only a world­
view held by many Israelis, but also double as part of a sense of Israeli nationalism. 
In expressing his opinion on nationalism, former Deputy Minister of Defense Ephraim 
Sneh wrote about the importance of
[U]nderstanding of the lessons of Jewish history and of
the catastrophes and straggles that led to the founding
of the Jewish state. The Jewish people’s suffering while
scattered over the face of the earth, the terrible
culmination of which was the Holocaust, obliges us to
be strong in our own land. A deep knowledge of the
high price we have paid for establishing and
maintaining the state... will make clear... just how ^1irreplaceable this land is to us.
Sneh goes on to emphasize the importance of “national tradition”52 and belonging, 
and it very succinctly describes the ineffable tie Israelis feel to their country.
THE PERIPHERY POLICY
Since its creation in 1948, one of Israel’s primary goals has been to guarantee 
its survival through the achievement of legitimacy in the eyes of its detractors. Israel 
has pursued a variety of strategies in order to accomplish this goal, most notably its 
famed Periphery Policy53 and the advancement of the Middle East Peace Process. 
Both of these policies have held that normalizing relations with potential adversaries 
is essential to survival of the state.
51 Sneh, Navigating Perilous Waters, pp. 111-112.
52 Sneh, Navigating Perilous Waters, p. 112.
53 For an excellent overview of Israel’s Periphery Policy, see chapter three, “The Periphery Policy:
1958-1967,” in Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1998 
(London, 1989).
In its Periphery Policy, Israel sought to create close relations with those non-
Arab states at the ‘peripheries’ of the Middle East “that, as David Ben-Gurion put it,
lay beyond the ‘Arab fence.’”54 Most notably, these states included pre-
Revolutionary Iran and secular Turkey. By anchoring itself to these strong states
which also viewed the Arab world with some suspicion, Israel attempted to protect
itself by aligning with similarly minded nations. As a secret US Central Intelligence
Agency report explained, “the Israelis have over the years made efforts to break the
Arab ring encircling Israel by involvement with non-Arab Moslem nations in the Near
East.”55 For some Israeli leaders, this relatively short-lived policy provided an
important benefit which they saw as being of help in gaining recognition for their
state, or further
The underlying rationale for the periphery policy was 
Israel’s understanding that it could not achieve security 
through a military victory by eliminating millions of 
Arabs in the Middle East. Israel’s response, therefore, 
to its pressing security concern was to formulate a 
policy that would drive a wedge among its enemies by 
forging alliances with non-Arab nations.56
That is, the shifting of the focus of the Middle East from being simply Arab, 
but to also include Persian, Turkish, Berber, and Israeli. The founder of the Periphery 
Policy, Reuven Shiloah, argued that the “Middle East is not an exclusively Arab area; 
011 the contrary, the majority of its inhabitants [at the time] are not Arabs. The Turks, 
the Persians, and the Jews—without taking into account the Kurds and other non- 
Arab minorities in the Arab states— are more numerous than the Arabs in the Middle
54 Philip Robins, “The Middle East and Central Asia,” in The New Central Asia and Its Neighbours, ed.
Peter Ferdinand (London, 1994), p. 66.
55 Sobhani, Pragmatic Entente, p. 33.
56 Sobhani, Pragmatic Entente, p. 34.
East.”57 The logic held that if the focus was removed from the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
more nations would seek to establish relations with Israel.
Recently, the Periphery Policy has focused on containing the perceived threat 
from Iran.58 According to a senior Israeli government official, Israel has sought to 
build connections with the neighbors of Iran—its main enemy.59 Despite these 
attempts, there is a recognition that even such behavior cannot moderate Iranian 
behavior;60 however, it may contain Iranian actions.
THE TENETS OF ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Israeli national security policy can be subdivided into six separate yet 
interdependent components. These interrelated components reflect different aspects 
of the singularity of Israeli national security policy from doctrinal and strategic 
concepts to tactical and operational necessities. These components, when taken in 
sum, can assist in our understanding of the multifaceted and complex issues related to 
Israeli security. It is hoped that these tenets which I have identified below will serve 
as a lens through which Israeli interaction with the titular peoples of former Soviet 
states of Muslim Central Asia can be better understood; this analysis will be detailed 
in subsequent chapters. The use of these tools is intended to illuminate the rationale 
as well as the strategic and tactical thinking work behind Israel’s engagement with 
Central Asia during the ten-year period following the demise of the Soviet Union.
As has been demonstrated above, Israeli national security policy is a product 
and reflection of many concerns and factors unique to the Israeli case. Israeli and
57 Michael Brecher, Foreign Policy System o f  Israel, (New Haven, 1972) p. 174, cited in Sobhani,
Pragmatic Entente, p. 33.
58 Ephraim Sneh, MD (Member of Knesset), in a telephone interview with the author, 4 November
2005, Tel Aviv, Israel.
59 Sneh, telephone interview.
60 Sneh, telephone interview.
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Jewish history and geo-strategic realities have had an impact on Israeli understandings 
of their security requirements and the corresponding doctrines with regard to both 
Israel’s immediate regional neighbors as well as the larger international community. 
Israel’s geo-strategic limitations, such as its small size, hostile neighbors, 
topographically indefensible borders, lack of strategic depth, absence of formal 
alliances, and relatively small population, can be— and often are— addressed through 
the implementation of these national security tenets. The security tenets which follow 
are not specific to Israeli concerns in Central Asia; however, they are particularly 
relevant with respect to the case of the former Soviet Muslim republics. They are 
indicative of Israel’s security and threat perceptions for its region, the Greater Middle 
East, and the international arena.
For the pmposes of this thesis I have identified six national security tenets as 
follows: (1) situational permanence; (2) deterrence and power projection; (3) self- 
reliance; (4) great power associations; (5) emphasis on intelligence; and (6) strategic 
initiative. None of these tenets is granted any more emphasis than any other. They 
are parts of a whole and are best understood as complementary components which 
together serve as force multipliers to maximize the national security of Israel.
T h e  E v o l v in g  N a t u r e  o f  Is r a e l i N a t io n a l  S e c u r it y  P o l ic y
The second factor affecting the analysis of Israeli national security policy is 
the fact that it is a constantly evolving policy. The national security threats that 
confront Israel have changed since the creation of the state, and over time, as those 
threats change, so too have the policies and doctrines that the state employs to meet 
and overcome those challenges. This corresponding ebb and flow of threat 
perceptions and the attempts to rise to the challenges posed by those threats are very
aptly assessed in Mark Heller’s Adelphi Paper Continuity and Change in Israeli 
Security Policy.61 Some security threats (such as strategic geography and the
population disparity) have remained consistent concerns, while others (such as 
demographic increases and access to scarce resources such as water) have increased in 
importance. Israel is a small state, and Arab neighbors enjoy a population growth rate 
that Israel can never hope to match. Even the influx of Soviet and Eastern European 
Jews that have made Aliyah could never match the explosive growth rates witnessed 
in Egypt, Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.
When discussing Israeli national security, it is important to note that the types 
of conflicts Israel is likely to face in future is changing. The likelihood of large-scale 
conventional military conflicts has been reduced as Israel has secured peace 
agreements with its Arab neighbors. As of this writing, since Operation Iraqi 
Freedom has for the time being removed the threat of an Iraqi military attack, only 
Syria poses an immediate conventional threat to Israel,62 but this threat is unlikely to 
develop under the current leadership of President Bashar al- Assad.
The military-security threats facing Israel can be broken down into several 
different yet often overlapping forms. In an article in the Middle East Review o f  
International Affairs, a defense analyst observed four primary Israeli national security 
dilemmas: conventional wars, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, insurrection, and border 
skirmishes. Threats to the national security of Israel have included at least six major 
conventional wars, including the 1948 War of Independence; the 1956 Suez 
Campaign; the 1967 Six Day War; the 1969-1970 War of Attrition; the 1973 October 
War; and 1982’s Operation Peace for Galilee, which saw the IDF invade and occupy
61 See Heller, Continuity and Change. Heller charts the changes in external threats to Israel and
Israel’s responses to those changes in his study of this phenomenon.
62 For more on this development, see Gal Lufl, All Quiet on the Eastern Front? Israel’s National
Security Doctrine After the Fall o f  Saddam (Washington, DC, March 2004).
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Lebanese territory. Threats at “low end of the unconventional spectrum,” (such as 
terrorism) as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are 
increasingly posing existential threats to Israel’s national security.63 
E v o l v in g  T h r e a t  O r ig in s
The national security policy of Israel has evolved over decades since the 
founding of the state in 1948. In order to meet “acute challenges to its national 
security,”64 Israel has adapted to shifting threat origins and types. An example of the 
changing threats facing Israeli national security planners can be seen in the types of 
external military threats with which they have had to contend.
At the time of independence in 1948 and until the emergence of the 
proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD technology in the 1980s, Israel faced 
primarily a conventional military confrontation with its contiguous Arab neighbors.65 
Advanced delivery systems and the potentially devastating effects of a WMD attack 
on Israel dramatically altered Israeli threat perceptions: “Israel, because of its small 
size and highly concentrated population and industry, is especially vulnerable to 
WMD threats.”66 Since the 1980s, the threat no longer comes from quantitatively 
superior conventional Arab armies but from the increasingly inexpensive proliferation 
in advanced delivery weapons systems and WMD technologies from other than 
contiguous Arab neighbors.67 Despite the shift in the origin and method of the threat, 
the danger posed remains the same: an existential threat to the State of Israel. The 
rise of WMD threats marked a significant change in Israeli national security
63 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p.71.
64 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p.71.
65 Although Iraq has participated in several Arab-Israeli wars, it never had a significant impact on the
outcome of those wars. A key aspect o f Israeli military doctrine has always been to “terminate 
any military confrontation as quickly and decisively as possible” with the belief “that the longer 
active combat continued, the more political pressure would build on other Arab countries to join 
the battle.” See Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 13.
66 Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 31.
67 For more on this topic, see Efraim Inbar, “Israel’s Strategic Environment in the 1990s,” The Journal
o f  Strategic Studies 25, no. I (March 2002): p. 29 and p. 34.
perceptions and doctrine, one which in fact continues to be debated and is still 
evolving in Israel. This is just one example of how threats to Israeli national security 
have changed.68
From Strategic Shift to Tactical Implementation
A tangible example of how threat alterations have affected Israeli national 
security practices can readily be seen in the evolution of counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency tactics used by the Israeli military in confronting new military 
conditions.69 As old threats recede in likelihood and new threats emerge, the IDF has 
modified its operational procedures.
Israeli tactical combat has changed in order to deal with modern contemporary 
threats. This can be seen in the ways in which the IDF fights an asymmetrical conflict 
with Palestinian militants. Because the IDF now sees its land combatant role as 
fighting in urban and built-up areas, it has modified its tactics. This process began in 
the late 1990s, and as Brigadier General Aviv Kohavi stated to Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, “When the fighting started [during the al-Aqsa Intifadah] we realized there 
were no relevant doctrine or techniques for fighting low-intensity conflict combat in 
populated urban areas. With the situation in constant flux, on a daily basis we were 
required to develop solutions to unique situations.” One such example was a 
technique Kohavi employed to keep his soldiers off the streets during the first Israeli
68 For more information, there are numerous sources to consult. Some recommended places to start
include: Heller, Continuity and Change; Inbar, “Israel’s Strategic Environment,” pp. 21-38; 
Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” pp. 71-86; Sneh, Navigating Perilous Waters; 
and O ’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” pp. 371-402.
69 Alon Ben-David, “Homeland Security: Israel— On the frontier of success,” Ja n e’s Defence Weekly,
22 June 2005, http://www.janes.com; Alon Ben-David, “Israel’s Low-intensity Conflict 
Doctrine— Inner conflict,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 September 2004, http://www.janes.com; 
Eshel, “Looking into the Future,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 August 2000, 
http://www.janes.com; and Ed Blanche, “Israel Addresses the Threats of the New Millennium,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, February and March 1999 (parts one and two), 
http://www.janes.com.
reoccupation of a Palestinian refugee camp. At the Balata refugee camp outside 
Nablus in February 2002, Kohavi’s men “came up with the idea of moving into the 
camp by carving a passage through the walls” which allowed them “to avoid the 
streets and alleys and surprise the enemy.” This innovation70 was quickly adopted in 
other IDF operations and is now taught in IDF courses as a standard method. Many 
other techniques, such as those to facilitate surprise arrests and apprehending wanted 
persons in urban locations, were developed to meet emerging threats and are now 
taught in IDF courses as a matter of standard doctrinal instruction. These are merely a 
few tactical operational examples to illustrate how Israeli strategic security perception 
evolves and adapts to meet the ever-changing strategic threat environment.71
S it u a t io n a l  P e r m a n e n c e
The term ‘situational permanence’ is used to describe the fact that Israel’s 
geo-strategic situation will not fundamentally change. The existence of the Jewish 
state is a geopolitical reality, and Israel is a permanent fixture in the international 
community. Moreover, the conditions in which the state must exist— and it is 
important to stress that this is from an Israeli perspective—will not change: Israel 
will “continue to live in a hostile environment.”72
From the perspective of Israeli national security planners, it is prudent policy 
to maintain the firm stance that regional intransigence to the existence of the Jewish 
state will not end— Israeli and Jewish histories painfully prove this point. The Israeli 
government had expected regional acceptance following the armistice accords which 
ended open hostilities in the War of Independence; however, when that acceptance
70 The US military learned this technique from the Israelis, and it was employed in the American siege
of Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004.
71 Ben-David, “Israel’s Low-intensity Conflict Doctrine,” http://www.janes.com.
72 Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 10.
was not forthcoming, Ben-Gurion moved to put a greater emphasis on Israel’s 
security component. Klieman notes that “this expressed itself in strengthening of the 
Israel Defense Forces, enforcement of a retaliatory policy aimed at punishing Arab 
armistice violations, plus a declaratory (casus belli) policy of explicit warnings meant 
to deter Arab aggression.”73 This development in Israeli foreign and security policies 
was a direct result o f the ever-increasing realization that Israel’s neighbors were 
unprepared and unwilling to acknowledge the permanence of the State of Israel.
While Israel’s regional neighbors refused to recognize the reality of the
Jewish State’s creation and permanent existence in what they had previously
perceived solely as the Arab World, the perception held by Israeli national security
planners that the region was a dangerous and hostile neighborhood hardened. As
Klieman astutely wrote, “[T]he world beyond Israel’s borders is often perceived of, in
short, as distinctly inhospitable—a dangerous and challenging place.”74 In his
discussion of the impact of this trend, he added:
Perceiving Arab enmity as enduring and real permits 
little room for generosity, few illusions, and absolutely 
no major mistakes on Israel’s part. In the long run, 
faith, trust, and self-assurance have been eroded and 
replaced by mistrust, by apprehension, and by a certain 
rigidity that foreigners often find disagreeable.... Thus it 
is that Israel’s military approach to the dilemma of 
physical security and to regional politics is often 
diagnosed by outside commentators as a siege 
mentality, or “Massada complex.” 75
Moreover, regional friends may not always be peaceful neighbors. Despite the 
peace agreements and normalization of relations between nations, there are no 
guarantees that this will always be the status quo. “For Israelis cynical about the
73 Klieman, Israel & the World, p. 69.
74 Klieman, Israel & the World, p. 43.
75 Klieman, Israel & the World, p. 60.
sincerity of Arab commitments to peace, ‘war after peace’ is a problem inherent in the 
peace process. For others, concern stems primarily from uncertainty about political 
stability in the region.”76 Heller identifies demographic pressures, rapid urbanization, 
economic stagnation, stalled reforms, challenge of radical Islam or resurgent 
nationalism, and uncertain political succession as chronic internal problems77 that 
could cause friendly states to reverse their positions vis-a-vis Israel and renounce 
peace agreements. Those states bordering Israel, such as Egypt, who have revamped 
and modernized their militaries after establishing relations with Israel, would 
fundamentally alter Israel’s security perceptions if they were to reenter the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. The strategic calculus would dramatically shift to a precarious 
situation if hostile regimes were to emerge where currently nonbelligerent 
governments currently exist. As a result, Israel must always be prepared to defend 
itself. According to Prime Minster Barak, “The might of the IDF is the true guarantee 
to the peace agreements, to our partners’ abiding by them, and to Israel’s security 
after attaining peace treaties. We live in a difficult region and environment, which do 
not resemble neither North America, nor Western Europe. In the Middle East there is 
no pity or esteem towards the weak: He who is unable to defend himself does not get 
a second chance.”78
The Rise o f  the Iranian Threat
For much of Israel’s existence, this intransigence has been described as Arab 
hostility. While not to discount the threat of Arab hostility, it is critical to stress that 
opposition to Israel has not emanated solely from the Arab world, but also from the
76 Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 23.
77 Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 23.
78 Inbar, “Israel’s Strategic Environment,” p. 35, quoting remarks by Ehud Barak made at the National
Defense College, Yediot Aharonot, 13 August 1999. Quote unchanged, reproduced as in the
original.
rest of the international community, in particular the nonaligned and Third World 
countries, and especially from the wider Muslim world.
Events in recent years have led Israeli national security strategy to place less 
of a premium upon threats arising from the Arab world— especially since the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime— and come to 
view Iran as the single greatest existential threat to Israeli security.79 From the Israeli 
point of view, Iran in particular has emerged since the 1979 Islamic Revolution as one 
of the primary— if not greatest— enemies of Israeli security. The Israeli perception of 
an Iranian threat and the fear of Khomeini sm will be explored in Chapter 3.
The Reality o f Regional Enmity
This perception of regional enmity has been hardened into policy reality over
the course of the past half century. Israel has faced threats from its immediate
neighbors, the so-called confrontation Arab states,80 or frontline states, and from
states farther away such as Iran. Bernard Reich wrote
The other Arab states pose less of a direct military 
threat but are included in the conception of the enemy 
because they have been allied with the confrontation 
states in the Arab League and other institutions, have 
participated in Arab summit decisions against Israel, 
have joined in the chorus of anti-Israel rhetoric, and 
have provided some of the wherewithal for, and 
occasionally sent Loops to participate in, the wars, 
terrorist acts, and other anti-Israel military and 
paramilitary actions.81
Israel has fought at least five major wars (excluding the 1968-1970 War of 
Attrition) with its regional neighbors and is currently engaged in the second 
Palestinian national uprising. Although the first Intifadah can be classified essentially
79 Sneh, telephone interview.
80 Reich, “Israeli National Security Policy,” p. 2.
81 Reich, “Israeli National Security Policy,” p. 3.
as clashes with a largely unarmed civilian population under military occupation, the 
second or al-Aqsa Intifadah is markedly different and serves as an example of the 
regional hostility arrayed against the State of Israel.
The second Palestinian uprising rages as an urban low-intensity conflict 
between the IDF and Israeli security services, on the one hand, and fairly well armed 
irregular guerrillas and militant terrorists one the other. Moreover, this latest 
Intifadah has taken on its own regional hue: Iran and Lebanese elements have sought 
to provide weapons and ammunition to Palestinian fighters, in addition to rhetorical
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support.
The most notable example of Iranian involvement has been the Karme-A 
incident (3 January 2002), in which Israeli naval commandos intercepted in 
international waters a freighter carrying over 50 tons of Iranian materiel destined for 
Palestinian guerrillas.83 The Iranian-backed Hezbollah organization has also 
attempted to infiltrate weapons and fighters into Israel and Gaza, the latter made 
famous through the capture of the vessel Santorini (6 May 2001). Hezbollah has tried 
to link the al-Aqsa Intifadah to the disputed Shebba Farms territory situated between 
Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. The involvement of Hezbollah is troublesome because the 
organization is tacitly and expressly backed by both Iran and Syria, thereby increasing 
the possibility of a widening conflict.
Furthermore, the proliferation of regional satellite television services has 
exacerbated the perception of the al-Aqsa Intifadah as a regional conflict. Since the 
creation of such pan-Arab channels as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya, the entire region
82 Robert Berger, “Israel Concerned Over New Hamas-Iran Alliance,” Voice o f  America, 22 February
2006, and “Israel intercepts Hizbaflah shipment to Palestinians,” news summary of the Institute 
for Counter-Terrorism, 24 May 2003.
83 “Israel Intercepts Palestinian Anns Shipment at Sea,” news summary o f the Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, 5 January 2002.
views the conflict on a daily basis.84 The continual consumption of this video 
violence has led to a corresponding increase in the flow of moneys and charitable 
donations to ‘martyrs’ families’ from donors through the Arab and Muslim world. As 
a result, the conflict has had an adverse effect on Israel’s standing throughout the 
international community, especially with those Arab states such as Tunisia and Qatar 
with which Israel had made diplomatic inroads.85 Thus, 50 years after the 
establishment of the State of Israel, even a seemingly local dispute between two 
parties can be understood from an Israeli perspective as yet another example of 
regional hostility.
•k k  * k k
Situational permanence can therefore be understood to be one of the core 
concepts of Israeli national security policy. It is a twofold concept. The first 
component is that the State of Israel, as both a national homeland for world Jewry and 
as the national progression of the Zionist enterprise, is a reality that will not again be 
displaced. The second is the notion that the circumstances which cause the threats 
that are perceived by Israeli decision makers will not fundamentally change. The 
threats which Israel has been forced to confront since it declared independence 
reaffirm the fact that it lives in a hostile neighborhood, amidst many actors (nations 
and non-state actors alike) who would gladly welcome the destruction of the Jewish 
state. Israel’s defense posture, therefore, can be understood as one of national defense 
to safeguard the security and continued existence of the state.
84 Christopher Boucek, “Satellites beam uprising across the region,” Middle East Times (Cairo), 15
October 2000.
85 Israelis often refer to such states as ‘moderate’; however, such a term does little to accurately portray
the true nature of their regimes.
D e t e r r e n c e  a n d  P o w e r  P r o je c t io n
Deterrence has historically been an essential tool for Israeli policy makers. 
This policy has essentially entailed two main components. The Israeli policy of 
deterrence first seeks to deter hostility through the understood consequence of 
overwhelming Israeli retaliation. Second, this policy attempts to ensure that all 
would-be belligerent states know that a hefty price will be extracted for any attempt to 
compromise the national security of the State of Israel. It is the notion that any hostile 
aggression would be met with an appropriate military response that would both meet 
and repulse the initial attack and seek to inflict punitive damage that will ensure that 
such a strike would not occur again.
Successful Power Projection
When taken together with the acknowledged ability of Israeli military and 
security forces to project their power across vast distances, the policy of deterrence is 
magnified significantly. Examples of Israeli power projection have included 
instances of both overt and more clandestine military activity. Successful examples 
of overt military power projection far from Israeli national territory include the 
hostage rescue at Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976; the June 1981 air strike on the Iraqi 
nuclear facility at Osirak; the October 1985 air raid on the headquarters of the PLO in 
Tunis, Tunisia; and also in Tunis, the April 1988 assassination of PLO military 
commander Khalil Wazir, better known as Abu Jihad.86 The Israelis have struck deep 
into Africa, across the Mediterranean Sea in the distant Maghreb, and deep into the 
Arab heartland.
Examples of less overt but not-quite-clandestine power projection include the 
retaliatory assassinations of the Palestinian Black September terrorists responsible for
86 For more information on these events, consult Dilip Hiro, The Essential Middle East: A 
Comprehensive Guide (New York, 2003), s.v. “Mossad,” pp. 331-333.
the murders of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972; the sabotage 
of nuclear components destined for Iraq in the French port of La Seyne-sur-Mer in 
April 1979; the clandestine abduction87 from Western Europe to Israel of nuclear 
whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu in September 1986; and the October 1995 
assassination of Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Abdul Aziz Shikaki in Malta.88
All of the examples cited above—from the instances of overt preemptive 
power projection to lesser acknowledged instances of assassinations, sabotage, and 
espionage—have occurred far from Israel’s borders, often on other continents. Yet 
these disparate events are linked as examples of the State of Israel’s acting to either 
project its power across great distances in order to influence the conditions which may 
have an adverse effect on the state’s national security, or in order to respond to a 
hostile action.
Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent
No discussion of deterrence and Israeli national security policy can be 
complete without reference to Israel’s understood nuclear capability. While the 
subject is beyond the scope of this present study, a very brief mention is warranted to 
acknowledge its importance.
Israel’s ever-changing national security environment has required its national 
security planners to prepare for the eventuality of the emergence of WMDs and 
sophisticated delivery systems such as ballistic missiles. A number of Israel’s hostile 
regional neighbors have sought to acquire WMDs, such as chemical warfare agents 
(CW) and biological warfare agents (BW). Libya, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq 
have all at one point been suspected of possessing CW and/or BW. Several Arab
87 For more on the Vanunu saga, see Peter Hounam, The Woman from Mossad: The Story o f  Mordechai
Vanunu & the Israeli Nuclear Program (n.p., 1999).
88 Hiro, Essential Middle East, s.v. “Mossad,” pp. 331-333.
states have even used these weapons in war; Egypt has been accused of using CW 
during its involvement in Yemen in the early 1960s. More widely known is the fact 
that Iraq used CW during its eight year war with Iran and again against its own 
Kurdish population, most notably at Halabja in 1988. Furthermore, regional states 
such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq have all at one time sought nuclear 
weapons. Israel, as mentioned above, took military and covert action to preempt the 
Iraqi nuclear program. After the past decade, Iran’s nuclear ambitions now appear to 
be the most advanced and are therefore the most worrisome to Israeli national security 
planners.
As best as can be understood from open source literature, Israel is believed to 
be in possession of a nuclear deterrent and the capability to deliver such weapons 
throughout the region. In its policy of nuclear ambiguity, Israel has repeatedly 
stressed that it will not be the first nation to introduce such weapons to the region.89 
However, it has also cautioned all other states against assuming that their introduction 
of nuclear arms would somehow hobble Israel’s ability to respond in kind. This 
ultimate deterrent is intended to give pause to Israel’s enemies before they consider 
launching a WMD attack on the Jewish state. Israel’s nuclear deterrent is believed to 
be composed of land- and sea-based weapons, as well as the capacity to deliver such 
weapons by tactical aircraft. Crucially, Israel is believed to have a second-strike 
capability by virtue of its three Dolphin-class submarines acquired from Germany. 
This seaborne capability ensures that no state can launch a preemptive strike, nuclear 
or otherwise, and escape from devastating retaliation.
89 Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, p. 66.
Limits o f  Deterrence
Within the concepts of Israel national security policy it is important to 
recognize that even deterrence has its limits. Simply put, there are some situations in 
which deterrence does not or cannot work. When it comes to deterring terrorism, 
Israel has very aptly demonstrated that in the event of terrorist activity originating 
from a foreign country, that nation will be held responsible. Israel has launched 
punitive raids into the territory of all its neighbors to make this point. However, 
attempting to deter religiously inspired suicide bombers has proven far more difficult. 
Retaliation against surviving family members has failed to work. Expulsions and 
home demolitions have not made Israelis safer, and thus unilateral separation has 
gained currency.
Another example of the failure of deterrence occurred during the 1991 Gulf 
War when Iraqi Scud missiles fell on Israel. American pressure kept Israel from 
retaliating; however, the threat of Israeli massive retaliation did not dissuade Iraq 
from initially attacking the Jewish state. It must be acknowledged that the aim of 
Iraq’s attacks were to fracture the coalition aligned against Baghdad, yet even so the 
understood threat of an Israeli response did not materialize. For decades, Israeli 
national security policy has fostered the understanding that any attack on Israel would 
be met with overwhelming and devastating repercussions. As a result, it must be 
considered that in the eyes of Israel’s potential attackers, the perceived likelihood of a 
massive retaliation has diminished. If this understanding is true, then Israeli national 
security planners must find another way to impress upon hostile states that there is a 
very significant price to pay for threatening Israel. In this sense, it could be argued 
that preemption and prevention of capabilities that threaten Israeli security interests 
will increase in importance in Israeli national security policy.
S e l f -R e l ia n c e
From the earliest days, Israeli leaders have learned the painfiil lesson of self- 
reliance. In essence, self-reliance as a tenet of national security policy means that the 
Jewish state cannot count on any other nation to work to consistently ensure Israel’s 
safety and security: “An immediate strategic objective, greatly influenced by the 
Holocaust and the 1948 war, was to become as self-reliant as possible where security 
was concerned.”90 When Israel was attacked by all of its Arab neighbors after 
declaring independence, it was not the international community or any outside actor 
who acted to protect the nascent state. It was Israel alone who defended its security.
Handel has identified self-reliance as one of the core concepts of Israeli 
political-military doctrine. He wrote that “Israel has made and will continue to make 
every effort to reach the maximum level of military self-sufficiency.”91 This 
development is in part a reaction to historical events such as those outlined 
previously, and was reinforced by the international community’s actions toward Israel 
in episodes perceived by the Israeli leadership as times of national emergency. The 
historical impact of these events cannot be underestimated; they reinforced for the 
Israeli leadership and the national security establishment the need to take matters into 
their own hands and not to rely 011 any outside power for assistance. When 
considered with the emotional impact the Holocaust had upon each Israeli family, this 
is not a surprising development; the experiences of the 1948 war, the struggle of 
independence, and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflict reinforced this perception.
90 O’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 378.
91 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, p. 65.
Military Self-Sufficiency
In terms of its national security policies, Israel has sought self-reliance for two 
essentially interdependent reasons. The first is related to Israel’s historical 
vulnerability to arms restrictions, and the second is tied to Israel’s isolation in the 
international community.
With respect to Israel’s access to military materiel, it is important to note that 
“Israel has been subject to two damaging amis embargoes in its history: the first 
during the War of Independence... and the second on the eve of the 1967 War.” In 
1948, the United States and the United Kingdom both halted the flow of weapons. 
The second incident occurred when France withheld military assistance in an 
unsuccessful attempt to dissuade Israel from going to war.92
As a result, Israel has developed one of the world’s most advanced military 
industries. Israel has become a world leader in pioneering new technologies and has 
benefited from field testing most new weapons systems in regular operations by the 
IDF. In less than half a century, Israel has gone from a net importer of second-hand 
weapons to a high-tech defense exporter.93 The defense industry in Israel is a key 
component in the critical national infrastructure, and self-reliance in this area has 
allowed Israeli leaders to choose a path of true independence and national self-interest 
without compromising foreign policy or national security goals to international 
political considerations.94
92 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p. 80.
93 In the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the American military contacted their Israeli
counterparts to obtain replacements for their arsenals depleted during the Afghan and Iraqi 
campaigns.
94 One notable exception to this statement was Israel’s cancellation of a major weapons deal with China
due to US objections. In 2000, Israel agreed to sell China three Phalcon airborne early warning 
systems. Washington expressed serious concerns about equipping a potential adversary with 
advanced detection systems in light o f American defense commitments in East Asia. Israel 
eventually cancelled the sale.
The continued qualitative development of Israel’s defense industry is 
dependent upon second-generation sales to third countries in order to generate the 
funds to reinvest in the research and development of newer and more sophisticated 
weapons systems. In conducting such sales, Israel continues to bolster its own 
defense against numerically superior adversaries while at the same time maintaining 
knowledge of the arms inventories of other states, some of which may not always 
remain friendly. Weapons sales and refurbishments in relation to Central Asia have 
been noteworthy and will be detailed in greater depth in subsequent chapters.
Lack o f  Alliances
Throughout its history Israel has existed without any formal alliances: “Israel 
is militarily and, to a lesser extent, politically isolated from the rest of the world; it is 
not a member of any political or military alliance and must ultimately rely completely 
on its own power in case o f  emergency.”95 This is due to several reasons, chiefly the 
perception in the international community of Israel as a pariah state; that is, over time, 
the policies of the State of Israel have caused many nations to reconsider formal 
alliances with Israel. As Israel’s major international ally, the United States is 
committed to the defense of Israel; however, this exists outside of any formal alliance 
system. It is the result of American policy, and from the perception of many in the 
Israeli establishment, US policy is very valuable but it is not ironclad. Many in 
Congress may disagree with that assessment; however, their veracity— other than 
rhetorical or financial— has yet to be proven. Israel has been granted ‘major non- 
NATO ally status’ by the American government, yet this designation relates to
95 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, p. 64 (emphasis in original).
facilitating defense technology and materiel transfers and is not a collective security 
agreement.
Israel’s alliance with Turkey is a major development in the history of Israeli 
foreign policy. The relationship between Israel and Ankara, however, is primarily a 
relationship of mutual interests. When those interests no longer overlap, due to local 
or regional developments, such cooperation may very well diminish. While there is 
substantial security and military cooperation, joint training, and so on between the two 
nations, from a reading of the publicly available material regarding the current 
arrangement, it also is not a collective security agreement.
G r e a t  P o w e r  A s s o c ia t io n s
One of the founding tenets of Israeli national security policy has been the 
deliberate policy to secure at least one “great power patron.” This was laid out by 
Ben-Gurion and has been “a cardinal principle” of Israeli national security policy ever 
since. However, it is important to stress that Israeli policy also very carefully calls on 
Israel not to rely upon any outside power to defend the State of Israel. Through 
hundreds of years of anti-Semitism, history has proven that no other country or group 
of countries would act to defend the Jewish people, and this has been discussed 
earlier. As such, Israeli leaders took the early decision not to align with any great 
power. Britain had unsuccessfully worked to frustrate Zionist efforts to create a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine, and the international community and the United 
Nations failed to respond to Israel’s calls for assistance during the 1948 War of 
Independence.96
96 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p. 81.
Michael Handel has noted that although Israel has sought to maintain its 
neutrality, Israeli policy holds that a superpower ally could present Israel with great 
benefit. This association with a superpower, however, would not prevent Israel from 
acting in its own self-interest when such circumstances dictated. Handel adds that 
Israel would not refrain from military action to defend itself against any great power if 
need be.97
Greater License
It has been noted that prior to three of Israel’s regional wars in which Israel 
initiated combat, the Jewish state first sought and secured approval from its power 
patron at the time. In 1956, it “joined with” France—its great power patron then— 
and the United Kingdom in a preemptive attack against Egypt. Israel had also 
“secured initial American approval for its military plans in 1967 and 1982.” It has 
been asserted that other than the 1948 War of Independence, Israel has had the 
“assistance of a great power patron in each Arab-Israeli war.” This, in turn, has given 
Israel greater license to act in the international community.98
Origins and Benefits
O ’Neill has noted that this policy had its early origin in the 1950s when 
several factors coalesced. Increased Soviet support for the Arabs and restrictions on 
Jewish emigration were two of the developments which led Israel to grow closer to 
Western great powers.99 The massive Soviet arms deal with Egypt in 1955 reinforced
97 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, p. 66.
98 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p. 81.
99 O ’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 378.
this position. In part, this policy development is a return to the relationship with 
Great Britain during the early Mandate period.
O’Neill further states that alignment with a great power benefits Israel in 
several ways. First and foremost are security concerns: Adversaries of Israel “might 
come to realize that violent opposition to Israel was no longer a sensible policy.” In 
addition to having a powerful friend and ally, association with a great power would 
give Israel greater latitude in how it could respond to threats against its national 
security. Secondly, this type of a relationship could aid Israel in its “material 
assistance,” both military and economic. The third benefit to the Jewish state is that 
“the legitimacy of Zionism would be increased.” This last fact would contribute to 
the solidification of the state and would advance the Israeli foreign policy goals of 
international recognition and acceptance.100
Nevertheless, the policy of alignment with a great power has been 
institutionalized policy since the 1950s, and today the United States serves as Israel’s 
great power ally. The US-Israel relationship as it bears upon this present study will be 
discussed in the following chapter.
E m p h a s is  o n  In t e l l ig e n c e
The militaries and national security apparatuses of all states depend upon a 
judicious use of intelligence in order to better inform national security decision 
making. In Israel this is no different, and in fact it can be argued that Israeli national 
security planners are in many cases more dependent upon intelligence than their 
counterparts in other nations may be. Israel has always been surrounded by hostile 
and belligerent states and has been forced to adopt a strong defensive posture in order
100 O’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 378.
to survive amid so many detractors: “Given the ability of standing Arab forces to shift 
quickly from defensive to offensive deployments, Israeli military posture placed a 
premium on early warning.” 101 As a result, Israeli leaders have come to depend upon 
timely intelligence to best inform the national security decision-making process.
Intelligence As a Lever to Maximize Response Times
Due to Israel’s unique geopolitical realities, accurate and useful intelligence is 
essential to the Jewish state’s national security. Israel is at its most vulnerable during 
a conventional attack in the immediate onset, while the fighting is on Israeli territory 
and before the IDF can mobilize its reserves. Lacking strategic depth and possessing 
a relatively small standing army (regionally speaking), Israeli national security policy 
places a premium on informed intelligence. At its narrowest point, Israel is merely 
miles wide and backed against the Mediterranean Sea; there is no room in which to 
withdraw. As a result, defense doctrine calls for the IDF to quickly push enemy 
forces out of Israeli territory and for the majority of fighting to be conducted on non- 
Israeli soil. One analyst has identified this as “offensive maneuver warfare,” 102 and 
added that it comprises part of the Israeli security disposition to wage “preventative 
and preemptive war.” 103 Israel is also numerically outnumbered by foes who have 
utilized their superior numbers in combat without warning at least twice— in 1948 and 
again in 1973. The Israeli army is a comparatively small force, with the bulk o f its 
numbers serving in reserve units. The reservists require time to be mobilized104 and 
“because of the time required to mobilize and deploy the reserves, a premium was
101 Heller, Continuity and Change, p. 13.
102 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p. 76.
103 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p. 72.
104 This in part can account for the reasons why the reserves are periodically mobilized. When the
General Staff and National Security Council believe that the national security is at risk, Israeli 
leaders often now preemptively call up the reserves in order to best defend the state and shorten 
the time of response.
placed on advanced warning from a high-quality intelligence apparatus.” 105 Proper 
intelligence warnings— such as those that were ignored in 1973— can help shorten the 
time in which the IDF is able to properly engage in offensive maneuver warfare.106 
Speed is crucial in Israeli strategic planning in order to end a conflict before the 
international community can interfere;107 this is in part a result of the negative 
perception held by many in the security establishment in Israel who view the 
international community and United Nations as biased. The proper use of intelligence 
can ameliorate these security conditions; it can quicken Israeli response time and 
shorten the time in which Israel is at its most vulnerable.
Intelligence plays a critical role when national security is considered in terms 
of the threat environment Israel must inhabit. As outlined above, from the viewpoint 
of Israeli national security planners, given Israel’s situational permanence it follows 
that the state must be prepared to defend itself. Proper intelligence can better inform 
those decisions and “because the threat to the security of the state is perceived as 
continuous, a constant state of alert must be maintained by the IDF, especially by the 
intelligence force and the air force.” 108
S t r a t e g ic  In it ia t iv e
By its very nature, the national security of an attentive state is most often 
challenged by external threats which emerge from outside the control those
responsible for implementing the state’s national security policies. It is therefore
necessary for those responsible to take whatever actions they can to mitigate the 
effects of external developments which may have a negative impact on national
105 O ’Neill, “Defense Policy of Israel,” p. 379.
106 For more on the use of reservists in the IDF, see Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p.
73-75.
107 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, p. 66.
108 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, p. 67.
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security. In Israel, this means that decisions need to be made when and where it is 
best for the state, a fact which has been described above as Israel’s propensity to 
engage in “preventative and preemptive war,” 109 especially when confronted with 
existential threats.
Preventative and Preemptive War
This active response in Israel often requires Israeli national security planners 
and decision makers to exercise policy options designed to improve and safeguard 
national security on Israel’s own timetable. Events cannot and will not wait for Israeli 
leaders to act; rather, they must seize the initiative when they can. Moreover, the 
international community has demonstrated its unwillingness to act to address 
challenges and threats to Israeli national security. When opportunities have presented 
themselves to advance national security, Israeli decision makers have historically 
been given narrow windows in which to operate.
This ability to seize the strategic initiative is a means by which Israeli national 
security planners can improve their control over the events that will affect and shape 
the regional and international security and threat environment in which Israel exists. 
In doing so, Israeli national security planners are able to negate the numerous 
disadvantages of the Israeli case and maximize Israel’s assets. This maxim has 
repeatedly been demonstrated throughout the existence of the Jewish state.
There are numerous examples of times in which Israeli leaders have employed 
strategic initiative to address national security challenges. Some of these examples 
include the overt use of military force as in the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War, and the 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon. Other examples of when Israel
109 Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” p. 72.
acted to use the strategic initiative to advance national security objectives can be seen 
in the repeated attempts to derail the Iraqi nuclear program, culminating in June 
1981’s preemptive air strike to destroy the Iraqi nuclear program at Osirak. In April 
1979 Mossad operatives destroyed “two cores destined for the Tammuz nuclear 
reactor”— components for Iraq’s nuclear program—“at the French port of La Seyne- 
sur-Mer,” and in June 1980, Israeli agents assassinated Yahya al Mashad, “an 
Egyptian nuclear physicist overseeing the Iraqi-Egyptian cooperation on nuclear 
development.” 110
*  a  *  *  *
This chapter has attempted to detail the origins and foundations of Israeli 
national security policy in order to provide a basis from which to approach the focus 
of this thesis, Israel’s interaction with Central Asia during the decade from 1991 to 
2001. As Israeli policy in the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet power in Central 
Asia was chiefly aimed at preventing the emergence of new threats to national 
security, it is hoped that this chapter will serve as a touchstone for the concepts and 
issues which are to be discussed in subsequent chapters. The next chapter will 
examine the application of Israeli national security policy and explore how Israel 
utilized its policy of national security to interact with the newly independent states of 
Central Asia.
110 Hiro, Essential Middle East, s.v. “Military in Israel,” pp. 326-327.
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O p p o r t u n it ie s
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states in 
Central Asia was an event no one had prepared for, much less anticipated. Israeli 
leaders, just like their counterparts throughout the world, were caught completely by 
surprise at the pace of events. Israeli foreign policy was forced to confront a dramatic 
event and rapidly assess the situation to determine how it would impact the State of 
Israel, its national security, and its relations with the rest of the world.
Building upon the previous chapter which outlined the origins and foundations 
of Israeli national security policy, this chapter applies that framework to the question 
of how Israel approached the former Soviet Central Asian republics. This chapter 
examines Israel’s nine interrelated policy objectives in the region and details how 
these strategic objectives reflect the basic national security tenets which have directed 
Israeli foreign policy. Because the region was an unknown entity for Israeli policy 
makers, the popular preconceptions of Central Asia—-and the security dilemmas the 
region posed—are explored. This is intended to both frame the discussions which 
will follow in the next chapters and underscore the basic perception within Israel’s 
foreign policy community that the emergence of five new ‘Muslim’ states had the 
potential to have a negative impact their national security.
To further inform our analysis, both the threats and opportunities presented by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in Central Asia are assessed. Together, these 
potential dangers and possible openings served as challenges for Israeli policy and 
motivated Israeli policy planners to engage these new republics. These developments 
were considered to be security issues; thus their impact on Israeli national security is 
explored here.
The end of Soviet power in Central Asia led numerous analysts and observers 
to herald the arrival of a revived ‘Great Game’: a now global competition for 
influence and strategic access in the area. The relative merits and advantages of a 
wide range of actors (the United States, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of 
China, Turkey, Islamic Republic of Iran, and even Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India) 
has heretofore been chronicled. To date, however, there has been little attention 
focused on the role of the State of Israel in the former Soviet South. Curiously, it is 
the State of Israel that has quietly developed the closest and greatest relationship with 
the Muslim republics of Central Asia.
In the first ten years of their independence, the State of Israel established 
extremely close relations with the new nations of the region. By following traditional 
foreign policy objectives, Israel achieved its goals and neutralized potential threats in 
the region. In relatively little time, it achieved very close diplomatic, economic, and 
security ties with Central Asia, virtually unnoticed by the outside world.
Israel became a very successful player in Central Asia, influencing everything 
from pipeline construction to defense spending. Understanding the actions and 
intentions of this little-studied actor is rapidly growing in importance as the region
continues to evolve. It is the aim of this chapter to analyze the origins of Israeli 
policy towards Central Asia and to explore how and why Israel approached the 
region.
R e l a t io n s  w it h  t h e  R e p u b l ic s
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel officially established 
diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan in February 1992; Kyrgyzstan in March 1992; 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in April of 1992; and, over a year later with Turkmenistan 
in October 1993.111 For the leadership of the republics, “ties with Israel symbolized 
an antifundamentalist orientation. A pro-Israel outlook was understood to enhance 
one’s standing in the West.” 112 Relations with Israel were also sought because Israel 
was seen as a conduit to Western aid dollars. This notion should not be overlooked. 
With little advance warning, the Central Asian republics were transformed from 
subsidized and protected components of a global superpower to third world states 
with no experience of modem independent governance.
Israel was also viewed by the republics as very much an example to emulate.
It is only one of a handful of smaller states that have both successfully industrialized 
and been able to maintain a strong defense posture.113 “Israel’s powerful image 
promises much to these countries, which perceive it as a model state: small but 
politically and economically strong, and both democratic and secular.” 114 As Raphael 
Israeli has written, Israel demonstrated that through modem technology, scientific
111 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel’s Diplomatic Missions Abroad,” http://www.israel-
mfa.gov.il.
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ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York, 1994), p. 83.
113 Jonathan R. Adelman, Torrents o f  Spring: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics (London, 1995), pp. 64-65.
114 Bulent Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia,” Middle East
Policy 5, no. 4 (January 1998): p. 69.
means, and “certain sociopolitical” values, small nations can be powerful and 
advanced countries.115 One of the most attractive motivations for the establishment of 
positive relations with Israel originated in the perception that positive ties with Israel 
would lead to positive ties with the United States. Israeli influence and capability is 
often very much exaggerated; however, Israel does maintain disproportionate 
influence in Washington, DC.116 Quoting the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, the Times 
o f Central Asia stated that “many countries around the world believe that one of the 
surest routes to better relations with Washington is to win over the ‘Jewish lobby’ in 
America— a notion that many Jewish leaders are reluctant to disabuse them of.” 117 It 
is important to keep in mind that the relationship between Israel and the republics was 
not purely a one-way avenue of exchange: Israel was— and is— a very attractive 
partner for these new states.
The Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta ran a noteworthy article on 20 
January 1992. Entitled “USA Encourages Muslim Republics to Follow Turkey: Israel 
Makes Inroads,” it stated that officials of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
“recommended that diplomatic missions be opened” in the republics “and that they be 
offered the services of experts in all spheres—from agriculture to defense.” This 
article appeared several weeks before Israel actually began its diplomatic efforts in the 
region and demonstrates very clearly that the State of Israel had a plan of action to 
secure its influence in the republics. The article concludes by quoting “a high-ranking 
Israeli spokesman” who stated that “until they have decided what route to follow, we
115 Raphael Israeli, “Return to the source: the republics of Central Asia and the Middle East,” Central
Asian Survey 13, no. 1 (1994): p. 29.
116 Brenda Schaffer, PhD (University of Haifa, Israel), in discussion with the author 4 November 2005,
Jerusalem.
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have an opportunity to penetrate them and influence events.” As this chapter shall 
illustrate, this goal was very successfully accomplished. 118
ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA
The creation of five new independent Muslim nations was not a development 
widely perceived by Israeli policy makers as one that would be of benefit to their 
national security concerns. This is in large part due to the Israeli trend of ‘primacy of 
security’ dating back to the founding of the state; this belief “holds that almost every 
problem is a security problem, or at least involves security aspects.” 119 A multitude 
of interests was at stake in the region, and in order to address the fast-moving new 
realities being created on the ground in Central Asia, Israel needed to create a 
framework with which to engage the republics. This strategic framework was 
primarily intended to ensure the continued security of the State of Israel and was 
composed of several longstanding Israeli foreign policy objectives. Israeli foreign 
policy objectives would be furthered by ensuring that the republics did not align 
themselves against Israel and preventing the republics from falling under either the 
influence of Iran or radical Islam. I have identified nine separate yet interdependent 
strategic objectives which Israeli policy sought to achieve. These nine interdependent 
objectives are as follows:
• to prevent the spread of Iranian influence among the states of the 
former Soviet Union;
• to curb the development of hostile regimes and curtail the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs);
118 “USA encourages Muslim republics to follow Turkey: Israel makes inroads,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta
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• to remove the emphasis on the Arab world within the Greater Middle 
East;
• to avert the focus from the Middle East peace process;
• to maintain and expand the strategic relationship with the United 
States;
• to foster the creation of ‘moderate’ Muslim states;
• to encourage the development of an economic hinterland;
• to expand and support domestic military preparedness and technologies 
through the sale of military hardware to foreign states; and
• to ensure the protection of local Jewish communities and cultural 
heritage.
For the purposes of this thesis, these nine Israeli policy objectives have been 
divided into four primary means of implementation: diplomatic efforts, economic and 
commercial relations, development assistance, and military and security cooperation. 
In later chapters which focus on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, these components will 
be examined in detail. Because the primary focus of this study addresses security 
concerns, the religious and cultural aspects of Israel’s relationship with Central Asia 
will be discussed briefly and only as warranted. A thorough examination of the 
religious, cultural, and historical links is much beyond the scope of this present work, 
and is deserving of a separate treatment. For this reason, there will be little mention 
of the region’s Jewish communities and how they are a factor vis-a-vis Israeli-Central 
Asian relations, except within the context of security policy making.
In order to better understand Israeli policy towards Central Asia it is essential 
to detail the rationale and logic motivating Israel’s actions. The following is an 
attempt to place the nine policy concerns and objectives in the context of Israeli 
national security policy.
P r e v e n t in g  t h e  S p r e a d  o f  I r a n ia n  In f l u e n c e
Israel’s primary strategic objective in Central Asia was to block the spread of 
Iranian influence.120 This view was also echoed by Ephraim Sneli who had long taken 
a serious interest in Israel’s policies toward Central Asia.121 The emergence of an 
independent Central Asia led many Western observers to fear that these new republics 
could eventually fall under the sway of Iran. In 1993, two American academics often 
associated with the thinking in Israel claimed that “looking at the world through the 
combined filters of fundamentalist Islam and resurgent Persian nationalism, they [the 
Iranian government] aspire to a sphere of influence that includes Iraq, the 
Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.” 122
Writing in Amu Dcuya; The Iranian Journal o f  Central Asian Studies, 
published by the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s in-house think tank, Mohammad-Reza 
Maleki observes that “Israel still considers Iran as a main strategic threat.” 123 
According to the stance of Israeli national security policy, the development of an 
Iranian sphere of influence in Central Asia would have a negative impact on Israeli 
national security.124 At the time, Israeli security planners viewed not only all of its 
immediate neighbors (including Egypt, in the event that a future Egyptian government 
might reverse and revoke the Camp David Accords) as potential adversaries, but also 
the rejectionist hard-line Arab states of Libya, Iraq, and especially Persian Iran. The
120 David Menashri, PhD (Senior Research Fellow at The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern
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121 Ephraim Sneh, MD (Member of Knesset), in a telephone interview the author, 4 November 2005,
Tel Aviv, Israel.
122 Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1
(January-February 1993): p. 126.
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possibility that the Central Asian republics might follow the Iranian model of 
development and align against Israel was a veiy real concern.
In examining Israel’s goals in the region, Rasul Yalcin notes that Israel was 
eager “to weaken any attempts by Iran to rally the Islamic world against it.” 125 In 
addition to Israeli efforts, American supporters of Israel took action to block Iranian 
influence in the region. Eleven major American Jewish organizations actively 
encouraged the US Congress to pass the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 in part to 
prevent Iranian efforts “to bring the nations of the region into its sphere of 
influence.” 126 Both the United States and Israel recognized the danger; one of the 
conclusions from Israel’s bilateral strategic talks with the United States in 1997 was 
that Iran poses “a threat to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia... and 
Israel.” 127
An Iranian Shift o f Focus, Not an Israeli Change in Perception 
Towards the late 1990s, Iran shifted its emphasis to focus on improving its 
economic links with the Central Asian states: “Iran has concentrated on its trade links 
more than anything else. Of course one can argue that commercial ties increase the 
political presence.” 128 Israel’s efforts to frustrate Iran’s early objectives clearly 
increased the difficulty that the Iranian regime encountered in Central Asia. 
However, simply because Iran no longer sought to actively export its fiery brand of 
revolutionary Islam does not mean that Iran ceased being a threat in the eyes of Israeli
125 Rasul Yalcin, The Rebirth o f  Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Post-Soviet Era 
(Reading, UK, 2002), p. 273.
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policy makers. Iran’s ambitious program to acquire WMD and advanced missile 
technology was, and remains to this day, of prime concern. Likewise, Iran’s recent 
efforts to forge an informal grouping of nations sharing Persian heritage and 
language129 are viewed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry as an attempt to covertly 
promote Iranian influence through seemingly innocuous means.130 In the view of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, Iran needs all the friends it can get to continually offset the 
tensions it encounters in the international community.131 Iran’s attempts to shift to
, ■ 132economic cooperation are equally disturbing to Israeli policy makers, especially 
when it comes to infrastructure projects and road and rail construction. When 
Iranians are involved, according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, such long-term 
projects mean that the Iranians establish an equally long-term presence in a country 
and over time will work to make that presence— and its accompanying influence—
1 33permanent.
Throughout the period covered in this thesis, Israel’s prime objective has been 
to prevent Iran from establishing a threatening presence in Central Asia. This 
theme—based largely upon the Israeli perception of Iran as a grave threat to its 
national security— not only recurs throughout the decade after independence but well 
into the 21st century. The rise of catastrophic terrorism, the emergence of violent 
radical Islamist militancy, and the spotlight on Eurasia created by the US-led global 
war on terror has reaffirmed for many the dangers posed by dangerous regimes which 
operate outside the international consensus. Iran’s continued support for militant
129 Based upon discussions held with Iranian foreign ministry employees in Teheran, Iran, February
2004.
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terrorist organizations bent upon targeting Israel, the new Iranian regime’s threatening 
and bellicose rhetoric with regards to Israel’s existence, and Teheran’s ongoing 
nuclear program all serve to reinforce the perception that Iran is a mortal threat to the 
security and safety of Israel. As long as Central Asia remains one of the venues in 
which Iran may engage in provocative behavior against Israeli interests, this view will 
endure.
C u r b in g  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  H o s t il e  R e g im e s  a n d  t h e  S p r e a d  o f  
WMDs
In order to maintain its security, Israeli policy has sought to curb—or at least 
not promote—the emergence of hostile governments which may eventually engage in 
hostilities with Israel. In the past, this policy has produced some notable failures, 
including the rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
The five new Central Asian states were perceived to be at risk of developing along the 
same path as the regime in Iran. Such a development posed considerable risks, 
especially due to the presence of Soviet-era nuclear arms. As one analyst noted, 
“[T]he existence of nuclear weapons and technology in Central Asia worries Israel 
and increases the strategic importance of the region.” 134
Maleki asserts in Amu Darya that the “possibility of nuclear proliferation in 
the region is a prime concern for Israel.” 135 Yalcin moreover identifies the “ultimate 
disposition of nuclear weapons (in Kazakhstan), and their possible transfer to such 
enemies as Iran” 136 as one of Israel’s three main concerns in Central Asia. A further
134 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 78.
135 Maleki, “Turkish-Israeli Relations,” p. 190.
136 Yalcin, Rebirth o f  Uzbekistan, p. 273.
fear concerns the possible rise of “Islamic terror groups in Pakistan and the Central 
Asian republics” and Pakistan’s nuclear capability.137
After the collapse of Soviet power in Central Asia, the threat of WMD 
proliferation became one of the three main dangers that Israel faced in its dealings 
with the region and this will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.
D il u t in g  t h e  ‘C o n c e p t  o f  a n  A r a b  M id d l e  E a s t ’
From an Israeli security perspective, the State of Israel has always been at risk 
due to its situational permanence. As noted in the previous chapter, Israel cannot 
change the very real fact that it is numerically outnumbered by enemies, both real and 
perceived. Furthermore, Israel has often risked being defined by its Arab neighbors. 
That is to say, Israel has often been defined by what it is not—-Arab and Muslim— 
rather than what it is. This tendency has the effect of placing the State of Israel on the 
defensive. Twenty-two Arab states, it is feared, have the option of speaking with one 
voice, however rarely it is used. Whether it is to denounce Israeli behavior towards 
its Arab neighbors in such venues as the Arab League or Non-Aligned Movement or 
in the attempts to link Zionism with racism through the United Nations General
138Assembly, in the past the Arab states have sought to use their greater numbers to 
isolate Israel, not just regionally but internationally. Israel, for its part, has refused to 
engage the Arab world as one entity. Examples of this tactic have included Israel’s 
refusal to sit down simultaneously with all parties at the peace process talks139 and the
137 B. Raman, “National Missile Defense-Theatre Missile Defense: Right Question, Wrong Answer,”
South Asia Analysis Group paper number 22, Executive Assessment, 18 May 2001, 
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Sharon government’s non-answer to the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah’s 
peace initiative offered at the 22nd Summit of the Arab League, held in Beirut, 
Lebanon, in March 2002.140
Dating back to Ben-Gurion’s Periphery Policy, Israel has historically sought to 
break out of this restrictive labeling and reach out to other non-Arab peoples in the 
Middle East. The development of Israel’s close ties with Turkey can be viewed as a 
natural progression of this tendency. The creation of five new non-Arab, culturally 
Muslim states abutting the region gave the opportunity for Israeli policy to again 
advance the concept of a greater Middle East.141 As an Iranian journal noted, “[Tjies 
with Central Asia... has somewhat diluted the concept of an Arab Middle East. And 
from a strategic point of view, the proximity of this region with Iran, makes the issue 
even more significant for Israel.” 142
A v e r t in g  t h e  F o c u s  f r o m  t h e  M id d l e  E a s t  P e a c e  P r o c e s s  
For Israel, the Middle East peace process is not just about establishing peace 
and security with its immediate neighbors; it has also come to be a prerequisite to 
greater international recognition and acceptance and by extension, greater security. 
Thus, Israel’s efforts are intended not just for Arab consumption but for international 
consumption; peace with its neighbors, per the Israeli perspective, can also serve as a 
means to solidify the security of the state, both regionally and internationally. 
Through negotiating settlements with its Arab neighbors, Israel stands not only to
Palestinian Affairs on the 9th round of the Middle East peace process talks held in Washington, 
DC, during the summer of 1993.
140 Under the Saudi initiative, all 22 members of the Arab League agreed to recognize Israel in exchange
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secure the safety of its citizens but also to gain the international recognition that it has 
long sought. For example, through acceptance Israel’s permanent position in the 
United Nations would be finally established as either an Asian, Middle Eastern, or 
even European member.
The Israeli public and policy makers alike are well aware of the impact the 
peace process has 011 the state’s international standing. From the perspective of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, the number of nations with full diplomatic relations with 
Israel is often used as an informal measure of the success of Israeli foreign policy. As 
mentioned previously, following the Oslo Accords, the number of nations recognizing 
Israel rose to an all-time high. This demonstrates the importance other nations have 
placed upon Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians. Not only does engagement 
with the Palestinians and Israel’s other neighbors move Israel closer to international 
normalization, it also undercuts the popular international perception of Israel as being 
an anti-Muslim state.
Therefore, it is not surprising that during previous lulls and hiatuses in the 
peace talks, Israel’s relationship with the Central Asian republics truly began to 
emerge. As the peace talks slow down or falter, Israel continues to advance its goal of 
eliminating the anti-Muslim perception. At the time, this fact was widely written 
about in the Arab and Iranian press. Many Arab commentators saw links between the 
Netanyahu government’s intransigence in negotiations and the development of ties 
with Central Asia. Israel and Netanyahu were charged with avoiding the 
“consequences of economic cooperation” 143 and “sidestepping the Arab world.” 144 
Likewise, for engaging Israel while the peace process withered, the republics were 
also subjected to a wide range of criticisms, ranging from charges of authoritarianism
143 “Netanyahu seen trying to sidestep the Arabs by forging ties with Central Asian States,” Mideast
Mirror 12, no. 122 (1 July 1998): p. 19, quoting Atef al-Gomhari, al-Ahram (Cairo), 1 July 1998.
144 “Netanyahu seen trying,” p. 19.
to allegations that these nations had renounced Islam.145 When looking back at the 
recent history of the Arab-Israeli peace process, one can now discern trends regarding 
the status of Israeli-Central Asian relations in which, during lulls in the negotiating 
process, Israel would ramp up its engagement with the former Soviet republics to 
offset diplomatic slowdowns closer to home.
Muslim Eurasia represented an opportunity for Israel to expand the number of 
non-Arab Muslim nations with which it deals in order to offset the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This is important because as the perception that Israel is anti-Muslim 
decreases, Israel’s position vis-a-vis the peace talks increases. If Israel is able to 
remove, or at least lessen, the role of religion in the peace process, the negotiations 
become more a discussion about real estate and less a confrontation over who owned 
the land first. In a sense, this policy is also about defusing international Muslim rage 
so that the negotiations can become a question of where to draw a line on a map and 
not a challenge to a nation’s legitimacy and sovereignty. Israel was fearful that the 
Central Asian states might align themselves against Israel and against it’s position vis- 
a-vis the peace process: “If these republics become [sic] Muslim states, Jews fear, 
they will also turn anti-Israeli and, by extension, anti-Jewish.” 146
Central Asia and the Peace Process
Most of the states in the Middle East sought relationships with the Central 
Asian republics. A number of actors in the region attempted to win over the new 
states to their perspective on Middle East issues (such as the status of Jerusalem, the 
state of the peace process, and the general question of the role of religion in society).
145 See, e.g., “Uzbekistan’s ‘unholy alliance’ with Israel,” Mideast M inor  12, no. 235 (21 October 1998):
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Israel was particularly concerned that the republics would side with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and it is important to bear in mind that at 
the time of independence, the PLO was still an illegal organization (from the Israeli 
perspective) and was banned from the Occupied Territories. The potential entry of 
five more Muslim nations into the ‘rejectionist front’ of nations opposed to the State 
of Israel drew the attention of both the Israelis and the PLO, but none more so than a 
nuclear-armed Kazakhstan. For Israel this issue raised serious concern, and 
diplomatic activity by both the Israelis and the Palestinians quickly followed. Shireen 
Hunter has noted that “ties with Central Asia were more important for Israel when it 
had not made peace with Jordan and the PLO.” 147
This race for the republics was not just between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Shortly after Israel began its diplomatic blitz in Central Asia, Syria also made the 
rounds in the region, and “the ensuing competition had political, strategic, economic, 
ideological, and cultural dimensions.” 148 Within this same time frame, other states, 
most notably Iran and Saudi Arabia, also joined the fray.
M a in t a in in g  t h e  St r a t e g ic  R e l a t io n s h ip  w it h  t h e  U n it e d  St a t e s
Over the course of the Cold War, Israel’s strategic importance to the United 
States grew. Israel was perceived to be a We stern-oriented outpost of freedom and 
democracy amid a host of hostile and unstable nations aligned against Western 
interests. This perception increased during the Reagan Administration, when US- 
Israeli relations were at their height. It is important to note that with the end of the 
Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, Israel’s leaders feared 
that its strategic relationship with Washington would also wane.
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Coming as it did in the aftermath of the Shamir loan guarantee debacle and 
Washington’s displeasure with “the Likud settlement policy in the West Bank and 
Gaza,” 149 the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred at a time of particular strain in the 
US-Israeli relationship. After Israel had agreed to refrain from striking back at Iraq 
after Israel was subjected to repeated Scud missile attacks, had endured the fear that 
their enemies would perceive this inactivity as a lack of Israeli nerve to use force 
when push came to shove, and had been cajoled by the Americans to participate in the 
Madrid Peace Process, Israeli-American relations were quite stressed. It was only 
natural that Israel would fear that its importance to its most important ally would 
decrease in the post-Cold War era.
Israel’s continued national security was dependent upon not being made 
redundant to its primary sponsor, the United States. It is central to Israeli national 
security policy to maintain very close ties with the United States, as outlined in the 
preceding chapter. The maintenance of a great power relationship is one of the major 
pillars of Israeli national security policy. Israel benefits greatly from this relationship 
and in the post-Cold War environment, it was vital that ties with America continue 
unchanged in strength.
Through a veiy well orchestrated campaign, Israel has been able to redefine 
itself as a bulwark against fundamentalism and specifically Iranian Shi’a extremism 
now that the war against Communism has been won.150 Since the events of 11 
September 2001, Israel has further tried to cast itself as being on the frontlines of the 
war on terrorism. In depicting itself as an outpost of liberal democracy battling Sunni 
Islamist radicalism, Israel portrays itself as the first line of defense against al-Qaeda-
149 Jacob Abadi, Israel's Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy,
(London, 2004), p. 427.
150 Michael Parks, “Israel calls itself bulwark against ‘Islamic terror’,” The Los Angeles Times, 3 January
1993.
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directed or -inspired terrorism. By replacing the ‘Red menace’ of Communism with 
the ‘Green peril’ o f Islamist radicalism, Israel has played to the concerns of its 
benefactors and will continue to receive the nearly $3 billion in combined annual 
assistance from Washington. It was written at the time (February 1993, just over a 
year into Central Asian independence) that “Israel is raising the war cry against Iran 
to recreate the comfortable situation it used to enjoy as Washington’s ‘strategic asset’ 
against communism. Iran and its Islamic revolution are simply the handiest 
solution.” 151
This is neither to propose that Israel is not in a dangerous neighborhood nor to 
deny that it is faced daily with very real threats of its own. The violent al-Aqsa 
Intifadah, the rise of a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, the continued Iranian support 
for Palestinian rejectionist groups, and Teheran’s ongoing nuclear program are all 
proof of Israel’s very real and very precarious security situation. The threats that 
Israel confronts do not originate in Central Asia; however, the threat that they may 
manifest themselves in Central Asia is veiy real and it drives Israeli policy in the 
region. Writing before 11 September 2001, former Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim 
Sneh noted that “Iran’s reach can be felt from the Middle East to Uzbekistan.” 152
In sum, the threat of resurgent militant Islam in Central Asia in large part 
continues to allow Israel to maintain its qualitative military edge courtesy of the 
United States.
F o s t e r in g  t h e  C r e a t io n  o f  ‘M o d e r a t e ’ M u s l im  S t a t e s  
This point closely follows the preceding objective: as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, Israeli national security doctrine has held that over time, the
151 “Shaul Eisenberg emerges from the shadows,” Israeli foreign affairs IX, no. 2 (26 February 1993),
p. 4.
152 Ephraim Sneh, “We can’t abandon the spirit of Entebbe,” Washington Jewish Week, 5 July 2001.
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security and stability of the state can be guaranteed only through the establishment of 
full peace and integration with its neighbors. As such, it is essential to encourage and 
foster the growth of what Israeli leaders would term ‘moderate’ Muslim states— 
Muslim states friendly to Israel. Some reports have even gone as far as stating that 
Israel’s intentions in the region were to ensure that the republics remained secular.153
Just a year after Central Asian independence, it was observed that, from 
Israel’s perspective, Islamic radicalism was “sweeping across the Middle East, North 
Africa, and now Central Asia” 154 and would threaten regional stability and security. 
Radical Islam had the potential to become one of the greatest threats to stability in 
Central Asia. As has been mentioned previously, even the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
believed that the republics would ‘return to Islam’ after independence and form 
Islamic governments. Israel— as well as Turkey and the United States, and especially 
the region’s other neighbors Russia and China—had “a common interest in preventing 
the radical Islamization of Central Asia.” 155 Israel found common cause on this issue 
with the regimes in the region who also interpreted radical Islam as a threat to 
regional stability and security. As Shireen Hunter has observed, “[t]he Central Asian 
leaders share Israel’s concerns about Islamic radicalism.” 156
What Israeli leaders can do to influence such developments is arguably 
limited, and the Iranian revolution of 1979 is a prime example. Over the course of 
less than one year, Israel’s closest ally in the region became its greatest adversary. 
The Iranian case is instructive because it demonstrates how quickly developments can
153 Antoine Blua, “Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia,” Eurasianet.org,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501 .shtml (accessed 21 August 
2001).
154 Parks, “Israel calls itself bulwark.”
155 Gulnara Yuldasheva, “Modem Uzbekistan: Problems of Development,” labyrinth: Central Asia
Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1996): p. 40.
156 Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, p. 143.
come to pass and underscores the fact that there is little permanency when it comes to 
Israeli security.
Israeli policy does incorporate allowances for some influence on its Muslim 
neighbors, in the form of both inducements and threats. The lure of trade, access to 
international lending and trade forums such as the World Trade Organization, and the 
impression that cordial relations with Israel can translate into positive relations with 
the United States157 and other western nations are all often held out as benefits that 
would follow from a lack of enmity in dealing with Israel. Israeli policy often holds 
that when belligerent behavior goes uncorrected, negative repercussions may follow. 
Such repercussions may be in the form of threats of direct military action, covert 
activities, or coordination with Israel’s primary benefactor and ally, the United States, 
in creating a unified policy position.
Ultimately, Israeli policy cannot much influence the pace or form of political 
Islam in its regional neighbors. It can act passively as a model for a secular state and 
provide hope for new nations, demonstrating that “by adopting certain sociopolitical 
means, by adapting to the technological and scientific environment of the modern 
world, and by internalizing certain values” 158 a nation can be led to stability and 
prosperity. What it can actively do, however, is to block, stymie, and frustrate the 
actions of other states such as Iran from spreading their influence.
157 Many aspects of Israeli power and influence are overestimated by international observers. One area
in which Israeli influence is quite substantial, however, can be found in Washington, DC where 
Israeli interests are often taken quite seriously. Israel has lobbied on behalf o f several other 
nations, including Azerbaijan, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and India (based in part on Brenda 
Schaffer, PhD [University o f Haifa, Israel], in discussion with the author 4 November 2005, 
Jerusalem). Also see Dilip Hiro, “Uzbekistan: Karimov’s Visit to Israel Cements Ties,” IPS 
News Reports, n.p., n.d. and Hillel Kuttler, “Sharansky, Uzbekistan FM to boost ties through 
joint US appearances,” The Jerusalem Post, 11 March 1999.
158 Israeli, “Return to the source,” p. 29.
E n c o u r a g in g  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a n  E c o n o m ic  H in t e r l a n d  
Israel has a modem industrialized economy and both the Israeli public and 
private sectors actively seek out new markets. Likewise, pre-existing markets were 
also sought: As Robert O. Freedman wrote in 1993, “Israel, which had begun to 
develop economic ties to Central Asia in the final years of the Soviet Union, hoped to 
be able to further these ties, particularly because it could offer assistance in the 
agricultural sector, especially in the areas of irrigation, water management, and cotton 
growing.” 159 Because of its sheer size and its vast resources Central Asia is an 
attractive area for economic cooperation. According to a report on Eurasianet.org, 
“[T]hough geographically distant from Central Asia, Israel is playing an increasingly 
significant economic role in the region.” 160 The report cites several reasons for 
Israel’s commercial relationship with the republics, including “the region’s abundant 
natural resources, and its large pool of relatively cheap but skilled labor.” 161 
Significantly, the size of the Central Asian market has been a prime motivator for 
Israeli economic investment: “Israel sees in Central Asia a potentially vast export 
market.” 162 The region “represents a potentially important market for specialized 
goods, such as machinery, chemicals, and plastics.” 163 While in Uzbekistan leading a 
trade delegation, Minister of Industry and Trade Natan Sharansky noted that Israel 
exported “means of telecommunications, chemical fertilizers, machine tools, medical 
equipment, electric devices, agricultural produce, and plastic goods” to the region.164
159 Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia,” p. 17.
160 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.emasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml
(accessed 21 August 2001).
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(accessed 21 August 2001).
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163 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml
(accessed 21 August 2001).
164 “Israeli delegation to visit Uzbekistan,” n.p., 27 June 1998, http://uzland.info/06_27_98.htm
(accessed 8 April 2006).
Maleki, writing in Amu Daiya , notes that “the expansion of economic ties” is
an essential objective for Israeli policy in Central Asia.165 As the Johns Hopkins
University Central Asia-Caucasus Institute wrote, “Israel attempts through economic
cooperation to support economic development in Central Asian countries, while
pursuing active diplomacy in the region.” 166 Through greater economic cooperation
with the Central Asian republics, Israel “will be able to expand its strategic depth
within the region.” 167 This is to be accomplished in part through joint ventures and
cooperation with Turkish businesses in order to achieve “greater access to markets of
the Newly Independent States.” 168
Developments in Central Asia have the potential to dramatically impact Israeli
national security due to the region’s proximity to the heart of the Middle East, the size
of the Muslim population in the region, the possible rise of Islamic radicalism, and the
region’s abundant natural resources.169 As such, Israeli investment in Central Asia is
critical to the state’s national security and economic health.170 This was noted in an
article in the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst:
Israeli policy-makers on a special hearing 
acknowledged this fact in the Israeli Knesset, where one 
expert said that “ ...fledging partnership [with the 
republics of Central Asia] may be of cardinal 
importance to the economic future of Israel....” Some 
Israeli politicians attach even greater importance to 
Central Asia and claim the “the region holds the 
potential for Israel’s future growth and development, on 
one hand, and danger to Israel’s survival, on the 
other.” 171
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The economic benefits of closer ties with Central Asia were touted by eleven
American Jewish organizations in a B’nai B’rith Center for Public Policy report
urging passage of the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. In addition to B ’nai B ’rith,
Agudath Israel, the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Anti-
Defamation League, Hadassah, Jewish Council for Public Affairs, Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the Orthodox
Union, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
were all “strong supporters” of the legislation. The Silk Road Strategy Act was
supported by these organizations in large part because “genuine independence, peace,
and prosperity” for the republics would translate into benefits for “the national
interests of the West, Israel, Turkey, and other regional allies.” Such benefits would
come not only through preventing Iranian influence but through greater investment by
“emigres to Israel [who] have returned to invest in the native lands.” 172
Five American-Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish
Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, B’nai
B ’rith, and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, were “alerted to the economic
and strategic importance of the region to Israeli” interests.173 These five Jewish
organizations wrote a letter of support on 22 June 1998 to Senator Sam Brownback
(R-Kansas), the sponsor of the act. In their letter these groups wrote that passage of
the legislation would
improve the lives of thousands of Jews. Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have 
significant Jewish populations, and the latter three are 
countries with Muslim majorities that, nevertheless, 
have good relations with Israel and provide models for
172 “Urgent: Tell your Senators,” http://bnaibrith.org/cpp/randa/silkroad699.html (accessed on 5 April
2001).
173 Hershel Shanks and Suzanne F. Singer, “Oil and Jews on the Silk Road,” Moment (Washington,
DC) 23, no. 5 (October 1998), p. 75.
the Islamic world of the benefits of trade and 
commercial activity with the Jewish state.174
S u p p o r t in g  D o m e s t ic  M il it a r y  P r e p a r e d n e s s  t h r o u g h  A r m s  S a l e s
Central to Israeli military preparedness is the continued export of second- 
generation arms to friendly states. The Israeli defense industry is arguably one of the 
primary engines of the Israeli economy, if not its biggest single component. Some 
reports have indicated that Israel must sell arms, equipment, and technologies in 
excess of “$2 billion in order to sustain itself at its current level.” 175 According to 
Yossi Ben Hanan, the head of SIB AT, Israel’s Defense Export Activity, “[T]he very 
survival of Israel [is linked] to an independent defense industrial base.” 176 Israel 
maintains its military superiority over its neighbors and regional enemies through a 
sustained qualitative advantage, which contributes significantly to Israel’s national 
security policy of deterrence and power projection: the Israeli military makes use of 
the best and latest technologies in order to always possess an unparalleled advantage 
over any potential adversary. While the United States and other western nations have 
done much to assist the Israeli military in maintaining its edge, it is ultimately the 
responsibility of Israel’s civilian and military leadership to ensure it never loses this 
edge.
In order to maintain this level of investment, the Israeli defense industry relies 
upon the sale of second-generation aims and technologies to friendly nations. The 
sale of such items generates income that is then reinvested in research, development, 
and production of the next generation of advanced weapons systems. By partially 
funding its military expenditures in such a fashion, Israel is able to continue
174 Shanks and Singer, “Oil and Jews,” p. 75.
175 Nicholas Fiorenza, “Center of Excellence: In a State of War Once Again, Israel Learns from
Practice,” Armed Forces Journal International, (November 2001), p. 46.
176 Fiorenza, “Center o f Excellence,” p. 46.
maintaining its qualitative edge over its quantitatively superior adversaries. Such 
sales also serve a vital intelligence function: it allows Israel’s national security 
establishment to know the disposition and capabilities of the militaries and security 
apparatuses of the foreign states to which it sells amis. This order of battle 
intelligence is of great use, either directly in the event of Israeli military action or 
indirectly if provided to an ally as a liaison favor.
It is interesting to note that one of the first exchanges between Israel and the 
republics was a “proposal to modernize MiG aircraft” in the CIS’ arsenal.177 The 
offer, from state-owned Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), was made public by Channel 
1 TV Moscow on 30 January 1992, at least 12 days before Israeli Ambassador to 
Moscow Aryeh Levin made his tour of Central Asia to begin the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations.178 Under the terms of the proposal, IAI would refit CIS 
“MiG-21 and MiG-23 military aircraft by installing up-to-date electronic equipment 
and Western manufactured radars.” 179 This modernization program was intended not 
only to improve the survivability of CIS combat aircraft in the field but also to 
increase the potential Third World market “which formerly bought equipment and 
arms from the Soviet Union on a regular basis.” 180 This episode demonstrates the 
early existence of Israel’s military relationship with the republics. In a strange turn of 
events, a little over a week later, the Russian military offered to sell Israel “the super-
I S31modern MiG-29,” thereby trumping the Israeli upgrade offer and effectively 
negating the Israeli commercial deal.
177 “Israel: proposal to modernize MiG aircraft,” Channel 1 TV  (Moscow), in Russian, 0300
GMT 30 January 1992, in BBC SWB SU/W0216 A/3[17] (7 February 1992).
178 “Israel: proposal,” in BBC SWB SU/W0216 A/3[17].
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181 “MiG-29s reportedly on offer to Israel,” Channel I  TV  (Moscow), in Russian, 1500 GMT
11 February 1992, in.B5C.SWB SU/1303 A4/l[2] (13 February 1992).
T h e  P r o t e c t io n  o f  L o c a l  J e w is h  C o m m u n it ie s  a n d  C u l t u r a l  H e r it a g e  
In Central Asia, Israel “particularly welcomed warm ties with predominantly 
Muslim states; and they looked ahead to setting up networks for the day when the 
region’s two hundred thousand Jews might need to leave in a hurry.” 182 As discussed 
in the preceding chapter, the Jewish Diaspora has a special significance for the State 
of Israel, not just culturally and socially, but in terms of national security. As the only 
guaranteed protector of Jews in the Diaspora, Israel has a special responsibility to care 
for and provide for Jews living in Central Asia. Although there is no historical legacy 
of anti-Semitism in Central Asia, unlike other parts of the former Soviet Union, “the 
fate of the Jewish population in the Caucasus and Central Asia is another source of 
concern for Israel.” 183 The deportation of European Soviet Jews to Central Asia 
under Stalin actually saved many from the horror of the Holocaust, and many Jews 
were warmly accepted by their Muslim Central Asian neighbors.184
The large number of Israelis with roots in the Central Asian region 
underscores this notion and the independence of Central Asia “gave Israel a historic 
opportunity to communicate with the oldest Jewish communities of Asia, such as the
1 o r
Jews of Bokhara.” Israeli Prime Minister David Levy’s speech to the Knesset on 
24 December 1991 recognized the Central Asian republics and “expressed his hope 
that in return Israel would be able to obtain their cooperation and that they would 
facilitate Jewish immigration to Israel.” 186 Thus “caring for these Jews and preparing 
for their return to Israel, is of prime concern to Tel Aviv’s foreign policy.” 187
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MASHAV AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
An issue closely tied to diplomacy and economic development has been the 
large-scale development assistance that the State of Israel has devoted to the Central 
Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Development assistance has 
been especially sought from Israel for a number of reasons. Among these reasons are 
the extremely large Soviet and Russian immigrant community present in Israel; the 
great number of highly trained Soviet immigrants in Israel who possess an unrivaled 
knowledge of Soviet engineering and who have also retained very valuable social and 
cultural aptitudes; the large number of people in Israel who are proficient in Russian; 
and the fact that Israel, through its aid agency, offers free Russian language training 
courses for Central Asians both in the region and in Israel itself.188 Many of the 
newly independent states approached Israel for assistance in specific areas in which 
they perceived Israel to be particularly adept, such as in drip irrigation techniques, 
water conservation, and soil management.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Center for International Cooperation, known 
by its Hebrew acronym MASHAV, is the organization responsible for Israeli aid and 
development projects overseas. In Israel, aid to foreign countries is distributed and 
administered through the Foreign Ministry. This fact is noteworthy because it 
indicates clearly how Israel views aid to foreign countries: as a component of foreign 
policy. While Israel is certainly not the only state to organize itself in this manner, it 
is very relevant when examining Israeli foreign policy. From Israel’s view, 
development assistance cannot and should not be separated from foreign policy; it is 
simply yet another method to advance policy goals and initiatives.
188 For more on the linguistic and cultural aspects, consult Andrey Vasilyevich Fedorchenko, 
“Kazakhstan-Israel: Ways of Economic Rapprochement,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi- 
bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html (accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued). Also based upon field 
research conducted in Central Asia and Israel, 2004-2006.
Writing in 1994, Raphael Israeli cited Israel’s potential aid programs as one of
four areas of appeal to the republics. He wrote that
Israel has tremendous experience and knowledge to 
share in the fields of water conservation, agricultural 
technology, and the development of arid areas.
Devastated Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, following 
many years of monoculture, which polluted their land 
and water, are in much need of Israel’s prowess in these 
domains. So are the poor nations of Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, who might adopt some of 
Israel’s technologies.189
Accordingly, Israel very deliberately made use of the needs of the republics in order 
to influence their post-Soviet politics.
C o n f e r e n c e  o n  In t e r n a t io n a l  C o o p e r a t io n  in  t h e  C IS  a n d  E a s t e r n  
E u r o p e
On 25 November 1997, MASHAV held a conference on International 
Cooperation in the Commonwealth o f  Independent States and Eastern Europe at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Member of Knesset and former Minister of Health Dr 
Ephraim Sneh190 gave a lecture titled “The Countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and their Influence on Israel’s Security.” 191 It is noteworthy that 
Dr Sneh was responsible for the allocation of $20 million in state funds for a hospital 
in Azerbaijan192 and the financing of an intensive care hospital in Ashgabat, 
Turkmenistan.193
189 Israeli, “Return to the source,” p. 29.
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191 Ephraim Sneh, “The Countries o f the Commonwealth of Independent States and Their
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Speaking to MASHAV trainers, Sneh stated that “MASHAV is advancing two 
items on Israel’s strategic agenda: security and economy. I do not consider 
development cooperation to be a donation, nor an act of altruism, but rather, an 
investment of the first rank.” 194 Sneh added that Central Asia is now included in what 
he terms “Israel’s hinterland.” 195 By this he means those states which affect Israel’s 
security, either directly or indirectly, as a result of the advances in military, ballistic 
missile, and WMD technologies (see chapter two). Modem missile technology and 
the proximity of Central Asia to Iran therefore dictates its inclusion in this hinterland. 
In the estimation of Sneh, foreign aid money is therefore really an investment in 
Israel’s security, and he is not alone in his beliefs.196
ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA: MISUNDERSTANDING OF 
THE REGION
While it has become a cliche to write that the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc were unforeseen in Western capitals, it bears repeating 
that many nations were unprepared to deal with the end of what had been the 
prevailing order of the Cold War. It is also important to bear in mind that the 
republics themselves were unprepared for the challenges of independence.197 Many 
Russophiles and Sovietologists were educated, trained, and employed to decipher the 
inner workings of the Soviet Union; however, their experiences and perceptions 
tended to focus largely on the Slavic component of Soviet officialdom rather than on 
the identities of neighboring Soviet Republics. This component of the Soviet Union
194 Sneh, “Countries of the Commonwealth,” http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il. Sneh, telephone
interview.
195 Sneh, telephone interview.
196 Based on Sneh’s paper and conversations with the author held with Israeli officials in
Israel, summer 1999 and November 2005.
197 Yuldasheva, “Modern Uzbekistan,” p. 38.
was primarily—but not exclusively— ethnicly Slavic and religiously Orthodox 
Christian. As such, little was known of the Soviet Union’s vast Central Asian 
landmass, its peoples, cultures, or unique national identities. Throughout the West, 
Central Asia was an unknown entity. These newly created countries had never 
existed as independent nation-states and their national identities, such that did exist at 
the time, were largely artificial constructs, a product of Soviet nationality policies 
whose origins date to national delimitation in 1924. The outside world had to start 
from scratch in building relations with the newly independent states of the region; 
however, with continued Jewish immigration, Israel was able to capitalize on their 
new knowledge-base. 198
For much of the Soviet period, Central Asia remained virtually closed off. 
There were few exchanges with Central Asia and relatively few non-Soviets were able 
to visit the region, much less gain valuable insights through on-the-ground 
experience. It is important to note that this was not the case just for Western and 
Israeli visitors but also for travelers from the Muslim world; Soviet paranoia of an 
Islamic fifth column kept nominally ‘Muslim’ Central Asia very distant from the Arab 
and Muslim worlds.
Fresh in the minds of Israel’s leaders were several notions that greatly 
influenced their perception of the new republics of Central Asia. For the purposes of 
this study, the origins of Israeli perceptions of Central Asia have been broken down 
into four major factors. These four factors which contributed to the formation of 
Israel’s popular interpretation of Central Asia are: (1) a historical memory of Soviet
198 Israeli familiarity with Central Asia differed from that of other nations in an essential area; as Soviet 
Jews increasingly made Aliyah, those originating from Central Asia (including the Bukharan 
Jews) brought with them living memories and connections to the region. These individuals and 
families would prove an invaluable connection and resource for the Slate o f Israel as it interacted 
with the Central Asian republics.
support for the Palestinians and the so-called ‘Rejectionist Front’ of radical Muslim 
nations which were opposed to the existence of the State of Israel; (2) the experience 
of surviving Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War; (3) the lack of 
much experience199 in dealing with Muslim nations; and (4) the fact that Central Asia 
was an unknown entity to Israel. These four factors, when coupled with the black- 
and-white terms in which policy is generally created in Israel, underscored the need to 
engage Central Asia. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, Israeli policy 
makers have tended to view issues relating to national security as questions of 
national survival, and therefore as a zero-sum game in which the State of Israel either 
wins or it loses. Because losing in this sense means the destruction of the state, Israel 
must never lose. The formation of Israel’s relationship with Central Asia was no 
different: the thinking within the Israeli government at the time held that developing 
positive relations with the new republics was paramount to the survival of the state. 
Army Chief of Staff and future Prime Minister Ehud Barak said at the time that the 
“new Muslim republics in Asia don’t seem [to be]... something that will add to our 
health, at least in the long term.”200
Historical Memory o f Soviet Support fo r  Palestine and the 'Rejectionist Front’
Foremost in the popular conception of Central Asia was the memory of the 
Soviet Union’s support of the Arab and Palestinian cause through both words and 
deeds.201 Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained veiy close 
relationships with a number of Arab nations that were opposed to the existence of the
199 Israel’s formal experience was limited to dealings with Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. At the time of the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Israel had limited relations with Turkey, frosty relations with Egypt, no 
relations with Iran since the Islamic Revolution.
~°° Pipes, “The Event of Our Era,” p. 48, referring to Israeli television, broadcast 11 September 1991.
201 See Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia,” pp. 16-20.
State of Israel. Moscow had served as a “spoiler, the supplier of arms to radical Arab 
countries and the instigator of hostility between Israel and its neighbors.”202 As 
successor states to the Soviet Union, therefore the republics of Central Asia were to 
be viewed with much skepticism by Israel.203 As a result, ensuring that these new 
republics did not follow in the tradition of the Soviet Union became a prime goal for 
the government in Israel.
Leading up to and during the 1991 Gulf War, Israel was locked in several 
confrontations with its Muslim neighbors. The first Intifadah continued to rage in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories; Israel was still deeply entrenched in southern 
Lebanon and had yet to engage in the Madrid peace talks. Most importantly, Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein had made repeated threats against the Jewish State, at one point in 
July 1990 threatening to “burn half of Israel” in a chemical warfare strike.204 The 
attempted Iraqi strategy to fracture the international coalition by dragging Israel into 
the conflict certainly played into Israel’s perception of a nation under threat.
Operation Desert Storm: Ballistic Missile Attacks
A second factor that influenced Israel’s perceptions of Central Asia also has 
its origins in the 1991 Iraq war. During Operation Desert Storm, Israel became one of 
the nations subjected to ballistic missile attacks. As has been demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the changing face of modern warfare has increasingly led to the
202 Abba Eban, “Forward,” in Aryeh Levin, Envoy to Moscow: Memoirs o f  an Israeli Ambassador, 1988-
1992 (London, 1996), p. xv.
203 In his memoirs, former Israeli Ambassador to Moscow Levin relates an exchange with Deputy
Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov that took place in late March 1992 on the subject of continued 
arms sales to states hostile to Israel, in particular, a $2 billion sale to Teheran alone. Kolokolov, 
responsible for the Middle East at the Foreign Ministry, remained quiet according to Levin. 
Kolokolov’s wife, however, injected that as long as Russians wanted to live, they would need 
money. This episode indicates that Israeli concerns were not without basis in fact.
204 Karen Laub, “Israeli Official Says Nation is Set to Use Chemical Arms if Iraq Attacks,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 July 1990.
emergence of new security threats. The threat posed by ballistic missiles is just one 
example that has caused the State of Israel to expand its security and threat 
perceptions, and to incorporate dangers lurking beyond its immediate borders.205
During the 1991 Gulf War, over a period of six weeks, “thirty-nine—some say 
forty— Iraqi missiles were fired” at Israel. This was part of an unsuccessful Iraqi 
strategy to fracture the coalition by drawing Israel into the conflict. Over the course 
of those six weeks, the noted Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld writes that 
the total payload of the Iraqi ballistic missile attacks was approximately 10 tons, or 
“less than the combined payloads of two modem fighter-bombers.” Nonetheless, the 
psychological impact of the Iraqi attacks was devastating. Very few Israelis died due 
to the Iraqi missile attacks; far more people sought medical attention after suffering 
from shock or from self-inflicted injuries. Specifically, one person died as a result of 
the missile attacks and two more died of injuries sustained in the attacks, yet over 
1,000 people sought medical attention. Of these, approximately 250 people were 
actually injured in the attacks, about 500 people suffered from shock, and the rest had 
injected themselves with the chemical warfare agent antidote atropine in the false 
belief that the Iraqi missiles were carrying unconventional CW warheads. A further 
ten people are believed to have died from either heart attacks or from “suffocation as 
they failed to unscrew the filter on their gas masks.” Van Creveld notes dryly that 
“Israel has the dubious distinction of becoming the first country in history to go 
through a war in which the number of those who had died of fear exceeded those who 
had been killed by enemy action by a ratio of 10:1.”206
The psychological impact of the threat demonstrated by Iraqi ballistic missiles 
cannot be overstated. Van Creveld contrasts the Israeli experience in 1991 with that
205 Fiorenza, “Center o f Excellence,” p. 46.
206 Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical Histoiy o f  the Israeli Defense Force (New
York, 2002), pp. 331 and 334.
which took place in English and German cities during the Second World War. He 
notes that during WWI1 these cities “regularly absorbed thousands of tons of bombs 
and suffered tens of thousands of casualties without ceasing to function for longer 
than was necessary to repair the worst of the damage.” Similarly, during the Israel’s 
War of Independence, Israelis put on a brave face and were “determined to cope with 
air attacks and cany on life as usual.” This is in stark contrast to how Israelis coped 
during the Iraqi Scud attacks when many Israelis fled to other parts of the country.207
The experiences of 1991 greatly affected Israeli perceptions of security. For 
the first time in Israeli history the state was subjected to a serious threat from far 
beyond its borders.208 Moreover, Israeli intelligence was unable to “provide the 
government with hard data on the size and nature of the threat (e.g., how many 
missiles Saddam possessed and whether he had chemical warheads for them).”209 The 
lack of credible intelligence about the threat at hand would be rectified in the future. 
As shall be demonstrated, a significant factor in Israel’s penetration of Central Asia 
was Israel’s desire to gain intelligence insights into both the threats emanating from 
Iran and Afghanistan. The IDF and the Israeli intelligence community would not be 
left blind again.
Many of the security threats that would emerge from the ashes of the Soviet 
Union— specifically long-range missile technology and weapons of mass 
destruction—parallel what transpired over those six weeks in early 1991. The Iraqi 
Scud attacks bore a specific poignancy for a nation and people so deeply affected by 
the Holocaust; the notion of an Iraqi chemical attack could not be psychologically 
separated from the horror of industrialized murder in Nazi Germany’s gas chambers.
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Allegations (far beyond the scope of this thesis) that West German firms had helped 
Iraq develop its CW capabilities further reinforced this connection.
Little Experience Dealing with Muslim Nations
A third factor which colored Israel’s viewpoint on Central Asia was that at the
time Israel did not have much success in dealing with Muslim nations. It is important
to note when the Central Asian republics got their independence in December 1991,
the State of Israel had secured a peace a treaty only with Egypt, the Camp David 
0 10Accords of 1978. Israel was still technically in at war with the remainder of the 
Arab world, dating from the 1948 War of Independence. The peace with Cairo was at 
best a cold peace— ambassadors had been exchanged and relations normalized—but 
there was little more. Full relations with Turkey were still several years away from 
blossoming into their current state. At the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Turkey was the only other Muslim nation to recognize Israel, a precondition for 
Turkey’s admission to NATO.211 Likewise, other peace deals were yet to come. The 
Oslo Accords with the PLO (September 1993) and the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
(26 October 1994) were still approximately two and three years away, respectively.212 
Lacking many relationships with Muslim nations, Israel was quick to act: “In addition 
to the usual reasons for seeking good relations, they [the Israelis] particularly 
welcomed warm ties with predominantly Muslim states.”213 This was essential to 
undercut Israel’s so-called ‘anti-Muslim’ image, as well as the perception of Israel 
abroad as being anti-Muslim. Moreover, this fact should not be overlooked; it is an 
important consideration because one of Israel’s main objectives in establishing
210 Menashri, interview.
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212 Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, p. 143.
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relations with the Central Asian republics was to defuse tensions and decrease 
international Muslim fervor over the pace of the peace process.
Unknown Entity
The fifth factor in Israel’s perception of Central Asia was ignorance. Central 
Asia was an unknown quantity to many countries in the West, and Israel was no 
exception. As noted above, even the Iranian government was ignorant vis-a-vis 
Central Asia.
For instance, the Iranian threat was believed in firmly and rarely— if ever— 
challenged. Just how Shi’a, Persian-speaking Iran was to make inroads in Sunni, 
predominantly Turkic-speaking Central Asia—-with Tajikistan being the notable 
exception—was evidently not much examined at the time in Israel, nor in London or 
Washington for that matter. However, both Israel and Washington had deemed Iran a 
threat to the security of Central Asia,214 and by extension a threat to Israel itself. 
Were Iran allowed to do as it pleased in the region, Israeli and US national interests 
would suffer as would the security of the State of Israel.
T h r e a t s  a n d  O p p o r t u n it ie s : P o t e n t ia l  D a n g e r s
At the time of its independence, Central Asia posed several significant threats 
to Israeli security. The perception of these threats helped motivate Israeli foreign 
policy planners to reach out and engage the republics in order to neutralize potential 
dangers.
These threats focused largely around the likelihood that Iran could possibly 
come into possession of strategic weapons and technologies left from the Soviet-era.
214 Arieh O ’Sullivan, “US, Israel conclude strategic dialogue,” The Jerusalem Post, 6 June 1997.
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Primarily this included the existence of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, the legacy of 
the vast numbers of Soviet-vintage special nuclear materials scattered throughout the 
former Soviet Union; and a fear of a post-Soviet brain drain and the migration of 
scientific knowledge to Iran and other hostile states. All o f these threats are hard 
security threats and ones which at the time appeared to be the most pressing, both in 
terms of the sheer numbers involved, but also as a result of the devastating 
consequences if a worst-case scenario came to pass.
Other threats obviously existed in the region. These included the possible rise 
of hard-line Islamist regimes, possible negative consequences for the region’s Jewish 
communities, and the development of rear areas in which anti-Israel terrorist 
organizations could train and seek refuge. Furthermore, Israel was also concerned 
about the possible emergence of new state sponsors of terrorism or the creation of 
new petrol-economies aligned against Israel which could have financially subsidized 
the rejectionist Arab states in their struggle with Israel.
Kazakhstan As a Nuclear State
The Soviet Union’s widely dispersed nuclear arsenal ended up being located 
in four sovereign nations after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union saw nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles located in Belarus, 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and Kazakhstan. Repeated assurances from
Moscow that these nuclear weapons remained firmly in the control of the Russian
» • “*) I ^military unfortunately did little to alleviate justifiable concerns arising from the 
existence of strategic weapons outside the physical control of Moscow. The Russian
215 The Soviet strategic command center with ultimate control over Soviet nuclear arms was located in 
Moscow and not in Kazakhstan. It is therefore a near impossibility that independent Kazakhstan 
would be able to launch or transfer Soviet-legacy weapons of mass destruction independently of 
Moscow. Nikolay Kuzmin, PhD (Kazakh political analyst and former Soviet diplomat and 
military officer), interview with the author, 24 January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
military, after all, had many of its own problems to deal with, from locating enough 
capable young men to serve in the military to providing enough food for its conscripts 
to eat.
Independent Kazakhstan came into existence in 1991 as a de facto nuclear
power due to the presence of over 2,000 Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
located within its territory.216 Kazakhstan fully cooperated in the repatriation of
Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia, as did both Belarus and Ukraine.217 At the
time it was widely feared that ‘Muslim’ Kazakhstan would be a natural destination for
radical regimes, especially Iran, seeking to acquire an operational nuclear warhead or
the components, technology, or expertise to advance its indigenous weapons program.
Such an acquisition, it was feared, could happen by sale, sharing, or theft. The Israeli
concerns regarding Kazakh nuclear capability “can partly account for Israel’s feverish
activity in the region and for its intense efforts to establish diplomatic contacts with 
0 1 &Kazakhstan.” During the research for this thesis, the former Mossad Director- 
General confided in the author that in retrospect it can now be said no Kazakh nuclear 
arms came into Iranian custody.219
Such fears have not centered only on Kazakhstan. Similar allegations of 
Tajikistan selling nuclear technology to Teheran were made on 2 January 1992: 
“Interested parties from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, have reportedly 
visited Dushanbe.”220 The fear of Soviet nuclear weapons falling into the wrong
216 Murat Laumulin, “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Policy and the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in The
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Asian Studies 1, no. 1, (Fall/Winter 1996) and Laumulin, “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Policy.”
218 Abadi, Israel’s Quest fo r  Recognition, p. 437.
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hands nearly became reality in January, 1990: anti-government forces in Baku, 
Azerbaijan, rose up and attempted to breach the “perimeter of an army base... to steal 
the nuclear weapons stored there.”221 In their book detailing the frightening state of 
disarray of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, Andrew and Leslie Cockbum 
document the panic this episode triggered among US intelligence agencies.222 The 
fact that armed rebel forces were puiposely targeting Soviet military facilities with the 
explicit intention of stealing nuclear weapons ushered in a terrifying new era: “A wall 
had been breached. The Soviet Union was visibly crumbling and now it was apparent 
that a vast nuclear arsenal could come adrift in the wreckage. The notion sent chills 
around the world.”223
Special Nuclear Materials and Soviet-Era Weapons
At the time of Central Asia’s independence, the Red Army had been dispersed 
throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. As a result, vast amounts of weapons, 
military materiel, and hardware were effectively transferred to the control of the 
newly independent states. Such materiel ranged from huge amounts of conventional 
military equipment to the Soviet Union’s clandestine chemical and biological research 
and production facilities located throughout Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and southern 
Russia.
Of particular concern were the large numbers of special nuclear materials 
spread throughout the former Soviet Union. These special nuclear materials included 
a variety of non-weapons grade radioactive isotopes such as cesium-137 and cobalt-
Emerging Relations with the Arab States and Israel,” in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance 
and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (London, 1994), p. 318, citing Moscow Radio, Rossi 
Network, 9 August 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92 155 (11 August 1992), p. 2
221 Andrew Cockbum and Leslie Cockbum, One Point Safe: The Terrifying Threat o f  Russia’s Unwanted 
Nuclear Arsenal, (London, 1997), p. 9.
For more on this episode, see chapter one, “Black January,” Cockburn and Cockburn, One Point Safe.
223 Cockbum and Cockbum, One Point Safe, p. 12.
60 that were used in civilian applications such as medical imaging devices, portable 
generators, and food processing and agricultural equipment throughout the Soviet
224Union. The Soviets had done an extremely poor job of properly inventorying their 
nuclear munitions, especially when it came to these so-called ‘orphaned’ special 
nuclear materials. Many were never adequately accounted for and remained Tost’ 
upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
While special nuclear materials such as cesium-137 and cobalt-60 were 
unsuitable for use in traditional nuclear weapons, the concern remained that these 
radioactive substances could be combined with conventional explosives to create a 
radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. Such a weapon would spread radioactive 
debris and particles, contaminating not just the immediate blast area but possibly the 
surrounding areas as well, given the proper weather conditions. Many analyses 
concur that such a weapon would in fact do little physical damage,225 but the 
psychological impact could be significant. While not a weapon of mass destruction, a 
radiological dispersal device would certainly be a weapon of mass disruption, and 
would therefore be a prime weapon for terrorists. The Soviets allegedly conducted 
some tests of radiological weapons at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan.226 There have 
been rumors that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein experimented with similar 
technology, although there is no public evidence to support this claim.
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The ‘Brain D rain' and Scientific Knowledge
The end of the Cold War brought an end to the Soviet Union’s vast military- 
industrial complex. For both US and Israeli national security planners this meant an 
end to the Soviets’ vast program of subsidizing the research and development of 
WMDs; however, the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the knowledge base 
gained over years of WMD production. In addition to the disposition of the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, a third danger arose from the 
large numbers of now unemployed WMD scientists and technicians. This was 
especially true regarding those working in the Soviet biological warfare field, which 
was often referred to as the ‘poor man’s nuclear program.’227
With the end of subsidies from Moscow, the 70,000 scientists and workers 
who had once created enormous quantities of unconventional weapons were suddenly 
unemployed and left with few prospects. It was not long before representatives from 
states of concern began to visit these scientists with very generous employment offers. 
In 1998, The New York Times reported that “Iran is scouring the former Soviet Union 
to hire scientists who once worked in laboratories tied to Moscow’s vast germ warfare 
program and has succeeded in recruiting some of them to take jobs in Teheran.” The 
authors added that Iran was offering salaries as large as $5,000 per month to
knowledgeable scientists-—scientists who had often made less than that amount in an
, 228 entire year.
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In their report, The New York Times noted that at least five former Soviet 
biological warfare scientists had accepted Iranian offers and had relocated to Iran, and 
a further undisclosed number had accepted contracts to complete work for the Iranian 
government’s clandestine WMD program while in Russia. Over a dozen more 
scientists claimed to have been unsuccessfully approached by the Iranian government; 
two of them claimed to have been “asked specifically to help Tehran make biological 
weapons.” American officials have claimed that the actual number of attempted and 
failed recruitments by Iranian government representatives is much higher. It is 
reasonable to conclude that many more scientists may not have admitted to such 
attempted recruitment and that the actual numbers may in fact be much higher. This 
sheds some insight on the size of the problem of the post-Soviet brain drain, 
especially considering the sheer number of scientists who were involved in the Soviet
229program.
Given the size of this problem, it is little wonder that Israeli security officials 
were concerned about the fate of Soviet scientists. If the Iranian government acquired 
advanced Soviet unconventional weapons technologies, there was little reason to 
think that they would not be used to threaten the State of Israel.
T h r e a t s  a n d  O p p o r t u n it ie s : P o s s ib l e  O p e n in g s
The successful application of Israel’s foreign policy objectives in Central Asia 
had the potential to deliver many opportunities and openings for Israel. In addition to 
the obvious benefits of neutralizing the threats of Iranian penetration and Islamic 
radicalism, there are three specific opportunities that thus far have not been discussed
229 Miller with Broad, “Iranians, Bioweapons.”
in detail: greater Jewish immigration from former Soviet Central Asia, enhanced 
commercial relations, and opportunities for increased intelligence collection.
All three of these developments could help bolster Israeli national security. 
The first opportunity to come from independence and greater Central Asian-Israeli 
relations came in the form of increased Jewish immigration to Israel. This would not 
only advance the goal of the ‘ingathering of the exiles’ but would help bolster Israeli 
security by countering the evolving demographic shortfall vis-a-vis Israel’s Arab 
neighbors.
Second, greater commercial ties would not only clearly benefit the Israeli 
economy, but would also provide a means for Israel to expand its presence in the 
region. Greater economic cooperation benefits national security through several 
means. Technology transfers and exchanges create opportunities for Israelis to visit 
the region and vice versa. Through such exchanges, personal relationships are made 
and connections grow. When the time comes to ask for a favor or assistance, it is 
always easier to reach out to a friend. Furthermore, positive relationships can aid in 
preventing the emergence of anti-Semitism—an important point for the region’s 
Jewish communities. Business ties nations together and it has often been said that 
nations that trade together do not go to war; the benefits of ties with Israel 
demonstrably far outweigh any gains from not engaging Israel. Finally, interacting in 
the commercial sector often leads to cooperation in other areas, such as diplomacy 
and security. Some nations may be willing to start a relationship based on trade, and 
from there they can deepen. In short, the close ties that can come about through trade 
with Israel can help solidify Israel’s international security.
A third opportunity in Central Asia would be increased opportunities for 
intelligence collection on several of Israel’s greatest concerns: Iran, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan. Because these are neighboring states of the Central Asian republics, the 
benefits Israeli intelligence could gain by working in the region are significant.
Continued Jewish Immigration
While initially Israel encouraged the immigration of Jews from the former 
Soviet Union, in recent years the state has tempered its original enthusiasm. Soviet 
Jews have made a considerable impact on Israeli culture and have provided a 
significant boost to the population. This fact has been trumpeted by some Israeli 
security advocates who see a larger Jewish Israeli population as vital to Israel’s 
national survival because of the demographic disparity between the Israelis and 
Palestinians.
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, immigration to Israel was attractive to 
many people seeking a better life. Fraudulent documents identifying the bearer as 
Jewish facilitated this immigration process for those who would otherwise be 
ineligible. Criminals fleeing prosecution also fraudulently entered Israel and this 
influx eventually gave rise to organized crime in Israel. Israel’s basic law enshrines 
the Jewish right-of-retum through provisions for any Jew to make Aliyah and claim 
Israeli citizenship. Furthermore, under Israeli law, no Israeli citizen can be extradited 
to another country to stand trial. Because of this, Israel has become a natural 
destination for any fugitive wishing to avoid prosecution. Instances of trafficking in 
persons and narcotics, especially the smuggling of female sex workers and trade in the 
drug Ecstasy, have increased with the arrival of the so-called ‘Red Mafiya’ in 
Israel.230
230 Conversation with a journalist for a major Israeli newspaper who wished to remain anonymous, held 
in Jerusalem in November 2005.
As of 2006 most of the Jews able and willing to relocate from Central Asia 
have already done so.231
Commercial and Economic Relations
Israel fared better than any other Middle Eastern nation when it comes to 
doing business in Central Asia. In this regard, “Israel has been more successful in 
developing economic ties than have Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other rich Muslim 
Gulf states,”232 and, in fact, it is the “Middle Eastern state with the largest number of
• * 233joint ventures” in Central Asia. Agricultural and irrigation technology have figured 
prominently as have telecom technology, fertilizers, machine tools, medical 
equipment, plastic goods, and agricultural produce.234
Joint ventures and business investments are a means by which Israel can 
influence events in Central Asia as well as bolster its own domestic economy. The 
development of an economic hinterland has long been a goal of Israeli policy makers. 
Deals with Israeli businesses, especially those done through the government’s arms 
and technology firms, may also be viewed as a form of state subsidy. An example of 
this can be seen in Israel’s state-owned aircraft industries; for years a failing business, 
it has been kept alive in part through foreign deals with Israel. In short, Israel reckons 
Central Asia can serve as a large market for its exports with which it can fuel its
235economy.
Private sector commercial relations between Israeli businesses and Central
Asia are noteworthy for several reasons. First, the government actively participates in
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promoting trade and economic cooperation. Second, Israeli policy has been to gain 
influence in Central Asia in large part through technology transfers and investment, 
much the same way it has utilized development assistance.
In terms of commercial relations with Central Asia, several Israeli firms have 
done quite well in the republics. These include the Merhav Group; Netafim, Inc.; 
Beta Shita; Ben Shanar Associates; Bateman; Gamatronic Electronic Industries, Ltd; 
RAD Data Communications; Alvarion; Tadiran Electronic Industries; Solan 
International Communications Service; K.Sh.S. Contact Ltd; Optical Access; and the 
Eisenberg Group. In terms of revenues, Beta Shita earned $6 million for a trial 
irrigation system in Andijon, Uzbekistan,236 and as of 1998, Israeli firms have done in 
excess of $1 billion in projects at the Merkhau refinery.237 In 1993, Saul Eisenberg 
was reported to have “lined up deals in Kazakhstan worth a potential $2 billion.”238 
Furthermore, for the republics, Israel is an attractive partner in large part due to its 
“free trade relationships with the United States and the European Union, as well as 
with Canada, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Jordan, and Turkey.”239
Generally speaking, there have been several reasons why Israeli firms have 
done so well in Central Asia. First among these has been the active participation of 
the Israeli government. Israel has lobbied the governments of the republics on behalf 
of industiy sectors as well as specific firms. Commercial relations have also benefited 
from the state’s decision to extend export credits and insurance to Central Asia. An 
important second reason for Israel’s success has been the perception of Israeli firms in
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the republics: the reputation of the technology that has made the kibbutzim bloom has 
preceded itself.
A third factor in Israel’s success has been the number of Israelis of Central 
Asian origin. These individuals not only know local languages such as Uzbek and 
Tajik/Persian, but they also know the lay of the land. Having grown up and been 
socialized in Central Asia, they also speak the same cultural language, and this has 
allowed them to return to the region to do business with people they most likely went 
to school with and possibly even knew as children. This local, firsthand knowledge is 
unbeatable in a business culture that still remains largely based upon who you are and 
the art of personal negotiation. The large numbers of Russian-speaking Israelis (the 
largest Russian-speaking population outside of Russia) have also helped commercial 
relations, although regional language proficiency has allowed Israelis to in a sense 
bypass Moscow and go straight to the source.240 Those Israelis that can trace their 
roots back to Central Asia have for the most part been actively doing business in the 
republics. A commonly held belief in the new Central Asian republics was that 
“Jewish immigrants from the Southern Tier were expected to invest in their countries 
of origin.”241
These factors are interestingly combined in the person of Natan Sharansky, 
Minister of Industry and Trade in the Netanyahu government. Although not 
originally from Central Asia, he has come to be representative of Israel’s interests in 
the region. During his tenure, Sharansky made many visits to the region, and served 
as the de facto “Netanyahu government coordinator in dealing with Russia.”242 It has 
been observed that Sharansky is linguistically at ease with Central Asian leaders, who
240 For example see Hiro, “Uzbekistan.”
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are invariably fluent in Russian.243 It is also believed that the Ukrainian dissident and 
native Russian speaker was active in promoting Israeli business in Central Asia due to 
personal interest.244
Intelligence Collection Opportunities
Relationships with the Central Asian states have proven to be a windfall for 
Israeli intelligence. Israeli intelligence agencies have operated in the region on the 
issues relating to the proliferation of WMDs and missile technology and have also 
tracked the development of international Islamist terrorism. They have also been 
active in monitoring developments in neighboring Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
During a July 2001 visit to Kazakhstan, Israeli Minister of Infrastructure 
Avigdor Lieberman (himself a native Russian speaker originally from Moldova) 
“suggested that Israel and Kazakhstan could engage in information exchanges on 
combating terrorism,”245 an example of how security cooperation can grow from trade 
discussions. Similarly, Uzbekistan has approached Israel for intelligence cooperation 
and assistance in combating Islamist terrorism.246
Since the republics’ independence, “Israel has sought to promote security ties 
with Central Asian governments.”247 Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington, DC, “Israel has been supplying the US with an 
extraordinary amount of behind-the-scenes intelligence assistance and security
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advice”248 on Central Asia, especially on Afghanistan.249 According to The 
Jerusalem Post, Washington sought Israeli intelligence regarding Central Asia 
because “Israel has a stronger foothold”250 in the region. This intelligence assistance 
was provided because “Israel has better intelligence and stronger relations with 
countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.”251 Uzbekistan has been noted to host 
a significant Israeli intelligence presence, rumored to be the Mossad’s largest station 
in the region.252
With regard to WMD technology, several sources have reported that Israeli 
operatives have been involved in collecting intelligence 011 the status of Kazakh 
nuclear weapons, at times in cooperation with their counterparts from the CIA.253 
Dovetailing with Israeli’s concerns about the fate of Soviet nuclear scientists, Aras 
notes in a 1998 article that “the Mossad and CIA keep a close eye on the nuclear- 
energy experts of the Central Asian states.”254
Israel’s human intelligence collection, or HUMINT, has benefited as a result 
of the presence of “Israeli military and intelligence personnel to serve as support for 
US operations against Osama bin Laden from the territory of Tajikistan.”255 The 
reports of Tajik-based operations are not the only ones, however. Analogous 
reporting has surfaced which has placed Israeli observers and advisors-—and even 
some Israeli human intelligence assets256— in Afghanistan, an allegation which Abdul
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Rashid Dostum’s National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan has controverted.257 
Other reports indicate Israeli presence in the disputed region of Indian-controlled 
Kashmir.258
Because this region continues to be a denied area for Israeli intelligence 
operatives, much of Israel’s intelligence collection with respect to Iran, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan has been in the form of greater signals intelligence (SIGINT) and 
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). SIGINT refers to 
communications intercepts and/or any other information that can be obtained though 
electronic intercepts; MASINT refers to the intelligence collected through both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of sophisticated technical collection systems. 
These data have the potential to improve Israel’s understanding of the types and 
designs of the weapons in question as well as to monitor the pace of technological 
advancement. Both Iran and Pakistan possess threatening missile and nuclear 
weapons programs; Pakistan became a known nuclear power in 1998, while Iran 
continues to actively pursue its ambitious WMD and ballistic missile acquisition 
program. Israeli intelligence agencies and the entire national security establishment 
are focused on monitoring Iran’s progress in developing a nuclear bomb. Reportedly 
aspects of Israeli intelligence services have established a location “across its [Iran’s]
June 2001). See also Kathy Gannon, “Arabs in Afghanistan Claim US Link,” Associated Press, 
n.d., http://www.afgha.com/?af=archive&op=printpage&artid=108 (accessed 2 April 2006).
257 “There is more heavy fighting in N. Afghanistan,” reprint of Voice o f  America, broadcast 1544 GMT
15 July 1998, http://www.angelfire.com/ny/chapandaz/page5.html (accessed 13 June 2001). This 
report states that the Northern Alliance deny using Israeli military advisers, referencing an 
Agence-France Presse (n.d.) story which reported the presence of Israeli military advisors.
258 See “Israel trains Indians for conflict with Muslim Kashmir,” The Jerusalem Post, 15 August 2001;
“Israeli national security advisor to visit India next week,” Agence-France Presse, 6 September 
2001; “Govt denies reports o f Israeli commandos,” Arab News, 29 September 2000; “Israeli 
terrorism experts visit Delhi,” Strategic Affairs, http://www.stratmag.com/issueOct-l/page02.htm 
(accessed 22 June 2001); “The India-Israel connection,” Strategic Affairs, 
http://www.strategic.com/issue2Sep-l/page01.htm (accessed 20 January 2003); “India Deploys 
Israeli Hi-Tech War Equipment in War Preparations,” DEBKAfile, 31 December 2001; and 
“Pakistan Downs Indian Spy Drone Made in Israel,” DEBKAfile, 8 June 2002.
northern border”259 (which would place it in either Turkmenistan of Afghanistan) 
from which to keep an eye on Iran. Curiously, Israeli intelligence officers are located 
in both of these nations.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dramatically altered the geopolitical 
landscape throughout the world. In Israel, the unfolding events in Central Asia were 
being watched with particular interest. Israel’s greatest fear at the time was that the 
new republics would fall under the sway of Iran’s fiery brand of revolutionary Islam 
and adopt Teheran’s fierce opposition to the very existence of the Jewish State. The 
twin threats of radical Islam and Iranian influence drove Israel’s policy community to 
act.
This chapter has sought to examine the ways in which Israel approached 
Central Asia. By exploring Israel’s foreign policy objectives and concerns in the 
region, it has been demonstrated that Israeli engaged the Central Asian republics in 
order to protect and ensure its own national security. Popular misconceptions about 
the region further facilitated the Israeli view that the emergence of independent 
Central Asian states were a security challenge. Israeli policy quickly and aptly 
adapted to identify and neutralize perceived threats and rapidly took advantage of new 
opportunities.
Building on this foundation, the following chapters will detail in depth Israel’s 
relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
259 “Israel and Afghanistan” Foreign Report, 18 June 1998, http://www.janes.com.
Ch a p t e r  F o u r : Is r a e l ’s R e l a t io n s h ip  w it h  U z b e k ist a n
Israeli policy toward Uzbekistan was propelled by the desire to ensure that 
Uzbekistan did not align against Israeli interests. Israel had three concerns regarding 
Uzbekistan: the potential rise of Islamist extremism in Uzbekistan, Tashkent’s 
position 011 the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the fear of that Iran might have an influence 
in Uzbekistan. The fate of the historic Jewish community in Uzbekistan provided a 
further motivation for Israeli policy. As the region’s most strategic and populous 
state, Uzbekistan was considered a bellwether for the region. In order to prevent the 
devolution of Uzbekistan into a nation hostile to its interests, Israel sought to support 
the regime of President Islam Karimov and thus bolster stability throughout the 
region. Israel engaged Uzbekistan in diplomatic relations and development 
assistance, economic and commercial relations, and security cooperation. Primarily 
through a combination of economic and commercial relations, Israel created a 
framework of political and diplomatic agreements to bolster the Uzbek state. Israel’s 
policy of constructive engagement with Uzbekistan successfully forestalled the 
emergence of a government hostile to Israeli interests and laid the foundation for a 
strong relationship. As a result, governmental cooperation between the two states 
grew close through a shared sense of danger, which arose mainly from their like- 
minded perception of threats from militant Islamist extremists and Iranian-backed 
fundamentalists.
This chapter will demonstrate the scope of Israeli-Uzbek relations through an 
analysis of the interactions in the areas of diplomatic relations and development 
assistance, economic and commercial relations, and security cooperation over the 
course of the first decade of Uzbekistan’s independence. Developments in these three 
areas will be examined in order to determine Israel’s motivations. Special attention 
will then be given to an analysis of Uzbekistan’s voting pattern in the United Nations 
General Assembly on resolutions related to the Middle East that are considered hostile 
to the State of Israel. This will be used as a metric with which to gauge the success of 
Israel’s policy of constructive engagement.
To facilitate the analysis in this chapter, the Israeli-Uzbek relationship over the 
course of the first decade of Uzbek independence has been broken down into three 
periods which correspond to the contours of the relationship. During these three 
phases the relationship first grew close, then experienced an interlude of several years 
while Israeli attentions were directed to pressing security matters closer to home, and 
finally entered a period of sustained re-engagement. In the first phase (1991-1994), 
Israeli-Uzbek ties began from very limited relations to include diplomatic, 
commercial, and security interactions. Significant development assistance and 
commercial contacts took place during this initial period. By the end of this first 
phase, however, the attentions of Israeli policy makers began to drift towards more 
pressing concerns.
The next phase of the relationship (1995-1997) was characterized by an 
absence of important interactions. There were no major Israeli visits to Uzbekistan 
during this lull, and fewer then five agreements were reached. Commercial relations 
continued and these provided the continuity in the relationship despite a lack of 
activity on other fronts. Although there was little diplomatic activity and no security
cooperation in the relationship during this period, it is important to note that the 
overall relationship did not deteriorate. The foundations of the relationship remained 
strong, which allowed ties to increase and grow in strength quickly during the third 
phase of the relationship (1998-2001). This period witnessed a re-invigoration of the 
friendship, replete with numerous visits and the conclusion of a number of 
international agreements between the two nations, and trade continued to be steadily. 
During the third phase, the Israeli-Uzbek relationship truly began to show benefits for 
Israeli national security.
This chapter concludes with brief sections that examine Uzbekistan’s position 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and an analysis of Uzbekistan’s voting behavior in 
the United Nations General Assembly on resolutions related to the Middle East that 
are considered hostile to Israel. The development of Tashkent’s position on these 
resolutions is used as a metric to gauge the success of Israel’s policy of constructive 
engagement.
p h a s e  i, 1991- 1994 : a c c e l e r a t e d  e n g a g e m e n t
Israeli policy toward Uzbekistan during the first phase of the relationship was 
primarily concerned with preventing the emergence of a government in Tashkent that 
would be hostile to Israel and its national interests. Israel also sought to block the 
perceived rise of Islamist extremism and to frustrate perceived Iranian attempts to 
interfere in Uzbekistan. On the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was Israel’s intention to keep 
Uzbekistan neutral, at the very least, on the question of Palestine. Achievement of 
these goals, it was hoped, would create another non-Arab Muslim state friendly to 
Israel; this would help advance Israel’s general policy goals for the region (discussed 
in chapter three). Israel thus engaged Uzbekistan in diplomatic relations and offered
development assistance, initiated economic and commercial relations, and fostered 
security cooperation.
D ip l o m a t ic  R e l a t io n s
Uzbekistan held particular importance for Israeli policy in the region; located 
at the center of the region, it retained the largest population, possessed the region’s 
holiest Muslim sites, and had a history of religious activism. The consequences for 
failing to engage Tashkent were significant: if the new Uzbek government was not 
supported, it was feared that the country could devolve into Islamist chaos. Such a 
situation would be a detriment in the region, provide an entry for Iranian influence, 
and be disastrous for the Uzbek Jewish community.
Diplomatic Recognition
Israel first recognized the independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan 011 25 
December 1991. Uzbekistan was the first of the newly independent Central Asian 
republics to officially establish diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, and 
during 1992 Tashkent and Israel cooperated closely.261 At the time, the state-owned 
Uzbek media commented that this development was event “not only in the interests of 
Uzbekistan and Israel, but it is of great importance to the countries of Central Asia 
and also
260 This information is drawn from a limited-circulation official Uzbek government document entitled
“Information on Commercial-Economic Relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the 
State of Israel,” p. 1. Document was written by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and translated from the Russian “MHcJjopMauHJi O ToproBO-SicoHOMimecKHX Cbh3hx 
Pecny6jiHKM y36eKHCTaH C TocyflapcTBOM LbpaiiJii,.” Obtained in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 
October 2004, and in the collection of the author.
261 Henry Hale, “Islam, State-building and Uzbekistan foreign policy,” in The New Geopolitics o f
Central Asia and Its Borderlands, eds. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Bloomington, 1994), 
p. 136.
Table 4.1 Major Visits, 1992-1994
Date Visitor Purpose Location
Feb ’92 Ambassador Aryeh Levin Ceremony to mark relations Uzbekistan
Aug '92 Deputy Justice Minister Mirze Abdo Salmov
Discussion of
increased
relations
Israel
Jul ’94 Foreign Minister Shimon Peres Official Visit Uzbekistan
Sep ’94 PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat
Discuss 
recognition & 
exchange of 
ambassadors
Uzbekistan
Sources: FB1S; BBC SWB, Levin (1996); author’s research.
Table 4.2 Major Agreements, 1991-1994
Date Agreement Focus WhereSigned
25 Dec 
’91 Israeli recognition of Uzbekistan Political Israel
24 Feb
’92 Establishment of diplomatic relations Political Uzbekistan
1993 Treaty discussions on air transit inter­operability Economic NA
1 May ’93 Tourism agreement Economic Israel
4 Jul ’94 Aviation agreement Economic Uzbekistan
4 Jul '94
Protocol on consultation between the 
Foreign Ministries of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan and the State of Israel
Political Uzbekistan
4 Jul ’94 Agreement on tourism cooperation Economic Uzbekistan
4 Jul ’94 Protocol on developing & supporting business (protection of investments) Economic Uzbekistan
Sources: FBIS; BBC SWB; Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade, and Finance;
Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations; author’s research.
Kazakhstan.”" " Table 4.1 details the major visits that took place during the first 
phase of the relationship.
262 “Israel establishes diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan,” Uzbek Radio (Tashkent) in Uzbek, 0300 
GMT 24 February 1992, in British Broadcasting Corporation. Summon' o f  World Broadcasts 
(hereafter BBC SWB), SU/1314 A4/l[2] (26 February 1992).
Establishment o f  Diplomatic Relations
Aryeh Levin, Israel’s Ambassador to Moscow, was in Tashkent 011 24 
February 1992 to officially establish diplomatic relations and representation (see table
4.2). Levin met with Karimov and the Uzbek leadership, held talks with Foreign 
Minister Ubaidallah Abdulrazakov and Tashkent Hakim (governor) A. I. 
Fazylbekov,263 and oversaw the initial search for a building to house Israel’s new 
legation. In two months, Israel had extended recognition and opened diplomatic 
relations with Uzbekistan and was in the process of establishing a permanent presence 
in Tashkent, a pattern that would be repeated in other states.
In Levin’s discussions with Abdulrazakov a number of issues were brought 
up, including economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation between the two nations. 
Such cooperation was viewed in Tashkent to be advantageous to the fledgling 
republic.
Levin noted in his memoirs the concerns that both he and his government had 
over the position of Islam in newly independent Uzbekistan, and the potential threat 
that political Islam posed to the security of the State of Israel. These concerns, 
however, did not reflect the facts on the ground. At the time, the Islamic threat was a 
fiction; neither the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan nor the Afghan Taliban 
movement in Afghanistan was yet a reality. While in Tashkent in February 1992, 
Levin discussed these issues with his hosts. According to Levin, one of the primary 
topics was the question of whether Uzbekistan would replace the Cyrillic script with 
the Arabic script the Uzbek language had once used. I11 1924, the Latin script 
replaced the Arabic script in the written form of the new official Uzbek language, and 
in 1940, Uzbek was forced to change to use the Cyrillic script. According to Levin, it
263 “Israel establishes diplomatic relations,” in BBC SWB, SU/1314 A4/l[2] (26 February 1992).
was the Israeli government’s position that usage of the Arabic script “was seen as a 
very strong vehicle for Muslim fundamentalism.”264 In response to a direct question, 
Abdulrazakov indicated that the Uzbek government had yet to decide whether the 
Arabic script would be used to replace Cyrillic.265 The veiy fact that these topics 
were discussed during Israel’s first major diplomatic conversation with Tashkent 
illustrated the importance that staunching Islamic fundamentalism held for Israel. 
This also indicates the Israeli government’s poor understanding of the region, as 
Islamist fundamentalism had yet to be a serious concern, however, it does reflect the 
fear and concern that partially motivated Israeli actions in this period.
Conversion to the Arabic script, it was feared in Israel, would ease 
Uzbekistan’s return to the Muslim World and would facilitate the spread of extremist, 
anti-Semitic, and anti-Israeli propaganda. Coupled with the concerns of recent 
incidences of intercommunal unrest and violence in the Ferghana valley (June 
1989),266 Israel’s early concerns over the role of Islam in Uzbekistan were 
exacerbated. While the unrest in Ferghana was not related to Islamist extremism, 
these events were viewed as what could come to pass.
According to an unattributed article in Israeli foreign affairs, in September 
1992, Uzbek officials who were visiting Israel made it a point to warn of 
“fundamentalist Islamic efforts to influence policies of the former Soviet republics.” 
This had little reflection to developments on the ground in the region; yet it 
demonstrates how the Uzbek government was communicating to the Israelis what 
they believed the Israelis wanted to hear. The Uzbeks were part of a delegation which 
comprised Azeri and Kazakh officials as well, and the warning was delivered to
~64 Aryeh Levin, Envoy to Moscow: Memoirs o f  an Israeli Ambassador (London, 1996), p. 351.
265 Levin, Envoy to Moscow, p. 351.
266 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional
Security (Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 42-43.
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. This also indicates that through its policy of 
constructive engagement, Israel was slowly drawing Uzbekistan closer. If this was 
so, the Israelis were certainly pleased to hear representatives of nominally ‘Muslim’ 
nations express concerns over Islamic fundamentalism, concerns which matched 
Israeli anxieties.267
Visit o f Foreign Minister Peres
In early July 1994, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres made an official
* 268visit to Uzbekistan. Islamist extremism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were the 
two primary issues discussed during this visit. In meetings with President Islam 
Karimov, Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov, and Foreign Minister Saidmuklitar 
Saidkasymov, Peres told his hosts that Israeli-Uzbek cooperation was very 
advantageous for both parties and relayed his government’s desire to establish strong 
diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural ties,269 Peres discussed a number of 
other issues in his official meetings, including proposals to expand and increase 
bilateral cooperation, and Uzbek efforts to transform the economy and implement 
democratic and legal reforms.270 Peres also met with leaders of the local Jewish 
community in Uzbekistan.
According to Israeli sources, the first and main topic of Peres’ discussions in 
Tashkent was Islamist extremism. Peres stated his belief that Uzbekistan and Israel
267 “Israel said to be covertly arming Azerbaijan,” Israeli foreign affairs VIII, no. 9 (4 November
1992): p. 5.
268 Glenn Eldon Curtis, ed., Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: countiy
studies (Washington, DC, 1997), p. 457. See also “Shimon Peres in Tashkent and Ashghabat,” 
labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly (autumn 1994): p. 13.
269 “peres y isits Tashkent, Samarkand,” Tashkent Radio Network in Uzbek, 1100 GMT 4 July 1994, in
FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
270 “Agreements signed with Foreign Ministry,” Tashkent Radio Network in Uzbek, 1330 GMT 4 July
1994, in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
share in a joint battle against radical Islam.271 Karimov agreed, and spoke out against 
Iranian-backed extremism: he told Peres that “Israel and Uzbekistan were united by 
the need to combat Islamic fundamentalism”272 originating from Iran. Peres further 
stated, “Like Uzbekistan, Israel is fighting fundamentalism, poverty, and war and I am 
sure we shall win this war... Fundamentalism in my judgment is a danger to [Uzbek] 
lives even more than to Israel. It is a movement of repression, of extremism, of 
backwardness, and it may hold up the progress of Arab life.”273 Besides stressing the 
dangers to non-Arab Uzbekistan, Peres also emphasized the impact of 
fundamentalism on the Arab world in order to point out the threat that Middle Eastern 
transnational Islamist extremism posed to Uzbekistan and Central Asia.
The second major topic of Peres’ discussions was the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. He sounded out the Uzbek government’s position regarding Palestinian
974autonomy and succeeded in securing public Uzbek statements regarding the 
neutrality on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Karimov told Peres that 
conflict with the Palestinians can “only be resolved by means of peace talks and 
active political considerations.”275 The Uzbek government also expressed its support 
for the peace process, according to open sources, and Foreign Minister Saidkasymov 
informed Peres that Tashkent thought Israel was making positive steps towards 
peace.276
271 “Peres Notes Joint Interests,” Qol Yisra’el (Jerusalem) in Hebrew, 1200 GMT 3 July 1994, in FBIS-
CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
272 “Shimon Peres in Tashkent and Ashghabat,” labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly (autumn 1994): p.
13.
273 “Israeli Foreign Minister Arrives For Official Visit,” Itar-TASS in English, 1405 GMT 3 July 1994,
in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), pp. 56-57.
274 “Uzbeks want to make their peace with America through Israel,” Izvestiya (Moscow) in Russian, 5
July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
275 Victor Niyazmalov, “Roundup on Israeli Foreign Minister’s Visit,” Itar-TASS in English, 2004
GMT 4 July 1994, in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
276 “Agreements signed with Foreign Ministry,” in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
According to the Russian newspaper Izvestiya, during Peres’ visit to Tashkent, 
the Israeli government was asked to “intercede with the Americans to improve 
strained US-Uzbek relations.”277 This referred to a minor incident regarding the 
harassment by the Uzbek government of an Uzbek national employed by the 
American embassy. Peres agreed to explore possible ways for Israel to mediate 
between Uzbekistan and the United States, making much more of this incident than 
was actually case, however, it stands as the first time in which Israel offered to use its 
relationship with the United States to advance relations vis-a-vis Uzbekistan. Israel’s 
offer to serve as an interlocutor with Washington demonstrates that the Uzbeks had 
come to appreciate the benefits of ties with Israel, and it also attests to the successes 
of Israeli policy in cultivating the relationship. Israel benefited not only in giving 
assistance to Uzbekistan in their relationship with the United States, but also in 
reinforcing to the American government that Israel was a useful and beneficial ally to 
have in dealing with the Muslim republics of former Soviet Central Asia.
Because of both the reception Peres received in Uzbekistan as well as the
unity in Israeli and Uzbek positions on the threat of Islamist extremism, Uzbek-
Iranian ties suffered. In July 1994, both Teheran Radio and the Tehran Times278 were
highly critical of Peres’ visit to Tashkent. As the Central Asia Monitor reported,
Remarkably, the criticism focused as much on 
Uzbekistan’s leadership as on Peres; the Tehran Times 
said that Uzbek President Islam Karimov had been 
reinforcing dictatorial rule through a ‘brutal repression 
of democratic and Islamic forces.’ The Iranian
comments apparently mark a rapid deterioration of 
relations between the two countries, which had seemed 
close to a rapprochement when Iranian president Ali 
Akbar Rafsanjani visited Tashkent in October 1993.279
277 “Shimon Peres in Tashkent and Ashghabat,” p. 13, citing Izvestiya, n.d.
278 As an English language publication, the Tehran Times is not intended for mass domestic
consumption. Its opinions are more directed to readers abroad.
279 Central Asia Monitor, no. 4, (1994): p. 3.
As one commentator noted, stalling any progress Iran may have achieved in its 
relationship with Uzbekistan was an advancement of Israel’s policy of constructive 
engagement. Peres’ visit advanced Israel’s agenda in Uzbekistan, but it also appears 
to have set back Iran’s efforts to establish good relations. It is interesting to note that 
according to Iranian government sources, Teheran’s ire was directed as much toward 
Uzbekistan as Israel. This is important because it indicates Iran’s perception and 
recognition of the fact that Uzbekistan was not just reacting to Israel’s advances, but 
that Tashkent was actively seeking closer ties with Israel at the expense of Teheran. 
Iran’s displeasure at the Uzbek government only served to reinforce the perception 
that the Iranians were seeking to further the Iranian-Uzbek relationship to the benefit 
of Teheran, not Tashkent. Conversely, Israel’s overtures to Uzbekistan not only meet 
Uzbek needs, but reinforced the prevailing perception in Israel that Iran was an 
unwelcomed actor. The Iranian reaction to Peres’ visit was one of the greatest 
indicators during the first phase of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship that Israel was 
succeeding in its aims to prevent Iran from gaining influence in Central Asia. 
Through Peres’ visit, Israel was able both to identify Islamist extremism as a common 
enemy and to secure Uzbekistan’s position on the peace process.
A number of agreements were signed on investment protection, air transport, 
and tourism cooperation, and a protocol establishing and normalizing consultations 
between Israel and Uzbekistan was signed as well.280 Methods for boosting trade 
were also the subject of substantial talks between Peres and Sultanov.281 Peres 
expressed Israel’s thanks to Karimov personally and the Uzbek government generally 
for Uzbekistan’s attitude towards the local Jewish community282 and for the
280 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 1. See also “Agreements signed with
Foreign Ministry,” in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
281 Niyazmatov, “Roundup,” in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
282 “Peres Notes Joint Interests,” in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
compassion extended to Soviet Jewish evacuees during World War II.283 At the end 
of the visit, both parties agreed to work toward further visits at the presidential and 
prime ministerial level.
Yasir Arafat ’s 1994 Visit to Tashkent
In September 1994, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat made a working visit to 
Tashkent. While in Uzbekistan, Arafat held meetings with President Karimov, 
Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, and acting Oily Majlis Chairman Erkin 
Khalilov; he also met with Foreign Ministry officials and Majlis deputies. At the time 
of this visit, Uzbekistan and the Palestinians did not have embassy-level diplomatic 
relations. During his visit Arafat emphasized the “ancient links” between Palestinians 
and Uzbeks. Over the course of his two-day visit, Arafat discussed with his hosts a 
number of issues, including the situations in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and 
Tajikistan. However, no documents (agreements or protocols) were signed. On the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Karimov stated that he welcomed the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (13 September 1993).284
President Karimov commented during Arafat’s visit that “[w]e see Uzbek- 
Palestinian relations as an inalienable part of our cooperation with the Arab world.”285 
Karimov’s statement is indicative of the Uzbek’s positive approach to foreign 
overtures during this period, and it is important to not that Karimov had no prior 
foreign policy experience. It also provided an important insight because it explained 
how Tashkent approached relations with the Palestinians, as well as how Uzbekistan
283 “Agreements signed with Foreign Ministry,” in FBIS-CE-94 (5 July 1994), p. 57.
284 “ ‘Arafat Comments on ‘Solid’ Links to Uzbekistan,” Interfax (Moscow) in English, 1918 GMT 14
September 1994, in FBIS-CE-94 (15 September 1994), p. 54. see also “ ‘Arafat Arrives In 
Tashkent; Meets With Karimov,” Ostankino Television First Channel Network (Moscow) in 
Russian, 1050 GMT 15 September 1994, in FBIS-CE-94 (16 September 1994), pp. 67-68.
285 “‘Arafat Arrives In Tashkent,” in FBIS-CE-94 (16 September 1994), pp. 67-68.
engaged the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fact that Uzbek interaction 
with the Palestinians was viewed through the lens of cooperation with the Arab world 
and not the relationship with Israel allowed Uzbekistan’s relationship with Israel to 
evolve unencumbered. For Karimov, Uzbekistan’s relationship with the Palestinians 
was a component of Tashkent’s emerging foreign policy toward the Arab world. The 
Uzbeks did not seek to maintain parity in their dealings with both the Israelis and 
Palestinians; on the contrary, Tashkent’s relationship with Israel was much more 
substantive and nuanced than its relationship with the Palestinians. Karimov was 
careful in maintaining Uzbek neutrality on the question of Palestine; however, this 
was not done at the expense of close ties with Israel. Moreover, that Arafat made his 
first visit as PLO Chairman to Uzbekistan three years after Uzbek independence 
reflects the relative unimportance of Uzbek-Palestinian relations.286 It is important to 
bear in mind that at the time, there was no Uzbek sense of parity in relations with 
Israel and the Palestinians.
Development Assistance As Diplomacy
As an extension of both diplomacy and commerce, development assistance is a 
critical component of foreign policy. Uzbekistan, a newly independent nation dealing 
with its legacy of Soviet-era social and environmental problems, had a great need for 
assistance as it was confronted with the realities of self-govemance; this was 
especially true in the immediate aftermath of independence (1991-1992). Faced with 
the end of subsidies from Moscow and a crippling economic situation, much needed 
development assistance served to help steady Uzbekistan in the post-independence 
period. Assistance helped alleviate some of the hardships that followed the
286 Arafat had previously traveled to Tashkent as a representative of the Arab states and not as a
Palestinian official; see “ ‘Arafat Arrives In Tashkent,” in FBIS-CE-94 (16 September 1994), pp.
67-68.
termination of subsidized social services, guaranteed employment, and massive 
ecological damage. Israel had the hope that this would have the effect of buoying the 
Uzbek leadership through uncertain times. Israeli development assistance given to 
Uzbekistan served political and diplomatic ends, rather than economic and 
commercial ones. With Israeli national security concerns in mind, policy makers in 
Israel hoped that development assistance would forestall the emergence of a hostile 
regime in Tashkent and would lessen the likelihood that the region’s most populous 
state would succumb to Iranian overtures. Israel’s assistance programs were helpful 
to some extent during this period, as were those of the Europeans and the Japanese.
Israeli development assistance to Uzbekistan was sizable in the first phase of 
their relationship, especially in the area of agricultural productivity. Other areas in 
which Israeli offered aid included public health programs, medical training and 
education, and land management. Israel was well known for its experts and expertise 
in all of these fields. Small numbers of Uzbeks went to Israel to participate in 
education and training opportunities; in Tashkent, MASHAV specialists created an 
Agricultural Consulting Center because of the large amount o f Israeli foreign aid 
work in Uzbekistan.287 The American Joint Distribution Center has also been 
particularly active in Uzbekistan, providing everything from subsistence foodstuffs to 
building a school, computer education center, yeshiva, and adult community center.288
During the first phase of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship, Israel sought to 
promote its expertise in the areas of agriculture, development, public health, and
287 “jjS-Israeli Cooperation in Central Asia” USAID’s Partnership with Israel’s MASHAV,”
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/car/briefers/rnachav/htmI (accessed 4 December 
2004). Also “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 5.
288 Hershel Shanks, “Tashkent Diary: ‘Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” ’ Moment (Washington, DC) 23,
no. 5, October 1998, pp. 46-49.
environmental protection.289 Most attention was devoted to improving agricultural 
productivity and the yields of Uzbekistan’s main crop, cotton, and many of 
MASHAV’s programs focused on demonstrating how Israeli expertise could help 
“transform collective command economy farms into farm enterprises that can 
compete on the emerging freer market.”290
E c o n o m ic  a n d  C o m m e r c ia l  R e l a t io n s
During the first phase examined in this chapter, the development of economic 
and commercial ties was an essential component of the relationship. Israeli policy 
sought to promote trade and investment and the Israeli government consistently 
worked to help Israeli businesses in the Uzbek market.291 Such investment was a 
combination of government subsidies and private sector funds. This served to 
stabilize the Uzbek government, which in turn created an environment conducive to 
the advancement of other Israeli policy objectives.
Tashkent was eager to capitalize on Israeli expertise in agricultural and water 
usage in arid environments. In the first phase of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship, Israeli 
firms were thus most active in the agricultural sector. Because Uzbekistan’s economy 
was heavily dependent on agriculture, Israeli technologies were immediately 
implemented in the areas of drip irrigation and improving agricultural yields. Another 
area of commercial cooperation between Israel and Uzbekistan involved soil 
conservation technologies. These areas formed the majority of Uzbekistan’s interests
289 Michael Parks, “Foreign Aid: Israelis Back in Business Lending a Hand Abroad, ” The Los Angeles
Times, 27 April 1993.
290 Simon Griver, “Projected Partnerships (an interview with Dan Ben-Eliezer, Director of the Projects
Division of MASHAV),” Shalom Magazine, no. 1, 1997, p. 3.
291 “Israeli Insurance For Trade Risks in Uzbekistan,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 9 September
1999.
in doing business with Israel,292 as well as the bulk of business ventures that took 
place during this phase.
Chart 4.1 Israeli-Uzbek Trade, 1992-2001
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
The Pace o f Commercial Relations
After Uzbek independence, Israeli firms increased their involvement in 
Uzbekistan. Despite these obstacles, Israel worked to establish commercial relations 
and to open the Uzbek economy to Israeli imports.293 In this regard, Israel 
successfully expanded its economic relations (see chart 4.1),
At the end of 1992, there were officially 25 Israeli-Uzbek joint ventures.294 
This, the first year for which there are figures, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics 
recorded data only from May onwards. Before May 1992, imports and exports with 
the Newly Independent States (NIS) were aggregated under the single heading of 
“Former Soviet Union.” A very modest amount was recorded in 1992: there were no 
imports from Uzbekistan and only $0.1 million worth of exports were recorded.
292 Hale, “Islam, State-building and Uzbekistan,” p. 163.
293 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav08l501.shtml
(accessed 2 1 August 2001).
~94 Israeli-Uzbek trade statistics, http://uzbekistan.virtualave.net/Israel.htm (accessed 22 June 2001).
However, in 1993, Israel imported $0.8 million and exported $4.2 million worth of 
goods. Total trade turnover for 1994, the last year of this phase, rose to $5.2 million, 
with imports and exports of $3.9 million and $1.3 million respectively (see table
4.3).295
Table 4.3 Israeli-Uzbek Trade, 1992-1994 
(in Millions of Dollars)
1992 1993 1994
Exports S0.1 $4.2 $3.9
Imports s o . o SO.8 $1.3
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
Major Commercial Investment, 1992-1994
Israeli commercial activity in Uzbekistan during the first phase of the 
relationship occurred in three main areas: irrigation and agricultural; animal 
husbandry; and aviation interoperability and tourism promotion. The majority of 
Israeli private sector activity during this period involved the export and installation of 
drip irrigation technologies. Discussion of some of the more important agricultural 
projects that took place from 1992 through 1994 follows below table 4.4, many for 
which we don’t have details as more was promised than was delivered. Israeli 
sources have made much of the Israeli government’s commercial cooperation with 
Uzbekistan during this period; however, there exists no external proof to substantiate 
these claims, leading to some questions of follow though. What is known is that there 
was substantial interest and overtures involving a number of promises. Numerous 
reports detail alleged progress on the ground, yet in the final analysis, it seems these 
fell short.
~95 Foreign Trade Statistics Monthly, Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel),
http://wwwl.cbs.gov.il/fr trade/ftmenu e vl new.htm.
Table 4.4 Major Israeli Projects, 1991-1994
Year Project Sector Business(es)Involved
Contract
size
(where
known)
Early
1990s
Drip irrigation-before and after 
independence Agricultural Eisenberg Group NA
Early
1990s
Cattle farming and animal 
husbandry Agricultural not known NA
1992 Drip irrigation Agricultural Beta Shita $6m
1992 Drip irrigation at Malek state farm in Syr Darya province Agricultural Netafim NA
1992 Sale of sprinklers Agricultural Netafim NA
1992 Drip irrigation Agricultural Zera’im Gedera NA
1994 Dairy farming Agricultural Einav NA
Source: BBC SWB; author’s research.
Israel’s export of irrigation technology to Uzbekistan originally formed the 
majority of their commercial relationship.246 In 1992 Sadik Safaev, first deputy at the 
Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, told the Christian Science Monitor 
that Uzbekistan “welcomes activity from Israeli firms” and added that four Israeli drip 
irrigation businesses were at that point investing in the new republic.24 The Beta 
Shita company signed an $6 million agreement in September 1992 to install an 
advanced irrigation system in Andijon in eastern Uzbekistan.24s This was a major 
contract because it involved some of the most fertile and agriculturally productive 
regions not just in Uzbekistan but in all of Central Asia. Netafim was also active 
during the first phase of the relationship. It was involved in the sale of sprinkler 
systems to the Organization for Maintenance of Agricultural Equipment"44 and the 
installation of irrigation systems in a number of locations100 including the Malek state
Bulent Aras, The New Geopolitics o f  Eurasia and Turkey's Position (London. 2002), p. 61.
' Q Colin Barraclough, “Muslim Republics Welcome Israeli Irrigation Expertise,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 23 September 1992. 
g!' Aras, New Geopolitics o f  Eurasia, p. 61. See also Barraclough, “Muslim Republics.”
“Sprinklers catch on,” labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly (winter 1995): pp. 30-31.
00 Barraclough, “Muslim Republics.”
farm in Syr Darya province.301 Netafim was also involved in a joint irrigation project 
on a 300-hectare site using technology produced by Israel’s Zera’im Gedera firm.302
Israeli films were very active in the export of agricultural expertise, especially 
concerning cotton production.303 Israeli technology greatly improved the productivity 
of Uzbek cotton farming enterprises, and cotton products accounted for nearly ten 
percent of total Uzbek exports to Israel.304 Uzbekistan’s irrigation system 
traditionally suffered from massive loss of large volumes of precious water en route to
O A f
the cotton fields: many irrigation channels were unlined (which caused water loss
because of seepage), exposed to the sun (increasing evaporation), and frequently in a 
state of serious disrepair.306 Furthermore, chronic over-irrigation in such an arid 
environment destroyed the water table in many portions of the country and led to the 
salinization of the topsoil.307 Since cotton is one of the most intensive water 
consuming agricultural products, Israel technology to maximize water usage was of 
great interest to Uzbek farmers; Netafim’s sprinklers cut water consumption rates in 
cotton production by over 50 percent.308
Another investor in the agricultural sector was Israeli entrepreneur Saul 
Eisenberg, and his investments and enterprises in Uzbekistan reportedly boosted 
agricultural productivity and cut irrigation rates.309 Eisenberg’s drip irrigation 
program increased “cotton production by 40 percent while reducing water usage by
301 “Sprinklers catch on,” pp. 30-31.
302 “Uzbekistan & Israel,” Vesti, 1 September 1999.
303 Aras, New Geopolitics o f  Eurasia, p. 61.
304 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 3,
305 Barraclough, “Muslim Republics.”
306 Based upon firsthand information gained during the author’s fieldwork in Uzbekistan in 2004, 2005,
and 2006.
307 Based upon firsthand information gained during the author’s fieldwork in Uzbekistan in 2004 and
2006.
308 “Sprinklers catch on,” pp, 30-31.
309 “Israel: entrepreneur seeks cooperation,” in BBC SWB , SU/W0213 A/3 [13] (17 January 1992).
two-thirds and fertilizer and pesticide use by 10-20 percent.”310 Curiously, 
Eisenberg’s agricultural investment projects began before Uzbekistan gained its 
independence.311 Perhaps because of this, and because of Eisenberg’s close ties to the 
Israeli government, Israeli foreign policy objectives in Uzbekistan were advanced 
more easily than they otherwise might have been.312 Some reports have alleged that 
Eisenberg’s business activities not only overlap with Israeli government objectives, 
but that Eisenberg has utilized his commercial dealings to provide cover for Israeli 
intelligence collection operations.313
Israel was also active in successful commercial animal husbandry enterprises 
in Uzbekistan during this phase of the relationship. Through the participation and 
technological investment of Israeli firms, Uzbek cattle yields increased and the 
amount of consumable beef was doubled.314 This was accomplished by greater 
efficiency and not through greater investments in land or livestock. Israeli businesses 
were also active in establishing dairy farms in Uzbekistan.315 Einav supplied 800 
Holstein316 dairy cows to the Lenin Mining and Metal Combine in Almalyk, and 
worked to establish a second dairy farm in Karshi.317
The final major area of Israeli commercial activity during the first period 
concerned the creation of direct international air connections to and from Israel, and
310 Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia,” p. 18, citing Abraham Rabinovich, The Jerusalem Post, 21
August 1992.
311 “Israeli-USSR Ties Flourish, Immigrants Languish,” Israeli foreign affairs VII, no. 5 (22 May
1991): p. 3.
312 For example, Eisenberg’s businesses contributed to the ‘opening up China’ for Israel. For more,
consult “Shaul Eisenberg emerges form the shadows,” Israeli foreign affairs IX, no. 2 (26 
February 1992): p. 3.
313 “Kazakhstan deal,” Israeli foreign affairs VIII, no. 10-11 (31 December 1992): p. 8. This article
cites the early 1992 ‘familiarization tour’ former Mossad Deputy Director General David 
Kimche made throughout the Central Asian republics. See also “Israel covertly arming 
Azerbaijan,” p. 2.
314 Khusnidinov, interview.
315 Jonathan Hadar (Desk Officer responsible for the Central Asian republics at the Ministry of Industry
and Trade), telephone interview with the author, 30 June 1999, Jerusalem.
316 Israeli Holstein cows have been specially bred to thrive in hot, arid climates. Judy Siegel-Itzkovich,
“MASHAV: Help to Emerging Nations,” n.p., n.d., document in the collection of the author.
317 “Israeli know-how,” labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly (summer 1994): p. 35.
Uzbekistan was unique among the Central Asian republics in this regard. Flights— 
commercial as well as charter— existed between Israel and Central Asia, especially 
Uzbekistan, during the first two phases of the relationship.318 In June 1991—prior to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Israel and Uzbekistan—there existed an air route from Tashkent to Israel, 
although it is not clear often this operated.319 In 1993 the Uzbek national airline 
signed an interoperability agreement with Israel,320 and during Foreign Minister 
Peres’ 1994 official visit an aviation agreement was signed.321 This, coupled with two 
tourism agreements (19 9 3 322 and 1994), laid the groundwork for future cooperation.
There were several reasons for establishing a direct Tel Aviv-Tashkent route. 
Tashkent is the largest city in Central Asia, and the airport servicing Tashkent served 
“as a major air link for other former republics of the Soviet Union with South Asia 
and Southeast Asia, as well as a major hub linking Central Asia with Western Europe 
and the United States.”323 The attractiveness of Tashkent may also have been 
highlighted as a gateway to other destinations such as India and Malaysia. El A l’s 
decision to make Tashkent a regional destination in part comes from the size of the 
Uzbek Jewish community and the large community in Israel with ancestry from and 
ties to Uzbekistan, especially those who identify themselves as Bukharan Jews. Many 
in this community are interested in visiting the “graves of their fathers” in 
Uzbekistan.324
318 During fieldwork in Israel during the summer of 1999 the author observed a large number of travel
agents advertising very inexpensive and frequent flights from Tel Aviv to Tashkent. Many were 
located along Ben Yehuda Street in Tel Aviv.
319 Daniel Romanowski, “Jewish History of Uzbekistan,” n.p. n.d, 
http://www.heritagefilms.com/UZBEKISTAN.html (accessed 17 November 2001).
"° Curtis, ed., Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, p. 443.
“Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 1.
322 “Tourist pacts,” Israeli foreign affairs no. 5 (25 June 1993): p. 2.
323 Curtis, ed., Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, p. 442.
324 Khusnidinov, interview.
Another justification for making Tashkent a regular destination arises from the 
fact that El A1 serves a vital national security function. Although it is a commercial 
national earner, El A1 operates as one of the primary means for the State of Israel to 
move large numbers of military personnel and materiel beyond Israel’s borders. The 
Israel Air Force does not possess enough military transport aircraft to perform these 
tasks, including evacuation. Israel’s national security planning includes the 
requirement that El A1 airplanes and resources always need be available for use in the 
event that Jews in the Diaspora must be suddenly evacuated to safety in Israel. 
Moreover, the use of El A1 aircraft instead of Israel Air Force transport planes 
facilities greater international cooperation: it is far less controversial for many nations 
to cooperate with Israel commercial airplanes, and it gives plausible deniability. It 
also enables the Israeli government to avoid public scrutiny of some of its activities 
and maintain vital operational security, an attribute widely perceived by the policy 
planning community in Israel as bolstering the success of activities the Israeli 
government would prefer not to publicize. The Israeli government, the military, and 
the national security services all work to keep very close tabs on the location and 
disposition of all El A1 aircraft so that in the event of a national emergency, those 
planes can be ‘deputized’ and pressed into national service in defense of the state and 
in advancement of its national interests.325
The existence of direct Israel-Uzbek routes demonstrates the closeness of ties 
between Israel and Tashkent. The Tel Aviv—Tashkent route is one of Israel’s more 
‘esoteric’ air routes. El A1 has historically run at a loss, and the Tashkent route is not 
a large revenue earner. Thus, as with other El A1 routes that offer significantly 
competitive pricing, the Tel Aviv-Tashkent route also operates in the advancement of
325 Based on discussions with an Israeli intelligence officer and conversations with an El A1 security 
officer, London and Tel Aviv.
Israeli government policy goals: financial gain is far from being the justification for 
continued Tel Aviv—Tashkent flights.
S e c u r it y  C o o p e r a t io n : A n e c d o t e s , P e r c e p t io n s , a n d  R e a l it ie s
Of all of the areas in which a relationship with Israel would be beneficial, 
perhaps military and security cooperation would be the best. Israel has both earned 
and cultivated a powerful reputation as a small but strong and secure state. It is 
known the world over as a state that has proven its capability to defend itself at home 
and abroad, often against overwhelming odds. Given its reputation in military- 
security matters, Israel would be a natural partner for the Uzbek government. When 
the perceptions of the Israeli state to exert its will through the use of force—both 
overtly and by covert means—is held to be among the world’s best, it logical that 
friendly states would seek cooperation in this area. A further reason for Israel’s 
security relationship was because of the local Jewish community in Uzbekistan: 
Jewish and Israeli history has proven that the security of the Jewish people can only 
be responsibility of the State of Israel. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Israel began 
to create networks that would facilitate the evacuation of Uzbekistan’s Jewish 
community in the event that local conditions became inhospitable.326 In short, Israeli 
believed that such cooperation was in their strategic interests.
When it comes to military and security cooperation, it is extremely difficult to 
collect precise and accurate data on arrangements and agreements that both the Israeli 
and Uzbek governments would prefer not to discuss. This is further complicated by 
the reluctance of many sources in Israel and Uzbekistan to comment for attribution or 
to share relevant documents.
326 Daniel Pipes, “The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East,” in 
Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Turkmenistan, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York, 1994), p. 83.
Nonetheless, it would be remiss not to include some mention of the allegations o f security and 
intelligence cooperation said to exist between the two states. The allegations are noteworthy because 
they entail the presumption that Israel and Tashkent operate in tandem. The strongly secular Uzbek 
government, which perceives itself to be locked in a critical struggle with Islamist terrorists, has often 
been accused of waging a war against Islam itself-—similarly, Israel has often been accused of 
perceiving all Muslim neighbors as enemies. The implicit presumption is that Uzbekistan must 
naturally receive help and training from the Israelis since this would serve some Manichean goal to 
destroy strong, organized Muslim political power. While it should go without saying that this is not the 
case, and that it is far from true that Israel and Uzbekistan operate jointly in this manner, there is some 
security and intelligence cooperation between the Israelis and the Uzbeks on matters of mutual 
concern. In the aftermath of Uzbek independence, Israel believed it would be a prudent strategy to 
build relationships with the military and various security apparatuses, partially because of the 
uncertainty in the immediate post-Soviet era and partially because cooperation in these areas would be 
required in the event that the Uzbek Jewish community had to be evacuated. Agencies of the 
Israeli government have also been involved in the training of Uzbek security services, 
especially the elite military units responsible for the protection of President 
Karimov.327 It is important to stress that there is no publicly available information to 
support this claim; however, the frequency with which these claims are repeated— 
both in Uzbekistan and the West—provides an important indication of the perceived 
level of Israeli-Uzbek cooperation.
1991-1994 O v e r v ie w
In the first phase of the relationship, Israel established diplomatic relations 
with Uzbekistan and began the process of cementing Tashkent’s orientation on 
regional affairs through economical and commercial relations. United in a common 
perception of the threats of Iranian-backed extremism and Islamist terrorism, Israeli-
327 Based upon the author’s discussions with Western and Uzbek political observers in the United 
Kingdom and Uzbekistan, 2004.
Uzbek relations grew close. Moreover, Israel sought to secure Uzbek neutrality in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
With the Oslo Accords (1993), many nations that had previously kept Israel at 
arm’s length extended diplomatic relations as Israel implemented Oslo. Israel’s 
isolation in the international community lessened further as relations began to 
normalize with the Palestinians. As the taboo of dealing with the Jewish state began 
to recede, the utility of maintaining positive relations with non-Arab Muslim states 
began to lose its importance to Israel. As a result, Israel’s attentions were directed 
away from the relationship with Uzbekistan. In the second phase of the relationship, 
this trend would continue.
p h a s e  i i ,  1995- 1997 : in t e r l u d e
Israeli-Uzbek ties leveled off in the second phase of the relationship. During 
this period, Israel’s need for friendly relations with non-Arab Muslim states receded 
in importance. This was based 011 the presumption that following the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (1993), peace with Jordan (1994), and progress on relations 
with the Palestinians, Israeli diplomatic isolation would soon end. Acceptance and 
recognition in the international community were optimistically believed would soon 
follow. As some Arab states began to thaw in their relations with Israel, Israel eased 
the urgency of its efforts in Uzbekistan.
Changes in Israel’s security calculus occurred during this period. The 
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist (November 
1995), Hezbollah’s renewed cross-border shelling of northern Israel, Operation 
Grapes o f  Wrath in Lebanon, a series of deadly terrorist attacks by Islamic Jihad, and 
looming Turkish-Syrian hostilities refocused Israeli security attentions closer to home.
During this period Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was elected, mainly (it was 
hoped) to bring security to Israel. The newly elected Likud government thus de­
emphasized negotiations with Israel’s Arab neighbors and replaced this with renewed 
efforts to bring security to Israel from Arab enemies, both real and imagined.
There was little diplomatic activity between Israel and Uzbekistan during this 
period, although commercial relations continued. During the second phase of their 
relationship there was no significant security cooperation other than the sales of 
weapons and ammunition from Israel to Uzbekistan. Annual trade continued to 
increase, and the foundations of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship remained intact.
Between 1995 and 1997, there were only two political developments of note 
aside from Kamilov’s visit. The first took place in 1996 when Uzbekistan protested 
against anti-Israeli platforms introduced by the Iranians at a summit of the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO). The second was the Uzbek decision to upgrade the 
status of its diplomatic representation in Israel to a full embassy (March 1997). These 
two events show that in spite of a pause in the official interaction between the two 
nations, the Uzbeks sought to maintain the solidity of the relationship and to improve 
their ties with Israel.328 These efforts would be recognized by the Israelis in the third 
period of the relationship, to be examined later in this chapter.
D ip l o m a t ic  R e l a t io n s
There was relatively little diplomatic activity between the two nations in this 
period from 1995 to 1997. With the exception of a visit by the Uzbek Water
' * 329  *Munster (and his counterparts in the region-wide National Committee for
328 James M. Dorsey, “Karimov, West share interests in Central Asia,” The Washington Times, 26 June
1996.
329 “Central Asian Ministers for Water Affairs Come to Israel,” MASHAV News, Shalom Magazine, no.
2 (1997): p. 4.
Coordinating Water Resources), Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov was the only 
Uzbek officially to visit Israel. There were no official Israeli visits to Uzbekistan 
during this period.
Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov traveled to Israel in April 1997. While in 
Israel, Kamilov signed several agreements intended to further cooperation in a 
number of areas, including culture, science, and education.330 These were the only 
agreements reached during this phase and they occurred toward the end of it, marking 
the beginnings of another shift in Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan.
Economic Cooperation Organization Protests and Operation Grapes o f Wrath 
Uzbekistan became a full member of ECO in 1992, when full membership was 
extended in November of that year to all the former Soviet Central Asian republics, as 
well as Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. ECO was originally founded in 1964 by Iran, 
Turkey, and Pakistan as an organization called Regional Cooperation for 
Development, and it became ECO in 19 8 5.331 Since 1992, Uzbekistan has attended 
ECO meetings and participated in the organization’s activities. While its stated 
objective is to advance the socio-economic development and integration of member 
states, because Iran led the re-establishment of ECO and because its secretariat is 
located in Teheran, the organization has largely served as a conduit for increased 
Iranian penetration into Central Asia.
At the May 1996 ECO summit, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani gave a speech critical of Israel332 and the United States, and the Iranian 
delegation introduced several anti-Israeli platforms into the summit discussions.
330 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 1.
331 David Menashri, “Iran and Central Asia,” in Central Asia Meets the Middle East, ed. David
Menashri (London, 1998), p. 96, note 58.
332 Andre Grabot, “Five-year-old Uzbekistan lacks democracy but it is a US favourite,” Agence France-
Presse, 1 September 1996.
Visibly disturbed by this, Uzbek President Karimov threatened to withdraw from 
ECO and stated that he opposed “transforming the organization into a military- 
political unit.”333 At Karimov’s insistence, Uzbekistan walked out of the summit in 
protest. The Uzbek position was supported by both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, both 
of whom left the May 1996 ECO summit early in solidarity. For Uzbekistan, it was 
not simply enough to walk out of the summit or to boycott ECO—Tashkent went as 
far as threatening to withdraw its membership over the issue. Uzbekistan would not 
have taken these steps— nor would Kazakhstan or Tajikistan— if relations with Israel 
were not significant, and certainly not if they were less valuable than ties with 
Teheran.334
Karimov, criticizing Iran in remarks which drew the attention of Washington 
and Israel, reportedly said, “If the ECO is to be a political forum for insulting absent 
countries, my country will withdraw from the organization.”335 Karimov’s threat to 
withdraw from the Economic Cooperation Organization for “Iran’s ‘politicization’ of 
the ECO by criticism of Israel”336 was serious and had regional implications. 
Kyrgyzstan joined Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in support of Karimov’s move. 
Ultimately, it matters little whether Karimov’s actions were motivated out of a desire 
to protect Israel, stand up to Iran, or initiate an assertive and independent Uzbek 
foreign policy. The episode serves as an example of how Israel’s constructive 
engagement with Tashkent resulted in problems for Iran in the region: Israel’s 
relationship with Uzbekistan was strong enough to make possible their protest against 
Iran’s “politicization.” No matter the reason, this could be seen as a victory for Israeli
333 Lowell Bezanis, “ECO Summit Rumpus,” OMR1 Daily Digest 2, no. 94 (15 May 1996).
334 Bezanis, “ECO Summit Rumpus.”
333 Grabot, “Five-year-old Uzbekistan.”
336 Curtis, ed., Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, p. xxv.
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policy this was a victory because the incident ended in an Iranian diplomatic setback 
in the region.
This episode also marked the beginning of a new aspect of the Israeli-Uzbek 
relationship. Uzbekistan would increasingly use its voice in international 
organizations to blunt criticism of Israel, especially within the United Nations General 
Assembly (discussed below). The May 1996 ECO summit took place one month after 
Israel launched Operation Grapes o f  Wrath in Lebanon. Designed to end Hezbollah’s 
shelling of northern Israel, the 16-day military assault (11—27 April 1996) generated 
fierce outrage throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. In light of this event and the 
regional turmoil it caused, it is noteworthy that Uzbekistan led opposition to Iran’s 
attempts to criticize Israel within an organization of Muslim countries. The fact that 
Tashkent was able to lead other Central Asian states in protest reinforced the 
usefulness of the Uzbek relationship to Israeli policy makers.
Uzbek Upgrade in Representation
The second political development to take place during this period when 
Uzbekistan upgraded the status of its diplomatic representation in Israel from a 
consulate to a full embassy in March 1997, in recognition of the importance of the 
relationship with Israel. This demonstrates that despite an outward lack of 
engagement in the Israeli-Uzbek relationship, there remained a desire of the parties to 
maintain the firm foundation on which ties had been built. Moreover, it shows that 
Tashkent was not dissuaded from pursuing further interactions with Israel regardless 
of Israel redirecting its attention to matters closer to home.
One month before Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov was scheduled to 
make the only official visit to Israel in this phase of the relationship, President
Karimov made the announcement about upgrading Uzbekistan’s representation in 
Israel to embassy level before a visiting delegation from the Conference of Presidents 
of Major American Jewish Organizations. While the official decision was made 
several days before the official announcement, the choice of audience demonstrates 
both the importance Uzbekistan placed on positive relations with Israel and the Uzbek 
perception of the Conference’s political clout both in Israel and America.337
This last point is significant because Tashkent believed that close ties with 
Israel would translate into a corresponding closeness with the United States. 
Throughout the relationship, the Uzbeks sought to use their ties with Israel to improve 
relations with Washington. In 1994 (in the first phase of the relationship) Uzbekistan 
asked the Israelis to intercede on their behalf in Washington, and in 1999 (in the third 
phase of the relationship) Natan Sharansky and Kamilov made joint appearances in 
Washington, so that the Uzbeks could capitalize on Israel’s ability to open doors in 
Washington.338 Karimov had previously met in Tashkent with visiting delegations of 
American Jewish groups, using such opportunities to highlight his nation’s ties with 
Israel in attempts to build Uzbekistan’s political capital with the United States. Such 
efforts have brought rewards to Uzbekistan, in the form of support from the American 
Jewish community339 and recognition of Uzbekistan’s struggle against extremism.340
337 Data in this paragraph taken from Aryeh Dean Cohen, “Uzbekistan opens embassy in Tel Aviv,”
The Jerusalem Post, 9 March 1997; and “Jews in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan live in Muslim 
World,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 17 March 2003.
338 Hillel Kuttler, “Sharansky, Uzbekistan FM to boost ties through joint US appearances,” The
Jerusalem Post, 11 March 1999.
339 “American Jewish leaders wish victory to Uzbek leader in presidential election,” Uzbek Television
first channel (Tashkent), in Russian, 3 January 2000, in BBC Monitoring International Reports 
(3 January 2000).
340 Such ties were highlighted in the aftermath of the violence in Andijon in May, 2005. See Marc
Perelman, “Uzbek Unrest Shines Light on Leader’s Ties to Jewry,” The Fonvard (New York), 
27 May 2005.
Development Assistance
During the second phase of the relationship, Israel continued their low-level 
assistance programs to Uzbekistan. Most notable was a soil management and forestry 
project MASHAV administered with the Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries.341 Like other Israeli ventures in Central Asia, this project benefited from 
American financial support delivered through USAID. The project was intended to 
assist the expansion of the Uzbek agricultural sector through improvements to land 
that had been destroyed by years of improper irrigation techniques; specifically, this 
project targeted the reclamation of water-logged, high-salinity lands in Ferghana.342 
MASHAV’s project introduced new trees specifically grown to “biologically drain 
and restore unusable land and return these lands for agricultural use and timber 
production in the Ferghana Valley.”343 Also during this period MASHAV 
administered one of its biggest projects in the region, an agricultural program at the 
Ahmed Yassaviy collective farm near Tashkent.344
E c o n o m ic  R e l a t io n s
The second phase of the relationship saw stronger trade relations than during 
the previous period. Total trade turnover doubled from 1995 to 1996(from $9 million 
to $18 million; see table 4.5), and that level remained constant for 1997. Israeli 
exports to Uzbekistan rose in 1995 to $7.6 million, nearly double the amount of the 
previous year. The level of exports more than doubled in the next year: in 1996,
341 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 6.
342 “MASHAV: Help to Emerging Nations,” n.p., n.d., document in the collection of the author.
343 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 6. See also “USAID-MASHAV Partnership
in Central Asia,” MASHAV Center for International Cooperation, n.d., 
http://www.mashav.rnfa.gov.il; and “US-Israeli Cooperation in Central Asia: USAID’s 
Partnership with Israel’s MASHAV,” 4 December 2004, 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/car/briefers/machav/html.
344 “Israeli Cooperation Center Opens Tashkent Club,” Biznes Vestnik Vostoka (Tashkent) in Russian,
15 September 1995, p. 1, in FBIS-CE-92 (27 September 1995), p. 93.
$18.6 million worth of goods was exported to Uzbekistan. In 1997, the amount 
remained nearly the same at $18.3 million.345
During the same period, Israeli imports from Uzbekistan were much more 
modest. In 1995, $1.4 million of imports was recorded. However, that level dropped 
significantly during the next two years: in 1996 and 1997, Israel imported only $0.3 
million and $0.6 million respectively.346
Table 4.5 Israeli-Uzbek Trade, 1995-1997 
(in Millions of Dollars)
1995 1996 1997
Exports S7.6 $18.6 $18.3
Imports $1.4 $0.3 $0.6
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
Major Commercial Investments, 1995-1997
Commercial relations during the second phase of the relationship were limited, 
as shown in table 4.6. Aside from the agricultural projects that continued into the 
second phase of the relationship, Israeli commercial activity was limited to the 
technology, defense, and food processing sectors.
The Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations noted that during this 
phase, 3.5 percent of all Uzbek imports from Israel were classified as “weapons and 
munitions.”347 Model agricultural farms were also established in Uzbekistan “with 
guidance from Israeli experts stationed” '4S in the region. This latter project also 
involved
Foreign Trade Statistics Monthly, Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel),
http://wwwl.cbs.gov.il/fr trade/ftmenu e vl new.htm.
'4<' Foreign Trade Statistics Monthly, http://www 1.cbs.gov.il/fr trade/ftmenu e vl new.htm.
347 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 3.
348 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Year in Review,” Israel Government Year Book, 1999,
http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0gbl0 (accessed 5 March 2001).
Table 4.6 Major Israeli Projects, 1995-1997
Year Project Sector Business(es) Involved
Contract
size
(where
known)
1995 Software and computer services Technology UCD Micros (joint venture) NA
mid-
1990s Wetland reclamation Agricultural MASHAV funded NA
mid-
1990s Weapons and ammunition sales Defense not known
(3% of all 
imports 
from 
Israel)
mid-
1990s Food processing
Food
processing
Flex International 
Manufacturing and 
Trading Ltd
NA
mid-
1990s
Cattle farming and animal 
husbandry Agricultural not known Not known
Sources: Uzbek Foreign Economic Relations Ministry; MASHAV; author’s research.
sending “hundreds of participants”344 to Israel for training in agriculture, medicine, 
and education. Israeli “counselors were dispatched on brief missions as consultants in 
these fields”350 to conduct traveling courses, an example of how commercial relations 
were fused with the advancement of diplomatic objectives and development 
assistance missions. The food trading firm Flex International Manufacturing and 
Trading Ltd was one of only two representative businesses fully accredited by the 
Uzbek Ministry of Justice; the other Israeli business is Netafim.351
In the technology sector, UCD Micros operated in a number of areas, 
including software development, computer training, and network and telecom 
maintenance. This joint venture also performed secure work for the National Bank
349 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0gbl0 (accessed 5 March
2001).
350 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0gbl0 (accessed 5 March
2001 ).
351 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 6.
for Foreign Economic Activity and Visa.352 UCD Micros could not have held 
contracts that dealt with critical and sensitive aspects of Uzbek financial infrastructure 
without some support and encouragement from the Israeli government. Such 
‘assistance’ helps promote and facilitate contracts with the Uzbek National Bank for 
Foreign Economic Activity. This type of business facilitation activities are in line 
with comments made by Israeli trade officials that their government actively 
supported and encouraged Israeli businesses, especially with respect to the hi-tech 
sector.
As in the previous period, there is much that is still not known regarding the 
specifics of Israel’s commercial relationship with Uzbekistan from 1995-1997. 
Although many Israeli sources indicate the level of investment between the two 
countries, in this analysis it again appears that much more was promised and 
discussed than was actually followed through upon.
1995-1997 O verview
The second phase of the relationship between Israel and Uzbekistan saw a 
noticeable reduction in the pace of development. As Israel was focused on other, 
more immediate concerns, the Israeli-Uzbek relationship seemed to level off as a 
result of a lack of engagement. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated in the next 
section, it is important to note that Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan did not 
deteriorate appreciably during this period. Because of this, the relationship would 
grow much stronger during the next phase.
Israeli policy had optimistically anticipated that regional security would 
increase because of Israel’s steps towards normalization with its Arab neighbors;
352 Data regarding the Israeli-Uzbek joint venture UCD Micros is drawn from the prospectus of the
Uzbekistan Computer Design Group (UCD Group).
353 Based upon author’s field research in Israel (2005) and Uzbekistan (2006).
because this did not happen, Israel would again turn its attentions towards Uzbekistan. 
Strong ties with Tashkent would help block Iranian ambitions, demonstrate to the 
world that Israel was not alone in its fight against Islamist terrorism, and combat 
Israel’s anti-Muslim image. Furthermore, Israel could advance its security policy by 
working with Uzbekistan even when it appeared that it could not do so with its 
regional Arab neighbors. In stepping back from the peace process, Israel sought to 
regain regional initiative. The conditions that had previously led Israel to decrease the 
scope of its interaction with Uzbekistan were now underscoring the reasons for 
Israel’s re-engagement with Tashkent.
p h a s e  h i , 1998- 2001 : r e -e n g a g e m e n t
Following the lull in relations from 1995-1997, Israel re-engaged with 
Uzbekistan during the last phase of the relationship to be examined in this chapter. 
Realizing that Israel’s security was not being strategically furthered by its policies 
with its immediate Arab neighbors, the benefits of positive relations with Uzbekistan 
were reaffirmed. As a means to block Iran and staunch the spread of Islamist terror, 
warm ties with Uzbekistan were believed would promote Israeli interests and security.
In this third phase of the relationship, Israeli policy towards Uzbekistan 
involved diplomatic and political interaction, economic and commercial ties, and 
security cooperation. More visits took place and more agreements were created than 
during the other periods examined. This built upon the foundations that had 
previously been laid and created a strong framework for cooperation. Israel was 
successful in its objective to thwart Iran, thus preventing the emergence of a hostile 
government in Tashkent. Uzbekistan shared Israel’s suspicions of Teheran and
radical Islam, and became a steady international actor, aligned with Israeli interests 
and protective of its local Jewish communities.
D ip l o m a t ic  R e l a t io n s
During this final period, a number of significant political events occurred. 
President Karimov made his first visit to Israel and several high-ranking Israelis 
visited Uzbekistan, as detailed in table 4.7. Through these visits, a great number of 
international agreements were signed (see table 4.8), creating a strong framework for 
the friendship. Trade restrictions eased and Uzbekistan did not add to the pressure on 
Israel to make concessions in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians. The more 
important visits and an analysis of their impact on the relationship follows below.
Table 4.7 Major Visits, 1998-2001
Date Visitor Purpose Location
May ’98 PM Benjamin Netanyahu Official visit Uzbekistan
Jul ’98 Minister of Industry and Trade Natan Sharansky
Trade
promotion tour Uzbekistan
Late '98 Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai
Discussion of 
increased 
relations & 
defense 
cooperation
Uzbekistan
Sep *98 President Islam Karimov Official state visit Israel
Sep ’98 President Islam Karimov Working visit Ramallah
Apr V9 PLO Chairman Arafat Working visit Uzbekistan
mid-
1999 Uzbek Health Minister
Discussion of
increased
relations
Israel
mid-
1999 Uzbek Agriculture Minister
Discussion of
increased
relations
Israel
Jul ’01
Minister of National 
Infrastructure Avigdor 
Liberman
Trade
promotion tour Uzbekistan
Sources: Itar-TASS\ FBIS; BBC SWB; Eurasianet.org; author’s research.
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Table 4.8 Major Agreements, 1998-2001
Date Agreement Focus WhereSigned
Jun '98 Bilateral trade agreement Economic Uzbekistan
Jun '98 Economic cooperation agreement Economic Uzbekistan
Jun '98 Agreement to assist in irrigation Economic Uzbekistan
Jun ’98 Agreement to build greenhouses Economic Uzbekistan
Sep ’98 Protocol on the Joint Establishment of Cultural Centers and their Activities Academic/cultural Israel
Sep ’98
Plan for Cooperation in the Sphere of 
Public Health and Medicine between 
the Ministry of Health of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of 
Health of the State of Israel
Public health Israel
Sep '98 Agreement on Commercial and Economic Cooperation (signed) Economic Israel
Sep '98 Agreement on technical cooperation Technical Israel
Sep '98 Agreement on cooperation in the sphere of agriculture Economic Israel
Sep '98 Agreement on cooperation in the 
sphere of environmental protection Technical/ecological Israel
Sep '98 Protocol on mutual assistance in customs affairs Economic Israel
Sep '98
Cooperation between the National 
Bank of Foreign Economic Activities 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the 
Israeli Foreign Trade Risks 
Corporation (IFTRIC)
Economic Israel
Sep ’98
Protocol on double taxation (ratified 
early 1999, implementation 1 Jan 
2000)
Economic Israel
Sep '98 Protocol on the prevention of tax evasion Economic Israel
Feb '99
Agreement on Commercial and 
Economic Cooperation (came into 
force)
Economic NA
Mar '01 Samarqand-Tel Aviv flight agreement Economic NA
May '01 Agreement on servicing and refueling of El Al planes in Tashkent Economic NA
May ’01
Agreement on servicing and refueling 
of Uzbekistan Havo Yullari planes in 
Tel Aviv
Economic NA
Jul '01 Joint declaration on prospects for trade and cooperation Economic Uzbekistan
Ju! '01 Discussion of air transit cooperation Economic Uzbekistan
Jul '01 Joint economic declaration Economic Uzbekistan
Sources'. FBIS; BBC SWB; Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations; Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; author’s research.
Cultural and academic exchanges also grew during this period. In July 2000 
the Israeli embassy, Jewish Agency, and the Shalom Jewish Center in Bukhara 
organized an exhibition of work depicting Jerusalem by well-known Israeli 
photographers.354 This was the fourth in a series of similar exhibitions organized by 
the Israeli government in Uzbekistan. Other similar activities included concerts 
featuring Israeli and Uzbek musicians, a festival of Israeli art, and an Israeli film 
festival.355
Visit o f  Prime Minister Netanyahu
On 28 May 1998, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stopped in 
Tashkent en route from China. In meetings with President Karimov and Prime 
Minister Utkir Sultanov, Netanyahu discussed issues of importance to Israel, 
including Iran’s nuclear program, Islamist extremism, and developments in regional 
security. No agreements were signed during this visit; however, Netanyahu invited 
Karimov to visit Israel, and initial discussions of his official visit began at this time.356
Netanyahu’s visit to Tashkent was significant and indicated that the third 
phase of Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan had begun. It was one month shy of 
four years since the last official Israeli visit, and with Netanyahu’s meetings in 
Tashkent, Israeli policy had shifted to include re-engagement with Uzbekistan. In the 
Arab world, Israel’s renewed attentions toward Uzbekistan were seen as a move that 
allowed Israel to avoid the constraints that had developed in dealing with its Arab
354 “Jerusalem from a Bird’s Eye View,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 20 July 2000.
355 “Festival of Israeli art,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 1 February 2001.
356 “Israeli Prime Minister in Tashkent,” RFE/RL Newsline: Transcaucasia & Central Asia, 29 May
1998.
neighbors and in effect, to concentrate on building ties with non-Arab ‘Muslim’ 
nations with which Israel could accomplish its foreign policy objectives.357
Netanyahu’s visit was followed quickly by two other senior visits. In July 
1998 a trade promotion tour was led by Minister of Industry and Trade Natan 
Sharansky and in late summer Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai traveled to 
Tashkent. Mordechai was reported to have discussed defense cooperation with the 
Uzbek government, although no public documents were signed during his stay. These 
two visits built upon Netanyahu’s re-invigoration of the relationship with Uzbekistan. 
Sharansky’s visit is detailed in the section on economic relations later in this chapter.
Karimov \s Official Visit to Israel
President Karimov made a three-day official visit to Israel begimiing on 14 
September 1998 during which Israeli-Uzbek cooperation was greatly advanced. The 
issues discussed included the increased threat of Islamist extremism, as well as 
economic and commercial relations. Karimov stressed Israeli-Uzbek economic ties as 
a means to build greater cooperation between Israel and Tashkent, and he reiterated 
his government’s strong opposition to Islamist extremism.358 In addition to 
Karimov’s meetings with Israeli President Weisman and Prime Minister Netanyahu, 
Karimov also met with Sharansky and Israeli business leaders.359
During his 15 September 1998 meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the 
two leaders discussed Islamist extremism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
357 “Netanyahu seen trying to sidestep the Arabs by forging ties with Central Asian States,” Mideast
Mirror 12, no. 122 (1 July 1998); p. 19, quoting Atef al-Gomhari, al-Ahram (Cairo), 1 July
1998.
358 Danna Harman, “Uzbek leader, Netanyahu pledge to fight fundamentalism,” The Jerusalem Post, 16
September 1998.
359 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 1.
destruction (WMDs) as threats to regional security.360 Netanyahu said of Israeli and 
Uzbek threat perceptions, “We adhere to the same assessment of the danger to peace 
and stability in the region, and intend to work in this sphere hand in hand.”361
A series of agreements were signed while Karimov was in Israel regarding 
commercial, economic, technical, agricultural, and ecological cooperation.362 Also 
signed were protocols to avoid double taxation, prevent income tax evasion, promote 
mutual assistance in customs affairs, and an agreement ensuring “Cooperation 
Between the National Bank of Foreign Economic Activities of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan and the Israeli Foreign Trade Risks [Insurance] Corporation (IFTRIC).”363 
In all, nine bilateral documents were signed. Speaking to over 100 Israeli 
businessmen, Karimov stated that “the most important part of our cooperation is 
economic. We are very impressed by the Israeli technologies we have seen.”364 He 
added that the trade agreements signed during his stay would facilitate greater 
technological agricultural cooperation.365
On security issues, Karimov agreed to “exchange information about the 
common threat perceived to be emerging from Iran,”366 and to build on the defense 
cooperation agreed during Mordechai*s visit to Uzbekistan.367 Karimov and 
Netanyahu discussed ways in which the two countries could cooperate in combating 
terrorism, prohibiting the proliferation of WMDs and fighting threats to regional
360 “Uzbek President in Israel,” Central Asia Monitor, no 5 (1998): p. 35, and “Uzbek president winds
up visit to Israel,” Itar-TASS World Service in English, 16 September 1998, in BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 16 September 1998.
361 “Uzbek president winds up,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 September 1998.
362 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 2. See also “Uzbek President in Israel,” p.
35, and Harman, “Uzbek leader, Netanyahu pledge.”
363 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 2.
364 David Makovsky, “Israel, Uzbekistan to join forces on Iran,” Ha ’aretz, 16 September 1998.
365 Makovsky, “Israel, Uzbekistan join forces.”
365 Makovsky, “Israel, Uzbekistan join forces.”
367 Steve Rodan, “Uzbekistan sees Israel as defense partner,” The Jerusalem Post, 17 September 1998.
security and stability, although no security protocols were signed.368 While in Israel, 
Karimov spoke out against extremism and pledged to continue the battle against the 
joint enemy of Israel and Uzbekistan: Islamist terrorism. To vividly underscore his 
position, Karimov spoke at a reception held in his honor about his country’s 
relationship with Israel and he stated (to very warm applause) that “Islamists deserve 
to have their heads cut off, and I am prepared personally to do that.”369
Uzbekistan and the Palestinian Authority
While in the region, Karimov also traveled to Ramallah to meet with PLO 
Chairman Arafat in September 1998. Karimov was identified by Arafat not just as his 
close personal friend, but as a friend to all the Palestinian people.370 Arafat 
commented that his talks with Karimov were “constructive, successful, and very 
important,” and that the Uzbek president was “very interested in the success and 
protection of the peace process,”371 Although Karimov acknowledged to reporters 
that he and Arafat did not discuss the peace process at all.372 For his part, Karimov 
told reporters that he was pleased to meet with Arafat, and stated that Uzbekistan 
“fully supports the Palestinian people” and that his visit expressed “the support of the 
Uzbek people and government for the Palestinian people.”373
While it is interesting to note that Karimov met with Arafat of greater interest 
is the lack of any substantial dialogue or accords between the two leaders. The two 
did not even discuss publicly the peace process. Uzbekistan was firmly aligned with
368 Harman, “Uzbek leader, Netanyahu pledge,” and Makovsky, “Israel, Uzbekistan join forces.”
369 “Uzbekistan’s ‘unholy alliance’ with Israel,” Mideast Mirror 12, no. 235 (21 October 1998): p. 12,
quoting Mohammad al-Sammak, al-Ahram (Cairo), 21 October 1998.
370 “Uzbek President in Israel,” p. 35.
371 “Mideast'. Uzbek president visits Arafat in Ramallah; joint news conference held,” Voice o f
Palestine radio (Ramallah), in Arabic, 15 September 1998, in BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 15 September 1998.
372 “Mideast: Uzbek president,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 September 1998.
373 “Mideast: Uzbek president,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 September 1998.
Israel, yet Tashkent sought to maintain the perception of solidarity with the 
Palestinians. While Karimov was praising Arafat and the Palestinian people, the 
Uzbek government was doing little in fact to advance the Palestinian cause. As will 
be examined later in this chapter, despite the president’s statements, when presented 
with opportunities to support the Palestinians in the UN General Assembly, after 
March 1998 the Uzbek delegation did not vote in favor of resolutions supportive of 
the Palestinian cause. Nonetheless, Karimov did invite Arafat to come to Tashkent in 
October 1998 for the 1225th birthday anniversary of Imam al-Bukhari.374
Six months after their meeting in Ramallah, Arafat stopped to Tashkent to 
discuss the declaration of a Palestinian state with Karimov while en route to China. 
This April 1999 visit took place right before the deadline for the conclusion of 
permanent status negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians per the Wye River 
Memorandum. Arafat sought to gain Uzbek support for the exercise of “the 
legitimate Palestinian national right to set up their independent state.”375 The fact that 
Arafat did not secure official Uzbek support coupled with the lack of Uzbek support 
in the UN General Assembly demonstrate that Israel was achieving subtle victories 
through its relationship with Tashkent.
Karimov’s September 1998 visit to Israel was a success for its policy of 
constructive engagement with Uzbekistan. Israel was able to continue Uzbek 
neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and confirm Tashkent’s strong opposition 
to both Islamist extremism and Iranian interference in the region. Furthermore, to 
have a Muslim ally of Israel travel to meet with the Palestinians and not discuss the 
peace process served two of Israel’s goals: it helped to divert attention from the peace 
process.
374 “Mideast: Uzbek president,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 September 1998.
375 “Arafat holds ‘successful* meeting with Jiang Zemin,” Palestinian Radio (Ramallah), in Arabic, 15
April 1999, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 April 1999.
Development Assistance As Diplomacy
Israeli development assistance continued to be an avenue for Israeli 
engagement with Uzbekistan during the last phase of the relationship. Israel was 
involved in two main assistance programs during this period: the creation of private 
sector agricultural enterprises and public health programs. On the first project, 
MASHAV sought to assist formerly state-run farms in Uzbekistan in their 
transformation to free-market operations. One part of this program involved the 
Akkurgan demonstration farm and aimed to partially create private family daily 
farms. Work at this farm had previously focused on dairy cattle husbandly and 
veterinary care. At Akkurgan, Israeli experts living in Uzbekistan as well as short­
term visiting Israeli trainers sought to improve feed systems, computerize farm 
processes, market daily products (such as yogurt, butter, and cheeses), and establish 
private, commercially viable farms. This was supplemented by a series of Russian- 
language training programs held in Israel for Uzbek participants. The project was 
made possible with the assistance and cooperation of USAID, the Uzbek Commercial 
Development Bank, and the Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture.376
The project at Akkurgan was one of MASHAV’s biggest in Uzbekistan.377 
The Israeli Foreign Ministry attached significant importance to this project as 
evidenced by its description of the program. The Foreign Ministry described its goal 
as assisting
in the process of modernization; privatization [of] 
human resource development; transfer of appropriate 
technologies; advisoiy services and other support 
activities to the agricultural sector, geared towards a
376 “Dairy Cattle Husbandly Demonstration Project in Uzbekistan,” M ASHAV  -  Center fo r
International Cooperation, 20 July 1998, http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il.
377 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 5.
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market-oriented economy. The program also aims to 
encourage privatization, market development and in 
particular, the development of the emerging private 
family rural sector.378
Such objectives were seen as an investment in furthering Uzbekistan’s 
commercial viability, and as money well spent to prevent the emergence of instability 
in the country. The latter goal was a central objective for Israeli policy in Central 
Asia because it was thought that instability in Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian 
republics would lead to the development of a regime unfriendly to Israeli interests and 
security.
The second area in which MASHAV was active during this period was the 
public health sector. Israeli medical teams performed hundreds of eye surgery 
operations and participated in numerous blindness prevention missions.379 In addition 
to training local doctors, the Israelis donated the ophthalmological equipment they 
had brought to their Uzbek counterparts, rather than shipping the equipment back to 
Israel.380 In 2000, Israel also donated over $10,000 for medicines to be used in 
Karakalpakstan.381
E c o n o m ic  R e l a t io n s
In 1998, Israeli private investment in Uzbekistan was estimated to be in excess 
of $20 million, which while “not huge” was a “sign of the potential” size of the 
market and a “sign of the future.”382 In 2000 there were 45 Israeli-Uzbek joint
378 “Dairy Cattle Husbandry,” http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il.
379 Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, “MASHAV’s Medical Activities Highlighted,” The Jerusalem Post, 24
October 2004.
380 Siegel-Itzkovich, “MASHAV’s Medical Activities Highlighted.”
381 “Israel donated medicines worth $10,000 to Karakalpakistan [sic],” Narodnoye Solov (Tashkent), 25
November 2000.
382 Hershel Shanks and Suzanne F. Singer, “Oil and Jews on the Silk Road,” Moment (Washington,
DC), vol. 23, no. 5, October 1998, p. 68.
3 83ventures and five officially accredited representative offices of Israeli 
businesses.384 Israeli investment in the Uzbek energy sector alone was estimated at 
over $158 million.385
Over the course of the last phase of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship examined in 
this chapter, total trade turnover rose from $11.2 million in 1998 to $20.1 million in 
2001 (see table 4.9). These figures were led by Israeli exports to Uzbekistan which 
rose to $10.1 million in 1998 to $16.3 million in 1999. After a drop to $9.9 million in 
2000, Israeli exports returned to $17.8 million in 2001. Imports from Uzbekistan rose 
from the previous year to $1.1 million in 1998, then dropped to $0.4 million in 1999. 
These levels rose again in 2000 and 2001 to $1.5 million and $2.3 million, 
respectively.386
Table 4.9 Israeli-Uzbek trade, 1998-2001 
(in Millions of Dollars)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Exports $10.1 $16.3 $9.9 $17.8
Imports $1.1 $0.4 $1.5 $2.3
Source-. Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
Sharansky’s Trade Promotion Tour
In June 1998, Natan Sharansky, Israel’s Minister of Industry and Trade, led a 
trade delegation of Israeli business leaders and industrialists to Uzbekistan.387 While 
in Tashkent, Sharansky met with President Karimov and held a series of meetings at 
the Ministries of Foreign Economic Relations, Agriculture, and Power and
383 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml
(accessed on 21 August 2001).
384 Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic o f Uzbekistan, “Uzbekistan-Israel: New
Facets of Cooperation,” http://www.mfer.uz/english/news/05&07&2001.html (accessed 27 July
2002).
385 “Uzbekistan and Israel Share the Same E n e m y AIA, 9 January 2005.
386 Foreign Trade Statistics Monthly, http://wwwl.cbs.gov.il/fr_trade/ftmenu_e_vl_new.htm.
387 “Israeli delegation to visit Uzbekistan,” n.p., 27 June 1998, http://uzland.info/06_27_98.htm
(accessed 8 April 2006).
Electrification.388 Several agreements were signed during Sharansky’s visit, including 
accords on bilateral trade and economic cooperation389 and agreements for several 
Israeli projects in the agricultural sector. Sharansky also worked on an agreement on 
Most Favored Nation trade status that was signed a few months later, in September 
199 8.390 It was reiterated that Israel has had “particularly” good relations with 
Uzbekistan, in large part because of Tashkent’s “tough stand against militant Islam” 
and the warm relationship between the Uzbek government and the region’s largest 
Jewish community.391
Karimov highlighted Uzbekistan’s expanding relationship with Israel and 
praised cooperation with Israel in meetings with Sharansky; he told reporters, “We 
have a lot of experience in economic cooperation with Israel.” Sharansky explained 
that the Israeli government “gives a lot of support to enterprises and companies that 
invest in Uzbekistan.” This statement was the clearest to date in indicating that the 
Israeli government was assisting and subsidizing Israeli private-sector investments 
and business ventures in Uzbekistan in order to further its policy of constructive
392engagement.
In a two-hour meeting with Karimov, Sharansky discussed Israel’s two foreign 
and security policy concerns regarding Uzbekistan: terrorism and Islamist extremism. 
An important reason for Sharansky’s visit was that he confirm Uzbekistan’s position 
regarding these two concerns because it was central to Israeli policy that Israel and 
Uzbekistan maintain alignment on them. Commenting on their shared perception of
388 “Uzbek president praises growing relations with Israel,” Itar-TASS World Sendee (Moscow), in
Russian, 1610 GMT 1 July 1998, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 July 1998.
389 “Israel and Uzbekistan sign trade agreement,” BBC World Service, 2 July 1998. See also “Uzbek
president praises relations,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 July 1998.
390 “Uzbek president praises relations,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 July 1998. See
also Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, Central Asia: The Challenges o f  Independence 
(London, 1998), p. 228, and “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 3.
391 “Israeli trade minister visits Uzbekistan,” BBC World Sendee, 30 June 1998.
392 “Uzbek president praises relations,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 July 1998.
the twin threats of terrorism and Islamist extremism, Sharansky stated that “we suffer 
from it and Uzbekistan, an Islamic country, is doing its utmost to prevent such 
extremity [on its territory].”393
Building on his praise of Uzbek efforts to battle terrorism and extremism, 
Sharansky considered Uzbekistan a model of development for the Muslim world, 
where a strong government enforced the separation of religion and state. He 
expressed his support for Tashkent and claimed somewhat optimistically that “in 
thirty years Uzbekistan not Saudi Arabia would be the center of business in the 
Muslim world.”394 This rather sanguine remark demonstrated perhaps more the hopes 
and aspirations some in the Israeli government held for Uzbekistan and the future of 
the ‘Muslim’ world, rather than an actual assessment of the future.
Sharansky’s visit was significant not only because he earned the government’s 
commerce portfolio, but because he was a native Russian-language speaker, he was 
afforded greater access to Uzbek leaders than other non-Russian speaking Israeli 
leaders. Moreover, it is thought that he held a special interest in developing trade and 
relations with the Central Asian republics, and served both as Israel’s unofficial 
representative to the region.395 Sharansky was also thought to have severed as the 
prime minister’s chief advisor on Central Asian affairs.396
By the time of Sharansky’s visit in June 1998, Israel’s commercial interests 
included investment in the hydrocarbon and mineral recovery sectors as well as the 
export of “telecommunications, chemical fertilizers, machine tools, medical
393 “Uzbek president praises relations,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 July 1998.
394 “Israel and Uzbekistan sign trade agreement,” BBC World Seivice, 2 July 1998.
395 This is thought to in part be because of his personal experiences and connection with the fonner
Soviet Union, Hadar, telephone interview. See also David Makovsky, “Uzbekistan may buy 
arms from Israel,” Ha ’aretz, 2 July 1998.
396 Based on private discussions with the author held in Israel (1999).
equipment, electric devices, agricultural produce, and plastic goods.”397 Israeli trade 
experts worked with their Uzbek colleagues to help further the development of more 
open trade and they [Israeli trade experts] also trained Uzbek specialists from the 
Uzbek Entrepreneurship Development Assistance Project and the Business Support 
Center during short-term visits to Israel.398
Pace o f Commercial and Economic Cooperation
In February 1999 the Agreement on Commercial and Economic Cooperation 
came into force, and Israel “announced the repeal of special import licenses for Uzbek 
goods.”399 With the implementation of this accord, both nations cooperated to create 
an Intergovernmental Uzbek-Israeli Commission for Commercial and Economic 
Cooperation. This organization was charged with facilitating bilateral trade and 
commercial relations primarily by increasing trade levels, increasing investments, and 
according to an Uzbek government report, exploring “new directions and 
opportunities for bilateral cooperation.”400 Also in 1999, the Israeli Institute of 
Export and IFTRIC rated Uzbekistan as the leading market in Central Asia for Israeli 
investors and exporters.401 That same year the Israeli Export and International 
Cooperation Institute noted that Israeli firms were increasingly winning tenders and 
contracts in Central Asia, particularly those funded by “the world’s principle 
international financial institutions.”402 Israel’s Bateman Engineering was particularly 
singled out for its successes in Uzbekistan. Israeli-Uzbek trade demonstrates that
397 “Israeli delegation to visit,” http://uzland.info/06_27_98.htm (accessed 8 April 2006).
398 “Agreement on the creation of scientific and specialists’ fund signed,” Times o f  Central Asia
(Bishkek), 2 February 2001.
399 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 2.
400 “i nformation on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 2.
401 “Israeli Insurance For Trade Risks in Uzbekistan,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 9 September
1999.
402 “International Projects— Proven Interdisciplinary Capabilities,” report produced by the Israeli
government's Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute, n.p, n.d.; document in the 
collection of the author.
bilateral economic and commercial cooperation in 1999 (as shown in table 4.9, above) 
was veiy good. At the time, Uzbekistan was Israel’s largest trading partner in Central 
Asia.
It is noteworthy that although total trade turnover fell in 2000, it rose again in 
2001 and reached its highest level at $20.1 million. This dip in trade turnover may or 
may not have been partially caused by the Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifadah) in 
September 2000 and the subsequent deterioration in Israel’s security situation. The 
trade relationship between Israel and Uzbekistan remained strong regardless of 
terrorist attacks. The Intergovernmental Uzbek-Israeli Commission for Commercial 
and Economic Cooperation had scheduled a conference entitled “Do Business in 
Israel” for December 2001 in Israel; however, due to the security situation in Israel at 
the time—just three months after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States— the conference was not scrapped altogether, merely rescheduled for a 
later date.403
Liberman’s 2001 Trade Promotion Tour
The implementation of Israeli technologies to utilize renewable solar power 
had been the subject of bilateral discussions for several years, and in 2000 Israel and 
Tashkent “announced plans to cooperate on the development of solar technology.”404 
When Minister of National Infrastructure Avigdor Liberman visited Uzbekistan in 
July 2001, he and his Israeli trade delegation discussed energy conservation and 
technologies that could utilize renewable power sources. The main topic in these 
discussions focused on “possible joint power engineering projects” that “encourage
403 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 2.
404 “Uzbekistan: Foreign Investment,” document in the collection of the author.
environmentally clean sources of power”405 such as the use of solar energy. 
According to internal Uzbek government documents, the Israeli delegation gave a 
presentation on the benefits of “utilizing Israeli experience in the sphere of solar 
energy use”406 and are understood to have lobbied the Uzbek government for 
contracts in this area.
In his meeting with Uzbek Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Elyor 
Ganiev, Liberman signed several documents (including a joint economic declaration 
and a joint declaration on prospects for trade and cooperation407) and held aviation 
discussions. Liberman spoke highly of Israeli-Uzbek relations and stated in a press 
conference that “[w]e hope that the near future will be signified by a great inflow of 
Israeli investments” to Uzbekistan.408
Liberman and Sharansky> in Central Asia
It is noteworthy that Liberman led the trade mission: at the time he was not 
serving in the Trade Ministry but was Minister of National Infrastructure. His seven- 
day mission to Central Asia to boost Israeli commercial relations indicated he was 
now Israel’s main point of contact with regards to Central Asia policy. Liberman’s 
July 2001 trip to Central Asia was actually his second official trip; the first occurred 
in May 1998 while he was Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office in the 
Netanyahu government.409 Liberman and Natan Sharansky share some striking 
similarities regarding their involvement in Israel’s relationship with Central Asia.
405 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav08l50l.shtml
(accessed 2 1 August 2001).
406 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 2.
407 See “Uzbekistan, Israel Discuss Economic Cooperation,” Eumsianet.org, 
http://www.eurasianet.org. For additional information, see Blua, “Israel Emerges,” 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml (accessed 21 August 
2001).
408 “Uzbekistan-Israel: New Facets,” http://www.mfer.uz/english/news/05&07&2001.html (accessed 27
July 2002).
409 Sami Rozen, "Israelis To Ann Kyrgyz Commando,” AIA, 28 March 2006.
Both men had significant linguistic and cultural advantages because they were bom in 
the Soviet Union and are native Russian speakers.410 Furthermore, both Liberman 
and Sharansky have ties to Israel’s sizable and important Soviet and post-Soviet 
immigrant community: Liberman through the political party Yisrael Beytenu (“Israel 
is our home”) and Sharansky through the Israel B a-Aliy a (“Israel Rising”) political 
party. The Israeli Russian-speaking community gives Israel a major advantage in 
doing business in the Central Asian region. As a result of these connections, 
Liberman and Sharansky have been perceived as keeping the interests of the Russian- 
speaking, Soviet immigrant community in mind. This has subsequently led to a 
perception in some of the states of the former Soviet Union that these men not only 
care about developments there, but are in a position to do something about it.
Commercial Aviation Cooperation
During this phase of the relationship commercial aviation cooperation 
expanded significantly. El A1 became one of only eight foreign airlines operating a 
representative office in Tashkent and was permitted to sell tickets on El A1 flights as 
well as a limited number of seats on those flights operated by the national airline 
Uzbekistan Havo Yullari.411 These latter flights were operated on a code sharing 
agreement.412 An agreement announced through Interfax on 26 May 2001 noted that 
El A1 (as well as other Israeli flagged earners) would be “serviced and fueled at 
Tashkent airport.”413 In a reciprocal arrangement, the aircraft of Uzbekistan Havo
410 Neither of them is o f Central Asian origin; Liberman emigrated from Moldova, while Sharansky
was born in Ukraine.
411 “Israeli Airlines Opens Representative Office in Tashkent,” Interfax, 26 May 2001.
412 Ofer Moreno (Deputy Chief o f Mission, Embassy of the State of Israel to the Republic of
Uzbekistan), interview with the author, 13 March 2006, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
413 “Israeli Airlines Opens Office.”
Yullari would receive similar services at Ben-Gurion International Airport outside Tel 
Aviv.414
The Tashkent offices of the Israeli airline Arkia are located across the street 
from the Israeli embassy. This one-block section of Abdullah Kahhar Street was 
closed to through traffic as of 2004, and is guarded by Israel security personnel and 
Uzbek security forces from the Ministry of Interior, National Security Service, and 
Tashkent militia. In addition to vehicle barriers, the Uzbek Ministry of Interior has 
often positioned an armored personnel earner in the street.415 The level of security 
accorded to the Arkia office not only demonstrates Israeli and Uzbek threat 
perception,416 but the fact that it is protected serves as recognition that the airline 
office is, in a sense, a component of the Israeli presence.
In part to capitalize on the interest in flights to Israel, in March 2001 it was 
announced that a new Samarqand-Tel Aviv route would begin operating.417 Although 
it was planned to operate just once a month, it is indicative of a desire to capitalize 
commercially 011 the Israeli connections with Samarqand. A significant number of 
Israelis and their families of Bukharan Jewish origin travel to the region to visit 
family and friends and spend time in the country of their forefathers.418 Some Uzbek 
emigres in Israel who prefer not to return to Uzbekistan often pay for their friends, 
family, and former neighbors to visit Israel.419 A number of Israelis have also paid to 
bring musicians and entertainers from Uzbekistan to Israel to perform at special
414 “Israeli Airlines Opens Office.”
415 Data in the preceding paragraph relating to security measures came through fieldwork in Tashkent
over a two-and-one-half-year period (2004—2006).
416 This is an important fact in light of the revelation that the suspects in the February 1999 Tashkent
bombings had also surveilled the Israeli embassy. See “Uzbek TV continues reports on trial of 
bomb suspect -  footage of trial,” Uzbek Television first channel (Tashkent), in Uzbek, 3 June 
1999, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 June 1999.
417 “Flights To Be Launched Between Uzbekistan, Israel, Russia,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 15
March 2001.
418 Khusnidinov, interview.
419 Moreno, interview. Also based on informal discussions the author had in London and Tel Aviv.
occasions such as weddings and bar or bat mitzvahs.420 Because it is home to one of 
the oldest Jewish communities in Central Asia, and because a significant Israeli 
community traces its origins to Samarqand and the surrounding regions, a Samarqand- 
Tel Aviv route was logical.421
4-0 Moreno, interview. Also based on informal discussions the author had in London and Tel Aviv.
421 “New air route to be opened from major Uzbek town to Israel and Russia,” Narodnoye Slovo 
(Uzbekistan), n.d, and “Uzbekistan March 20 N ew s"  (2001),
http://www.uzland.uz/2001/marcli/20.htm (accessed 22 June 2001).
Table 4.10 Major Israeli Projects, 1998-2001
Year Project Sector Business(es) Involved
Contract
size
(where
known)
1998 Dairy processing Agricultural Marav NA
1998 Greenhouse construction project Agricultural not known NA
1998 Irrigation assistance project Agricultural not known NA
1998 Discussion of electric power station construction Energy not known NA
1998 Discussion of solar power station construction Energy not known NA
1999
Israeli Institute of Export and the 
Israeli Foreign Trade Risks 
Insurance Corporation rate 
Uzbekistan as the leading market 
for Israeli investor and businesses
NA NA NA
1999 Poultry processing Agricultural MAD NA
1999 Industrial upgrades Industrial Bateman Projects, Ltd $300m
1999 Supply of energy consumption counters Energy Nisko NA
late
1990s Power supply contracts Technology
Gamatronic Electronic 
Industries, Ltd NA
late
1990s Telecom access projects Technology
RAD Data 
Communications NA
late
1990s
Modems and radio access 
contracts Technology Alvarion NA
late
1990s
Electronic and technology 
upgrades Technology K.Sh.S. Contact Ltd NA
late
1990s Industrial equipment Technology
Tadiran Electronic 
Industries NA
late
1990s Fibre optic cable contracts Technology Optical Access NA
2000 Molybdenum export JV in Chirchik Industrial Metek Metal Technology $19.39m
2000 Battery production with UzExide in Jizzak Industrial not known NA
2000-
01
Booster compression station at 
Shurtan gas condensate field Energy Bateman Projects, Ltd $192m
2001 Turnkey mining facility construction in Navoi Industrial Bateman Projects, Ltd $89m
2001 Bottled water sales Foodprocessing not known NA
2001 Samarqand-Tel Aviv flight agreement Aviation not known NA
unkwn. Weapons and ammunition sales Defense not known
(3% of all 
imports 
from 
Israel)
Sources: Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations; FBIS; BBC SWB; author's research.
Major Commercial Investment, 1998—2001
As demonstrated by table 4.10, there were a number of significant Israeli 
commercial projects in Uzbekistan during the last phase of the relationship to be 
examined in this chapter. Israeli businesses were active in the agricultural, energy, 
industrial, and technology sectors, and there was some activity in the food processing, 
aviation, and defense sectors. Also during this period, Israeli cooperation in the 
creation and launch of Uzbekistan’s first communications satellite was discussed.422 
A brief examination of the more notable projects during this period follows.
There were several large-scale projects to take place during this period, 
including the creation of a molybdenum export joint venture, industrial upgrades at a 
metallurgy concern, several natural gas projects, and a project to produce batteries in
• * 423cooperation with UzExide. The molybdenum joint venture, Uzmetall Technology, 
was formed in late 2000 to process and produce molybdenum for export. 
Molybdenum is an element frequently used in hardening steel and is often used in 
copper extraction and mining operations. Its other applications include usage in the 
manufacture of petroleum pipelines, aircraft, missile parts, and some electronic 
applications,424
Uzmetall was created as a joint venture by Israel’s Metek Metal Technology, 
the Almalyk Mining and Metals Combine, and the Uzbek Refractory and Heat 
Resistant Metals Plant in Chirchik.425 The Chirchik joint venture (which dates back
422 “Uzbekistan to announce satellite tender in May,” Uzbek Television first channel (Tashkent), in
Russian, 26 January 2000, in BBC Monitoring International Reports (26 January 2000).
423 “Batteries with Uzbek label,” Narodnoye Slovo (Tashkent), in Russian, 27 April 2000, in BBC
Monitoring International Reports, 27 April 2000.
424 For more infonnalion, consult the entry on “Molybdenum,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molybdenum (accessed 13 April 2006).
425 “Uzbek-Israeli JV May Start Producing Molybdenum 2001,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 14
December 2000.
to President Karimov’s 1998 visit to Israel426) is well known as a ‘tangible example’ 
of a collaborative investment in which Uzbekistan benefits from its relations with 
Israel.427 The president of Metek Metal, A. Rosenberg, commented at the plant’s 
opening that the joint venture would create jobs and transfer technology to 
Uzbekistan,428 both vital components for continued Uzbek economic growth and 
stability.
This joint venture was funded through a $16 million credit originating from an 
unspecified Israeli bank;429 one report claimed that the Bank of Israel would subsidize 
the project.430 The total capital investment was estimated at $19,390,000 and was 
planned to fully pay for itself in five years.431 The total credit value was insured by 
IFTRIC and guaranteed by the Uzbek government.432 Internal Uzbek government 
documents valued Tashkent’s financial responsibility at $17,490,000, nearly $1.5 
million more than had been publicly announced.433
A second major Israeli-Uzbek joint venture involved Haifa-based Bateman 
Projects Ltd, a subsidiary of Bateman Middle East, itself a major multinational firm. 
In late 2001 Bateman signed an agreement to deliver equipment for a turnkey project 
at the Navoisky Mining Metallurgical Plant. The agreement was originally valued at 
$197,800,000; however, the Uzbek Association for Foreign Economic Cooperation
426 “New Uzbek-Israeli joint venture set up to produce molybdenum,” Uzbek Television firs t channel
(Tashkent), in Russian, 1430 GMT 22 February 2001, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 
on Eurasianet.org, 22 February 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org.
427 Timur Agzamovich Alimov (Director, International Cultural Center, Republic of Uzbekistan),
interview with the author, 19 October 2004, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
428 “New Uzbek-Israeli joint venture,” http://www.eurasianet.org.
429 “Uzbek-Israeli JV will receive credit in amount of million US $,” Kabar news agency (Tashkent),
10 January 2001, and Abraham Rein, “New Uzbek-Israeli joint venture,” 
http://www.eurasianet.org.
430 “Uzbek-Israeli joint venture launches 20m-dollar molybdenum project,” Uzbek radio (Tashkent), in
Uzbek, 19 February 2000, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 19 February 2000.
431 “Uzbek-Israeli JV,” and “Uzbek-Israeli JV May Start Producing Molybdenum 2001,” Times o f
Central Asia (Bishkek), 14 December 2000.
432 Abraham Rein, “New Uzbek-Israeli joint venture set up to produce molybdenum,” Eurasianet.org,
23 February 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org.
433 Limited-circulation official Uzbek government document entitled “Information on Commercial-
Economic Relations between the Republic o f Uzbekistan and the State of Israel,” p. 4.
was subsequently involved and, after completing an analysis of the deal, it ruled that 
the contract was overvalued. The new contract value was lowered to $89,000,000, a 
cut of over $100 million. The Navoisky Mining Metallurgical Plant was expected to 
come up with financing in excess of $56,000,000, while foreign credit was to cover 
approximately $33,000,000. Bateman was not required to generate any of the 
financing for this project.434 This signified the desire to continue to do business with 
Bateman.
Israeli firms were also involved in a number of natural gas projects during the 
third phase of the relationship. Such projects have been second in significance only to 
irrigation and agricultural investments for the Uzbek economy. Nisko won a tender in 
1999 to supply energy-consumption counters at the Shurtan Gas and Chemical 
Complex.435 Bateman invested in at least three of the natural gas ventures,436 one of 
which involved performing industrial upgrades for which Bateman won $300 million 
Israeli government contract in 1999. Another project Bateman took on was the 
construction of a booster compression station at the Shurtan gas condensate field with 
Uzbekneftgaz (2000—2001).437 In 1999 Bateman won $300 million Israeli 
government contract and The Shurtan facility was a vital component of Uzbekistan’s 
strategic economic planning.438
Bateman’s project at Shurtan called for the oversight and supervision of 
Uzbek workers, as well as other design, supply, and management services.439 The
434 It is critical to note that this controversy has not been publicized and the author has only become
aware of it though confidential internal Uzbek government documents which were not intended 
for public consumption. “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 4.
435 “Uzbekistan & Israel.”
436 Tal Muscal, “Bateman Middle East awarded $160m, gas project in Uzbekistan,” The Jerusalem
Post, 26 December 2000.
437 “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 3. Also see “Foreign Investments in
Uzbekistan in 2002,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 15 August 2002.
438 “Foreign Investments in Uzbekistan.”
439 Muscal, “Bateman Middle East.” Also see “Foreign Firms to Boost Uzbek Energy Sector,” Oil &
Gas Journal Exchange, 5 March 2001.
Shurtan gas condensate field is one of the largest in Uzbekistan and regularly 
produces in excess of 15 million cubic meters of natural gas per year,440 which is 
approximately 36 percent of all Uzbek natural gas.441 Project estimates claimed that 
the Shurtan fields produce 75 percent of Uzbek domestic gas consumption and that 
the compressor station would extend productivity 20 years.442
The contract was confidentially valued at $192,220,000, a figure largely 
prepaid to Bateman, thereby resulting in a substantial reduction in Bateman’s 
exposure. The project was financed through a combination of foreign bank loans 
guaranteed by the Uzbek government, over $100 million insured by the US Export- 
Import bank, and guaranteed by IFTRIC.443
There were many projects in which Bateman was involved in this period; yet 
not all of them were without controversy, as noted above. The difficulties Bateman 
encountered in their agreement to deliver equipment for the turnkey project at the 
Navoisky Mining Metallurgical Plant (late 2001) demonstrate several issues 
concerning the operation of Israeli business in Uzbekistan. The first issue is the 
intrusion of the government into a private sector deal and the subsequent 
revaluation— at a much lower contract value— after negotiations were completed and 
the contracts were signed. This makes all international firms, not just Israeli 
businesses, hesitate when it comes to doing business with Uzbekistan. If signed 
contracts are not honored and international legal business standards are not 
universally applied, then surely some international firms will think twice before trying 
to do business in Uzbekistan; a development, unfortunately, that we are beginning to
440 “Uzbekneftgaz signs contract with Israeli Bateman,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 1 February
2001 .
441 “Foreign Firms to Boost.”
442 Muscal, “Bateman Middle East.”
443 See “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 4, Muscal, “Bateman Middle East,”
“Foreign Firms to Boost,” and “Uzbekneftgaz signs contract with Israeli Bateman,” Times o f  
Central Asia (Bishkek), 1 February 2001.
observe today. Another issue raises the question of who is actually in a position to 
enter into binding deals—is it the Uzbek business partner, or perhaps a government 
functionary higher up in bureaucratic circles?
Smaller investments by Israeli firms also occurred in the food processing and 
technology sectors. A daily processing joint venture was established by Marav Food 
Technologies and partially financed by Baraka Universal.444 This joint venture 
created 15 milk processing facilities in 1998 under a decree of the Council of 
Ministers.445 Israeli bottled water was also marketed in Uzbekistan.446 A number of 
Israeli hi-tech firms worked on telecom and technology expansion projects during this 
period, including UCD Micros, another Israeli-Uzbek joint venture.
Israeli businesses have been active in multiple layers of the Uzbek economy. 
Their successes in the agricultural, industrial, and technology sectors have been the 
result of both keen business expertise and the active support and lobbying of the 
Israeli government. As a result, Israel and Uzbekistan grew remarkably close during 
its first decade of independence. This closeness was further facilitated by former 
Soviet emigres who were eager to do business in Uzbekistan and by the proactive 
engagement of Israeli leaders such as Sharansky and Liberman. The bilateral 
economic ties have had the intended, additional effect of creating greater 
opportunities for Israeli and Uzbek leaders to meet and discuss mutual concerns and 
problems, and this has drawn the two nations closer together. Thus Israel has 
buttressed its diplomatic overtures to Tashkent with viable commercial successes, 
creating even more opportunities for Israel to constructively and positively engage 
with Tashkent.
444 “Leasing Market in Uzbekistan,” Interfax, 23 October 2003.
445 Decree no. 434, 1998, “Information on Commercial-Economic Relations,” p. 4.
446 Adeeb Klialid, PhD (Department of Histoiy, Carleton College), discussion with the author, 3 April
2004, Princeton, New Jersey.
S e c u r it y  C o o p e r a t io n
Of all the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan enjoyed the closest cooperation 
with Israel when it came to security matters. This was a result o f Israel’s central 
objective to foster stability in Uzbekistan, described as the most geopolitically 
strategic state for Israel’s purposes.447
During Minister of Trade and Industry Sharansky’s visit to Tashkent in June 
of 1998, President Karimov informed him that “Uzbekistan is willing to purchase 
military technology from Israel.”448 Karimov has also claimed that Uzbekistan faced 
threats similar to those that confronted Israel. Leaders in Israel and Uzbekistan 
agreed that terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, especially from Iran and Taliban- 
ruled Afghanistan, were the main concerns.449 Certainly both Israel and Uzbekistan 
have been fiercely anti-fundamentalist, an attitude which has helped foster the 
closeness between Israel and Tashkent: on numerous occasions both Israeli and 
Uzbek leaders have claimed that they “were united by the need to combat Islamic 
fundamentalism.”450 The Iranian nuclear weapons program was another concern both 
countries shared during this time.451
What little is actually known about the security cooperation between 
Uzbekistan and Israel in based on published reports about President Karimov’s visit to 
Israel in September 1998. During his visit Karimov “pledged” to bring Israel and 
Uzbekistan closer in a “wide-ranging defense relationship” and praised the reputation 
of Israel’s defense industry. While on a tour of Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd,
447 Dilip Hiro, “Uzbekistan: Karimov’s Visit to Israel Cements Ties,” IPS News Reports, n.p., n.d.
448 Makovsky, “Uzbekistan may buy arms.”
449 “Uzbek President Visits Israel to Promote Bilateral Ties,” The Israeli Economy: Achievements and
Potential, Israeli Ministry of Finance, September 1998.
450 “Simon Peres in Tashkent,” p. 13.
451 “Israeli Prime Minister in Tashkent,” RFE/RL Newsline: Transcaucasia & Central Asia , 29 May
1998.
Karimov expressed his interest in “cooperation with IAI in a variety of fields.” 
Among the weapons systems at IAI in which Karimov expressed interest were the 
Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Arrow anti-missile missile, ground 
control systems, as well as satellites.452
Hezbollah and Uzbeldstan: A Request fo r  Assistance
After the February 1999 bomb attacks in Tashkent, there were unsubstantiated 
rumors that Israeli government agencies had informed the Uzbeks that the Lebanese 
terrorist organization Hezbollah was responsible. Karimov declared to reporters that 
the perpetrators were “the same as those who are planting bombs in Israel.”453 The 
Jerusalem Post reported two days after the bombing that Uzbekistan had asked for 
“Israel’s help against Hezbollah.”454 According to the report, Karimov requested an 
expansion in counter-terrorism cooperation during a telephone conversation with 
Natan Sharansky, the government’s main unofficial point of contact on issues related 
to Central Asia.455 Karimov was convinced “that Hizbullah offshoots have penetrated 
the former Soviet Union and were sprouting up in Uzbekistan”456 and that “Islamic 
fundamentalism had already put down roots”457 in Uzbekistan. Reassuring Karimov 
of Israeli solidarity with them, Sharansky responded that the Israeli government 
“highly appreciated ‘the courage and steadfastness’ the Uzbek authorities were 
showing in their struggle against Muslim fanatics.”458
452 Rodan, “Uzbekistan sees Israel.”
453 “Uzbek head tells press in Kazakh capital about Tashkent blasts,” Kyrgyz Radio first program
(Bishkek), in Russian, 20 February 1999, m BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 February 
1999.
454 Danna Harman, “Uzbekistan asks Israel’s help against Hizbullah,” The Jerusalem Post, 18 February
1999.
4:15 Harman, “Uzbekistan asks Israel’s help,” and “Hezbollah behind Tashkent bombs, Uzbek leader 
tells Israeli minister,” Itar-TASS News Agency, 18 February 1999.
456 Harman, “Uzbekistan asks Israel’s help.”
457 “Hezbollah behind Tashkent bombs.”
458 “Hezbollah behind Tashkent bombs.”
Although an attempt by Hezbollah to assassinate the Uzbek president seems 
dubious at best, the news reports stating it was Israel who told Tashkent that 
Hezbollah was to blame are noteworthy they display the general assumption that 
Israel and Tashkent had been cooperating in the areas of intelligence and security. 
Even if there had not been any cooperation between the two states prior to the 
bombings, this certainly changed following the attempted assassination. It seems 
quite unlikely that Israel would turn down a request to render aid in efforts to combat 
Islamist terrorism, whether Hezbollah was active in Uzbekistan or not. Israel’s 
counter-terrorism assistance to the Uzbeks took on increased gravity after it emerged 
that the bombing suspects had surveilled the Israeli embassy in Tashkent.459
Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Coordination
Towards the end of the last phase of the relationship being examined in this 
chapter, Israeli-Uzbek security and intelligence cooperation had become quite 
significant. By 2001, Uzbekistan hosted the largest Israeli intelligence presence in the 
region,460 and was cooperating quite closely with Israeli authorities in combating 
terrorism.461 Israel has been able to influence not only the republics’ perception of 
security threats but also the appropriate steps to counter those threats. The 
establishment of an overt security and intelligence relationship has its origins in 
Karimov’s September 1998 visit to Israel, when Israel and Tashkent agreed to work 
together in dealing with the mutually perceived Iranian threat.462 Intelligence 
cooperation were reported to have been provided in the form of equipment and
459 “Uzbek TV continues reports,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 June 1999.
460 “Russia revives arms sales to Iran after ‘burying’ bargain with U.S.,” Arms Trade Newswire, 16
January 2001, http://www.clw.org/cal/newswire/nw011601.html (accessed 13 June 2001), 
quoting from the Mideast Mirror, 15 January 2001.
461 Yossi Melman, “Panel sets new guidelines on roles of Shin Bet and Mossad,” H a ’aretz, 18 October
2000 .
462 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1999, Volume 53 (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 77.
i  N  '
training, as well as by other assistance.463 Israel’s security cooperation with 
Uzbekistan was highlighted in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the United States when Israel offered the United States intelligence 
regarding Uzbekistan,464 and Israel helped Washington with an intelligence operation 
in Uzbekistan during the preparations for the war in Afghanistan that overthrew the 
Taliban.465
Many critics of Israel and Uzbekistan have attacked this cooperation. Those 
that object to the policies of either country, it seems, naturally assume that because 
both Israel and Uzbekistan have been actively engaged in fighting terrorism, there 
must be some clandestine coordination and cooperation between Israel and Tashkent. 
This assumption is further strengthened by extrapolating from the apparently close 
ties which exist between the two nations in other areas to include the area of security 
cooperation. These allegations would not be made if Israel and Uzbekistan did not 
already have obviously close cooperation in many other areas. As such, the 
allegations of military or intelligence conspiracies only underscore the strength of the 
Israeli-Uzbek relationship.
UZBEKISTAN AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT*. UNDERSTANDING
THE CONFLICT
Uzbek media rarely reported on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the al-Aqsa 
Intifadah. Unlike in most ‘Muslim’ nations, there are few— if any— television images
“Israel asks For Uzbekistan’s Assistance to Fight Terrorism,” IsraelWire> n.d.,
http://www.uzbekistanerk.org/3enl00900.html (accessed 22 June 2001).
464 Janine Zacharia, “Israel supplies US with Central Asia intelligence,” The Jerusalem Post, 5 October
2001 .
465 “Israel TV says Sharon offended at being ‘cuckolded’ by USA, Arabs,” Israel TV Channel 1
(Jerusalem), in Hebrew, 5 October 2001, in BBC Monitoring International Reports—Middle 
East, 5 October 2001.
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of the Palestinians.466 Most Uzbeks did not have access to satellite television or 
internet service; those who did generally followed the Russian-language media which 
report more frequently on the conflict in Chechnya rather than that in the Palestinian 
Territories. The major international Arabic-language satellite stations like al-Jazeera 
do not have much of a market share in Uzbekistan because few people understand 
Arabic, and even fewer are interested in the viewpoints that these stations are believed 
to advance.467 As a result, Uzbeks generally tend to have a different perception of the 
conflict in Israel and the Palestinian Territories than members of other ‘Muslim’ states 
do. Rarely if ever is the use of violence by any side ever justified: most Uzbeks feel 
that “terror is terror.”468 The position of the Uzbek government is that Israel has a 
right to exist peacefully and to defend itself.469
Within Uzbekistan, the Islamist opposition has used the language of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to describe the battle it views itself waging against the 
Uzbek state. Contributing to this violent situation is the support that the Uzbek 
Jewish community gives to the Karimov regime. Tashkent Jewish community leader 
Marek Fazilov commented that “all local Jews side with President Karimov.”470 The 
Islamist opposition have referred to President Karimov as a “Zionist Jew” and to his 
government as the “oppressive Zionist regime of Islam Karimov.”471 The use of such 
inflammatory language has created and helped perpetuate the view that the interests of
466 Based on interviews conducted in Tashkent, Uzbekistan with Zahidulla Munavvarov, PhD
(Chairman of the al-lmam al-Bukliari Scientific and Educational Center, Tashkent; MP, 
Republic of Uzbekistan), 5 and 13 October 2004; Shoazim Minovarov, PhD (Chairman of the 
Committee of Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers, Republic of Uzbekistan), 13 
October 2004; and Khusnidinov, interview, 18 October 2004.
467 Based on interviews conducted in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, October 2004.
468 Minovarov, interview.
469 Khusnidinov, interview.
470 Lev Gorodetsky, “Some Jews in Central Asia Worry as War Rages and Islam Grows,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, 22 October 2002.
471 Col. Jonathan Fighel (ret.), “Jihad in Uzbekistan: Suicide bombings spread to Uzbekistan,” special
report o f the International Counter-Terrorism Center (Herzilya, Israel), 30 March 2004. 
Document in the collection of the author.
1 V
the current Uzbek regime are the same as Israel’s. Furthermore, because the Islamist 
opposition believes that Israel supports the Karimov regime. Israel and the Karimov 
regime itself have become interchangeable and inseparable in their view.472 A 
spokesman for the underground militant movement Hizb-ut Tahrir, in an interview 
with the Far Eastern Economic Review, stated “[w]e are veiy much opposed to the 
Jews and Israel—we don’t want to kill the Jews but they must leave Central Asia. 
The United States is the enemy of Islam with the Jews.”473 This perception began to 
spread towards the end of the third phase of the relationship and has come to have an 
impact 011 the Israeli-Uzbek relationship.
P o l it ic a l  Id e o l o g y  o f  t h e  I s l a m is t  O p p o s it io n : A n t i- Is r a e l
Throughout most of the late 1990s, the Uzbek government perceived major 
security threats not just from neighboring civil war-ravaged Tajikistan and Taliban- 
ruled Afghanistan, but also from what the regime in Tashkent has labeled ‘Wahhabi 
Islamist radicals.’474 In the former Soviet territories, the term ‘Wahhabi’ has been 
used to refer to all Islamist radicals in general. In Uzbekistan, however, the term 
more specifically implies that those in question have received part of their motivation, 
funding, and experience abroad, most often in the Arab Gulf.475 As evidence of a 
threat from ‘Wahhabi’ Islamist radicals, Uzbek authorities claimed to have obtained 
materials written in Arabic,476 a language little spoken or understood in Uzbekistan.
472 Based upon discussions with an political observer held in Uzbekistan, October 2004.
473 Ahmed Rashid, “Only Allah Knows,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 November 2000, available
at http://www.feer.com/_001 l_09/p030region.html (accessed 5 April 2001).
474 See Kate Goldberg, “Uzbekistan voices security concerns,” BBC World Monitoring, 19 November
1999; “Jews in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan live in Muslim World,” Times o f  Central Asia 
(Bishkek), 17 March 2003.
475 Fighel, “Jihad in Uzbekistan.” Also based upon field research conducted by the author in
Uzbekistan in October 2004.
476 “Uzbekistan’s window of opportunity,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 27 July 2005.
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Nearly every Islamist organization—even those that have nothing to do with 
the Palestinian issue—make anti-Israeli statements and use the issue to build popular 
support. It is as though Uzbek Islamist political oppositionist organizations (including 
both those in Uzbekistan and those based in the region) can increase their credentials 
by taking anti-Israeli positions. The security situation from an Israeli perspective thus 
becomes exponentially more complex because of the vast number of groups and 
organizations that must be monitored in order to guard against the possibility that one 
group may someday make good on its rhetoric. This has contributed to greater Israeli 
intelligence collection efforts regarding Uzbekistan.477
For instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) repeatedly made 
statements against the government in Tashkent that were vehemently anti-Israeli. The 
IMU has accused the Uzbek government of carrying out Israel’s policies478 and of 
allowing Israel to attempt to enslave Uzbeks, plunder their wealth, create military 
bases in Uzbekistan, kidnap pious Muslims, and secure a predominant position for 
Jews in Uzbek society.479 IMU founder Tohir Yoldoshev has repeatedly denounced 
Israel as anti-Muslim and denounced what he perceived as Israel’s support for the 
Uzbek government.480 These statements were made on Iranian radio and actually 
worked in Israel’s interests: Teheran’s broadcasts of the IMU’s messages instigating 
the overthrow of the Karimov government on government radio— in Uzbek—towards 
Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia made the Iranian government appear to be a
477 Janine Zacharia, “Israel supplies US with Central Asia intelligence,” The Jerusalem Post, 5 October
2001. Also see Fighel, “Jihad in Uzbekistan.”
478 “Uzbek Islamic Movement: government must go or be removed by force,” Voice o f  the Islamic
Republic o f  Iran (Mashhad), in Uzbek, 19 March 1999, in BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 19 March 1999.
479 “Uzbek Islamic movement says current regime putting ‘fear’ into people,” Voice o f  the Islamic
Republic o f  Iran (Mashhad), in Uzbek, II  April 1999, in BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 11 April 1999.
480 “Uzbek opposition leader on establishing an Islamic state — Iranian Radio,” Voice o f  the Islamic
Republic o f  Iran (Mashhad), in Uzbek, 18 May 1999, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 
18 May 1999.
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destabilizing force, thus inadvertently increasing Uzbekistan’s cooperation with Israel 
in their battle against Iranian influence.
ANALYSIS OF UZBEKISTAN’S UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTES
Uzbekistan has been one of the staunchest supporters of Israel in the United 
Nations General Assembly. In fact, other than the United States and sometimes 
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, Uzbekistan is often the only other nation to vote 
with Israel on many of the UN’s most divisive issues. During the first ten years of 
independence, Uzbekistan’s voting record in the UN General Assembly has served as 
a strong indicator of its vigorous pro-Israeli and pro-Western stance, given the fact 
that most other Muslim nations often vote against Israel. Tashkent’s decision to place 
its pro-Israel interest ahead of any pressure to participate in Muslim solidarity was a 
vivid demonstration of the importance Uzbekistan placed on its relationship with 
Israel, and it exemplified the lengths to which Tashkent went in order protect this 
crucial relationship. The Israeli Foreign Ministry has noted that Uzbekistan often 
takes “Israeli positions into account and their votes are (usually) favorable to 
Israel.”481
An analysis of Uzbekistan’s voting record on General Assembly resolutions 
related to the Middle East and considered hostile to Israel that were passed during the 
time period covered in this chapter demonstrates the successes of Israel’s policy of 
constructive engagement. Over the course of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship, 
Uzbekistan’s voting pattern changed. The general frequency with which the Uzbek 
delegation voted in favor of resolutions critical of Israel decreased over the period 
examined in this chapter (see table 4.11 and chart 4.2). This was the result of a
481 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” http://www.israel.org/iTifa/go.asp7MFAH0gbl0 (accessed 5 March 
2001 ).
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change in Uzbekistan’s position on resolutions considered hostile to Israel. Also 
during the period examined the frequency with which the Uzbek delegation cast 
abstentions on these resolutions increased. This suggests that through its relationship 
with Uzbekistan, Israel created a strong bond with Tashkent and was successful in 
orienting Uzbek policy to align with Israel’s interests.
Chart 4.2 Uzbek Voting Frequency in favor of UN General Assembly 
Resolutions Related to the Middle East Considered Hostile 
to Israel, and Abstentions
abstain? 20
Sources: UN Bibliographic Information System; American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise.
The Uzbek delegation’s voting pattern is unusual in several respects. First, for 
the initial two years of Uzbekistan’s membership in the UN, the Uzbek delegation 
cast no votes on issues related to the Middle East. This is an exception to the 
behavior of most states because the issues related to the Middle East and the 
Palestinian Authority are some of the most divisive in the UN General Assembly, and 
thus the most heavily voted. In the following years, the Uzbek delegation often 
continued this practice, as shown in table 4.11. On occasions where no vote was 
registered it cannot be known with certainty whether or not the Uzbek delegation was
present for the vote. However, in several cases (from 1994 onwards) circumstantial 
evidence exists to
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suggest that the Uzbeks chose not to vote, such as on those occasions when votes 
were recorded either before or after the resolution in question. The second unusual 
factor in the Uzbek voting pattern has to do with how Uzbekistan cast its abstentions. 
In most cases, a delegation would abstain when it wanted to be counted for the 
quorum but did not want to cast a vote either in favor or against a resolution. 
Alternatively, some nations cast abstentions when they disagreed with a resolution, 
but not strongly enough to warrant voting against it. The data examined for this 
thesis, however, suggests that the Uzbek delegation cast abstentions when they did not 
want to go as far as to vote in favor of a resolution. This subtle difference may help to 
explain the patterns that emerge in the analysis of Uzbekistan’s position on the 
General Assembly. Ultimately, this slight difference mattered little to Israel because 
the abstentions were not votes in favor of hostile resolutions. Thus Uzbekistan may 
have been exercising voting subtleties for the benefit of nations other than Israel, such 
as those in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Nonaligned 
Movement (NAM).
PHASE I: 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 4
During the 47th and 48th Sessions of the General Assembly, the first two 
sessions in which Uzbekistan was a member of the UN, the Uzbek delegation cast no 
votes on General Assembly resolutions related to the Middle East considered hostile 
to Israel (see table 4.11). It is not known whether the Uzbek delegation was not 
present for the vote or simply chose not to vote on these resolutions.
During the 49th Session in 1994, Uzbekistan voted in favor of four of nine 
resolutions hostile to Israel, while casting two abstentions, and not voting at all on the 
other three resolutions. This was the only time during the period examined in this
chapter that the Uzbek delegation voted to condemn Israeli settlements in the 
Occupied Territories (A/RES/49/132). The three resolutions on which the Uzbek 
delegation cast no vote involved the Middle East peace process, Jerusalem, and the 
Golan.
P h a s e  II: 1995-1997
During the 50th Session in 1995, out of nine resolutions considered hostile to 
Israel that passed, the Uzbek delegation voted in favor of none, and cast two 
abstentions. The abstentions were cast on resolutions highlighting the risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East (A/RES/50/73) and the right of Palestinian self- 
determination (A/RES/50/140). No votes were cast the other seven resolutions, which 
involved measures on Israeli settlements, the peace process, Jerusalem, the Golan, and 
Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. It is not known whether the Uzbek 
delegation was present for those votes or not.
In 1996, Uzbekistan voted in favor of nine out of 30 resolutions passed in the 
General Assembly, and abstained four times. The Uzbek delegation voted to extend 
assistance to Palestinian refugees (A/RES/51/124, A/RES/51/126, A/RES/51/127, 
A/RES/51/128, and A/RES/51/130) and to call on Israel to apply the Geneva 
Conventions in the Occupied Territories (A/RES/51/11332). Uzbekistan also voted 
for the first time to investigate Israeli human rights practices (A/RES/51/134), to call 
on Israel to evacuate the Golan (A/RES/51/135), and in favor of Palestinian 
sovereignty in the Occupied Territories (A/RES/51/190). On the risk on nuclear 
proliferation, the Uzbek delegation abstained (A/RES/51/48).482 The Uzbek
482 The three other resolutions on which the Uzbek delegation cast no vote were resolutions affirming 
the Palestinian Right o f Self-Determination (A/RES/51/82); a resolution on Palestinian 
Refugees (A/RES/51/129); and a resolution critical of Israeli practices in the Occupied 
Territories (A/RES/51/131).
delegation cast no ballot on 17 resolutions, and continued to not vote on the issues of 
the peace process, Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem.
Of 24 resolutions hostile to Israel passed in the General Assembly in 1997, 
Uzbekistan voted in favor of only five. During this session, Uzbekistan voted for the 
first time in favor o f the resolution citing Israel as a risk to nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle East (A/RES/52/41). The other four votes concerned administrative matters in 
the UN General Assembly regarding the issue of Palestine (A/RES/52/49, 
A/RES/52/50, and A/RES/52/51) and a resolution calling for a peacefiil settlement of 
the Palestinian Question (A/RES152/52). The Uzbek delegation cast no other votes, 
but circumstantial evidence suggests that the Uzbek delegation was present for votes 
on the status of Jerusalem (A/RES/52/53) and the Golan (A/RES/52/54), and opted 
not to vote. Significantly, on the two Emergency Special Session resolutions critical 
of Israeli actions in East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories (A/RES/51/ES/l 0-3 
and A/RES/51/ES/l0-4), the Uzbek delegation abstained. Uzbekistan lost the right to 
vote under Article 19 because Tashkent was two full years behind in the payment of 
its contributions; however, this affected only one vote examined in this study.
During this phase of the Israeli-Uzbek relationship, Uzbekistan’s voting 
pattern shifted. On the issue of censuring Israel as a risk to nuclear proliferation in 
the Middle East, the Uzbek delegation went from abstaining to voting in favor of the 
resolution. The Uzbeks also voted in favor of resolutions to provide assistance to 
Palestinian refugees, to apply the Geneva Conventions, to criticize Israeli human 
rights practices, and to call for an immediate withdrawal from the Golan.
PHASE III: 1998-2001
Beginning in 1998 with the 53rd Session the general frequency with which the 
Uzbek delegation voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolutions hostile to Israel 
dropped significantly. This corresponds with the renewed activity seen in the Israeli- 
Uzbek relationship. In the 53rd Session, Uzbekistan voted in favor of none of the 22 
resolutions related to the Middle East considered hostile to Israel. During the same 
session, the Uzbek delegation abstained eight times on resolutions that included 
Jerusalem (A/RES/53/37) and the Golan (A/RES/53/38). They also abstained on the 
General Assembly procedural resolution related to the issue of Palestine, on which 
Uzbekistan had previously voted in favor (A/RES/53/39, A/RES/53/40, and 
A/RES/53/41). Abstentions were also cast on resolutions calling for a peaceful 
settlement of the Palestinian Question (A/RES/53/42), the right of Palestinian self- 
determination (A/RES/53/136), and Palestinian sovereignty over natural resources in 
the Occupied Territories (A/RES/53/196). In the aftermath of Israel’s re-engagement 
with Uzbekistan, the Uzbek delegation’s voting pattern shifted to reflect a pro-Israeli 
bias. Despite President Karimov’s statements to Arafat while visiting Ramallah in 
September 1998 that Uzbekistan was supportive of Palestinian rights, the Uzbek 
delegation in the General Assembly did not vote in favor of any resolutions related to 
Palestinian rights. They cast no vote at all on 14 resolutions.
Of the 22 resolutions passed in the General Assembly that were hostile to 
Israel in the 54th Session, Uzbekistan only voted in favor of two (one of which was the 
right to Palestinian self-determination), and cast seven abstentions. As in the 53rd 
Session, Uzbekistan again abstained on resolutions related to Jerusalem 
(A/RES/54/37) and the Golan (A/RES/54/38), the procedural resolutions regarding 
Palestine (A/RES/54/39, A/RES/54/40, and A/RES/54/41), and resolutions endorsing
a peaceful solution to the Palestinian Question (A/RES/54/42) and Palestinian 
sovereignty over natural resources in the Occupied Territories (A/RES/54/230). The 
Uzbek delegation did not vote at all on 13 resolutions.
During the 55th Session of the UN General Assembly—the last to be examined 
in this study— the Uzbek delegation voted in favor of three out of 23 resolutions 
related to the Middle East considered hostile to Israel. Uzbekistan voted (for the 
second time) in favor of citing Israel as a risk to nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East (A/RES/55/36). They voted in favor of Palestinian self-determination 
(A/RES/55/87) and sovereignty over natural resources (A/RES/55/209), a departure 
from their usual practice of abstaining from such resolutions. No abstentions were 
cast in 2000. The Uzbek delegation did not cast votes on 20 of the 23 resolutions 
hostile to Israel, resolutions which covered issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the 
occupation of the Golan, application of the Geneva Conventions, Israeli settlements, 
Palestinian human rights, and assistance to the Palestinians.
During the third phase of the relationship, Uzbekistan’s voting pattern visibly 
softened on resolutions related to the Middle East considered hostile to Israel. Over 
the course of this three-year period, the Uzbeks went from abstaining on the status of 
Jerusalem and the Golan to casting no vote at all. Tashkent’s position on the 
resolution calling for a peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also 
followed this pattern. Similar patterns can be seen on resolutions related to the issue 
of Palestine in the General Assembly. On resolutions related to the Committee on the 
Exercise of Palestinian Rights, the Division for Palestinian Rights, and the Special 
Information Program for Palestine, Uzbekistan’s votes went from abstentions to no 
ballot cast. In shifting from abstaining on the issue to not casting a ballot on all these
issues, the Uzbek delegation did not participate in the quorum, and therefore lowered 
the total number of votes registered.
O v e r v ie w  o f  U N  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  V o t e s
Over the course of Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan examined in this 
chapter, Uzbekistan’s voting frequency in the UN General Assembly on resolutions 
related to the Middle East considered hostile to Israel shows a downward trend. This 
coincided with the emergence of an independent Uzbek foreign policy, yet the two 
were not in conflict. Throughout the 1990s, as Uzbekistan gained more experience in 
independent governance, Uzbek foreign policy was increasingly being made in 
Tashkent, for the advancement of Uzbek national goals. Uzbekistan displayed a 
conservative voting record in the General Assembly and sought to maintain its 
positive relations with Israel. The Uzbek delegation’s voting record in the UN 
General Assembly suggests that as Tashkent’s relationship was improving with Israel, 
the frequency with which the Uzbek delegation voted in favor of resolutions hostile to 
Israel decreased and the frequency with which they abstained or cast no vote on those 
resolutions increased. Uzbekistan’s voting behavior on these resolutions indicates 
that over the course of the period examined in this thesis, Uzbekistan increasingly 
supported Israel’s position by not voting or abstaining on resolutions considered 
hostile to Israel. In the ten years examined in this chapter, constructive engagement 
with Uzbekistan thus yielded benefits to Israel in the international arena.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the first decade of Uzbek independence, Israel created a 
strong and close relationship with Uzbekistan through diplomacy and development
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assistance, economic and commercial relations, and security cooperation. This 
relationship was borne by Israel’s drive to improve its national security and advance 
its traditional foreign policy goals. Israel was successful despite a period of decreased 
attention and diverted energies that lasted several years. Through constructive 
engagement Israel helped ensure a stable and secular Uzbekistan, which shared its 
view of regional threats and was closely aligned with Israeli interests. Uzbekistan did 
not devolve into an Islamist state, nor did it fall under the influence of Iran. 
Uzbekistan was able to maintain a very balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, occasionally voicing support for Palestine while firmly voting with Israel in 
the United Nations.
During the first phase of the relationship, Israel provided essential support to 
the new nation and helped ease some of the hardships of independence. Uzbekistan 
did not pursue Islam as a unifying national ideology; Iran and other Muslim nations 
were treated with suspicion by Tashkent. These nations were welcome to invest, but 
their ideologies were to be left at home. The Uzbek Jewish community was allowed 
to make Aliyah, and those that chose to remain were never subjected to persecution. 
As the international community and the Arab and Muslim world welcomed Israel’s 
establishment of relations with the Palestinians and as Israel made peace with Jordan, 
the policies of constructing diplomatic bridges beyond Israel’s Arab neighborhood 
seemed to matter less in Israeli security policy. In short, Israel no longer needed non- 
Arab Muslim Uzbekistan as urgently as it had previously.
Believing that its security situation was improving, Israel diverted energy from 
the relationship with Uzbekistan and refocused it on issues closer to home. Although 
the Israeli-Uzbek seemed to reach a plateau in 1995, the Uzbeks continued to view 
their relationship with Israel as useful and worthwhile. As a result, the relationship
did not suffer from Israel’s inattention. When problems developed in the peace 
process and normalization with the Arab states did not continue, Israel returned to 
building the relationship with Uzbekistan in the third phase. Interaction with 
Tashkent demonstrated that Israel could and did benefit from ties with non-Arab 
Muslim states. Among other benefits, their relationship worked to combat Israel’s 
anti-Muslim image, and it sent a message to Israel’s Arab neighbors that Israel would 
engage with them on Israel’s schedule, and not before.
This chapter has shown that Israel’s pursuit of national security and friendly 
relations with Uzbekistan resulted in a complex and dynamic relationship. The 
opportunity to create a mutually beneficial relationship with a Muslim state had long 
been a priority for Israel. Through such a relationship, Israel improved its own 
national security. Because Uzbekistan is the area’s most geopolitically strategic 
country, Israel’s achievements there were a victory for Israeli policy throughout the 
region.
The extent of Israel’s influence in Uzbekistan ensured that Tashkent did not 
align itself against the State of Israel and its interests. When the Central Asian 
republics first got their independence, Israel moved quickly to secure its own national 
security objectives by engaging the republics in a variety of ways. Israel was very 
successful with Uzbekistan: both nations took the same stance 011 Iranian influence, 
both saw threats to their security similarly, Israel ensured the neutrality of this non- 
Arab ‘Muslim’ state on the issues surrounding Palestine, and the relationship between 
Jewish Israel and ‘Muslim’ Uzbekistan turned out to be mutually beneficial 011 many 
levels. While the victories of Israeli policy in Uzbekistan were significant, the 
achievements in neighboring Kazakhstan were even more dramatic.
Ch a p t e r  F iv e : Is r a e l ’s Re l a t io n s h ip  w it h  
K a z a k h s t a n , 1991-1995
Israel was driven to engage Kazakhstan out of fear that it might devolve into a 
nation hostile to Israeli interests. The presence of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan’s 
position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a fear of Iranian influence in the region led 
Israel to reach out to and engage Kazakhstan. Over the course o f the relationship 
examined in this thesis, Israel nurtured the development of a solid and multifaceted 
relationship with Kazakhstan designed to ensure that Kazakhstan would not align 
against Israeli interests. These actions prevented Israel’s fears from materializing and 
the two states grew close through their cooperation and coordination.
This chapter will demonstrate the extent of Israeli-Kazakh relations through an 
analysis of the diplomatic relations, economic relations and development assistance, 
and security cooperation that existed between the two states. During the first phase, 
from 1991 through 1995, the relationship grew rapidly from none at all and expanded 
to cover political, economic, and security relations. It was in this period that Israel 
provided significant development assistance to newly independent Kazakhstan, and 
the nuclear dimension in the security relationship was removed from the equation. 
The elimination of the nuclear dimension, which was Israel’s greatest concern, also 
marked a reduction in Israeli attention to Kazakhstan as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter. It is important to note that as detailed in the following chapter, the 
Israeli-Kazakh relationship did not devolve in the second phase of the relationship.
p h a s e  i, 1991- 1995 : r a p id  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  r e l a t i o n s
In order to ensure that Kazakhstan did not align against Israeli interests, Israel 
engaged Kazakhstan in multiple areas. The first phase of the relationship was 
dominated by Israeli fears that Kazakhstan would emerge as a state hostile to Israeli 
national security interests. This fear was most manifest in the areas of nuclear 
proliferation, Kazakhstan’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and potential 
rise of Iranian-inspired Islamist radicalism. Israeli policy focused upon the 
neutralization of these threats. To achieve these goals, Israel responded to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and sought to engage Kazakhstan quickly through 
diplomacy, economic and commercial relations, development assistance, and security 
cooperation. During this first phase of the relationship, there were a number of 
official and working visits between the two nations. A large number of agreements 
were reached between Israel and Kazakhstan. As a result, the Israelis provided 
valuable international support and stability to newly independent Kazakhstan.
D ip l o m a t ic  R e l a t io n s
Of all the new republics in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, was a state of particular 
state of concern for Israeli policy makers because of its Soviet nuclear legacy. Only 
one year into the Israeli-Kazakh relationship, Robert Freedman identified Kazakhstan 
as “the most important target for Israeli diplomacy” and he was proven correct in his 
claim that “Israel scored its most important political success”483 in Kazakhstan. 
Israeli policymakers especially sought to support Kazakh independence as a secular
483 Robert O. Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia: A Preliminary Analysis,” Central Asia Monitor, no. 
2 (1993): p. 17, citing Judy Siegel, The Jerusalem Post, 13 January 1992.
Muslim state.484 It was feared that Kazakhstan, with its strategic weapons and 
significant mineral resources, would emerge opposed to the State of Israel and align 
with the rejectionist front of ‘hard-line’ Arab states.
Creating positive relations with Kazakhstan was a critical diplomatic objective 
for Israel in part because Almaty was interpreted as having a “‘special 
responsibility’... to steer the new republics away from Islamic fundamentalism and 
Iranian influence.”485 This led Israeli Ambassador Ben-Tziyon Karmel to state in 
remarks at a Kazakh Supreme Soviet reception that “Kazakhstan occupies a special 
place” in Israeli foreign policy.486 It was essential for Israel to secure Kazakhstan’s 
position rapidly on a number of issues of concern to Israeli policy: nuclear 
proliferation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the containment of Iranian ambitions in 
the region, and positive and open diplomatic and trade relations. This last point was 
and is vital to Israeli perceptions of national security, as discussed in chapter two: true 
peace and security arise out of total, complete, and full relations, and not simply a 
cold peace typified by the absence of hostilities.
Prelude to Relations: Arafat’s 1991 Visit to Almaty
Despite Israel’s security concerns in Kazakhstan and the need for haste, the 
Palestinian leadership was the first to reach out to the Kazakhs. On 23 December 
1991, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat arrived in the Kazakh capital of Almaty,487 en
484 Andrey Vasilyevich Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel: Ways of Economic Rapprochement,”
http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html (accessed 22 June 2001, site 
discontinued).
485 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face o f  Central Asia (London, 1995), p.
121, quoting President Nazarbayev speaking in Austria, February 1992, Radio Free Europe 
Daily Report, 4 February 1992.
486 Gennadiy Kulagin, “Israeli Ambassador Speaks With Parliament Chairman,” Itar-TASS, in English,
1956 GMT 22 June 1993, in FBIS-CE-93 (23 June 1993), p. 43.
487 “PLO chairman in Alma-Ata,” TASS, 23 December 1991, in British Broadcasting Corporation,
Summaty o f  World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC SWB) SU/1263 i[8] (24 December 1991).
route from a visit to Hanoi, Vietnam.488 One of the first international leaders to visit 
newly independent Kazakhstan,489 Arafat arrived before Israel had recognized 
Kazakhstan’s independence.
Arafat’s objective was to gain Kazakh recognition of Palestine and he also 
urged Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to support the Palestinian cause within 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).490 Arafat proved to be successful in 
getting Kazakhstan—-the largest of the newly independent Central Asian republics— 
to recognize Palestine before the Israelis had even recognized sovereign Kazakhstan: 
the Kazakh recognition of Palestine occurred two days before Israel recognized the 
independence of Kazakhstan. According to a 24 December 1991 report on the 
Palestinian news agency WAFA, Kazakhstan accorded “official and complete 
recognition”491 to Palestinian statehood during Arafat’s stopover. On 5 January 1992 
Nabil Amr, the Palestinian Ambassador in Moscow, confirmed that Nazarbayev had 
extended recognition to Palestine. In speaking with Moskovsldye Novosti, Amr stated 
that during the meeting an “agreement was reached on exchanging ambassadors”492 
which was subsequently implemented.
On 15 November 1988 the Palestine National Council had declared the 
establishment of an independent “State of Palestine” with Arafat as its president.493 
This status was recognized by 91 of the 110 nations which had diplomatic relations 
with the PLO. As such, Nazarbayev’s recognition of Palestine and Arafat was hardly
488 “Nazarbayev reportedly ‘surprised’ at Yasir Arafat’s visit to Kazakhstan,” Moskovskiye Novosti
(Moscow), in Russian, no. 1, 5 January 1992, in BBC SWB, SU/1274 A 4 /l[l] (10 January 
1992).
489 attempts to influence Muslim republics: Effort aims to sway areas toward West,” The 
Baltimore Sun, 16 January 1992.
490 Carol R. Saivetz, “Central Asia: Emerging Relations with the Arab States and Israel,” in Central
Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (London, 1994), p. 315.
491 “Kazakhstan and the State of Palestine exchange recognitions,” TAP (Palestine), in Arabic, 1140
GMT 24 December 1991, in BBC SWB, SU/1271 A 4/l[l] (7 January 1992).
492 “Nazarbayev reportedly ‘surprised’,” BBC SWB, SU/1274 A 4/l[l].
493 Dilip Hiro, The Essential Middle East: A Comprehensive Guide (New York, 2003), s.v. “Palestine
Liberation Organization,” pp. 402-405.
exceptional. During Chairman Arafat’s brief visit to Almaty, Nazarbayev recognized 
Arafat as the president of Palestine and the two leaders agreed to develop further 
political, economic, and cultural cooperation between Kazakhstan and Palestine.494 
Nonetheless, until the September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles both 
Israel and the United States regarded the PLO as a terrorist organization, despite the 
PLO’s designation by the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people.
Contemporaneous reports reveal that Arafat’s first visit to Almaty was in fact 
not very different than Nazarbayev’s pending interactions with the Israelis. While 
Nazarbayev was reported by Moskovsldye Novosti as being “surprised” by Arafat’s 
one-day stopover in Almaty on 23 December 1991, he shrewdly maintained his 
neutrality with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arafat was not accorded a 
top-level reception worthy of a visiting head of state, and it was noted at the time that 
“Kazakhstan’s top political circles did not entirely share” Arafat’s “brotherly” 
perception of the visit. Rather than at the Presidential Palace, the Nazarbayev-Arafat 
meeting took place in the Supreme Soviet building, included few advisors from either 
side, and lasted “exactly one hour.”495 Although it is not known exactly what was 
said in their meeting, media reports of their discussion indicate that Nazarbayev 
listened politely to Arafat while in reality he conceded very little to the Palestinians. 
The exchange of recognition and statements of intent to further develop relations are 
not unusual nor do they convey that any special affinity existed between Kazakhstan 
and Palestine. Nazarbayev and his advisors appear to have conducted a formal 
introductory diplomatic discussion in keeping with Soviet-era practice.
494 “Kazakhstan and State of Palestine,” i n BBC SWB, SU/1271 A 4/l[l].
495 “Nazarbayev reportedly ‘surprised’,” BBC SWB, SU/1274 A4/1 [1].
While the diplomatic overtures were not unexpected, they were cause for 
concern for Israel. In spite of the 1988 Palestine National Council declaration and 
Arafat’s 14 December 1988 address to the UN General Assembly in which he 
renounced violence and accepted co-existence with Israel496— on both occasions 
Arafat and the PLO renounced violence and accepted coexistence with Israel— Arafat 
gave Nazarbayev a gift which belied the Palestinian’s stance regarding Israel. 
Nazarbayev was given a ceremonial sword whose handle was inlaid with mother-of- 
pearl designs featuring Palestinian flags, a representation of the al-Aqsa mosque, and 
an outline of a State of Palestine which covered the entire territory of Israel and the 
Occupied Temtories.497 While Arafat spoke with Nazarbayev about the importance 
of Palestinian sovereignty and coexistence with Israel, the gift he left behind tells a 
separate story. Arafat’s decision to present a gift to the Kazakh president which 
denied Israel’s right to exist confirmed the fears that the Palestinians sought to 
exclude the Israelis from any sort of relationship with the central Asian republics.
After the meeting it emerged that Arafat had conveyed to Nazarbayev that he 
perceived Kazakhstan to be part of the Middle East. Arafat was also reported to have 
told Nazarbayev that as part of the Middle East, war could easily spread throughout 
the region and Kazakhstan would then be subjected to Israeli missile attacks.498 
According to Arafat’s geopolitical interpretations, independent Kazakhstan was now 
embroiled in the Middle East conflict. This was an attempt to draw Kazakh support 
for the Arab position against Israel. Arafat’s visit and the statements that were made 
during his very brief meeting with Nazarbayev clearly demonstrated that the
496 Arafat’s address was given to a special session of the General Assembly convened in Geneva; see
Hiro, Essential Middle East, s.v. “Arafat,” pp. 45-48, and “Palestine Liberation Organization,” 
pp. 402-405.
497 This gift is on display at the Central State Museum in Almaty, observed by the author on 26 January
2005 during field research in Kazakhstan.
498 “Nazarbayev reportedly ‘surprised’,” BBC SWB, SU/1274 A 4/l[l].
Palestinians were doing exactly as the Israelis had feared they would: get to the region 
first and secure Kazakh backing for the Palestinian perspective. The Palestinians 
sought to be the first to present their viewpoint hoping to gain Kazakh support against 
the Israeli occupation in the Territories. In so doing, Arafat and the PLO wanted to 
strengthen the Arab and Palestinian negotiating position in their dealings with the 
Israelis.
Nazarbayev, from his initial presidential interaction with Arafat, took a very 
cautious approach to dealing with the potentially messy Israeli-Palestinian issue. 
Now it is apparent that from the very beginning of the relationship Nazarbayev 
worked with both the Israelis and the Palestinians in an evenhanded and fair manner. 
Jacob Abadi’s assessment was accurate when he argued that “President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev opened his country’s doors to Israel but at the same time he thought it 
prudent to meet with Arafat.”499 Nazarbayev’s balanced approach in interacting with 
protagonists from both sides allowed Kazakhstan to remain removed from the conflict 
and in fact facilitated Kazakhstan’s role as an international mediator. In this sense, 
Nazarbayev shrewdly placed the national interests of Kazakhstan ahead of the 
parochial benefit of either the Palestinians or the Israelis.
Israel Responds
Following the diplomatic maneuvering of Arafat and the PLO, Israel took 
steps to address the unfolding situation in Kazakhstan. Palestinian attempts to garner 
Kazakh support at the expense of Israeli influence in the region exacerbated Israel’s 
fears. Nazarbayev’s 23 December 1991 recognition of the State of Palestine and 
agreement to exchange ambassadors reinforced the Israeli government’s perception
499 Jacob Abadi, Israel's Quest fo r  Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy 
(London, 2004), p. 437.
that Central Asia must be engaged to ensure Israel’s national security. A failure to do 
so would weaken Israel’s international standing and compromise its position with the 
Palestinians and its Arab neighbors.
Shortly after Nazarbayev’s meeting with Arafat, Israel engaged in a dramatic 
diplomatic course of action. Israel began an intensive effort to use its influence with 
the American government to have Washington impress upon Nazarbayev and his 
government that relations with the PLO were not in Almaty’s interest. Among the 
tactics employed by the Israelis, “the Shamir government asked twenty-three 
Members of Congress to send in February [1992] a letter to Nursultan Nazarbayev... 
to demand he end his support for ‘these terrorists’.”500 The Shamir government’s 
decision to invoke its American lobby and utilize the leverage and weight of Congress 
to attempt to influence Kazakh foreign policy serves as an indicator of the seriousness 
with which the course of Israeli-Kazakh relations were perceived by policy makers in 
Israel.
Despite the strained relationship Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had with the 
US government while he was in office (1986-1992),501 this was no ordinary letter 
writing campaign. Members of Congress have historically taken a great interest in 
issues related to Israeli security, and there was no reason to think otherwise in this 
case. Within Congress, an individual representative or senator’s position on Israel is 
taken extremely seriously, and a candidate’s record on issues relating to Israel’s 
security and the US-Israel relationship can figure prominently.
Israel’s urgent actions to bring Washington’s clout to bear on this issue did not 
rest with the Shamir mailings. Secretary of State James Baker was also asked by
500 Leon T. Hadar, “The Last Days of Likud: The American-Israeli Big Chill,” The Journal o f  Palestine
Studies 21, no. 4 (Summer 1992): pp. 87-88.
501 This was primarily the $10 billion loan guarantee fiasco for housing for newly arrived Soviet Jews.
Israel to urge Kazakhstan to step back from its relations with the Palestinians.502 
Israel routinely lobbies the American government to endorse its policies, but it bears 
keeping in mind that Secretary Baker was not only one of the closest advisors to then- 
US President George H. W. Bush, but he was also the prime architect of the Madrid 
Peace Process. Furthermore, Baker was personally engaged in US diplomatic efforts 
in Kazakhstan, focusing his efforts on his repeated attempts to persuade the country to 
give up its Soviet-era nuclear amis and become a signatory to the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).503
In the end, the joint Israeli-American pressure on Kazakhstan to distance itself 
from Arafat and the PLO did not have its desired effect. Kazakhstan did not break off 
ties with the Palestinians. I would argue that the intense Israeli reaction generated by 
Nazarbayev’s meeting with Arafat was symptomatic of Israel’s deeply held concerns 
over the fate of Kazakhstan. Moreover it is likely that this episode in part contributed 
to Nazarbayev’s efforts to remain firmly neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel 
had the potential to offer many things to Kazakhstan, especially investment and 
access to Washington, two benefits of relations with Israel that Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres would later comment upon in Almaty. Nazarbayev proceeded to lead 
Kazakh foreign policy down the middle road, equally engaging Israel and the 
Palestinians while calling for a measured and balanced settlement in the Middle East. 
Israeli-American pressure may veiy well have also influenced Nazarbayev to launch 
and fund the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), an international group designed to combat regional conflict and promote 
peace and security throughout Asia (to be discussed later in this chapter).
502 Hadar, “Last Days of Likud,” pp. 87-88.
503 These issues and timing are discussed by Saivetz, “Central Asia: Emerging Relations,” p. 313.
Laying the Groundwork fo r  Diplomatic Relations
Following Foreign Minister David Levy’s recognition of Kazakhstan on 25 
December 1991, Israel moved quickly to establish its presence in the country. Among 
the first orders of business for Israel was the creation of an infrastructure to support its 
new relationship with Kazakhstan. This involved the creation of an embassy, 
preparations for establishing air connections, and the establishment of a 
communications channel. From the outset, Israel sought to create a long-term 
relationship with Kazakhstan, and this is evidenced by the steps taken early in the first 
phase of the relationship.
Among the first steps taken by Israel was to conclude an agreement with 
Kazakhstan to create a direct satellite telephone connection. This was essential for the 
operation of the embassy; however, it also established a foothold in Kazakhstan for 
Israeli telecom firms to update the dire state of the republic’s infrastructure. On 21 
January 1992, Israeli Communication Minister Rafa’el Pinhasi met in Almaty with 
Kazakh Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko in the first intergovernmental meeting 
and they agreed to establish a direct satellite telephone channel linking Israel and 
Kazakhstan.504 Telephone calls had previously been routed through Moscow and 
Israel beat out many other international competitors to build the first satellite link. By 
February 1992 that had changed. This episode is discussed in more depth in the 
section on commercial relations, below.
For the first two years, the Israeli embassy in Almaty was located within the 
Hotel Kazakhstan. In 1994 the embassy relocated to its permanent building on 
Zheltoksan Street.505 Having the embassy housed initially for two years in a hotel 
further underscored the need for direct communications with Israel, rather than
504 “Israel and Kazakhstan to set up direct satellite telephone link,” Itar-TASS World Service, in
English, 1945GMT 21 January 1992, in BBC SWB, SU/1285 A4/2[4] (23 January 1992).
505 See Israel Yearbook & Almanac, volumes 47, 48, and 49.
routing calls and cables through Moscow on non-secure Soviet-era hubs. It is neither 
unusual nor uncommon to take time in acquiring a suitable building to house an 
embassy, and it indicates that the Israelis were seeking a long-term relationship. That 
the Israelis were not allocated a building outright reflects Kazakhstan’s initial 
perception that relations with Israel did not require special consideration.
The last component in this initial set-up of was to make provisions for direct 
flights between Tel Aviv and Almaty. During 1991 to 1995, there were no regular, 
direct flights despite the existence of an aviation agreement between the two countries 
made in September 1992. Charter flights, however, did and continue to connect Israel 
and Kazakhstan.506 The lack of such regular, direct flights is not surprising, 
especially given the weekly flights on the Tel Aviv-Tashkent route which was 
discussed in the preceding chapter. However, as Kazakhstan boasts the largest 
economy in the region, as well as a Jewish community of between 7,000 to 12,000 
people (some estimate the Jewish population as high as 20,000; approximately 7,570 
Kazakh Jews have made Aliyah to Israel since 19 8 9 507), the establishment of such 
flights in the future remains a possibility.508
An important interest for Israel was the Jewish community in Kazakhstan. 
The Kazakh Jewish community is well organized and Israeli assistance programs have 
worked to build schools and a social welfare system for those Kazakh Jews that did 
not make Aliyah to Israel. However, in the case of Kazakhstan, it is important not to 
overstate the importance that this connection played past the initial period in Israeli-
306 Observations made by the author during field research in Israel (1999 and 2006) and in Kazakhstan 
(2005).
507 Chris Bird, “Synagogue won’t stop Jews leaving Central Asia,” Reuters, 26 August 1996, and Lev
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Telegraphic Agency, 3 November 2002.
508 Israel recently stated that it intends to establish regular flights to Kazakhstan in the future. See
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August 2004, http://www.kazakhemb.org.il (accessed 29 April 2006).
Kazakh relations.509 The Jewish community in Kazakhstan contributed to Israel’s 
interest,510 and the fact that there is no history of anti-Semitism in Kazakhstan 
facilitated the rapid advancements in the bilateral relationship seen in the first decade 
of Kazakh independence.511 Kazakh-Jewish ties date back to the Second World War 
when Jewish evacuees were welcomed in by their new Kazakh neighbors. 
Commenting on the close Israeli-Kazakh ties that emerged in the 1990s, Israeli 
Ambassador Israel Mey-Ami asserted that “the Jewish people and the people of Israel 
remember the hospitality extended by the Kazakh and Kyrgyz people to the Jewish 
refugees during World War II and we are grateful for that.”512 Because Israel’s 
relationship with the Kazakh Jewish community is much beyond the scope of this 
study, it will be mentioned only as warranted.
The Establishment o f  Diplomatic Relations
It was not until 11 February 1992 that the Israelis began overt diplomatic 
advances to Kazakhstan, when Aryeh Levin, Israel’s Ambassador to Moscow, toured 
the region in preparation for the “establishment of full diplomatic relations.”513 
During his visit Levin discussed the desire of his government to enhance commercial 
relations and technical cooperation.514 Israel was preparing to offer Kazakhstan and 
the other republics what they wanted and needed most, and what the Palestinians 
could not offer: economic assistance. The Palestinians attempted to compete for a
509 Nikolay Kuzmin, PhD (Kazakh political analyst), interview with the author, 24 January 2005, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan.
310 “Motives of bilateral relations between Israeli and Kazakhstan,” [in Arabic] Qods News Agency 
(Palestine), 23 January 2006, http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
511 Yerkin Tukumov (Deputy Director, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies), interview with the
author, 26 January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
512 Israel Mey-Ami, “Israel in Relation with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” Times o f  Central Asia
(Bishkek), 30 December 1999.
513 “Israel set to establish diplomatic relations with Central Asian republics,” Israel Broadcasting
Authority TV  (Jerusalem), in Hebrew, 1730 GMT II February 1992, in BBC SWB, SU/1303 
A4/1 [3] (13 February 1992).
514 “Israel set to establish,” in BBC SWB, SU/1303 A4/l[3].
short time by offering to subsidize a hospital to treat victims of radiation sickness at 
Semipalatinsk, but the PLO—itself a major recipient of economic assistance—was in 
no position to offer a sustained program to Almaty. This was biown by all parties, 
and was a likely motivator for US-Israeli joint programs in the region: to demonstrate 
to Kazakhstan the benefits of cooperation and collaboration.
On 9 April 1992, Nazarbayev again received Levin and they signed the 
official documents establishing diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Israel. 
Nazarbayev remarked at the time that his country was interested in obtaining loans 
and agricultural assistance from Israel. Levin stated that Israel was interested in 
working together in several areas including cotton production, telecommunications, 
and the pharmaceutical industry. The Israeli ambassador also suggested that 
Kazakhstan could benefit from applying Israeli desert agricultural techniques. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict was also discussed, and Nazarbayev told Levin that Kazakhstan 
favored a peaceful solution.515
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, a number of diplomatic 
visits ensued in order to consolidate the emerging relationship, as enumerated in table 
5.1 below. Table 5.2 details the agreements reached between the two states during 
this period. Discussions of the most significant visits and diplomatic agreements 
which took place during follow in the subsections below. As table 5.2 demonstrates, 
the majority of the accords secured during this phase of the relationship concerned 
economic relations; these will be examined in the next section of this chapter, which 
focuses on commercial relations for 1991-1995.
515 “President Nazarbayev Meets Visiting Israelis, Discusses Economy with Ambassador,” Moscow 
Interfax (Moscow), in English (text from Presidential Bulletin), 1615 GMT 10 April 1992, in 
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Table 5.1 Major Visits, 1991-1995
Date Visitor Purpose | Location
Dec '91 PLO Chairman Arafat
Discuss 
recognition & 
exchange of 
ambassadors
Kazakhstan
Jan '92 Minister of Communications Rafa’el Pinhasi
Establish 
satellite link Kazakhstan
Feb '92 Ambassador Aryeh Levin
Preparation of
diplomatic
relations
Kazakhstan
Apr ’92 Kazakh Trade Minister Zheltikov
Discussion of
increased
relations
Israel
Apr ’92 Kazakh Agriculture Minister
Discussion of
increased
relations
Israel
Apr ’92 JAFI head Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador Levin
Ceremony to 
mark relations Kazakhstan
Sep '92 Kazakh PM Sergey Tereshchenko
Discussion of
increased
relations
Israel
Dec '92 President Chaim Herzog Working visit Kazakhstan
Mar/Apr 
’93
Economic Minister Shimon 
Shitrit, Energy Minister 
Amnon Rubenstein, and Dep 
Knesset Chairman Ovadia Eli
Discussion of 
Israeli
investment; led 
trade group
Kazakhstan
Mar/Apr
’93
First meeting of Israeli- 
Kazakh Joint Trade 
Commission
Trade meeting Kazakhstan
Nov ’94
Second meeting of Israeli- 
Kazakh Joint Trade 
Commission
Trade meeting Israel
Jan ’95
Speaker of Kazakh 
Parliament Abish 
Kekilbayevich
Working visit Israel
Aug '95 FM Shimon Peres Official state visit Kazakhstan
Dec ’95 President Nazarbayev First official state visit Israel
Source: FBIS; BBC SWB; Abadi (2006); Aras (2002); Freedman (1993); author’s research.
Table 5.2 Major Agreements, 1991-1995
Date Agreement Focus WhereSigned
25 Dec 
’91 Israeli recognition of Kazakhstan Political Israel
21 Jan
’92
Agreement to set up satellite 
communications link Political/Economic Kazakhstan
2 Apr ’92 Agreement on Israeli participation in agricultural development Economic Kazakhstan
2 Apr ’92 Agreement on cooperation in industrial technologies Economic Israel
9 Apr ’92 Establishment of diplomatic relations Political Kazakhstan
Sep '92 Aviation agreement Economic Israel
Sep ’92 Protocol to establish Joint Economic Commission Economic Israel
3 Feb ’93 Knesset Finance Committee approves foreign trade insurance Economic Israel
30 Mar
’93
Cooperation agreement with the Israel 
Institute for International Trade Economic Kazakhstan
30 Mar
'93 Agreement on charter flights Economic Kazakhstan
30-31 
Aug ’95 Air service agreement Economic Kazakhstan
30-31 
Aug ’95 Scientific agreement Academic Kazakhstan
30-31 
Aug ’95 Agreement on economic cooperation Economic Kazakhstan
30-31 
Aug '95 Agreement on cultural cooperation Academic Kazakhstan
30-31 
Aug ’95 Agreement on tourism cooperation Economic Kazakhstan
30-31 
Aug ’95
Protocol on consultation between the 
Foreign Ministries of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the State of Israel
Political Kazakhstan
Dec ’95 Proclamation of mutual friendship Political Israel
Dec ’95 Declaration on Basic Principles of Relations Political Israel
Dec ’95 Cooperation agreement on protection of investments Economic Israel
Dec '95 Protocol on agricultural cooperation Economic Israel
Dec '95 Protocol on medical cooperation Economic Israel
Dec '95 Protocol on ecological cooperation Economic Israel
27 Dec 
'95
Bilateral Treaty for the Reciprocal 
Promotion & Protection of Foreign 
Investments (came into force 19 Feb 
‘97)
Economic Israel
Sources: Freedman (1993); FBIS; author’s research.
Prime Minister Tereshchenko Visits Israel
The Levin meeting was followed by Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko’s 
September 1992 official visit to Jerusalem, and in later months there were meetings 
with President Chaim Herzog, Foreign Minister Peres, and Knesset Speaker Shevach 
Weiss, and discussions focused on further cooperation.516 The participation of Israeli 
firms in the Kazakh agrarian sector and the export of Israeli advanced technologies 
for the cotton sector were two of the issues of Tereshchenko’s meetings. 
Tereshchenko also signed an aviation agreement,517 negotiated for Israeli assistance in 
promoting Kazakh exports 011 the international market, and discussed greater Israeli 
investment in modernizing Kazakhstan’s aging industrial infrastructure.518 
Tereshchenko and Peres spoke about expanding bilateral trade, Israeli economic and 
technical assistance, and the good results that Israeli firms had thus far achieved in the 
telecom and agricultural sectors.519 Israeli and Kazakh officials noted there was much 
potential in the warming Israeli-Kazakh for the development of a mutually beneficial 
relationship.
Israeli-Kazakh relations were “very friendly”520 and from a Kazakh 
perspective, very useful. The maintenance of good relations with Israel translated into 
cooperation with the West, especially through the Diaspora and the American Jewish 
community. While Israel’s ability to effect change and achieve its goals has been 
overstated in most cases, its ability to influence American policy is significant and
516 “Tereshchenko Arrives in Israel for Talks,” Kazakh Radio (Alma-Ata), in Russian, 0800 GMT 8
September 1992, in FBIS-CE-92 (9 September 1992), p. 42.
517 Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia,” p. 18.
518 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
519 Aleksandr Zhudro, “Working meeting held,” Itar-TASS World Service, in Russian (text of report
from Tel Aviv), 0835 GMT 7 September 1992, in FBIS-CE-92 (9 September 1992), p. 42.
520 Interview with Kazakh Foreign Ministry official, January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
should not be overlooked.521 Kazakh and Israeli leaders both knew this fact, and it 
was skillfully used by leaders in Israel to advance Israeli policy concerns. Israel’s 
ability to influence policy in Washington was viewed as a “major incentive”522 behind 
Kazakhstan’s friendship with Israel and the Diaspora.
Visit o f  President Herzog
In October 1992, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin approved the unique 
arrangement in which the travel of Israel’s president was facilitated by an Israeli 
industrialist with business interests in both China and Kazakhstan. Saul Eisenberg 
was one of the very first Israelis to do business in Kazakhstan (even pre-independence 
Kazakhstan). Rabin’s official approval thereby facilitated the blurring of state 
diplomacy and ostensibly private sector commercial activity, and thus gave the 
government’s endorsement to this venture. A few months later, in December 1992, 
Israeli President Chaim Herzog stopped in Almaty on his way back to Israel from an 
official visit to China and met with President Nazarbayev. The People’s Republic of 
China had only recently established full diplomatic relations with Israel, and Herzog 
was at that point the highest ranking Israeli official to travel to China. Herzog was 
flying aboard the private aircraft of Israeli industrialist Saul Eisenberg because El A1 
did not have a Tel Aviv-Beijing flight scheduled on the day Herzog wished to travel. 
While Eisenberg is thought to have accompanied Herzog on the trip to China, it was 
noted by one of Herzog’s spokespeople that the businessman did not accompany the 
Israeli president during any of his official state meetings.523 The significance of the 
role Eisenberg played in facilitating President Herzog’s visit to Kazakhstan is
521 Brenda Shaffer, PhD (University of Haifa), conversation with the author, 4 November 2005,
Jerusalem.
522 Kazakh Foreign Ministry official, interview.
523 “Eisenberg flies president to China,” Israeli foreign affairs IX, no. 2 (26 February 1993), p. 6.
reaffirmed by the fact that Eisenberg and his close business associate David 
Kirnche— former Mossad deputy director—were very active in Kazakhstan. This fact 
has reinforced speculation that Eisenberg was acting, in part, at the behest of the 
Israeli government.524
The two presidents agreed during their meeting to further develop commercial, 
economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, and Nazarbayev stated that 
Kazakhstan was in favor of balanced relations with both the Israelis and the
CQ-C
Palestinians. While in Almaty, Herzog invited Nazarbayev to visit Israel. 
Although this visit was originally scheduled for February 1994,526 Nazarbayev did not 
make his first trip to Israel until December 1995.
Visit o f  Foreign Minister Peres
Israel continued its diplomatic overtures and at the end of August 1995, 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres paid an official visit to Kazakhstan. Peres’ goal was 
to confirm Almaty’s commitment to a strong partnership with Israel, to which 
Nazarbayev responded by stressing that Israeli-Kazakh relations were bound to grow 
closer still.527 A number of agreements were signed during meetings with 
Nazarbayev, Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin, and Foreign Minister 
Kasymzhomart Tokayev on issues such as economic and diplomatic cooperation; they 
also agreed on a protocol on consultation between the two nations’ foreign
524 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” htlp://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
525 “Israeli President Holds Talks with Nazarbayev,” Itar-TASS World Sei'vice, in Russian, 0829 GMT
31 December 1992, in FBIS-CE-92 (31 December 1992), p. 59.
526 Untitled brief, Israeli foreign affairs IX, no. 2 (26 February 1993), p. 5.
527 Ivan Zakharchenko, “Israeli Foreign Minister Peres Pays Official Visit, Holds Talks with
Nazarbayev,” Itar-TASS, in English, 1909 GMT 30 August 1995, in FBIS-CE-95 (31 August 
1995), p. 67.
• * * 528  ♦ »ministries. Peres also discussed issues of regional security and stability, and
Nazarbayev invited Israeli firms to participate in the Kazakh hydrocarbon sector.529
It was reported that Peres specifically discussed “the two countries’ attitudes
towards nuclear weapons.”530 At the time of their meeting with Nazarbayev,
Kazakhstan was already committed to nuclear disarmament and had signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty eighteen months earlier, in February 1994.531 Peres
praised the Kazakh decision to remove nuclear weapons from its territory despite
pressure from Muslim nations to retain them.532 It is reasonable to conclude that the
discussions focused on the ultimate disposal of the Soviet-era nuclear anns and
technologies. It is also veiy likely that Peres discussed Israeli fears and concerns
regarding Iranian attempts to acquire Kazakh WMD technology. The regional policy
of Kazakhstan was also discussed, again hinting at the Israeli perception of a so-called
Kazakh ‘special responsibility’ in Central Asia, and it was agreed that Nazarbayev
would visit Israel at the end of 1995. 533
Before leaving Almaty, Peres was asked to comment on the increasing
cooperation between the two states. An Israeli reporter accompanying the foreign
minister asked Peres for his impressions as to why Israel had been able to secure such
close ties with Kazakhstan. Peres answered:
There is a strong Muslim element, but there is a strong 
separation between state and religion. There is much 
admiration for Israel. They look up to us as a pocket 
superpower that has achieved its strength and hope and 
influence by relying basically on the human element,
528 Zakharchenko, “Israeli Foreign Minister Peres,” in FBIS-CE-95, p. 67.
529 “Nazarbayev to Visit Israel,” Qol Yisra’el (Jerusalem), in Hebrew, 1600 GMT 30 August 1995, in
FBIS-CE-95 (31 August 1995), p. 67.
510 “Peres in Almaty,” labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly, autumn 1995: p. 10.
531 Shirin Akiner, “Soviet Military Legacy in Kazakhstan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 6, issue 12,
December 1994, http://www.janes.com.
532 “Nazarbayev to Visit Israel,” in FBIS-CE-95, p. 67.
533 “Peres in Almaty,” p. 10.
and they look upon Israel also as an entry into the next 
century and to the Western world.534
In this brief statement Peres acknowledged an essential Kazakh benefit of positive 
interaction with Israel: assistance in modernization and development. As this chapter 
demonstrates, through constructive engagement Israel was able not only able to 
satisfy its own national security concerns, but also provide Kazakhstan with much 
needed investment, trade, and access to the West, thus ensuring that Almaty would 
not align against Israeli interests.
Nazarbayev’s First Official Visit to Israel
In December 1995 Nazarbayev traveled to both Israel and Gaza, accompanied 
by over 100 Kazakh businessmen.535 During this visit the two nations signed a 
proclamation of mutual friendship536 and reached an agreement to work closely on 
investment, medical, and ecological issues.537 In a sign of expanding ties, Peres 
observed that the Israeli-Kazakh relationship was “a marriage of geography [theirs] 
and history [ours].”538 In recognition of ever improving relations, on the eve of his 
departure Nazarbayev signed a decree to upgrade Kazakhstan’s representation in 
Israel and officially establish a Kazakh embassy in Tel Aviv.539
Peres and Nazarbayev discussed several issues of Israel-Kazakh defense 
cooperation such as the modernization of Kazakh aeronautical equipment, conversion 
of defense industries, and coordination in fighting terrorism, as did defense ministers
534 “Israel’s Peres Signs Four Agreements,” Qol Yisra’el (Jerusalem), in Hebrew, 1500 GMT 31
August 1995, in FBIS-CE-95 (1 September 1995), p. 53.
535 “Nazarbayev to Israel and Gaza,” labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly 3, no. 1, 1996: p. 10.
536 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1996: Events o f 1995, Volume 50 (Jerusalem, 1996), p. 112.
537 “Motives of bilateral relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
538 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1996, p. 112.
539 “President Authorizes Embassy Opening In Israel,” Itar-TASS, in English, 0949 GMT 21 December
1995, in FBIS-CE-92 (21 December 1995), p. 51.
Uri Or and Sagadat Nurmagambetov.540 Nazarbayev’s discussion with then-Foreign 
Minister Ehud Barak addressed their mutual concerns over Iranian influence; the 
meeting was significant because Barak “expressed concern that Iran might look to 
Kazakhstan for expertise in helping it to develop a nuclear weapon capability.”541 
Nazarbayev responded by noting that he was working to counter Iranian influence in 
Kazakhstan.542 This early interaction foreshadows the role Nazarbayev played four 
years later when he acted to broker meetings between the Israeli and Iranian 
governments.
Before returning to Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev signed several agreements in 
Gaza with Arafat on economic, industrial, and cultural cooperation.543
E c o n o m ic  R e l a t io n s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s is t a n c e
One of the principle drivers of Israel’s policy toward Kazakhstan was the 
desire to secure a firm foothold in Central Asia’s most dynamic economy. In order to 
facilitate trade between Israel and Kazakhstan, the Israeli government became an 
active promoter of Israeli business interests. With each state visit, Israeli leaders 
discussed the promotion of Israeli commercial interests in Kazakhstan. While this 
was undeniably borne out of a desire to maximize Israeli penetration of the region’s 
most promising economy, it was also a means with which to draw Israel and 
Kazakhstan closer together politically.
540 “President Nazarbayev In Israel,” Itar-TASS, in English, 1103 GMT 26 December 1995, in FBIS-
CE-92 (27 December 1995), p. 30.
541 “Nazarbayev to Israel,” p. 10.
542 “Nazarbayev to Israel,” p. 10.
543 “Nazarbayev, Arafat sign cooperation agreements,” Kazakh Radio (Almaty), in Russian, 0400 GMT
29 December 1995, in FBIS-CE-95 (29 December 1995), pp. 41-42.
Structure o f  Economic Relations
One example of how the state became involved in actively encouraging and 
supporting these commercial efforts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia was the Israel 
Foreign Trade Risk Insurance Corporation’s expansion of coverage for Israeli 
ventures in the region. In an unprecedented move, on 3 February 1993 the Knesset 
Finance Committee approved over $220 million in trade insurance for projects in 
Kazakhstan.544 The IFTRIC’s expanded coverage affected Israeli investments in 
Kazakhstan and throughout the republics, most of all in Kazakhstan, which at the time 
was Israel’s largest market in the region. Underscoring the links between political 
developments and economic investment, the increase in insurance coverage occurred 
after Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev paid an official visit to Israel and proclaimed that 
Kyrgyzstan would be the first Muslim nation— and only the third country after Costa 
Rica and El Salvador, both of whose embassies are subsidized by the Israeli 
government—-to open an embassy in Jerusalem.545
Creating strong commercial links between Israel and Kazakhstan would 
ensure that Israel and Almaty grew closer. Moreover, increased economic relations 
would create greater opportunities for Israeli and Kazakh leaders to meet; such 
meetings provided further openings for the leadership of both nations to share their 
mutual concerns.
For Kazakhstan, a major factor in doing business with Israel was that Israel 
possessed free trade agreements with a number of nations. The lure of reaching 
potential consumers in North America, the EU, Central Europe, Jordan, and Turkey
544 “Shaul Eisenberg emerges from the shadows,” Israeli foreign affairs IX, no. 2 (26 February 1993),
p. 4.
545 “Kyrgyzstan’s embassy in Jerusalem tops Ukraine’s,” Israeli foreign affairs IX, no. 2 (26 February
1993), p. 4. Amid much confusion, Kyrgyzstan quickly backed away from this remark.
was significant.546 This aspect of Israel-Kazakh trade, however, is not reflected in the 
trade figures presented in this study. This is because Israel’s Central Bureau for 
Statistics notes only those transactions destined for the domestic Israeli market.
When examining the official start of commercial relations between Israel and 
Kazakhstan, two facts stand out: first, economic ties developed before the diplomatic 
relationship did. The initial deal to upgrade the Kazakh telecom sector and accords 
signed by Kazakh Trade Minister Zheltikov took place before Levin had secured full 
diplomatic relations. This indicates that from the outset, the Israeli government 
sought to create a lasting, multidimensional relationship with Kazakhstan. The 
second notable fact concerns who led Israel’s official trade discussions. At the senior 
level, these efforts were led by David Kimche, former director-general of the Foreign 
Ministry and deputy director of the Mossad. Kimche, who had previously been 
responsible for nurturing subtle relationships for Israel, began working on building 
economic bridges in Central Asia shortly after the region became independent and put 
out feelers as mentioned previously, was reported to have worked closely with Saul 
Eisenberg. Kimche’s involvement demonstrated the Israeli government’s strategic 
desire to create strong links with Kazakhstan.
Operationally, it was not Minister of Economics and Planning David Magen, 
Minister of Industry and Trade Moshe Nissim, or Minister of Finance Yitzhak Modai 
who led official trade talks with Kazakhstan; rather it was Sirncha Dinitz, head of the 
Jewish Agency for Israel, president of the World Jewish Congress, and chairman of 
the Executive of the World Zionist Organization who spoke on behalf of the Israeli 
government.547 Dinitz accompanied Ambassador Levin to Kazakhstan in early April 
1992 for the ceremony marking the opening of diplomatic relations, but Levin did not
546 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
547 Central Asia Monitor, no. 2, 1992: p. 7.
remain in Almaty while Dinitz held discussions regarding the economic relationship. 
Because he was a former ambassador to the United States (1973-1978), Dinitz was 
intimately involved in issues affecting Israeli national security and had been a 
delegate to the Camp David peace talks. During the 1973 War, Dinitz had played a 
major role in obtaining essential American anns-lifts that played a key role in the 
defense of the Jewish state. While head of the Jewish Agency, Dinitz coordinated the 
immigration of over one million Jews to Israel. He also became well known as one of 
the main architects of Israel’s strong relationship with the Jewish Diaspora, itself one 
of Israel’s key security policies as discussed in chapter two.548
The fact that Dinitz led the first official economic discussions with the 
Kazakhs after the opening of official diplomatic relations is noteworthy because it 
signifies the primacy of security, rather than trade, in Israel’s relationship with 
Kazakhstan. Dinitz’s official capacity was to facilitate continued Jewish immigration, 
itself essential because it contributes to the future security of the state. The 
emigration of former Soviet Jews was a very important issue in Israel at the time, and 
the fact that Dinitz worked on trade discussions with the Kazakhs suggests that the 
issues of security and trade were connected. Otherwise, it would have been expected 
that another representative of the Israeli government such as Economic Minister 
Magen, Trade Minister Nissim, or Finance Minister Modai would have traveled to 
Kazakhstan with Dinitz and Levin for official talks.
Framework o f Economic Relations
Israeli-Kazakh trade relations developed out of a strong framework created 
during the first period of their relationship. Within the first four years numerous
548 Biographical data on Dinitz drawn from
littp://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Dinitz.html (accessed 18 June 2006).
economic and commercial accords were signed. Communications Minister Pinhasi’s 
agreement to establish a satellite telephone link in January 1992 marked the beginning 
of a long-term economic and political commitment to Kazakhstan. This was bolstered 
by two agreements signed in Israel by visiting Kazakh Trade Minister Zheltikov in 
April 1992 prior to the opening of official diplomatic relations. The first was an 
agreement on Israeli participation in agricultural development, and the second was an 
agreement to cooperate in industrial technologies.549 This was followed in February 
1993 by the Knesset’s expansion of foreign trade insurance.
During Prime Minister Tereshchenko’s visit to Israel in September 1992, the 
two nations signed an aviation accord and he and Prime Minister Rabin signed a 
protocol to create the Kazakh-Israeli Joint Governmental Commission on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation.550 While with Rabin, Tereshchenko delivered a dossier 
containing details on 120 projects in which the Kazakhs were inviting the Israelis to 
participate; these projects were in areas such as agricultural technology, irrigation, 
soil improvement, storage of agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications, and space research.551 Israel was also reported to have 
expressed an interest in Kazakh water desalinization.552
This visit was then followed by a trade delegation and the inaugural meeting 
of the Joint Governmental Commission in March-April 1993. Additional agreements 
were reached in August 1995 when President Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Peres 
signed accords in Almaty on economic and tourism cooperation and signed a further 
aviation agreement. While in Israel in December 1995 for his visit state visit,
549 “Republic, Israel Expand Trade, Cooperation,” Kazakh Radio (Alma-Ata), in Kazakh, 1400 GMT 2
April 1992, in FBIS-CE-92 (9 April 1992), p. 59.
550 Aleksandr Zhudro, “Economic Protocol Signed,” Itar-TASS, in English (text o f report from Tel
Aviv), 0800 GMT 8 September 1992, in FBIS-CE-92 (9 September 1992), p. 42.
551 “Prime Minister, Israel’s Rabin Sign Protocol,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), in Russian, first
edition, p. 7, in FBIS-CE-92 (15 September 1992), p. 35.
552 Zhudro, “Economic Protocol Signed,” in FBIS-CE-92, p. 42.
Nazarbayev signed an investment cooperation agreement to protect Israeli investment 
in Kazakhstan and yet another agricultural accord.
These agreements created a film foundation on which investment and 
commercial relations were built. The institutionalization of the economic relationship 
allowed Israel to invest significantly over a short period of time in a developing 
economy. The joint nature of these accords demonstrates that this relationship was 
being advanced from both sides. The Israelis were eager to generate profits while 
creating a strong friendship, whereas the Kazakhs sought to improve their economy 
and benefit from Israel’s advanced technologies and access to other markets. Several 
of these agreements are detailed in the following subsection.
In a significant vote of confidence in the Kazakh economy, “the Israeli 
parliament... approved a huge specific-purpose credit for Kazakhstan, the first time 
the Israeli government has taken such a step for another country.”553 The Knesset 
would not have taken this rare action had it harbored reservations regarding the 
financial viability of Israeli firms in the Kazakh market. Furthermore, in mid-May 
1993, Bank Hapoalim granted a Kazakh bank an $80 million line of credit in order to 
facilitate the Kazakh import of Israeli agricultural equipment and training services.554 
Andrey Fedorchenko, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian 
Academy of Sciences in Moscow, noted that as of June 1993, the Knesset and Israeli 
government guaranteed “65 per cent of the value of private credits advanced by 
national companies for economic projects in Kazakhstan.”555 These actions again 
underscore Israeli confidence in the Kazakh market and the competence of Israeli
553 Shafiqul Islam, “Capitalism in the Silk Route?” in Central Asian and the World: Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York,
1994), p. 174.
5:4 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1994: Events o f 1993, Volume 48, (Jerusalem, 1994), p. 141.
555 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhs tan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html 
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
firms. Such loans and government guarantees are examples of the fluidity between 
diplomacy and business in strategic Kazakhstan.
The economic relationship continued to develop quickly, and in late M arch- 
early April 1993 Minister of Economics and Planning Shimon Shitrit, Minister of 
Energy and Infrastructure Amnon Rubenstein, and Knesset Deputy Chairman Ovadia 
Eli556 led a delegation of 80 businessmen to Almaty.557 The delegation brought with 
them the confirmation that Kazakhstan would be granted Israel’s first ever special 
puipose credit.558 In a series of meetings with Nazarbayev, Tereshchenko, Deputy 
Prime Minister Galym Abuseitov, and Foreign Economic Relations Minister Syzdyk 
Abishev, the delegation discussed economic cooperation and specific opportunities 
for Israeli interests in construction and reconstruction programs, and they reached a 
number of preliminary accords.559 At the time it was noted that Israeli-Kazakh 
business meetings were becoming regular as a result of Kazakh investment policies, 
an attractive tax regime, and the successes of Israeli films in the agricultural and 
telecom sectors.560 Their discussions focused on large scale, long-term opportunities 
for Israeli businesses in a variety of sectors including agriculture, food processing, 
pharmaceuticals, heavy and light industries, transport, construction, banking, and
561  * »finance. Israeli irrigation, telecom, energy, and mining businesses also continued 
to do well in Kazakhstan, as reflected in the substantial trade figures.
556 Eli was also Deputy Minister o f Defense and a board member of the Jewish Agency.
557 Boris Maynayev, “Israeli Delegation on Familiarization Visit,” Itar-TASS, in English, 0912 GMT 29
March 1993, in FBIS-CE-93 (30 March 1993), p. 72
558 Gennadiy Kulagin, “Nazarbayev Meets Israeli Business Delegation,” Itar-TASS, in English, 1501
GMT 31 March 1993, in FBIS-CE-93 (1 April 1993), p. 66.
559 “Further On Official Visit By Israeli Ministers,” Kazakh Radio Network (Alma-Ata), in Kazakh,
2300 GMT 31 March 1993, in FBIS-CE-93 (2 April 1993), p. 60.
560 “Israeli Delegation Pays Visit, Discusses Cooperation,” Ostankino Television First Channel
(Moscow), in Russian, 1400 GMT 2 April 1993, in FBIS-CE-93, pp. 69-70.
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Ill order to continue the pace of economic relations and facilitate greater trade,
the Kazakh-Israeli Joint Governmental Commission on Trade and Economic
Cooperation was created in September 1992. This organization was “one of the most
important achievements of the two sides in the economic sphere.”562 According to the
Kazakh government, the Joint Commission met three times during the first decade of
Kazakh independence: first March—April 1993 in Almaty, in November 1994 in
Jerusalem, and finally in June 1998 in Almaty.563 The Joint Commission worked to
ease trade restrictions between the two states and served as a regular forum for
representatives from both nations to discuss the bilateral relationship. At the close of
the Joint Commission’s first meeting, co-chairman Shitrit summarized the puipose of
the organization:
The combining of Israel’s entrepreneurial spirit and the 
most up-to-date technology and the huge economic 
potential and natural resources of Kazakhstan is the goal 
of our cooperation. It should help both countries to 
attain a higher standard of living and stronger
564economies.
It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the Kazakh delegation would 
travel to Jerusalem for official talks with the Israelis but Kazakhstan’s position in the 
UN General Assembly on the status of Jerusalem remained firmly against Israel.565 
With the exception of 1999,566 every time the General Assembly voted on the issue of 
Jerusalem from 1993 to 2000, Kazakhstan voted with Iran to call for an end to Israel’s 
unilateral claim to Jerusalem. This would suggest that while Kazakhstan sought to
562 “Motives of bilateral relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
563 “About the Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” Statement of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan
in the State of Israel, n.d., http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
504 “Israeli Delegation Pays Visit,” in FBIS-CE-93, pp. 69-70.
565 See Appendix One, UN General Assembly voting record on Middle East issues.
566 In 1999 Kazakhstan cast no ballot. Whether Kazakhstan was present and chose not to vote or was
not present is not known from the UN’s official records. However, the fact that the Kazakh 
delegation cast other ballots that day suggests that a decision was taken not to vote, although 
this cannot be known with certainty.
maintain an international position in line with other regional states and Muslim 
nations, in practice Kazakh foreign policy did not have problems with conducting 
official meetings with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem. This was certainly not lost on the 
Israelis, who viewed their meeting in Jerusalem as recognition by Kazakhstan Basic 
Law (1980): Jerusalem, Capital of Israel which claims all o f Jerusalem as the 
complete and united capital of Israel.567
The silence of the Arabic and Persian press on these meetings in Jerusalem is 
noteworthy. Possible explanations for this include a tacit understanding that Kazakh 
policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was decidedly even-handed; a 
recognition that Kazakhstan maintained positive ties with Israel while simultaneously 
voting in favor of repeated UN General Assembly resolutions that called for an end to 
the occupation of Jerusalem; and an acknowledgement by Teheran that Kazakh- 
Iranian relations were in fact amicable. In any event, Kazakhstan’s tacit recognition 
of Jerusalem did not complicate Almaty’s relations with other Muslim states.
On 27 December 1995 Israel and Kazakhstan signed the Bilateral Treaty for 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments. This agreement 
facilitated greater trade and investment by eliminating obstacles to profit removal. 
According to the Israeli Ministry of Finance, this agreement ensured compensation in 
the event of war, guaranteed capital repatriation in events of nationalization or 
expropriation, and prevented the unequal treatment of foreign investors. The treaty 
came into effect on 19 February 1997, and has since increased the flow of Israeli 
capital and investment into Kazakhstan.568
See http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1980_1989/Basic%20Law-%20Jerusalem- 
%20Capital%20of%20Israel (accessed 18 June 2006).
568 Data drawn from Israel Ministry of Finance, International Division, “Bilateral Treaties for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments,” 
http://www.mof.gov.il/beinle/talmor.htm (accessed 19 June 2006).
Pace o f  Commercial Relations
Trade ties between the two nations developed quickly and Kazakhstan 
benefited from Israeli investments in both agriculture and high technology.569 During 
the first four years of the relationship Kazakhstan was Israel’s primary trading partner 
in the region. In early April 1992 Kazakh Trade Minister Zheltikov traveled to Israel. 
It was announced on 2 April 1992—just seven days before the official announcement 
of formal diplomatic relations—that Israel and Kazakhstan would work together to 
develop greater commercial cooperation, increase trade relations, and expand 
industrial and technical collaborations.570 While in Israel, Zheltikov signed 
agreements for Israeli assistance in agricultural development, industrial renovation, 
and other training programs.571
Israeli businesses enjoyed early success in Kazakhstan in a variety of projects, 
focused on both the agricultural and industrial sectors. Following Kazakhstan’s 
independence, a number of Israeli firms entered the Kazakh market obviously with an 
eye to the benefits a large economy brimming with potential could offer. The 
enthusiasm of many Israeli entrepreneurs led them to make investments in former 
Soviet Central Asia, and in the immediate aftermath of independence Kazakhstan 
attracted the most attention. Israeli commercial activity began very quickly in 
Kazakhstan; within the first several months of the relationship, 18 Israeli companies 
had visited Kazakhstan to explore opportunities, and three were involved in 
significant business.572 Two areas of Kazakhstan’s dilapidated infrastructure that 
required the most attention were the agricultural and telecom sectors. It was in these
569 Tukumov, interview.
570 “Israel to help Kazakh agriculture and livestock breeding,” Kazakh Radio (Almaty), in Kazakh,
1400 GMT 2 April 1992, in BBC SWB, SU/1351 A4/2[7] (9 April 1992).
571 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
572 Hugh Carnegy, “Israel extends its ami to tie up central Asian links,” Financial Times, 6 May 1992,
two areas that Israeli businesses were most active during the first period of the 
relationship (see Major Commercial Investment, 1992-1995, below).
During 1992, Israeli firms secured agreements with Kazakhstan for several 
billion dollars’ worth of “economic collaboration” for the construction of chemical 
plants, the installation of irrigation facilities, and hospital renovations.573 Israeli firms 
were also retained to help “develop agriculture and livestock breeding and to train 
specialists.”574
Chart 5.1 Israeli-Kazakh Trade, 1992—2001
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Foreign trade turnover (see chart 5.1 and table 5.3) between Israel and 
Kazakhstan rose from $2.8 million in 1992575 to $35.5 million in 1993.576 These 
figures represent total Israeli exports to Kazakhstan; in calendar years 199 2577 and
573 Irina D. Zviagelskaya, “Central Asia and Transcaucasia: New Geopolitics,” in Central Asia and
Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict, ed. Vitaly V. Naumkin (London, 1994), p. 153.
574 “Israel to help Kazakh,” in BBCSW B, SU/1351 A4/2[7].
575 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 44, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 1993), chart 8.5,
pp. 266-267.
576 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 46, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 1995), chart 8.5,
pp. 272-273.
577 The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics figures from 1992 begin in May and not January.
1993 no Israeli imports from Kazakhstan were recorded/ s This twelve-fold increase 
in recorded exports represents the single greatest increase in Israeli-Kazakh ties 
during the time period covered in this thesis. In 1994 and 1995 Israeli exports 
dropped, while Israeli imports from Kazakhstan began to rise slowly. Israel exported 
$15.3 million worth of goods and imported $0.2 million from Kazakhstan in 1994,579 
and in 1995 trade figures were $11 million and $0.5 million respectively for exports 
and imports.580 Commercial trade activities demonstrate the desire of Israeli firms to 
operate in Kazakhstan over the course of the relationship.
As evidenced by these figures, at the beginning of this period commercial 
relations were developing extremely well. In recognition of this, the widely read 
Economist Intelligence Unit country profile of Israel commented that economic 
relations between Kazakhstan and Israel “were flourishing.”581 Acknowledgement by 
the EIU was significant because many governments and multinational corporations 
are consumers of such data. A private sector analysis also noted the varied Israeli 
commercial interests in Kazakhstan. Israel was identified in a confidential petroleum 
industry report on Kazakhstan as one of the “countries which have begun to play more 
important roles in different economic sectors.”582
Table 5.3 Israeli-Kazakh Trade, 1992-1995 
(in Millions of Dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995
Exports S2.8 S35.5 S15.3 S ll
Imports SO $0 SO.2 SO.5
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
5 8 See Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 44, chart 8.5. p. 266 and Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, 
Number 46, chart 8.5, p. 272.
579 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 46, chart 8.5, pp. 272-273.
5X11 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 47, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 1996), chart 8.5, 
pp. 223-223.
sl The Economist Intelligence Unit, Israel: Country' Profile 1992-93 (London, 1993), p. 9.
“Kazakhstan: Social and Political Backdrop,” draft version of a confidential petroleum industry 
report, n.p., n.d., p. 19. Document in the collection of the author.
These figures represent the initial large-scale boom in trade turnover between 
Israel and Kazakhstan in the first years of the latter’s independence. From 1994, trade 
levels decreased. This was the result of several factors, including the end of the initial 
excitement of Israeli businesses for opportunities in Kazakhstan, a difficulty in 
generating continued trade opportunities for Israeli firms, an economic slowdown in 
the Kazakh economy, and the fact that much had already been exported by Israel into 
Kazakhstan.
Development Assistance
Israeli development assistance to Central Asia was significant from the outset. 
In the case of Kazakhstan, development assistance should be considered primarily a 
component of economic policy and not of diplomatic policy. To be sure, 
development assistance was intended to advance the political objective of creating a 
strong bond with Kazakhstan. Nonetheless, it is significant that such aid was intended 
to further Israel’s commercial interests.
MASHAV worked closely with USAID in Kazakhstan. In early July 1992, 
US Secretary of State Baker’s idea of joining American funds and Israeli experts to 
work on development projects in Central Asia was primarily meant to combat the 
potential rise of Islamic fundamentalism.583 In September 1992 the first combined 
US-Israeli “agricultural aid delegation” headed to Kazakhstan in order to identify 
projects for combined assistance programs.584 This was followed one month later by 
a similar US-Israeli team that investigated potential public health projects they could 
assist. Further projects were found in the agricultural sector.585
583 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1993: Events o f 1992, Volume 47 (Jerusalem, 1994), p. 84.
584 “Kazakhstan deal,” Israeli foreign affairs VIII, no. 10-11 (31 December 1992), p. 8.
585 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1993, p. 84.
In addition to development assistance, the republics also received direct 
economic assistance from the United States delivered via Israel. In 1993 Kazakhstan 
received $400 million in such direct aid, granted to Israel for the specific purpose of 
“countering Iran’s influence in Central Asia.”586 Plans were also made to assist 
Kazakhstan in developing and modernizing its aging Soviet-era industrial facilities 
through the introduction of Israeli technology.587
Israeli aid was not an altruistic endeavor. This assistance was designed to 
staunch Iranian influence and prevent the emergence of Islamist threats. An 
important secondary consideration for Israeli donations to Kazakhstan was to plant 
the seeds of future Israeli-Kazakh commercial ventures. One of the major benefits for 
Israeli businesses was that the changes were subtle and occurred over a period of 
time, making the Kazakh infrastructure compatible with Israeli commercial products 
and processes.
This strategic investment in Kazakhstan was intended to help facilitate long­
term cooperation. In the long view, Kazakhstan was projected to become a 
technological hotbed where Israeli know-how would be combined with Kazakh raw 
materials to produce hi-tech goods for export to other countries at a sizable profit. In 
the early 1990s, it was hoped that this strategy would combat the flight of educated 
and productive Kazakh residents,588 especially those who had previously been 
employed in the Soviet nuclear and other weapons programs. This strategy also 
sought to close yet another avenue of potential Iranian cooperation with Kazakhstan, 
and was an additional attempt to further isolate Iran; it reinforced the Israeli
586 Zviagelskaya, “Central Asia and Transcaucasia,” p. 153.
587 “Israel to help Kazakh,” m B B C SW B , SU/1351 A4/2[7],
Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.iu/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html 
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
government’s desire to prevent Kazakhs from seeking employment in countries of 
concern such as Iran.
Major Commercial Investment, 1992—1995
Israeli commercial policy toward Kazakhstan from the beginning of 1992 
through the end of 1995 involved significant activity in a number of sectors. Because 
of the often overlapping nature of for-profit business ventures and Israeli aid projects, 
these two aspects of Israeli policy toward Kazakhstan are addressed in this section. 
The areas in which Israel was the most heavily involved during this period of the 
relationship were the agricultural and telecom sectors, with additional projects that 
took place in the industrial and energy sectors. Israeli involvement included the 
export of drip irrigation technologies; investment in the agricultural, industrial, and 
energy sectors; the manufacture of foodstuffs; and animal husbandry. Discussions on 
commercial air links between Almaty and Tel Aviv were also held during this period. 
Many of the Israeli projects in Kazakhstan as listed in table 5.4; some of the more 
important projects from 1992 to 1995 are discussed below.
Table 5.4 Major Israeli Projects, 1992-1995
Year Project Sector Business(es)Involved
Contract
size
(where
known)
1992 Drip irrigation project, Shymkent Agricultural Eisenberg Group $160m
1992 Cotton processing facility Agricultural Eisenberg Group NA
1992 Plastic film plant Industrial Eisenberg Group NA
1992 Telephony expansion project Telecom Motorola Israel NA
1992 Four turnkey agricultural upgrade projects Agricultural Merhav Group $35m
1993
Project financing: line of credit 
to purchase agricultural 
equipment and services
Agricultural Bank Hapoalim $80m
1993 Tomato paste JV Agricultural Pri-Nir; Teva Tari $2.5m
1993
Creation of training center for 
Kazakh Ministry of 
Communication
Telecom Degem; Tele-tech $1 m
1994
Build satellite communication 
system for domestic and 
international use
Telecom Gilat $4.6m
1995
Management contract for 
Karaganda Metallurgical 
Complex
Industrial Eisenberg Financial Group NA
1995 2 refinery upgrade contracts Energy Israel Corporation NA
1995 Ancillary services Energy
Lapidoth Oil 
Prospectors 
Corporation
NA
1995
Construction of 4 food 
processing and agricultural 
production facilities
Agricultural Merhav Group $60m
Sources: Israel Ministry of Industry & Trade; Israeli foreign affairs; Israel Business Today; Israel Year 
Book & Almanac; Abadi (2006); Aras (1998); Kazakh Embassy in Israel; author’s field work in Israel 
and Kazakhstan.
As detailed in the preceding chapter on Israeli-Uzbek relations, the reputation 
of Israeli drip irrigation technology had a high reputation in the region. As in 
Uzbekistan, there was an eagerness in Kazakhstan to harness Israeli expertise in 
agricultural development. Israeli firms moved quickly to implement advanced 
technologies and installing drip irrigation systems in order to boost cotton production.
Soon after Kazakhstan’s independence, many enthusiastic Israeli entrepreneurs 
flocked to Kazakhstan with hopes of exporting Israeli irrigation technologies.589
By the end of 1992 the Eisenberg Group had signed a $160 million irrigation 
deal and was in possession of $2 billion worth of letters of intent for additional 
contacts.590 This deal came less than a month after a similar project was abandoned in 
Tajikistan due to the civil war.591 The project created an irrigation system on a vast 
site of 200 square kilometers of cotton and agricultural fields in Shymkent province 
near the Uzbek border, a factory to build irrigation pipes, and made provisions for 
technicians.592 Of the $160 million total contract value, between $20 million and $30 
million was paid by foreign sources.593 The remainder was guaranteed by the 
IFTRIC594 which would place the officially guaranteed portion of the total value at 
around the 65 per cent level asserted by Fedorchenko in his analysis of Israeli-Kazakli 
economic relations.595 This arrangement highlights the support given by the Israeli 
government to private sector commercial concerns in its bid to draw Israel and 
Almaty closer together during the first years of the relationship. Eisenberg’s 
investments in Kazakhstan were the most successful in establishing an Israeli 
economic and political presence in Kazakhstan.596
Other firms were also active in the agricultural sector such as Pri-Nir, a joint 
Israeli-Kazakli venture run by former Deputy Mayor of Tel Aviv Michael Roee,
589 Michael Reynolds, PhD (Assistant Professor of Near East Studies, Princeton University), discussion
with the author, 19 May 2006, Princeton, New Jersey. See also Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan- 
Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html (accessed 22 June 2001, site 
discontinued).
590 Philip Robins, “The Middle East and Central Asia,” in The Central Asia and Its Neighbours, ed.
Peter Ferdinand (London, 1994), p. 72.
591 Robins, “Middle East and Central Asia,” p. 72.
592 See “Kazakhstan deal,” p. 8, and Abadi, Israel’s Quest fo r  Recognition, p. 436.
593 The Jerusalem Post, 5 December 1992.
594 “Shaul Eisenberg emerges,” p. 4.
595 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.rn/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
596 “Kazakhstan deal,” p. 8.
former Kazakh Prime Minister Tereshchenko, and Israeli businessman Jacob 
Cheskala.597 Netafim, another firm, was successful in installing drip irrigation 
systems throughout Kazakhstan.598 In February 1993 the Merhav Group increased its 
investments in Kazakhstan four-fold, from $40 million to $160 million.599 Through 
the use of Israeli agricultural and irrigation expertise, food production increased 
many-fold over the previous levels achieved by the Soviets; for example, tomato 
yields were six times greater than before.600 As early as 1992, Israel agreed to train 
Kazakh specialists in livestock breeding and animal husbandry and this yielded results 
quickly.601 Israeli programs increased milk production; work done by the Lachist 
finn and the Davy Foundation reduced milk production expenses and increased the 
yield by 60 percent.602
With respect to the telecom sector, Israel was quite active. Israeli firms 
completed numerous projects to upgrade and expand Kazakh telecommunications. 
The most notable contract followed immediately after Communications Minister 
Pinhasi’s January 1992 official visit to Almaty which preceded official relations. 
Originally from Kabul,603 Pinhasi was the first official Israeli to travel to Kazakhstan 
on governmental business. While in Almaty, Pinhasi called for greater economic
597 See “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il, and “Motives of bilateral
relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
598 Colin Barraclough, “Muslim Republics Welcome Israeli Irrigation Expertise,” Christian Science
Monitor (23 September 1992).
599 “Shaul Eisenberg emerges,” p. 4.
600 George E. Gruen, “Dynamic Progress in Turkish-Israeli Relations,” Israel Affairs 1, no. 4 (summer
1995): p. 56.
601 “Israel to help Kazakh,” in BBC SWB, SU/1351 A4/2[7].
602 Biilent Aras, The New Geopolitics o f  Eurasia and Turkey’s Position (London, 2002), p. 63, citing
the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board, Summary Notes of the Conference on possible 
cooperation among Turkish-Israeli firms in the Central Asian republics, Istanbul, 10 December 
1996, p. 6.
603 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1993, p. 188.
cooperation between Israel and Kazakhstan and expressed his government’s support 
for President Nazarbayev’s efforts to transform the economy.604
The commercial venture to upgrade the existing telecommunication system 
and create a direct-dial satellite link between the two nations was the first known 
successful Israeli commercial deal in any of the five Central Asian republics.605 
Pinhasi’s agreement with the Kazakhs also called for the creation of joint ventures to 
manufacture telephone equipment.606 Within several months of recognizing 
independent Kazakhstan, Israel had completed this contract, drastically improving the 
ability of the two states to communicate.
International commercial telephone calls began to be routed via Tel Aviv 
through this satellite link in April 1995.607 This corresponds to the beginning of the 
second period of the relationship between Israel and Kazakhstan when diplomatic 
interaction decreased, and official use of the channel declined. For Kazakhstan, the 
creation of a satellite connection with Israel was a first. As of January 2005, the only 
other cities to enjoy satellite links with Almaty were London, Paris, Istanbul, 
Frankfurt, Astana, Sydney, Seoul, and Tokyo.608 As will be demonstrated Israel 
continued to make significant improvements to the telecommunication network of 
Kazakhstan throughout the first decade of Kazakh independence.
In the industrial sector, the Eisenberg Financial Group won a management 
contract for the privatized Karaganda Metallurgical Complex (Karmet). However, 
after discovering that the facility’s debts were double what had been reported, the 
Group reneged on the contract. It should be recalled that Kazakhstan’s industrial
604 “Direct Communication Link with Israel Formed,” Interfax (Moscow), in English, in FBIS-CE-92
(23 January 1992), p. 99.
605 Saivetz, “Central Asia: Emerging Relations,” p. 317.
606 “Direct Communication Link,” in FBIS-CE-92, p. 99.
607 Israel Year Book & Almanac: Events o f 1995, Volume 50 (Jerusalem, 1996), p. 208
608 Data obtained by the author on field research in Kazakhstan, January 2005.
infrastructure required extensive refurbishment and the replacement of outdated 
equipment, a fact well known to most international investors.609
Significantly, Saul Eisenberg’s ability to invest in the Kazakh market was not 
affected by this episode, and he and his firms continued to do business in Kazakhstan. 
Only one conclusion can be drawn from this fact: the Kazakh government and the 
management of the Karaganda Metallurgical Complex were aware of Karmet’s true 
solvency and made the decision not to jeopardize future investments from either 
Eisenberg or other Israeli investors, private or public. As the Kazakh government was 
solely responsible for privatizing state enterprises, the decision not to engage in 
retributive actions directed against Eisenberg or other Israeli investors attests to 
Almaty’s desire Almaty to ensure further development of the Israeli-Kazakli 
relationship and continued Israeli investment in the economy. This was especially 
true as the Kazakh economy continued to slow down during the mid- to late-1990s. 
This episode demonstrated the importance Almaty placed on positive economic 
relations with Israel.
Early in the relationship, Israel began to invest in the energy and power 
generation sector in Kazakhstan. In the 1993 meeting among Kazakh President 
Nazarbayev and Israeli Science and Economic Minister Shitrit and Israeli Energy 
Minister Amnon Rubenstein, the three men discussed Israeli strategic investment in 
oil and gas production and power generation.610 Among the deals they discussed 
were investment in two large power plants in Karaganda,611 two refinery upgrade
609 “Kazakhstan: Social and Political Backdrop,” p. 19.
610 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001).
611 Mey-Ami, “Israel in Relation.”
contracts,612 and ancillary services provided by the state-owned Lapidoth Oil 
Prospectors Corporation in Kazakhstan.613
Israeli investment in Kazakhstan took place before and after the establishment 
of diplomatic relations, suggesting that the Israeli government backed the private 
sector in furtherance of Israeli policy towards Kazakhstan. The activities of the Israeli 
private sector advanced the government’s agenda. One can not otherwise help but 
wonder why Israeli private concerns would so quickly enter a foreign market that was 
only three months out of a decades-long disastrous experience suffering under a 
centrally planned economy. The Israeli government’s backing of private sector’s 
involvement partially explains the confidence of Israeli businesses in the as yet 
unknown Kazakh market.
S e c u r it y  C o o p e r a t io n : A n e c d o t e s , P e r c e p t io n s , a n d  R e a l it ie s
Broadly speaking, security cooperation between Israel and Almaty during the 
first phase of their relationship covered three areas. The two most significant issues 
were halting the spread of nuclear proliferation and curbing Iranian influence. The 
third issue involved the provision of material support for the new Kazakh National 
Guard,
It is extremely challenging to acquire accurate and attributable data regarding 
security cooperation between Israel and Kazakhstan, though it must be noted that 
there is more open source material available regarding Kazakhstan than Uzbekistan. 
Unlike Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan has not experienced a sustained and well-organized 
terrorist threat; nor have Israeli personnel, interests, or facilities in Kazakhstan been 
targets of terrorist violence as they have been in Uzbekistan.
612 “Shaul Eisenberg emerges,” p. 4.
613 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 1996: Events o f  1995, p. 213. Until early 1996, Lapidoth Oil
Prospectors Corp. was an Israeli state enterprise.
Israeli Intelligence Activity in Kazakhstan
Anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that Israeli, Western, and Kazakh 
intelligence and security services cooperated to combat nuclear proliferation and to 
monitor and track former Soviet weapons engineers in Kazakhstan. It was in the 
national security interests of both Israel and Kazakhstan to prevent the proliferation of 
WMDs. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, President Nazarbayev repeatedly spoke 
out against nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Israeli policy toward Kazakhstan— and 
indeed all of Central Asia—was concerned about the spread of such weapons and 
technologies.
Although Israel was insistent that Kazakh WMDs and expertise in them not 
spread to countries such as Iran, there is no evidence to suggest that Israeli pressure 
had an impact on the decision of the Kazakh government to renounce nuclear 
weapons. In fact one senior Kazakh Foreign Ministry official confided that there 
were no demands from Israel to remove the Soviet-era nuclear arms.614
Halting Nuclear Proliferation
Unique among the Central Asian states, when Kazakhstan gained
independence it was a de facto nuclear power, possessing many strategic Soviet-era
weapons and installations. This factor influenced how nations dealt with independent
Kazakhstan. For many reasons— such as those outlined in chapter three— Israeli
leaders were especially worried about the fate of Soviet-era nuclear weapons. This
constituted Israel’s essential concern in Central Asia. I agree with Abadi when he
observed that, as a result, “the Israelis were particularly concerned and therefore saw
614 Interview by the author with a senior Kazakh Foreign Ministry official, 27 January 2005, Almaty, 
Kazakhstan. This official was familiar with his country’s relationship with Israel and the 
decision to remove Soviet-era nuclear weapons.
an urgent need to normalize relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union. 
This fear can partly account for Israel’s feverish activity in the region and for its 
intense efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan.”615 This prime 
concern might also help explain why one of the first discussions between Israel and 
Kazakhstan concerned the creation of a direct satellite telephone link.
Israel’s concern about the Soviet weapons left on Kazakh soil after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union encompassed more than just the fate of Soviet battlefield 
weapons; Soviet-era special nuclear materials and civilian atomic industries were also 
cause for alarm. The threats inherit in the detritus of the Soviet Union’s massive 
military were extensive, and included rumors of lost nuclear warheads left unexploded 
and abandoned on test ranges on Kazakh soil.616 Freedman’s very early analysis of 
the relationship was correct when he asserted that for Israel “first and foremost was 
the fear that the nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan might find their way into the hands of 
Israel’s Middle Eastern enemies.”617
Cooperation between Israel and Kazakhstan existed prior to the removal of 
Kazakhstan’s nuclear arsenal. Following its removal, the security relationship 
between Israel and Kazakhstan continued to be strong, focused on tracking former 
Soviet nuclear experts and monitoring sources of weapons grade fuel and special 
nuclear materials.
Claims o f Iranian Attempts to Acquire Kazakh Nukes
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many stories began to appear in 
the world press about Soviet-era nuclear weapons and technologies slipping out of the
615 Abadi, Israel’s Quest fo r  Recognition, p. 437.
6,0 See Mural Laumulin, “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Policy and the Control o f Nuclear Weapons,” in The 
Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia, ed. George Quester (London, 
1995).
617 Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia,” p. 17.
Commonwealth of Independent States and to such states as Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The majority of these questionable reports focused on Kazakhstan. While part of the 
Soviet Union, the Kazak SSR was one of the centers of the Soviet nuclear weapons 
program, hosting everything from the extraction and production of uranium 
yellowcake through to enrichment and testing at the nuclear testing facility at 
Semipalatinsk.
It was feared that the acquisition by another nation of a Soviet-era nuclear 
device located in Kazakhstan could be manifested in several possible ways. Some of 
the scenarios that were envisioned included the sale of a nuclear device to the highest 
bidder by the cash-strapped Kazakh government, the ‘sharing’ of such resources by 
sympathetic ‘Muslim’ officials, or outright theft. Acknowledging this fact, one author 
aptly noted several years into the Israeli-Kazakli relationship that “Israel’s fear stems 
from the possibility of the transfer of nuclear weapons and technology to Iran.”618
Iran figured prominently within these scenarios, partly due to the general fears 
of Western observers and partly as a result of an ambitious attempt by the Iranian 
government to explore such so-called sharing with Kazakhstan. There was significant 
concern that the clerical regime in Teheran would achieve— or at least advance— its 
nuclear aspirations through the application of Soviet nuclear expertise. Iran was 
reported in 1992 to be “actively shopping”619 for nuclear technologies around the 
now-independent Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.
One such allegation was published in early 1992 when the newspaper Al- 
Watan al-Arabi “claimed that Iran had bought nuclear weapons from an ‘Islamic 
republic’ in the former Soviet Union and had recruited Soviet nuclear scientists.”
618 Bulent Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia,” Middle 
East Policy, vol. 5, no. 4 (January 1998): p. 78.
Andrew Cockbum and Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe: The Terrifying Threat o f  Russia's 
Unwanted Nuclear Arsenal (London, 1997), p. 145.
Kazakhstan vehemently denied this allegation, as did Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mahmud Vaezi while in Almaty to open Teheran’s new embassy. Iran’s English 
language Kayhan International, known to be close to hard-line elements in the 
establishment, voided its opinion vehemently on the controversy, claiming that Iran’s 
interest was “not out of a desire to buy nuclear bombs but to gain a foothold in a 
mutually beneficial future.”620
Western and Israeli fears of Iranian intentions and desires were justified 
through the repeated discovery of evidence suggesting that Iranian agents had visited 
many sites that had hosted the Soviet Union’s large scale nuclear and biological
f i )  Iwarfare programs. Such evidence took a variety of forms, including the discovery 
of shipping containers at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk 
(Kazakhstan) prepared for shipment to Iran.622
During the Soviet period, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant produced nuclear fuel 
pellets for the Soviet navy’s abandoned Alfa submarine project. Despite the fact that 
this ill-conceived project was terminated many years before, the highly enriched 
bomb-grade uranium fuel pellets remained stored at Ust-Kamenogorsk for several 
years after Kazakh independence. In 1993 the American government launched 
Project Sapphire, a secret program to secure and remove this highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) from Kazakhstan and transfer it to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
Tennessee. In all, approximately 600 kg was transferred to American custody, 
enough for approximately 24 nuclear bombs.623
620 Peter Feuilherade, “Searching for economic synergy,” The Middle East (March 1992), p. 34.
621 Reports o f Iranian interest in nuclear components and technologies in Kazakhstan generated enough
concern that the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence was receiving reports each week 
detailing Iranian ‘shopping’ expeditions that were focused primarily on Kazakhstan. For more 
information, see Cockburn and Cockburn, One Point Safe, p. 145.
622 Cockburn and Cockburn, One Point Safe, p. 161.
623 Based on the rough estimate of 25 kg of HEU per each bomb.
During this program, American experts taking part in Project Sapphire at Ust- 
Kamenogorsk discovered the containers ready for shipment to Iran. Kazakh officials 
insisted that the shipment bound for Teheran did not contain any HEU and comprised 
only beryllium. In fact, the beryllium was never shipped because it was discovered by 
Americans officials before it could be sent.624 It is important to note that beiyIlium is 
a nuclear fuel additive625 and is an essential component in nuclear weapon designs; it 
is also used as well in other defense and aerospace systems such as missiles, high 
speed aircraft, and satellites.626 Today, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant is no longer 
involved in the weaponization of nuclear technologies. However, as the largest 
uranium enrichment complex in the Commonwealth of Independent States,627 it is still 
an active component in Kazakhstan’s peaceful, civilian nuclear program.
One of the most explosive allegations of Iranian attempts to secure Kazakh 
nuclear weapons came in August 1992 “when Pravda quoted an Israeli military 
journal’s accusations that Kazakhstan had sold three atomic bombs to Iran.”628 
Kazakh officials strenuously denied these allegations and to date 110 evidence has ever 
emerged to confirm this report.629 In fact, as recently as April 2006 former Mossad 
Director-General Efraim Halevy firmly dismissed these stories as having 110 basis in 
fact;630 nevertheless, at the time, the fear was real. Moreover,
624 Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Game,” The New Yorker, 3 December 2003,
http://www.newyorker.eom/fact/content/articles/0 11203fa_FACT.
625 Akiner, “Soviet Military Legacy in Kazakhstan,” http://www.janes.com.
626 For more information, consult the entry on “beryllium,” available at 
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628 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “New Frontiers: Iran, the GCC and the CCARs,” in From the G ulf to
Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Exeter, 1994), p. 
103.
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James Rubin, spokesman for the US Department of 
State, told the Jerusalem Post that back in 1992 the 
United States had investigated reports that Iran had 
purchased nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, and 
determined “there was no evidence to substantiate such 
claims.” Rubin said that while the United States 
remains “concerned” about Iranian efforts to acquire a 
nuclear capability, “we have no information suggesting 
that Iran is in possession of nuclear warheads acquired 
from the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan.”631
Similar reports were, however, also printed in the European,632 The Los 
Angeles Times,633 Izvestiya,634 and The Jerusalem Post,635 variously citing Russian 
intelligence, classified Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps communication documents 
in Israeli custody, an exiled Iranian scientist, Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, former Soviet Foreign Minister Edward 
Shevardnadze, and an unidentified Egyptian newspaper. The ultimate falsity of these 
claims notwithstanding, this allegation is important because it highlights the fear  of 
such developments in the international community, and it very aptly demonstrates the 
level of concern in Israel regarding such a transfer of nuclear weapons from 
Kazakhstan to Iran. As this initial report originally allegedly came from an Israeli 
military journal, it is indicative of the extreme concerns at the time within Israel’s 
military and security establishment.
631 NIS NTD article abstract o f “Iran Said To Obtain Four Nuclear Bombs From CIS Republic,” 9 April
1998, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-TAC-98 (17 April 1998), p. 107, referencing Steve Rodan, “Iran Paid 
$25m for Nuclear Weapons, Documents Show,” The Jerusalem Post, 10 April 1998, NIS NTD, 
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632 “Iran Has N-Bomb,” The European, 20 April 1992, pp. 1-2; abstract, NIS NTD,
www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1992/19920620.htm.
633 “Fears Grow that Soviet A-Anns Are on Market,” The Los Angeles Times, 11 January 1992;
abstract, NIS NTD, http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1992/19920060.htm.
634 “Kazakhstan Will Not Trade Nuclear Weapons,” Izvestiya, 29 January 1992, citing a Daily Mail
article discussing Iranian visits to Kazakhstan and the possible sale of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems. Abstract, NIS NTD, http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1992/19920130.htm.
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Israeli Monitoring o f Kazakh Nuclear Technologies
In his memoirs, Ambassador Levin states that the Israeli Embassy in Moscow 
was receiving “an increasing amount of information on the sale and theft of nuclear 
warheads from the former Soviet arsenal”636 locate in Kazakhstan. Levin does not 
indicate in his memoirs where he obtained this information. It remains a credible 
possibility that Israeli security and intelligence agencies were involved in the 
investigation of this information and in the collection of further data concerning the 
location of nuclear arms on Kazakh territory. It is extremely likely, although only 
anecdotal evidence exists to corroborate this position, that Israeli intelligence services, 
eager to collect as much information as possible about loose Soviet nukes, would 
cooperate with Western and Kazakh intelligence agencies.
Levin also writes that similar stories “came directly to me from Vice President 
Alexander Rutskoi’s staff, which was more disturbing.”637 This statement indicates 
that there was some official cooperation and sharing of information and intelligence 
on this subject between Israeli officials and their Russian counterparts. Security in 
Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union was of course a major 
concern for the Russian government. The feared combination of radical political 
Islam and nuclear technology fanned old concerns for national security in the Russian 
core of the former Soviet Union.
In his 1998 article in Middle East Policy, Bulent Aras quotes “a report 
prepared in France” which claims that the American Central Intelligence Agency and 
Israel’s Mossad cooperated to “keep a close eye” on nuclear experts in Kazakhstan.638 
If this allegation were to prove true, and if the CIA and Mossad were to be effective in
636 Aryeh Levin, Envoy to Moscow: Memoirs o f  an Israeli Ambassador, 1988-1992 (London, 1996), p.
355.
637 Levin, Envoy to Moscow, p. 355.
638 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 78.
this endeavor, it would need the cooperation of their Kazakh colleagues to facilitate 
their success— or at the least Kazakh acknowledgement as a courtesy to a liaison 
service. This would therefore imply that the American, the Israeli, and the Kazakh 
intelligence services cooperated in this endeavor. Some sources have hinted at this 
being the case; however, this cooperation remains only a possibility, and is not 
publicly documented in the open source literature.
Implications fo r  Israel
By April 1995, Kazakhstan had signed and ratified the NPT and completed the
removal of all Soviet nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan’s decision to renounce nuclear
weapons and to voluntarily participate in the safe removal of its Soviet-era weapons
systems carried with it a particularly relevance with regards to Israel’s own
‘undeclared’ nuclear arsenal— a point which was not lost 011 Nazarbayev. Capisani
observed that at the time Kazakhstan gave up its nuclear capability,
Nazarbaev stated, “If we were to proclaim ourselves a 
nuclear power, that would be giving other countries like 
Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, or Israel the green light to 
gather atomic arms. We do not want to be the nation to 
instigate such a process. We have suffered too much at 
the hands of the nuclear industry near the Semipalatinsk 
polygon where, under the old regime, approximately 
500,000 people were unknowingly exposed to radiation.
This was a crime committed against the Kazak 
population.”639
Kazakhstan’s decision to become a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
further solidified its position vis-a-vis the possession of nuclear arms.
639 Giampaolo R. Capisani, The Handbook o f  Central Asia: A Comprehensive Suivey o f  the New 
Republics (London, 2000), p. 9.
Perception o f Iranian-Backed Fundamentalism
A second striking example of security cooperation between Israel and 
Kazakhstan had to do with Iran. Specifically, both Israel and Kazakhstan shared 
similar concerns regarding the potential danger of Iranian-inspired Islamic 
fundamentalism in Central Asia. Kazakh officials expressed their concerns to Foreign 
Minister Peres during a September 1992 delegation visit to Israel.640 Iran and Iranian 
inspired or backed extremism, in part for the reasons outlined in chapter three, was 
viewed by many in the early 1990s as the main source of these concerns, and as noted 
above, these concerns were closely tied to the ultimate disposition of Kazakhstan’s 
nuclear arms,
Abadi notes that Nazarbayev went to significant lengths to “allay Israeli 
fears”641 that Kazakh WMDs would end up in the control of Israel’s enemies. In early 
1992 “Nazarbayev gave an interview to one of Israel’s major newspapers, Yediot 
Aharonot, in which he said, ‘As for the nuclear weapons in our possession, you need 
not worry. They are meticulously guarded, and it is absolutely impossible to sneak 
them across our borders.’”642 This sentiment was echoed in September 1992, during 
Kazakh Prime Minister Tereshchenko’s three-day official visit to Israel. He reiterated 
Nazarbayev’s sentiments when he stated, “Nuclear weapons will not be sold to Iran or 
any other country. Kazakhstan is peace loving. Israel has nothing to wony about.”643 
Abadi further notes that “the Israelis continued to suspect that Kazakhstan was 
selling nuclear weapons to Iran and some Third World countries,”644 although there 
has never emerged any documentation to support these Israeli concerns. In fact, many
640 “Israel said to be covertly arming Azerbaijan,” Israeli foreign affairs VII, no. 9 (4 November 1992),
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September 1992.
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in the national security establishment such as former Mossad Director Halevy have 
now dismissed these fears as baseless.645 Nonetheless these concerns in large part 
drove Israel to actively engage Kazakhstan on related security issues. For their part, 
Kazakh officials worked very hard to reassure the Israeli government that such 
allegations were untrue. Some reports have stated that Kazakhstan permitted Israel to 
access nuclear materials on its soil.646 While these claims have not been verified, they 
provide interesting anecdotal support to the perceived closeness of the Israeli-Kazakh 
relationship.
During Nazarbayev’s visit to Israel in December 1995, he informed Foreign 
Minister Barak that “they ‘share Israel’s stand on the Iranian issue and [will] work to 
prevent Iranian influence in Kazakhstan.’”647 It should be remembered that 
Kazakhstan (and Tajikistan) joined with Uzbekistan in protesting Iran’s politicization 
of the 1996 Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Ashgabat because of 
Teheran’s “verbal attacks on Israel.”648 Nonetheless, Kazakhstan has enjoyed open 
and neighborly relations with Iran and has used this relationship with the regime in 
Teheran to advance Israeli objectives as demonstrated in chapter six.
Uniform Assistance
The final aspect of cooperation between the two states concerned non-lethal 
assistance. When the Kazakh National Guard was seeking to redesign its uniforms to 
reflect its break from the Red Army, one of the nations it turned to for assistance was 
Israel. This in part due to the fact that Kazakhstan had only “two out of 55 specialist 
soft military equipment factories in the former Soviet Union.” Israel excels in the
645 Halevy, telephone interview.
646 Dmitri Vertkin, “Kazakhstan: Independence and Armed Forces,” Defense Analysis 10 (April 1994),
p. 69, cited in Abadi, Israel’s Quest fo r  Recognition, p. 438.
647 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 77, quoting BBC SW B , SU 2425 (4 October 1995), p. G/5.
648 Lowell Bezanis, “ECO Summit Rumpus,” OMRIDaily Digest 2, no. 94 (15 May 1996).
area of specialist soft military equipment. In addition to the redesign of the uniforms, 
in mid-1994 negotiations were held with Israeli firms to provide equipment and 
technology to the Kazakh defense industry,649
1991-1995 O v e r v ie w
Israeli-Kazakh relations developed extremely quickly in the first phase of their 
relationship. The president and prime minister of each nation made official visits and 
there were more official visits and meetings between the years of 1992 and 1995 than 
in any other period covered in this study. Informal agreements were secured by the 
Israelis regarding Kazakhstan’s position vis-a-vis the Palestinians, and the overt 
nuclear threat posed by Soviet nuclear weapons systems ended when the transfer of 
Kazakhstan’s nuclear weapons to Russia was completed in April 1995. Constructive 
engagement, which resulted in a number of Israeli commercial enterprises entering the 
Kazakh market and in Israeli development assistance, sought to help ease the 
transformation of the Kazakh economy. These overtures were focused at building 
links with the Kazakh government and society in order to promote an environment 
that would be conducive to Israeli interests.
For the Kazakhs, warm relations with Israel were of immediate benefit. Their 
relationship facilitated a rapid influx of business opportunities and financial and 
material aid. An essential component of the relationship with Israel was the resulting 
goodwill that it generated in Washington. Friendly ties with Israel was one of the best 
ways to come to the attention of Western leaders because it sent the message that 
Kazakhstan was not going to devolve into a hostile state. It is important to note this
649 “New look for Kazakh uniforms.” labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly, summer (1994): 32.
was not achieved at the expense of Kazakhstan’s relationship with the Palestinians or 
the Muslim world.
In the first phase of their relationship, none of Israel’s fears regarding 
Kazakhstan materialized: Iran did not further its nuclear ambitions with Kazakh 
technology, Soviet-era WMDs and expertise did not leak out of the CIS, Almaty did 
not align against Israel, and Islamist radicalism did not take root in Kazakhstan. On 
the contrary, both before and after Kazakhstan established formal diplomatic relations 
with Israel on 9 April 1992, Israeli-Kazakh relations grew significantly and precluded 
the materialization of Israeli fears. Israel established close political, economic, and 
security relations with the region’s most promising economy, and the security of the 
Jewish community in Kazakhstan was never in jeopardy.
Because Israel’s security concerns were satisfactorily allayed in the first years 
of the relationship, the relative importance of Kazakhstan in Israeli national security 
policy dropped precipitously. Because Kazakhstan no longer posed a serious and 
immediate threat to the State of Israel, security concerns from states that were 
geographically closer to Israel itself resulted in a significant drop in the attention 
Israel paid to the Israeli-Kazakh relationship.
Ch a p t e r  Six : Is r a e l ’s R e l a t io n s h ip  w it h  K a z a k h s t a n ,
1996-2001
After the rapid development of the Israeli-Kazakh ties during the first phase of 
their relationship (1991-1995), Israel’s attentions were directed elsewhere. The 
usefulness to Israel of positive relations with Muslim nations receded in importance as 
Israel began to emerge from the diplomatic isolation caused by its relationship with 
the Palestinians. The second phase of the relationship, from 1996 to 1998, was 
characterized by a decrease in interactions as Israel’s attentions were directed closer 
to home. Little diplomatic activity occurred while trade and commercial levels 
decreased from their initial peak, and during this period there was no overt security 
cooperation. The third phase of the relationship covers the years 1999 to 2001, a 
period marked by a reinvigoration in the relationship and renewed diplomatic and 
security interactions. While commercial trade was sustained throughout the entire 
period explored in this chapter, it was during this third phase that the economic 
relationship between Israel and Kazakhstan truly began to show signs of sustained 
growth. Phases two and three are discussed in detail below.
This chapter concludes with sections that will analyze Kazakhstan’s position 
on the Arab-Israel conflict and Kazakhstan’s position within the United Nations 
General Assembly on resolutions regarding the Middle East that are considered 
hostile to Israel. The evolution of Almaty’s approach to these two subjects is 
employed as a metric to gauge the success of Israel’s policy of constructive
engagement. This chapter will also continue to demonstrate how Israel achieved its 
goal of maintaining Kazakh neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
p h a s e  i i ,  1996- 1998 : l a c k  o f  e n g a g e m e n t
After the Oslo breakthroughs (1993), many nations that had previously kept 
Israel at a distance began to make overtures to Israel. It appeared as though serious 
steps were being made toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and this 
removed one of the biggest obstacles for countries that had previously avoided contact 
with Israel. Israel’s relationships with non-Arab Muslim countries had been 
important for Israel’s national security because they blunted Israel’s conflict with the 
Palestinians and undercut the wider international community’s perception of Israel as 
an anti-Muslim state. Negotiated coordination with the Palestinians following the 
September 1993 Declaration of Principles led to an environment that allowed the 
Jordanians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Qataris to better their relations with Israel. 
Israel could relax its urgent efforts in Kazakhstan now that Israel’s diplomatic 
isolation was easing and Israel perceived that the dangers present at Kazakhstan’s 
independence had dissipated.
From 1996 through 1998, the Israeli-Kazakh relationship suffered from a lack 
of engagement in large part because Israeli attentions were directed elsewhere. New 
challenges and demands closer to home preoccupied the Israeli government; for 
example the newly elected Likud government of Benjamin Netanyahu was more 
skeptical than the Labor party had been in moving toward peace and normalization 
with the Palestinians and thus slowed Israel’s headway in dealing with the 
Palestinians. In addition, delays in implementing the Oslo Accords, deteriorating 
relations with the Palestinians, a series of deadly terrorist attacks in Israel, a troubled
Kazakh economy, Operation Grapes o f  Wrath in Lebanon, the threat of Turkish- 
Syrian hostilities, and the absence of the threats that had been perceived earlier from 
Kazakhstan contributed to create an atmosphere where Israeli-Kazakh relations 
stagnated due to lack of urgent attention.
D ip l o m a t ic  R e l a t io n s
During the second phase of the relationship, there was only one high profile 
official visit: a trade promotion trip led by Natan Sharansky. In the preceding phase 
(1991-1995) and in the following phase (1999-2001) many more high profile official 
state visits took place. Kazakh efforts to bring the Israelis and Palestinians together 
did continue, however, as did the meetings of the Kazakh-Israeli Joint Governmental 
Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation. Also during this phase the Israel- 
Kazakhstan Parliamentary Friendship League was created. This indicates that even 
though official interaction had slowed, the relationship’s foundation did not weaken 
during this period.
Conference on Interaction and Measures o f Trust in Asia
On 7 February 1996, representatives of both Israel and the Palestinians 
attended a two-day conference in Almaty to discuss security and confidence-building 
measures in Asia at the Conference on Interaction and Measures of Trust in Asia 
(CIMTA) in Almaty.650 This meeting, whose attendees included deputy foreign 
ministers from 15 nations as well as over a dozen other observers from various 
nations and international organizations, built upon the successes of a similar October 
1995 meeting. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev called CIMTA an attempt “to
650 “Conference on security opens in Alma-Ata,” Itar-TASS world service (Moscow), in English at 
0845 GMT 7 February 1996, in BBC Monitoring, SWB-FSU, 7 February 1996.
create an effective mechanism of preventative diplomacy in Asia.”651 The conference 
was intended to create a forum for the discussion of three draft documents: a 
Declaration of Principles of Relations, a document on Rules and Procedures, and a 
draft of a Structure and Institutions of CIMTA. These documents would eventually 
form the basis for an international summit in 2002 attended by heads of state, by 
which time CIMTA would eventually become known as CICA, the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia; however, the first CICA 
Summit would not be held until 2002, which is after the time period examined in this 
thesis. The idea behind this international assembly of Asian nations was first 
advanced by President Nazarbayev on the sidelines of the 47th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in October 1992.652 According to the US Department of 
State, CICA serves as a “developing international security forum” which “may 
culminate in the creation of a transcontinental ‘Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Eurasia.’”653 As of mid-2006 the 17 member states of CICA include 
all of the regional states except Turkmenistan, as well as nine observer states 
including the United States, Australia, and Japan.654 Several international 
organizations participate in CICA activities, including the United Nations, the
651 “Conference on security opens,” in BBC Monitoring, SWB-FSU , 7 February 1996.
65“ “Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA),” Embassy of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in the Untied Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
http://www.kazaklistanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/128 (accessed 27 May 2006), and 
“Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia: History of Success,” 
http://www.homestead.com/prosites-kazakhembus/CICA.html (accessed on 27 May 2006).
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia,” Fact Sheet, Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, 16 July 2003, 
http://www.state.g0v/t/pm/rls/fs/22786.htm (accessed 27 May 2006).
634 Members as of mid-2006 include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, 
and Uzbekistan. Observers include Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Ukraine, the United States, and Vietnam. In 1996, Egypt and Thailand were not yet 
members of the organization; see “Conference on security opens,” in BBC Monitoring, SWB- 
FSU, 7 February 1996, and “Conference on Interaction,” 
http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/128 (accessed 27 May 2006).
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the League of Arab 
States.655
Through CICA, Kazakh President Nazarbayev seeks “to have enemy states sit 
down together.”656 In doing so, according to one Kazakh political analyst, 
Nazarbayev is able to feel like a peacemaker, and thus realize his international 
ambitions to be a major international actor.657 Israel and the Palestinians (much like 
India and Pakistan, two other nations in conflict) have participated in the activities 
that led to CICA, and the Israelis and Palestinians have subsequently used its auspices 
as a venue to engage in multi-track diplomacy.658 Israel has participated in CICA 
since its inception and the Israeli Foreign Ministry has stated that it “attaches great 
importance to this organization.”659
To date there have been no reports of CIMTA/CICA being used as venue for 
unofficial Israeli-Iranian discussions during the period covered in this thesis. 
According the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, Iran “unconditionally supports”660 and 
participates in the activities of CICA. Iranian participation in CICA further lends 
support to the notion that Iran and Israel made use of Kazakh good offices to engage 
in limited discussions; Kazakhstan’s role as an intermediary between Israel and 
Teheran on such sensitive issues as the detention of Shirazi Jews arrested 011 charges 
of espionage, the fate of missing Israeli airman Ron Arad who was shot down over
655 “Conference on Interaction,” http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/128 (accessed 27
May 2006).
656 Nikolay Kuzmin, PhD (Kazakh political analyst), interview with the author, 24 January 2005,
Almaty, Kazakhstan.
657 Kuzmin, interview.
658 Interview with Kazakh Foreign Ministry official, January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
659 “Visit o f Deputy FM of Kazakhstan to Israel,” statement of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 13 May
2001, http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.aspVMFAH0jy70 (accessed 3 June 2001).
6(50 “Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister visits Tehran...,’’RFE/RZ, Newsline 5, no. 25, 6 February 2001.
Lebanon in 1986,661 and the circumstances surrounding missing Israeli soldiers,662 it 
would not be surprising if Nazarbayev’s CICA has in fact served some role.
It is important to stress that Israel’s primary interest in CICA stems not so 
much from support for Nazarbayev’s vision as it does from what CICA represents to 
Israel. CICA is the first international organization created by a nominally Muslim 
nation that has included Israel. Moreover, other regional states, such as Iran, have not 
objected to Israel’s inclusion. Thus, for Israeli policy makers, CICA’s value arises 
out of its potential to advance the inclusion, acceptance, and, by default, recognition 
of Israel among a strong regional bloc.
Israeli diplomats active in international organizations have said that they feel 
quite comfortable operating in Kazakhstan and appreciate the efforts made by the 
Kazakhs to include Israel. Kazakhstan, it has been observed, is a country in which 
Israeli diplomats can and do participate in international forums whose attendees 
represent nations with whom Israel may not otherwise readily engage.663
The Israel-Kazakhstan Parliamentary Friendship League
Building on the steadily improving state of relations between the two 
countries, the Knesset created the Israel-Kazakhstan Parliamentary Friendship League 
in November 1997.664 This organization was headed by Member of the Knesset 
Amnon Cohen, who has also served as the Chairman of the Knesset Economic
661 “Kazakhstan aids Israel track missing airman,” The Jewish News Weekly o f  Northern California, 25
October 2002, and Herb Keinon, “Israel asks Kazakhstan to approach Iran about Ron Arad,” 
The Jerusalem Post, 23 October 2002.
662 Herb Keinon, “Kazakhstan magnate is planning delegation to visit Iran,” The Jerusalem Post, 20
May 2003. See also “Iranian Assassins To Be Part Of Israel-Hizballah Prisoner Swap?” 
RFE/RL Iran Report 6, no. 392, 9 September 2003.
663 Discussion with Israeli diplomat, January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
664 “Motives of bilateral relations between Israeli and Kazakhstan,” [in Arabic] Qods News Agency
(Palestine), 23 January 2006, http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
Committee.665 Cohen, who was bom in Uzbekistan666 and immigrated in 1973, is the 
extent of Israelis of Central Asian origin influencing Israeli policy towards the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia.
The puipose of the League was to improve Israeli friendship and cooperation 
with Kazakhstan.667 In Israel, members in the Israel-Kazaklistan Parliamentary 
Friendship League have been drawn from across the political spectrum. In 
Kazakhstan, the Mazhilis (Kazakh Parliament) has taken measures to officially 
recognize the League and participate in its activities, and the government has noted 
that a counterpart organization was created in the Mazhilis.66S It is believed that 
Kazakh Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev participated in the formation of the 
Friendship League.669
Kazakhstan is not the only country with which the Knesset has established a 
friendship league. There exist similar leagues for many other nations including 
America, Russia, China, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Germany, and Italy; however, the 
Israel-Kazakhstan Parliamentary Friendship League was the first to be established 
with a Central Asian state, and as such it is indicative of the close ties that existed 
between Israel and Kazakhstan.
E c o n o m ic  R e l a t io n s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s is t a n c e  
The three years from 1996 through 1998 was a period of modest yet sustained 
Israeli commercial activity in Kazakhstan (see table 6.1). Annual Israeli exports to
and imports from Kazakhstan show that during these three years the total level of
665 “About the Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” Statement of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
in the State of Israel, n.d., http://www.kazakliemb.org.il. See also “Motives of bilateral 
relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
656 Israel Yearbook & Almanac 2000, Volume 54 (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 123.
667 “Motives of bilateral relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
668 “About Kazaklistan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
669 Based upon discussions in spring 2006 with a former American diplomat based in Almaty,
Kazakhstan.
trade averaged about $11.56 million per year, down from 1993’s record $35.5 million 
and the $15.5 million registered in 1994. In 1996 Israel exported $10.9 million worth 
of goods to Kazakhstan,6 0 while the figures for 1997 and 1998 were $9.7 million6 1 
and $12.3 million,672 respectively.
Imports from Kazakhstan, however, were much more modest. Total imports 
were $0.2 million6 3 in 1996, which slipped to $0.1 million6 4 in 1997, and then rose 
to $1.5 million675 in 1998. This second phase of the Israeli-Kazakh relationship 
concludes with the highest import figures yet recorded.
Table 6.1 Israeli-Kazakh Trade, 1996-1998 
(in Millions of Dollars)
1996 1997 1998
Exports S10.9 S9.7 S12.3
Imports SO.2 S0.1 S I.5
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
Sharansky>'s Trade Promotion Visit
Natan Sharansky, the Israeli government’s point man on Central Asia and the 
Minister of Industry and Trade, led a delegation to Kazakhstan beginning 28 June 
1998. Sharansky's group met with the prime minister and others, and discussed 
increasing the trade turnover between Israel and Almaty.676 The delegation was 
composed of Israeli officials and business representatives interested in discussing 
deals related to “telecommunications, chemical fertilizers, machine tools, medical
6 0 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 48, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 1997), chart 8.5, 
p. 231.
6 1 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 49, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 1998), chart 8.5,
p. 8-11.
h 2 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 50, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 1999), chart 8.5,
p. 8-11.
673 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 48, chart 8.5, p. 230.
674 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 49, chart 8.5, p. 8-10.
675 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 50, chart 8.5, p. 8-10.
6 6 See “Motives of bilateral relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006), and “Israeli 
delegation to visit Uzbekistan,” n.p., 27 June 1998, http://uzland.info/06 27 98.htm (accessed 8 
April 2006).
equipment, electrical devices, agricultural produce, and plastic goods.”677 In 1998, 
annual trade turnover between Israel and Kazakhstan was valued at $10 million; 
looking forward, Israel was most interested in strategic investment in Kazakhstan’s 
natural resources (especially hydrocarbons and non-ferrous metals), in which Israel 
had been invited to invest.678 This visit signified the desire of the Israeli government 
to boost trade turnover, despite the relatively low figures, and to focus on laying the 
groundwork for future commercial ties. Sharansky’s involvement was a further 
indication of Israel’s intentions due to his unique role in Israeli-Central Asian 
policy.679
During the period from 1996 through 1998, two further developments 
occurred regarding Israeli-Kazakh commercial relations. First was the third meeting 
of the Kazakh-Israeli Joint Governmental Commission on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation which coincided with the visit of Sharansky’s delegation in June 1998. 
This meeting focused on methods to raise trade volumes. The second event was the 
implementation of a free trade agreement between Israel and Kazakhstan. While 
Israel maintains a number of free trade agreements with numerous countries of the 
World Trade Organization, Israel’s agreement with Kazakhstan was one of just a few 
that Israel has with non-WTO member-states. Both of these developments 
demonstrate that despite Israel’s lack of political engagement in the relationship 
during this phase, commercial relations continued to build.
677 “Israeli delegation to visit,” http://uzland.info/06_27_98.htm (accessed 8 April 2006).
678 “Israeli delegation to visit,” http://uzland.info/06_27_98.htm (accessed 8 April 2006).
679 Jonathan Hadar (desk officer responsible for the Central Asian republics at the Ministry of Industry
and Trade), telephone interview with the author, 30 June 1999, Jerusalem.
Development Assistance
Between 1996 and 1998, two notable development programs took place that 
were not commercial enterprises. The first concerned water conservation; the second 
focused on medical care. In mid-1997, the ministers responsible for Water Affairs 
from the five republics— under the aegis of the Kazakh-based, regional organization 
National Committee for Coordinating Water Resources—paid a visit to Israel to 
discuss technological assistance in water purification and agricultural water recycling. 
Discussions focused on programs to share and manage scarce regional water 
resources and their effects on industry and agriculture.680
Israel was also active in providing medical aid and assistance. During the 
winter of 1997, MASHAV sent Russian-speaking physicians to Kazakhstan681 to 
teach local doctors a safer and simpler method to perform Caesarian deliveries.682 A 
similar project involved plastic surgery for Kazakh children suffering from facial 
deformities such as cleft palates.683 In this program, children were brought to Israel 
for corrective procedures, and Israeli doctors traveled to Kazakhstan to train local 
physicians in the procedures as well.684 An important reason for the numerous 
medical programs to Kazakhstan was the large number of Jewish Russia-speaking 
medical workers in Israel that had made Aliyah from the Soviet Union and its
685successor states. It was a priority for Israel to engage in these assistance programs, 
and it had a vast talent pool with connections to the region.
680 “Central Asian Ministers for Water Affairs Come to Israel,” MASHAV News, Shalom Magazine, no.
2 (1997), p. 4.
6S! Kyrgyzstan and Georgia were also visited.
682 Ruth Seligman. “The Misgav Ladach Method -  Maximum Effect, Minimum Damage,” Shalom
Magazine, no. 2 (1997), p. 1.
683 Ziva Shapira, “Small Contributions to Big Countries: Health Workers at Kaplan Hospital,” Shalom
Magazine, no. 2 (1997), p. 3.
684 Shapira, “Small Contributions to Big Countries,” p. 4.
685 Shapira, “Small Contributions to Big Countries,” p. 1.
Major Commercial Investment, 1996-1998
As table 6.2 demonstrates, Israeli investment in Kazakhstan focused largely on 
two key sectors in the second phase of the relationship. In the telecom sector, Israeli 
firms continued to build on the successes gained in the Kazakh market. During this 
period there was an increase in activity in the energy sector, with Israeli firms active 
in the construction and management of energy and power infrastructures. A brief 
discussion of some of the more notable projects during this period follows.
Table 6.2 Major Israeli Projects, 1996-1998
Year Project Sector Business(es)Involved
Contract
size
(where
known)
1996 Refinery construction project Energy Metek Metal Technology Company NA
1996 Drip irrigation project Agricultural MASHAV $0.45m
1996-
97
Purchase of 4 power plants & 
fee for 20-year operating 
concession
Energy Suntree Power $4.5m, +$20.7m
1997 Shareholder in Tenge upstream JV Energy NIR-Tenge NA
1998 Telephony expansion project Telecom Gilat $6.2m
1998 Telephony expansion project Telecom ECI Telecom NA
1998 Telephony expansion project Telecom SAP NA
1998 Telephony expansion project Telecom Tadiran Telecom $3m
Sources: Fedorchenko; Israel Business Today; Aras (2002); BBC Monitoring; Interfax; author’s
research.
Israel's Metek Metal Technology Company—also active in Uzbekistan— 
participated in a 1996 refinery construction project in Kazakhstan. Metek Metal 
initiated and managed the project and also ensured that the refinery production 
volume could expand. Financing was facilitated by loans from commercial banks in 
Israel, Canada, and the Czech Republic “against guarantees provided by the 
government of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Israel.”686
6X6 Andrey Vasilyevich Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel: Ways of Economic Rapprochement,” 
http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html (accessed 22 June 2001, site 
discontinued).
The following year, Suntree Power and its American partner AES “bought 
four combined heat and power plants in eastern Kazakhstan and agreed to manage for 
20 years two hydroelectric plants.”687 As a result, AES and Suntree Power controlled 
“a large part of the power generating capacity of eastern Kazakhstan and have plans in 
the future to potentially transmit electricity across the border to China.”688 Another 
Israeli firm, NIR-Tenge, was also active in the energy sector as one of four foreign 
shareholders in the Tenge upstream joint venture in the western Mangistau oblast.689
From 1996 through the end of 1998, Israeli firms continued to maintain a 
presence in the Kazakh telecom market, winning telephony upgrade and expansion 
contracts in 1998. Israel was the logical choice for providing telecom work. Israel 
has the most highly developed telecom system in the Middle East, and while Israel’s 
system is not the largest in the region, it is entirely digital and is far superior to any 
other system in the region.690 Moreover, since 1995 international telephone calls 
from Kazakhstan were routed through Israel because this was faster, cheaper, and 
more efficient.691 Israel’s competitive advantage in the telecom sector also resulted in 
their involvement in projects to provide technology transfers throughout the telecom 
sector.692 Because Kazakh telecom infrastructure was in shambles and international 
calling tedious, the choice to employ the region’s best provider of telecom technology 
and services is understandable.
As with other Israeli commercial ventures in Kazakhstan, the Israeli 
government provided extensive insurance for these deals and approved the
687 “Kazakhstan: Social and Political Backdrop,” draft version of a confidential petroleum industry
report, n.p., n.d., p. 19. Document in the collection of the author.
688 “Kazakhstan: Social and Political Backdrop,” p. 19.
689 “Kazakhstan: Golden Eagle Eyes Joint Venture Swoop,” Nefte Compass, 16 March 2000.
690 Data drawn from The World Factbook, Field Listing -  Telephone System, US Central Intelligence
Agency, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2124.html (accessed 19 June 
2006).
691 See previous discussion of satellite connection in chapter five.
692 Biilent Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia,” Middle
East Policy 5, no. 4 (January 1998): p. 77.
investments. Israeli financial institutions such as Bank Leumi provided credit 
financing to Kazakhtelecom. Israeli telecommunications upgrades thus carry the 
imprint of government approval, and in essence are hard to distinguish from official 
Israeli governmental projects.
In July 1998 the Israeli telecommunications firm Gilat reached an agreement 
with Kazakh officials to expand satellite telecommunications coverage throughout the 
country. Under the terms of the 18-month contract with Kazakhtelecom, Gilat 
provided satellite communications coverage to over 250 cities in Kazakhstan, valued 
in excess of $6,200,000.693 Project financing was guaranteed by the Israeli 
government and Israel’s Bank Leumi provided a loan to facilitate the deal.694 While 
the deal included standard provisions that Gilat would provide the “equipment, 
technology, and expertise”695 required for the completion of the contract, it also 
provided for future components to be manufactured in Kazakhstan. The Gilat 
telephony upgrade deal not only represented a significant and much needed upgrade 
to Kazakhstan’s infrastructure, but it also provided for an Israeli technology transfer 
to jumpstart Kazakh self-sufficiency in a commercial enteiprise. A Russian report 
valued the Gilat contract in excess of tens of millions of dollars, a figure which 
included Kazakh manufacture of components under Gilat’s imprimatur.696
Several other Israeli firms entered the Kazakh telecom market during this 
period, including ECI Telecom, Motorola Israel, SAP, and Tadiran Telecom.697 
Tadiran Telecom is a subsidiary of Africa Israel Investments Ltd owned by Lev
693 “Motives of bilateral relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006); “Israeli company
to develop Kazakh communications network,” Interfax news agency (Moscow), in English 1543 
GMT 17 July 1998, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, Central Asia-Political, 17 July 
1998.
694 “Israeli company develop Kazakh,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports (17 July 1998).
695 “Israeli company develop Kazakh,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports (17 July 1998).
696 Fedorchenko, “Kazakhstan-Israel,” http://www.transcaspian.rn/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/7514.html
(accessed 22 June 2001, site discontinued).
697 “About Kazakhstan-lsraeli relations,” http://www.kazakliemb.org.il.
Leviev, Kazakhstan’s honorary consul in Israel; Tadiran is also related to an Israeli 
military equipment firm. The number of Israeli firms involved in the Kazakh telecom 
sector is indicative of the rapid and thorough response Israel made to Kazakhstan’s 
modernization efforts.
1996-1998 O v e r v ie w
The second phase of the Israeli-Kazakh relationship witnessed a significant 
drop-off in the level of interaction between the two states. With Israel’s attention 
directed elsewhere, less urgency was devoted to ties with Kazakhstan. It is important 
to bear in mind that even though the relationship during this period may not have been 
as vibrant as it had during the previous period, the underlying bonds between Israel 
and Kazakhstan remained firm.
Relations between Israel and Almaty were still predicated on the strong 
foundation upon which they had been based: Israeli investment and access to the West 
still drove Kazakhstan, while a desire to promote Israeli influence and block Iran kept 
Israel interested in Kazakhstan.698 During the years 1996 to 1998, progress on 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict slowed noticeably, the Oslo Accords 
appeared to be all but dead, Israel still occupied southern Lebanon, and dialogues with 
the Syrians showed no movement. As a result, Israel’s international standing was 
compromised; all the reasons that had led Israel to be distracted from its relationship 
with Kazakhstan now became important reasons for Israel to re-engage with Almaty.
698 David Menashri, PhD (Head of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University), 
interview with the author, 7 July 1999, Tel Aviv, Israel.
p h a s e  h i ,  1999- 2001 : r e - e n g a g e m e n t
After stalling from 1996-1998, the Israeli-Kazakh relationship picked up 
again during the final period under examination here. In this third phase of the 
relationship, annual trade turnover rose and official visits again characterized the 
friendship between the two countries. The election of Ehud Barak to succeed 
Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister in May 1999 marked the return to power of 
the Labor party and its desire to advance the peace process as well as improve Israel’s 
security. The economic situation also began to improve and benefited from a Kazakh 
investment conference held in Israel during President Nazarbayev’s return visit in 
April 2000. In March 2001, Israeli politicians, academics, MKs, and businesspeople 
formed the Friends of Kazakhstan club, with former Knesset Speaker Dan Tikhon as 
the first president.699
Israel realized that dangers far from home still existed and constructive 
engagement with Kazakhstan was an essential tool in countering these threats (for 
example threats of Iranian origin). The lack of progress with the Palestinians and 
Israel’s other Arab neighbors in the preceding several years made Israel cognizant of 
the utility of warm ties with non-Arab Muslim nations. This final period in the 
relationship saw Israel nurture its relationship with Kazakhstan through diplomacy, 
commercial engagement, and security cooperation.
D ip l o m a t ic  R e l a t io n s
Renewed diplomatic engagement between Israel and Kazakhstan was buoyed 
in this period by Kazakhstan’s shifting position with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. While Almaty had always been strictly neutral and even-handed, the Kazakh
699 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakliemb.org.il.
position in the UN General Assembly on issues related to Israel became subtly more 
moderate. In addition, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat returned to visit Kazakhstan and 
President Nazarbayev traveled to both Israel and Ramallah. This period also saw 
Almaty’s attempts to moderate between Israel and Teheran.
A number of diplomatic visits occurred during this period, as detailed in table 
6.3. During this further consolidation of the relationship, several additional 
agreements were reached, as enumerated in table 6.4. An examination of the most 
important visits and an analysis of how they contributed to the Israeli-Kazakh 
relationship is given below.
Table 6.3 Major Visits, 1999-2001
Date Visitor Purpose Location
A p r'99 PLO Chairman Arafat Working visit Kazakhstan
mid-
1999 Rabbi Menahem Froman
Discussion 
with Iranian 
delegation on 
Shirazi Jews 
charged with 
espionage
Kazakhstan
Sep '99 Vice PM & FM Tokayev Official visit Israel
Apr ’00 Investment in Kazakhstan conference
Trade
exhibition Israel
Apr '00 President Nazarbayev Second official state visit Israel
A pr'00 President Nazarbayev Working visit Ramallah
May ’01 Deputy FM Abuseitov Working visit Israel
May '01 Deputy FM Abuseitov Working visit Ramallah
Jul ’01 Infrastructure Minister Avigdor Liberman
Trade
promotion tour Kazakhstan
Sources: Itar-TASS, Jerusalem Post; Qocls News Agency, Eurasianet.org; 
author’s research.
Table 6.4 Major Agreements, 2000
Date Agreement Focus WhereSigned
Apr ‘00 Customs agreement Political/Economic Israel
Apr ‘00
Declaration of the further development 
of mutual understanding & cooperation 
between the Republic of Kazakhstan & 
the State of Israel
Political Israel
Apr ‘00 Agreement to create Joint Committee for the Enhancement of Cooperation Economic Israel
Apr ‘00 Agreements on Business and Investment cooperation Economic Israel
Sources: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Division of Foreign Trade and International 
Relations; author’s research.
A r a f a t ’s 1999 V is it  t o  A l m a t y
In April 1999, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat returned to Almaty for a working 
visit.700 During this visit Arafat and Nazarbayev discussed the state of relations 
between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority as well as the ongoing NATO 
bombing of Serbian forces in the Kosovo war. Arafat informed Nazarbayev of his 
intention to declare Palestinian independence on 5 May 1999; however, that event 
never came to pass.
Nazarbayev took advantage of this opportunity to reiterate his stance on the 
peace process by saying that “Kazakhstan acknowledged the rights of both the Israeli 
and Palestinian peoples and the problem should be solved gradually by 
negotiation."701 While with Arafat, Nazarbayev delivered one of his most detailed 
remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which he urged the parties to return to 
negotiations and come to a settlement without resorting to violence. Nazarbayev also 
voiced his concern for the first time over the fate of Jerusalem as the home to the 
Haram al-Sharif. He told a press conference:
00 Bakhyt Zhumaliyeva, “Kazakhstan for an end to NATO bombing,” Itar-TASS Weekly News, 16 
April 1999.
701 “Kazakh President meets Palestinian leader,” BBC World Service, 16 April 1999.
Kazakhstan is for peaceful settlement of the Middle 
East conflict. It is necessary to get down to the 
negotiating table and settle the conflict without 
infringing [on] each other’s interests so that the solution 
of the matter should not cause a new wave of violence 
and confrontation. We are also concerned over the 
destiny of Jerusalem, where the third Muslim shrine, al- 
Quds Mosque, is situated.702
The Kazakh president also expressed his opinion that both sides were moving 
too slowly in seeking to address final status issues in the peace talks. Nazarbayev 
drew attention to the fact that the United Nations had set a five-year deadline in 1994 
for the preparation of Palestinian independence and that both the Israelis and 
Palestinians had signed an agreement in May 1998 to meet their obligations. Arafat 
and Nazarbayev would next meet one year later on the Kazakh president’s visit to 
Israel and Ramallah.
Nazarbayev’s comments while Arafat was in Almaty are noteworthy for three 
reasons. First, they mark a different Kazakh approach in dealing with the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Previously, Nazarbayev and other Kazakh officials had simply 
expressed their support for a peaceful, negotiated settlement, with no comments on 
the pace of the discussions. However, at this meeting Nazarbayev took the 
opportunity to express his opinion that the negotiations were not moving quickly 
enough. In past remarks, Nazarbayev had avoided commenting on such procedural 
matters, even though he himself had taken measures to facilitate greater dialogue 
between the parties. Second, Nazarbayev’s comments stressed the importance of the 
United Nations and the international community in the Arab-lsraeli peace process. 
Kazakhstan had always emphasized the importance of the United Nations and the 
Kazakh voting record on Middle East issues in the General Assembly through spring
702 Zhumaliyeva, “Kazakhstan for end bombing.”
1999 reflects that position. Third, in his remarks Nazarbayev expressed concern over 
the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. While such concern does not reveal any bias or 
preference with respect to the fate of holy sites in Jerusalem, this was the first time 
Nazarbayev had made any statements which revealed any attachments of concerns 
about to the specifics of final status issues at stake. Never before had Nazarbayev 
referred to Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. Because of this, his remarks are a rare 
departure from his usual disengaged yet supportive comments.
Kazakhstan’s Mediation Role with Iran
One of the key points to note about Kazakhstan’s relationship with Israel is 
that it did not prevent the emergence of friendly ties with Iran. On the contrary, 
Kazakhstan maintained good ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the 
closeness that existed between Almaty and Israel. Much like the relationship with 
Israel, Kazakhstan managed to have good political and economic ties despite the 
differences that existed between the national interests of both states.
Kazakhstan professed the opinion that Iranian-backed Islamic fundamentalism 
did not have a place in Central Asia; the Kazakh constitution defined Kazakhstan as a 
secular state.703 As discussed previously in chapter three, Iran realized rather early in 
its relationship with the Central Asian republics that the region was not fertile ground 
for the export of the Islamic revolution. As a result Teheran focused instead on re­
establishing cultural links throughout Central Asia. Teheran also attempted to build 
economic ties via agreements such as the short-lived 1996 oil swap whereby Kazakh
703 See International Religious Freedom Report, “Kazakhstan,” prepared by the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, http:// 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5574.htm (accessed 21 June 2006).
crude was delivered to northern Iran in exchange for a corresponding portion of 
Iranian oil sold on the international market.704
As a result of the good relations enjoyed by Kazakhstan with both Israel and 
Iran, it is not surprising that Almaty would seek to mediate between the two states. 
This was most dramatically illustrated by the role the Kazakh government played in 
the case of 13 Iranian Jews who had been arrested in the southern city of Shiraz 011 7 
June 1999, charged with spying for Israel and the United States.705 According to The 
Jerusalem Post and Foreign Report, very high-level covert discussions were held in 
Almaty among Israeli Rabbi Menahem Froman, an Iranian delegation, and President 
Nazarbayev.706 The reports claimed that Rabbi Froman was “proposed by the Kazakh 
ambassador to Israel as a possible conduit between Israel and Iran” and added that “an 
eventual unofficial meeting [in Iran] with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, as 
two men of religion, is not out of the question.”707
Although Rabbi Froman had previously obtained permission to travel to 
Iran, it is not known that his meeting with Khatami ever took place. It was reported 
in August 2000 in both Ad-Diplomasi and The Jerusalem Post that Israeli officials 
had privately admitted to Iranian representatives in Cairo that “ 10 of the Iranian Jews 
convicted of espionage were in fact spying for Israel.”709
This episode is one of the strongest indications of cooperation between 
Kazakhstan and Israel in matters of national security. In facilitating the meeting 
between Iranian and Israeli representatives on such a sensitive issue, Kazakhstan
704 Majid Jafar, “Kazakhstan: oil, politics, and the new ‘Great Game’,” in The Caspian: Politics,
energy>, and security>, ed. Shirin Akiner (London, 2004), p. 204.
705 “Thirteen arrested on charges of spying for Israel, USA,” in British Broadcasting Corporation,
Summary o f  World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC SWB) ME/3556 MED/1[1] (9 June 1999).
706 Douglas Davis and Margot Dudkevitch, “Report: Froman held talks on arrested Iranian Jews,” The
Jerusalem Post, 8 July 1999.
707 Davis and Dudkevitch, “Report: Froman held talks.”
708 Shawn L. Twing, “Israeli Rabbi Given Iran Travel OK,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
May/June 1998.
709 Jane’s Intelligence Watch Report—Daily Update 7, no. 151, 10 August 2000.
mobilized a significant portion of its government, from the president to its diplomatic 
missions abroad. The notion that Kazakhstan was trusted by both nations is further 
evidenced by the fact that the initial meeting was held in the Kazakh capital.
While this episode illustrates the closeness between Kazakhstan and Israel, it 
also illustrates the trust between Kazakhstan and Iranian. The arrest of Jewish 
Iranians on charges of spying for Israel was a development that Iranian officials 
wanted to resolve as quickly and quietly as possible due to the potential damage it 
could have caused to Iran’s already rocky relations with the West.710 Because of 
Kazakhstan’s close ties with Israel, Almaty proved to be a good location for 
Teheran’s unofficial dialogue. Moreover, the role that Nazarbayev and Almaty 
played realized Nazarbayev’s desire to be an international mediator, and this 
presumably advanced Kazakhstan’s profile in the West.
Nazarbayev '$ Second Official Visit to Israel
The April 1999 meeting with Arafat in Almaty was quickly followed by 
President Nazarbayev’s second official visit to Israel one year later, from 3-5 April
7112000. While in Israel, Nazarbayev participated in an international conference on 
investment in Kazakhstan712 and discussed a number of issues related to Israeli- 
Kazakh relations, including ways in which to increase trade and expand bilateral 
cooperation. During his visit, Nazarbayev signed a customs agreement to facilitate 
increased trade and transit,713 and he signed accords to promote business and 
investments between Israel and Almaty.714 The “Declaration of the further
710 “Secret Mission to Kazakhstan,” Foreign Report, no. 2551, 8 July 1999.
711 “About Kazakhstan-lsraeli relations,” http://www.kazakliemb.org.il.
712 “Economic News Digest,” Itar-TASS Weekly News, 3 April 2000.
713 Kazakhstan country page, NCSJ; Advocates on behalf o f  Jews in Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic States
& Eurasia, http://www.ncsj.org/kazaklistan.
714 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
development of mutual understanding and cooperation between the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the State of Israel”715 was also signed by Nazarbayev while he was in 
Israel. Furthermore, the two nations agreed to create a joint committee to further 
promote ties between Israel and Kazakhstan.716 Nazarbayev and his delegation also 
held meetings with members of the Knesset,717 as well as with leaders of Israel’s 
business and financial communities to discuss greater investment in Kazakhstan.718
During the visit, the Israeli government publicly thanked and expressed its 
gratitude to Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people for all that had been done to rescue 
“tens of thousands of Jewish families”719 during the Second World War. In 
recognition of Nazarbayev’s efforts to strengthen Israeli-Kazakh relations, Israeli 
President Ezer Weizman and Chief Rabbi Eliahu Bakshi-Doron presented Nazarbayev 
with an award “for Special Merits before the Jewish People.”720 Also during this 
visit, 3,000 trees were planted in Nazarbayev’s honor in the vicinity of Jerusalem in 
recognition of all that the Kazakh president had done to further relations between 
Israel and Almaty.721 All this was an extremely rare honor, especially for a visiting 
Muslim head of state.
On the issue of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kazakhstan’s efforts to 
‘establish stability’ in the Middle East were given “special appreciation” by President 
Weizman and Prime Minister Barak in their meetings with Nazarbayev. Kazakh 
Television’s first chamiel reported that according to Nazarbayev, the participation of
715 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakliemb.org.il.
716 Kazakhstan country page, http://www.ncsj.org/kazakhstan.
717 Oral Karpishev, “Nazarbayev to attend forum on investments in Kazakhstan,” Itar-TASS Weekly
News, 3 April 2000.
718 Oral Karpishev, “Kazakh president to leave for Israel for official visit,” Itar-TASS Weekly News, 3
April 2000.
719 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakliemb.org.il.
720 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il. See also “Kazakh president
visits Israel, Palestine, signs cooperation,” Kazakh Television first channel (Astana), in Kazakh, 
6 April 2000, in BBC Monitoring International Reports (6 April 2000).
721 For more details, see either the Kazakhstan country page, http://www.ncsj.org/kazaklistan, or
“About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
the United Nations in working to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict is veiy 
important to Kazakh foreign policy.722
Kazakhstan and the Palestinian Authority
While in the region, Nazarbayev traveled to Ramallah in the West Bank to 
meet with Chairman Arafat at the Mukata’a, the Palestinian Authority’s 
administrative headquarters. At a news conference following his meeting with Arafat, 
Nazarbayev stated that “there are no difficulties in relations between Kazakhstan and 
Palestine. There are no unresolved political and economic issues.” Nazarbayev told 
reporters that he wanted to strengthen relations with Palestinians and the Palestinian 
Authority; he blamed the lack of greater Kazakh-Palestinian relations on the “internal 
situation.” Nazarbayev was referring to the slow progress on negotiations between 
the Israelis and Palestinians, an opinion he had voiced when he had met with Arafat a 
year earlier in Almaty. 723
As a means of demonstrating the current extent of the relationship, 
Nazarbayev noted the 150 Palestinian students in attendance at universities in 
Kazakhstan and commented that in addition to 50 Kazakh students at “Palestine’s 
university,” a further 100 young Kazakhs were on exchange programs in the 
Palestinian Territories. He also reminded the journalists in attendance that 
Kazakhstan and the Palestinian Authority have exchanged ambassadors and that both 
were participating in a bilateral economic commission to boost trade.724
722 “Kazakh president visits Israel,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports (6 April 2000).
723 “Kazakh president visits Israel,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports (6 April 2000).
724 Remarks of President Nazarbayev in “Kazakh president visits Israel,” in BBC Monitoring
International Reports (6 April 2000).
The Beginnings o f  a Subtle Policy Shift
It is interesting to note that when Nazarbayev met with Arafat (both in Almaty 
in 1999 and Ramallah in 2000), he expressed the view that negotiations must occur at 
a faster pace whereas when with Israeli representatives, the Kazakh president did not 
make reference to the frequency or progress of the talks—he only called for further 
talks. This marks the beginning of a small but noteworthy development in the last 
phase of the Israeli-Kazakh relationship in that Nazarbayev’s remarks to the 
Palestinians differ from those made to the Israelis. In the two earlier phases of the 
Israeli-Kazakh relationship, Nazarbayev did not comment on the pace of negotiations 
at all; he only stressed that they continue.
It appears that Nazarbayev’s gentle prodding of Arafat was part of a larger 
pattern evident within the international community at the time, which was urging the 
Palestinian leadership to take bold steps towards reaching a final peace with the 
Israelis. This swell in international encouragement was at its peak during the July 
2000 Camp David summit in which Arafat and Barak failed to reach a final status
725settlement. In maintaining a gentle pressure on the Palestinian leadership to work 
towards peace, Nazarbayev subtly shifted his approach on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict away from being strictly non-partisan while still firmly advancing the 
position that an end to the dispute could be achieved through international mediation. 
In this sense, Nazarbayev’s statements to the Palestinians can be interpreted as having 
mild pro-Israeli undercurrents. These understated nuances in the Kazakh position 
become clearer when they are examined in conjunction with the details of 
Kazakhstan’s voting pattern shift in the UN General Assembly on issues related to
725 For more on the roles of American, Israeli, Saudi, and Egyptian leaders in working to convince 
Arafat to accept the Camp David terms, see Elsa Walsh, “The Prince,” The New Yorker, 24 
March 2003, pp. 48-63.
Israel and the Middle East that took place during this phase; this analysis follows later 
in this chapter.
It is essential to note, however, that this delicate modification did not harm 
Kazakhstan’s relations with the Muslim world. It was not so apparent as to cause a 
disruption in the relationship between Almaty and Teheran, which was based more 
upon political and economic realism rather than philosophical or perceptual affinity. 
Nor was the Kazakh shift as bold as the positions adopted by other Arab and Muslim 
states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Nonetheless, Nazarbayev’s subtle 
reorientation—a minor development, but nonetheless evident—is the first 
recognizable shift in what had been a consistent policy since their independence.
Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister to Israel
In May 2001 Kairat Abuseitov, the deputy foreign minister of Kazakhstan, 
paid a working visit to Israel to invite Shimon Peres— then the deputy prime minister 
and foreign minister—to attend a conference in Almaty entitled “The Twenty-First 
Century: Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.”726 Peres, in addition to other 
world leaders such as former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, agreed 
to speak at the conference.727 The conference was suggested by President Nazarbayev 
and is indicative of how he sought to act as an international mediator on the issue of 
nuclear weapons. Sources in the Kazakh Foreign Ministry stated that the conference 
was intended to boost regional stability and trust,728 like Nazarbayev’s other 
international initiatives. Since Kazakhstan renounced nuclear weapons in February
726 “Visit of Deputy FM of Kazakhstan to Israel,” statement of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 13 May
2001, http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0jy70 (accessed 3 June 2001).
727 “Kazakh leader to attend anti-nuclear conference in southern capital,” Khabar TV  (Almaty), in
Russian 27 August 2001, in BBC Monitoring, n.d.
728 Oral Karpishev, “Kazakhstan to host forum on confidence-building in Asia,” Itar-TASS Weekly
News, 14 February 2001.
1994, Nazarbayev had spoken out against them and urged all the nations active in 
CICA to follow his lead.
While in Israel, Abuseitov also discussed Israel’s continued participation in 
CIMTA/CICA as well as Israeli-Kazakh bilateral relations and “the situation in the 
Middle East”729 before heading to the Palestinian Authority Nazarbayev’s instruction 
to discuss the fall 2001 CICA meeting with Palestinian officials.730 The invitation 
and Abuseitov’s discussions on the state of Israeli-Arab relations is further evidence 
of Nazarbayev acting in the role of an international peacemaker that some observers 
have noted he aspires.731
E c o n o m ic  R e l a t io n s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s is t a n c e
From 1999 to 2001 the commercial and economic aspects of the Israeli- 
Kazakh relationship grew in both scope and substance. The expansion in trade was 
driven by a political will to increase business and investment opportunities as well as 
by the desire of Israeli investors to profit from a very large and relatively untapped 
market.
Between 1999 and 2001, Israeli exports to Kazakhstan climbed each year, 
from $11.3 million732 in 1999, to $16.3 million733 in 2000, to $20.9 million in 2001734 
(see table 6.5). Israeli imports, on the other hand, remained relatively constant, as 
they have throughout the overall period examined in this thesis. Down from the
729 “Visit of Deputy FM,” http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0jy70 (accessed 3 June 2001).
730 Karpishev, “Kazakhstan to host forum.”
731 Kuzmin, interview.
732 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 51, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 2000), chart 8.5,
p. 8-11.
733 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 52, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 2001), chart 16.5,
p. 16-11.
734 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 53, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem, 2002), chart 16.5,
p. 16-11.
record $1.5 million registered in 1998, Israel imported $0.2 million735 worth of goods 
from Kazakhstan in 1999, followed by a rise to $0.7 million™1 in 2000, and a return to 
near the 10-year average ($0.36 million) with $0.2 million 17 in 2001.
Table 6.5 Israeli-Kazakh trade, 1999-2001 
(in Millions of Dollars)
1999 2000 2001
Exports SI 1.3 S16.3 S20.9
Imports SO.2 SO.7 $0.2
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).
The upward trend in Israeli exports to Kazakhstan, while not reaching as high 
as the level set in 1993 ($35.5 million), demonstrates the renewed and reinvigorated 
commercial relationship between Israel and Kazakhstan in this final phase from 1999 
to 2001. In this period, Israeli-Kazakh economic relations centered on improving the 
commercial relationship by expanding the investment opportunities available to 
Israeli businesses. Two events during this period contributed to bolster trade 
turnover: first, the Investment in Kazakhstan conference held in Israel during 
President Nazarbayev’s April 2000 visit and, second, the trade promotion visit to 
Kazakhstan led by Minister of Infrastructure Avigdor Liberman. Moreover, by this 
time the Kazakh economy had begun to recover from the turmoil of the mid-1990s. 
Greater freedom for foreign investment, the elimination of governmental bloat, more 
stability in the currency, increased prices and availability of Kazakh goods in the 
international marketplace, and improvements in the hydrocarbon sector all contributed 
to the revival of the Kazakh economy.
35 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 51, chart 8.5, p. 8-10.
36 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 52, chart 16.5, p. 16-10.
ni Statistical Abstract o f  Israel, Number 53, chart 16.5, p. 16-10.
Investment in Kazakhstan Conference
While on his second state visit to Israel, President Nazarbayev attended and 
presided over the Investment in Kazakhstan conference which was held in early April
2000. This conference was a made a success by the active “participation of a large 
number of Israeli businessmen, bankers, and also business representatives from 
Kazakhstan and [the] delegation of the [business representatives from the] southern 
Kazakhstan region”738 that accompanied Nazarbayev on his trip to Israel. The 
conference featured presentations of proposed joint ventures and other economic 
opportunities for Israeli investors and there were exhibitions of Kazakh industrial and 
agricultural production.739 While at the conference, Nazarbayev also expressed his 
hope that Israel would be well represented at the Eurasia Economic Summit of the 
World Economic Forum held in Astana in late April 2000.740
By early 2001 Kazakhstan had benefited from the measures taken to increase 
trade and investment as evidenced by the fact that Israeli investments in Kazakhstan 
exceeded $270 million.741 Furthermore, Eurasianet.org noted that “officials... moved 
in 2001 to facilitate commerce, especially in agriculture, medicine,
telecommunications, and technology.”742 There were further benefits from the 
creation of a bilateral commission to explore ways to deepen and expand the 
relationship. On 3 April 2001 a joint Israeli-Kazakh committee was created to 
“examine trade issues”743 in order to create greater economic links. Also during this 
phase of the relationship, customs procedures were simplified in order to speed the
738 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakherab.org.il.
739 “Total volume of Israeli investments to Kazakhstan,” Economic News, 6 April 2000.
740 “Total volume Israeli investments.”
741 See Kazakhstan country page, http://www.ncsj.org/kazaklistan.
742 Antoine Blua, “Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia,” Eurasianet.org,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501 .shtml (accessed 21 August 
2001).
743 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml
(accessed 21 August 2001).
transit of international commerce between the two nations.744 This development had 
immediate and obvious results in the recorded foreign trade levels in Israel because 
the Central Bureau of Statistics does not officially record trade until it has been 
released from customs.
The number of joint ventures increased considerably during the last three 
years of the Israeli-Kazakh relationship examined in this thesis. In spring 1992, there 
were only three Israeli businesses active in Kazakhstan. At the time of the Investment 
in Kazakhstan conference in Israel (April 2000), 76 Israel firms were operating in 
Kazakhstan with a total investment of $188 million, and there was a further $50 
million invested in the agricultural sector.745 This was a significant increase in 
commercial activity in the span of just a decade.
Liberman’s 2001 Trade Promotion Tour
In July 2001 Israel’s Minister for Infrastructure, Avigdor Liberman, paid a 
high-profile official promotion visit to Kazakhstan.746 This was the first such visit 
since Natan Sharansky’s June 1998 trade visit. Liberman—a Russian speaking Israeli 
emigre from Moldova in the former Soviet Union— largely took on the Israeli 
government’s unofficial Central Asia portfolio from Sharansky. According to the 
American Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Kazakh Service, Liberman met with 
Kazakh Prime Minister Tokayev in Astana.747 Liberman and his delegation of Israeli 
executives also met with Kazakh businessmen, and their discussions focused on
744 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml
(accessed 21 August 2001).
745 “Economic News Digest.”
746 “Motives of bilateral relations,” http://www.qodsna.com (accessed 30 April 2006).
747 “Israeli Minister Visit’s Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,” Eitrasianet.org, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200107/0022.html (accessed 14 
August 2001), citing an RFE/RL Kazakh Service report.
increasing trade volumes and increasing Israeli investment in aircraft construction and
748energy sectors.
In a sign of the close ties between Israel and Almaty, it was announced during 
this visit that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would visit Kazakhstan in November 
2001.749 The announcement was made by Kazakh Prime Minister Tokayev’s press
750  * ♦office, not by the Israeli delegation, in a sign of Kazakhstan’s desire to stress the 
closeness of the relationship. In a statement designed to emphasize the solidity of the 
relationship, Liberman noted that Sharon “is very much interested in this visit and is 
sure that it is to take place be what may.”751 Sharon’s visit, however, did not take 
place due to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the 
ensuing global war on terrorism.
By the time of the Liberman visit, annual trade turnover between Israel and 
Kazakhstan had reached $17 million,752 up 210 percent in just two years.753 In July 
2001, Kazakh exports to Israel consisted of agricultural products and precious metals, 
while Kazakhstan imported a range of Israeli goods, including machinery and 
equipment, agricultural products, chemicals, plastics and rubber goods, jewelry, and 
precious metals.754
748 “Israel PM Will Visit Kazakhstan After Trade Group’s Talks,” Dow Jones International News, 9
July 2001.
749 See “Israeli Minister Visits Kazakhstan,”
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypemiail/200107/0022.html (accessed 14 
August 2001), or “Israel PM Will Visit Kazakhstan After Trade Group’s Talks,” Dow Jones 
International News, 9 July 2001.
750 “Israel PM Will Visit.”
751 Oral Karpishev, “Israeli premier to pay official visit to Kazakhstan,” Itar-TASS Weekly News, 9 July
2001 .
752 “Israeli Minister Visits Kazakhstan,”
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200107/0022.html (accessed 14 
August 2001).
753 “Israel PM Will Visit.”
754 Karpishev, “Israeli premier pay official.”
In 2001, it was noted that trade ties between Israel and Kazakhstan “have 
grown exponentially in recent years... double the amount registered in 1999.”755 In 
order to further demonstrate this upward trend, it is useful to note that for the first 
seven months of 2005, according to the Kazakh Ministry of Industry and Trade, trade 
turnover rose to $460 million, more than double what it was in the preceding year.756
Major Commercial Investment, 1999-2001
In the last period of this study, commercial relations included progress in 
several areas such as the transformation of development projects into private sector 
enterprises, gold production and extraction, the enrichment of uranium yellowcake, 
the establishment of private sector medical clinics, and space launches. An 
examination of the major developments in these sectors follows.
Table 6.6 Major Israeli Projects, 1999-2001
Year Project Sector Business(es)Involved
Contract
size
(where
known)
1999 Purchase of Tselinnyy Mining- Chemical Combine Industrial
KazSubton, Leviev 
Group $0.3m
1999 Investment in TMCC project Industrial KazSubton, Leviev Group $1.5m
1999 Investment in medical clinics Medical Center for Israeli Medicine NA
2000 Drip irrigation project and greenhouse construction Agricultural MASHAV NA
2000 Establishment of camel dairy farms Agricultural not known NA
2001-
02 Vasilkovskoye gold project Industrial Leviev Group $134m
Sources: Israel Government Yearbook; Itar-TASS; Dow Jones; Deutsche Press-Agentur; Times o f
Central Asia; author's research.
Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml 
(accessed on 21 August 2001).
756 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
In the late 1990s, Israel’s Leviev Group launched a joint venture with the 
government of Kazakhstan to extract gold from the Vasilkovskoye gold deposit in
q c n
Astana. In addition to its other natural resources, Kazakhstan had been rumored to 
possess a major gold deposit of world-class proportions.758 Lev Leviev is an active 
supporter of Israeli investment in Kazakhstan, serves as honorary consul of 
Kazakhstan in Israel,759 and is president of both the Federation of Jewish 
Communities of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Bukharan Jewish 
Congress.760 Leviev made much of his fortune in the diamond trade and has since 
become “one of the Jewish world’s pre-eminent philanthropists.”761 His charitable 
gifts have funded Jewish schools and social welfare programs throughout Kazakhstan.
Under the terms of the Vasilkovskoye agreement, the Leviev Group, 
“represented by its Dutch subsidiary Floodgate,” would control a 60 percent stake in 
the venture through which it was hoped to produce about five to six tons of gold per 
year.762 However, as of early January 2001, the Kazakh government had yet to 
resolve a taxation qualification dispute.763 As a result, the Vasilkovskoye project did 
not proceed, and it was predicted at the time to “not go fully on stream until 2002.”764 
Nonetheless, as one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan, this delay did not have 
negative repercussions on either Leviev’s investments specifically, nor on Israeli- 
Kazakh relations generally. In fact, the Vasilkovskoye project dovetails nicely with 
another mining operation of the Leviev Group.
757 “2002 the Start for Vasilkovskoye Gold Project,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 4 January 2001.
758 Jan Kutina, PhD (Department of Chemistry, Global Tectonics and Metallogeny Laboratory,
American University), discussion with the author, summer 1998, Washington, DC.
159 “About Kazakhstan-Israeli relations,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
760 Michael S. Arnold, “Diamond mogul and philanthropist has ear o f fellow Jews, world leaders,”
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 3 March 2003.
761 Arnold, “Diamond mogul and philanthropist.”
762 “2002 Start for Vasilkovskoye.”
763 “2002 Start for Vasilkovskoye.”
764 See “Limping Kazakh uranium plant sold off to Israeli company,” Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency
(Almaty), in Russian, 3 May 1999, in BBC Monitoring, 3 May 1999, and “2002 Start for 
Vasilkovskoye.”
Part o f the plans for the Vasilkovskoye project proposed for the raw gold ore 
to be processed by another Leviev subsidiary, KazSabton.765 KazSabton was formed 
in April 1999. The Kazakh portion of the new enterprise was the old Tselinnyy 
Mining-Chemical Combine (TMCC), whose uranium plant had failed to sell in 
January and February 1999 at its original asking price of over 2 billion tenge (—$17.5 
million).766 The Israeli portion of the new enterprise was Sabton, a subsidiary of 
Leviev’s Africa Israel Investments Ltd. In April 1999, Sabton Ltd outbid national 
firm Kazatomprom for TMCC, and reportedly paid 34.8 million tenge (-$314,000), 
much lower than the earlier asking price.767 However, the TMCC uranium plant 
carried significant debt and owed back pay to its workers in excess of 270 million 
tenge (-$2.8 million). Within six weeks of ownership, parent firm Africa Israel 
invested a further $1.5 million in production-related expenses at KazSabton, and 
announced plans to clear all debts and wage arrears within two to five years.768
KazSubton is involved in the production of uranium yellowcake for the 
national nuclear corporation Kazatomprom.769 From a security perspective, it is 
interesting to note that Kazakhstan has allowed a foreign firm to be partly responsible 
for the production of uranium yellowcake. While Kazakhstan is not the only 
developing nation to operate in this fashion,770 it is certainly intriguing to observe that 
a component of Kazakhstan’s critical national infrastructure is being partially run by 
an Israeli business.
765 Israeli industrialist Lev Leviev also owns Sabton Ltd which produces “polymetals and chemical
products, plus gold” as well as “Kazofat, a phosphate fertilizer producer.” See “2002 Start for 
Vasilkovskoye.”
766 Based upon the exchange rate at the time of the contract of approximately 114 tenge to one dollar,
“Limping Kazakh uranium plant,” in BBC Monitoring, 3 May 1999.
767 “Kazakh uranium plant sold by international tender,” Interfax news agency (Moscow), in English,
16 April 1999, in BBC Monitoring, 16 April 1999.
768 “Israeli company invests in Kazakh uranium mine,” Interfax news agency (Moscow), in English, 24
June 1999, in BBC Monitoring, 24 June 1999.
769 “2002 Start for Vasilkovskoye.”
770 Niger is perhaps the best known example of this trend; the French nuclear services conglomerate
Comiga dominates the industry.
The production of uranium yellowcake is simply the first stage in the nuclear 
enrichment process. To transform yellowcake into weapons-grade uranium, much 
more processing is required and Kazakhstan has been certified as no longer engaging 
in those processes. Yellowcake—with some further non-military processing—is 
suitable for civilian uses; however, it could also serve as an inferior component in a 
radiological dispersal device, more commonly known as a ‘dirty bomb.’ The Arabic 
and Persian press have failed to criticize Israel’s investment in Kazakhstan's 
production of yellowcake. This is surprising, given that a Jewish firm is active in 
controlling components of the nuclear fuel cycle in ‘Muslim’ Kazakhstan.
In the agricultural sector, during August 2000, MASHAV trainers launched a 
new project at the Kunarly farm in the Enbekshi-Kazakh district of Almaty province. 
This new project was designed to increase irrigation, support the construction of a 
demonstration greenhouse, and transform the facility into a private sector 
enterprise.771 In 1999, the Israeli Foreign Ministry noted that hundreds of Kazakh 
participants had received agricultural training in Israel through various MASHAV 
courses, and MASHAV trainers and experts in Kazakhstan continued to establish 
model agricultural farms.772 In 2000, Israeli dairy firms began to export their 
knowledge of camel-raising, and they began to assist in the establishment of camel 
dairy farms in Kazakhstan.773
During this period Israel established a series of medical and dental clinics in 
Kazakhstan such as the Center for Israeli Medicine (CIM) in Almaty.774 This center 
provides private medical care and for more complicated procedures, CIM facilitates 
the travel of Kazakh nationals to Israel as so-called medical tourists. These Israeli
771 “Kazakh Farmers lo Continue Israeli Project,” Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 31 August 2000.
772 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Year in Review,” Israel Government Year Book, 1999,
http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0gbl0 (accessed 5 March 2001).
773 “Israeli dairy farmer prefers camels to cows,” Deutsche Press-Agentur, 14 December 2000.
774 Center of Israeli Medicine, http://www.cim.escort.kz/eng/cimplus.htm.
clinics are successful because Israeli techniques and technologies are perceived to be 
among the best of those offered in Kazakhstan.775 One Kazakh commentator 
observed that this Israeli success could be attributed to the “Soviet-era perception” 
lingering in Kazakhstan that Jews make “good doctors, especially dentists,”776 while 
another analyst noted that because Soviet Jews were active in the fields of medicine 
and dentistry during Soviet times, this continues to be a successful field for Israeli
777investment.
A final important area of Israeli-Kazakh collaboration has been the tacit 
cooperation between the two states on the launching of satellites, including ones with 
military applications. An example of this cooperation was the December 1999 launch 
of the Eros satellite. A joint Israeli-US satellite “based on the ‘Ofeq’ series of 
military imaging satellites,” Eros had a ground resolution capability of just one-meter, 
and was widely understood to be focused on monitoring Iran. 778 Towards the end of 
the time period covered in this study, several Israeli satellites were launched from the 
Baykonur cosmodrome in central Kazakhstan.
While the satellites have actually been put into orbit with Russian spacecraft 
under contract to Russian entities, this demonstrates the mutuality of security planning 
in Israel and Almaty. The facilities at Baykonur are technically under lease to the 
Russian state; in the past, however, Almaty has been able to exert a de facto veto 
power over space launches from its territory following safety concerns and payment
779issues.
775 Kuzmin, interview.
776 Rashid Dyussembaev (Editor-in-Chief, The Kazakhstan Monitor), interview with the author, 25
January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
777 Yerkin Tukumov (Deputy Director, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies), interview with the
author, 26 January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
778 “Russia to launch Israeli-US imaging satellite,” Globes website (Tel Aviv), in English, 1 March
1999, in BBCSW B  MEW/0579[26] (9 March 1999).
779 “Focus-Kazakhs Enforce Launch Ban in Row with Russia,” Reuters, 9 July 1999.
S e c u r it y  C o o p e r a t io n
In the final period of the relationship examined in this study, Israeli-Kazakh 
security cooperation focused on counter-terrorism coordination. Other areas of joint 
cooperation included the delivery of an Israeli military field hospital to the Kazakh 
Republican Center for Catastrophic Medicine.780
Coun ter- Terr or ism Co or din a tion
During the last phase of the relationship, counter-terrorism coordination 
witnessed increased cooperation. Prior to the start of the global war on terror, Israel 
and Almaty discussed “bilateral cooperation in the sphere of fight[ing] against 
terrorism.”781 This was first publicly suggested following the July 2001 visit to 
Kazakhstan led by Avigdor Liberman, who proposed that the two nations participate 
in intelligence sharing in order to fight terrorism.782 According to the Kazakh 
Embassy in Israel and Kazakhstan Today, the two states have also signaled their 
desire to cooperate on combating “illegal migration, illicit drag trafficking” and to 
improve their “interaction in the area of public security protection and legal order.”783 
Such cooperation is believed to exist although independent confirmation does not 
exist.
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, it was reported 
that Israel began “supplying the US with an extraordinary amount of behind-the- 
scenes intelligence assistance and security advice.” Washington’s request for
intelligence from Israel on Central Asia shows recognition that the Israeli ability to
780 “Kazakhs get Israeli military field hospital,” Kazakh Radio first program  (Almaty), in Russian, 6
September 2000, in BBC Monitoring, 6 September 2000.
781 “Kazakhstan and Israel Need Agreement on Crime Control,” Statement of the Embassy of the
Republic of Kazakhstan in the State of Israel, n.d., http://www.kazakhemb.org.il, quoting 
Kazakhstan Today, n.d.
782 Blua, “Israel Emerges,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081501.shtml
(accessed 21 August 2001).
783 “Kazakhstan and Israel Need Agreement,” http://www.kazakhemb.org.il.
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monitor events and collect intelligence was much more advanced than that of other 
nations. Specifically, Israel had “better intelligence and stronger relations with... 
Kazakhstan” than the United States or other western nations had at the time. This was 
partially attributed to the large number o f Israelis who had roots in the region and 
were familiar with local languages. Moreover, due to the region’s proximity to 
Israel’s enemies, Israeli intelligence agencies had devoted considerable human and 
electronic collection resources.784
As of January 2005, Kazakh cooperation with the Israeli embassy and Israeli 
counter-terrorism agencies had been described by one Kazakh official as “mutually 
enthusiastic” entailed monitoring extremists “perhaps in Kazakhstan... with Middle 
Eastern connections.”785 Note, however, that because the official stated “perhaps in 
Kazakhstan,” the possibility exists that Israeli and Kazakh counter-terrorism officials 
cooperate outside of Kazakhstan. Any such cooperative programs, if they exist, have 
never been publicly acknowledged.
KAZAKHSTAN AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Since Kazakh independence, President Nazarbayev has repeatedly called for a 
peaceful, negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In one of his first 
discussions with Nazarbayev in April 1992, Ambassador Levin cemented the Kazakh 
position vis-a-vis Israel and the peace process. At that time Nazarbayev “affirmed” to 
Levin “that Kazakhstan was interested in a peaceful settlement of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict.”786 On 14 April 1992, several days after Israel and Kazakhstan officially
784 Janine Zacharia, “Israel supplies US with Central Asia intelligence,” The Jerusalem Post, 5 October
2001.
785 Interview with Kazakh Foreign Ministry official held at the UN Counter Terrorism Conference, 27
January 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
786 Robert O. Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia: A Preliminary Analysis,” Central Asia Monitor, no.
2 (1993): p. 17, citing Moscow Interfax, 10 April 1992, in FBIS-FSU-92 (14 April 1992), p. 56.
established full diplomatic relations, Moscow’s Interfax Radio declared that both
Kazakhstan and Israel were committed to a peaceful resolution between Israelis and
Palestinians saying that “the two sides stated that they favored a diplomatic solution
to the Palestinian problem.”787
There are striking similarities between Nazarbayev’s comments to Arafat in
1991 regarding Palestine and his remarks to Levin on relations with Israel in 1992. In
both instances, Nazarbayev’s statements secured positive relations; Nazarbayev was
careful not to upset either side and instead offered remarks which signified
Kazakhstan’s desire to maintain open relations with both peoples while maintaining a
balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This proportionate position in
dealing with both the Israelis and the Palestinians was further demonstrated on 31
April 1992 when Nazarbayev spoke with Yediot Ahronoth and stated that
Kazakhstan’s “approach to rival sides in the Middle East is even-handed.”788
While Nazarbayev has led Kazakhstan in this direction, he is not the only one
in the Kazakh government professing such an even tone on arguably one of the most
potentially volatile topics in international relations. One Kazakh political analyst
noted that many throughout the government believe there is “no one right side— not
all Palestinians are terrorists, and not all Israeli policies are good.”789 En route to
Israel in January 1995, Mazhilis Speaker Abish Kekilbayevich praised Israel and
explained his country’s position on the peace process as follows:
Kazakhstan is interested in deepening the process of 
reducing tension and improving the peace process and 
mutual cooperation among states of the Middle East.
And we note with great satisfaction those positive steps
787 Jacob Abadi, Israel’s Quest fo r  Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy
(London, 2004), p. 438.
788 Carol R. Saivetz, “Central Asia: Emerging Relations with the Arab States and Israel,” in Central
Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (London, 1994), p. 322, 
quoting Yediot Ahronoth, 31 April 1992, p. 18.
789 Tukumov, interview.
made thanks to the unusual approach of the Israeli 
leadership, as a result of which such important 
documents as the agreement with Jordan and Palestine 
were signed. We hope that these processes will be 
developed further.790
The Kazakh Foreign Ministry, in a statement issued in October 1995, stated that
Positive changes in the Middle East leading to peaceful 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should become 
irreversible in the interests of establishing mutual 
confidence, developing broad economic cooperation in 
the region, and creating an integral security system in 
Asia.791
The Foreign Ministry has further said that
Kazakhstan is for fair settlement of confrontation with 
full account of legitimate interests and rights of the 
Israeli and Palestinian people and welcomes recent 
significant signs of commitment to peace and 
cooperation on the part of both sides. Such a settlement 
should also take care of the rightful concerns of other 
sides involved to ensure that peace and confidence 
prevail in the region.792
These statements reflect the even-handed course on which Nazarbayev had set 
Kazakh policy with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. One way in which 
Kazakhstan has sought to transform those words into actions has been through the 
Conference for Security and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. The October 
1995 CIMTA conference in Almaty793 was the first time that the Israelis and 
Palestinians had come together under Kazakh auspices to discuss issues of mutual 
concern.
790 “Kazakh Speaker Optimistic on Relations with Israel,” Kazakh Radio Nehvork (Almaty) in Russian,
0700 GMT 9 January 1995, in FBIS-CE-95 (10 January 1995), p. 27.
791 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 73, citing BBC SWB, 4 October 1995, SU 2425, p. G/5.
792 Website of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, n.d., http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/127.
793 “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev hosts second Conference for Security in Asia,” labyrinth: Central Asia
Quarterly (winter 1995): p. 11.
According to one analyst, Nazarbayev’s playing the role of a mediator and 
honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians arises in part out of his drive to seek 
a good balance and build a dialogue between Kazakhstan and Muslim countries.794 
This insight supports the notion that Kazakhstan seeks to capitalize on its efforts at 
mediation not just to advance ties with Israel, but also to build commonality with 
fellow Muslim nations. In this sense, Kazakhstan’s orientation on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is both balanced and thinking toward the future.
Israeli officials confided to this author that their government has been 
appreciative of Kazakh efforts to work toward a peaceful solution to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, Israeli officials have stated that not only do they 
feel comfortable operating in Kazakhstan, but also that the Israeli Foreign Ministry is 
of the opinion that Kazakhstan (as a Muslim country that has a good relationship with 
Israel) is in a good position to advance peace in the Middle East.795 When Israeli 
President Herzog first met with Nazarbayev in December 1992, he expressed Israel’s 
support for the creation of an Asian security conference and pledged that Israel would 
participate in its activities. Indeed, the Kazakh initiative to create a security 
framework for Asia is the only international venue organized by a Muslim nation that 
has included Israel.
The possibility that Kazakhstan would align itself against Israel on the issue of 
Palestine was successfully blunted by of Israeli diplomacy and investment. As one of 
Israel’s key concerns, it was vital that Israel secure a positive relationship with 
Kazakhstan.
794 Tukumov, interview.
795 Based upon discussion with Israeli officials in Almaty and Jerusalem.
796 “Israeli President Holds Talks with Nazarbayev,” Itar-TASS World Service in Russian, 0829 GMT
31 December 1992, in FBIS-CE-92 (31 December 1992), p. 59.
Kazakhstan and the al-Aqsa Intifadah
On 12 October 2000, two IDF reservists were captured and subsequently 
lynched by a Palestinian mob in Ramallah. Following the eruption of violence in 
Israel and the Palestinian Territories in the wake of the al-Aqsa Intifadah (September 
2000), the Kazakh Foreign Ministry released a statement condemning the violence 
and urging a return to peaceful negotiations under UN auspices. The statement said 
that “the current situation not only drives the continuation of the peace talks into a 
corner, but presents a serious threat to a peace process in the Middle East.” It 
expressed concern for the victims and stated that the “escalation of violence and new 
human victims in the Middle East may be avoided only by effective and coordinated 
measures with the usage of the corresponding mechanisms of the UN and other 
international and regional organizations.” The Kazakh statement also reiterated the 
Kazakh position calling for stability in the region and the “resumption of negotiations 
to settle the conflict.”797
The Kazakh Foreign Ministry’s remarks were very much in line with previous 
Kazakh statements calling for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. These remarks 
also followed more recent Kazakh positions such as those expressed by Nazarbayev 
during Arafat’s 1999 visit to Almaty in which he advocated a greater role for the UN 
in the peace process.
Nevertheless, despite the Foreign Ministry’s condemnations of violence, when 
the United Nations General Assembly passed an Emergency Special Session 
Resolution (ES-10/7) condemning Israeli actions in East Jerusalem and the Occupied 
Territories on 20 October 2000, Kazakhstan abstained. This is noteworthy because it 
marked a shift in how Kazakhstan voted on these issues at the General Assembly.
797 Oral Karpishev, “UN and other institutions may help to avoid violence-FMinistry,” Itar-TASS 
Weekly News, 14 October 2000.
The emergency resolution called 011 Israel to observe the Geneva Conventions and it 
supported the resumption of negotiations that would lead to a speedy conclusion and 
final settlement of the peace talks.798 Kazakhstan had voted in favor of prior General 
Assembly resolutions calling on Israel to observe the Geneva Conventions each time 
they came up for a vote (A/RES/51/132, A/RES/52/65, A/RES/53/54, and 
A/RES/54/77) and had always voted in favor of resolutions advocating a negotiated 
settlement to the conflict. However, in the 54th Session of the General Assembly 
during which Kazakhstan abstained on the emergency resolution, the Kazakh 
delegation no longer voted in favor to investigate Israeli practices in the Occupied 
Territories (A/RES/55/130, abstain), or to call on Israel to observe the Geneva 
Conventions (A/RES/55/131, chose not to vote), or to condemn Israeli human rights 
violations (A/RES/55/133, chose not to vote). The position taken by the Kazakh 
delegation 011 human rights recalled abstentions in 1993 (A/RES/48/41 [A]) and 1994 
(A/RES/49/36[A]) on similar resolutions.
Thus, although the Kazakh Foreign Ministry continued to call for the active 
involvement of the international community in helping to secure a peaceful settlement 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, when presented with an opportunity to vote on 
issues related to the conflict in October 2000, for the first time since joining the UN 
Kazakhstan’s voting pattern had begun to change. This shift is significant because it 
is indicative of how Israel’s policy of constructive engagement with Kazakhstan led to 
a softening of Kazakhstan’s position 011 issues related to Israel in the UN General 
Assembly.
798 For more on UN General Assembly Emergency Session Resolution ES-10/7, consult the United 
Nations Bibliographic Information System for the text o f the resolution, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/710/92/PDF/N0071092.pdf7OpenElement.
ANALYSIS OF KAZAKHSTAN’S UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTES
Over the course of Israel’s relationship with Almaty examined in this thesis, 
Kazakhstan’s voting position in the United Nations General Assembly changed. In an 
analysis of the Kazakh delegation’s voting record on General Assembly resolutions 
that were passed related to the Middle East and considered hostile to Israel, several 
patterns emerge. The first is that the general frequency with which Kazakhstan voted 
in favor of resolutions critical to Israel decreased over the period examined. The 
second pattern to emerge is that Kazakhstan’s position on resolutions considered 
hostile to Israel also changed. From these changes, it becomes evident that Israel’s 
objective to blunt potential Kazakh hostility to Israel was successful in moderating the 
position taken by Kazakhstan in the General Assembly.
On several issues related to Palestinian rights and Israel’s actions in the 
Occupied Territories, the Kazakh delegation’s position shifted from voting in favor of 
these resolutions, to either casting abstentions or choosing not to vote. On occasions 
when 110 vote was registered, it cannot be known with certainty that the Kazakh 
delegation was present for the vote. In most cases anecdotal evidence exists to 
suggest that the Kazakhs chose not to vote: Kazakh votes 011 other resolutions were 
recorded before and after the resolution in question.
P h a s e  I: 1991-1995
With the exception of one resolution, Kazakhstan cast a ballot 011 every 
resolution in the United Nations General Assembly related to the Middle East 
considered hostile to Israel examined for this thesis in the period from 1992 to 1995; 
Kazakhstan did not join the UN until 1992. The only time the Kazakh delegation did
not vote occurred in the 47th Session (1992) on the subject of cooperation between the 
UN and the Arab League (A/RES/47/12), and it is not known if the delegation was not 
present or simply chose not to vote.
In 1992, Kazakhstan voted with Iran 22 times, or 81.48 percent of the time, as 
opposed only once with Israel. The only time Kazakhstan and Israel voted together in 
1992 was on Resolution 47/82 when both nations voted against the universal right to 
self-determination (A/RES/47/82). On three other occasions Kazakhstan cast 
abstentions on resolutions critical of Israel on such topics as the occupation of the 
Golan (A/RES/47/63[A]), the question of Palestine (A/RES/47/64[DJ), and on the 
Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories 
(A/RES/47/70[A]).
In 1993, out of 11 resolutions passed that were critical of Israel, Kazakhstan 
only voted in favor of only six. The Kazakh delegation abstained on the 
condemnations of the human rights situation in the territories (A/RES/48/41 [A]), the 
occupation of the Golan (A/RES/48/59[B]), and Israel’s nuclear program 
(A/RES/48/78), as well as a resolution calling for self-determination and 
independence (A/RES/48/94). Resolution 48/78 called for Israel to renounce nuclear 
arms and join the NPT. The Israeli and Kazakh delegations cast the same vote only 
once during the 48th Session, when they both voted against a resolution calling for 
non-interference in national elections (A/RES/48/124).
During the 49th Session of the General Assembly in 1994, on nine resolutions 
hostile to Israel that were passed, Kazakhstan voted in favor of seven and abstained 
twice. This was the first year that Kazakhstan voted to condemn Israel’s occupation 
of the Golan (A/RES/49/87). (This position was repeated again in the years from 
1995 to 1998.) In 1994, Kazakhstan also continued to abstain on the question of the
human rights situation in the Occupied Territories (A/RES/49/3 6[A]) and abstained 
on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (A/RES/49/78).
In 1995 Kazakhstan voted in favor of six out of nine resolutions passed in the 
General Assembly. Abstentions were cast on the situation in the Middle East 
(A/RES/50/22[A]), Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories (A/RES/50/29[A]), 
and on the risk of nuclear proliferation (A/RES150/73).
It can be seen from these tallies that during the first phase of the relationship 
(1991-1995), Kazakhstan’s voting pattern has been sympathetic to Israel on a number 
of issues including the subject of Israel’s nuclear deterrent, Israel’s NPT status, the 
Golan, and the human rights situation in the Occupied Territories. On proliferation 
concerns and the NPT, Kazakhstan has not lent its voice to the chorus of nations 
critical of Israel. This position is noteworthy because it runs counter to Nazarbayev’s 
calls for all nations to accede to the NPT, and it is in direct opposition to 
Kazakhstan’s position on the dangers of nuclear proliferation as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. It would appear that Kazakhstan’s position in the General Assembly not 
only recognizes Israel’s special security requirements but also represents sympathy 
for Israel’s stated position of nuclear ambiguity.
P h a s e  II: 1996-1998
In 1996, Kazakhstan voted in favor of 26 out of 30 resolutions hostile to Israel 
that were passed in the General Assembly. In this year, the four abstentions were cast 
on resolutions on the situation in the Middle East; Palestinian property rights; the risk 
of nuclear proliferation; and Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. Kazakhstan 
voted in favor of resolutions critical of Israel’s presence in Jerusalem and the Golan 
and resolutions critical of Israeli human rights practices and Israeli settlements.
In 1997 Kazakhstan’s voting position on issues related to Israel continued to 
harden, and the Kazakh delegation voted in favor of an Emergency Special Session 
resolution condemning Israel’s illegal action in East Jerusalem and the Occupied 
Territories (A/RES/52/ES/10-3). It is interesting to note that Kazakhstan did not vote 
in favor of a resolution calling for the Palestinian right of self-determination; this is a 
hint of a break in the pattern yet to come. The abstentions cast were again on 
resolutions on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and on Israeli 
practices in the territories.
In the 53rd Session in 1998, on the 22 resolutions considered to be hostile to 
the State of Israel, Kazakhstan voted in favor of every one. The Kazakh delegation 
voted with the Iranian delegation 95 percent of the time; the only divergent vote in 
1998 was on Resolution 53/42 calling for a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian 
question, when Iran chose not to vote. During the 53rd Session, Israel voted against 
21 resolutions and abstained just once.
During this phase of the relationship (1996-1998), Kazakhstan’s voting 
frequency on resolutions considered hostile to Israel steadily increased until it reached 
100 percent in 1998. This included votes in favor of resolutions critical of Israel’s 
presence in Jerusalem and the Golan, Israeli human rights practices, Israeli 
settlements, and an Emergency Special Session resolution on Israeli actions in the 
Occupied Territories. In the final phase of the Israeli-Kazakh relationship under 
examination, this pattern would break.
P h a s e  III: 1999-2001
An analysis of Kazakhstan’s voting behavior in the UN General Assembly on 
resolutions regarding the Middle East and Israel shows that Kazakhstan altered its
voting pattern in the period from 1999 to 2001. A shift in the voting behavior of the 
Kazakh delegation to the UN General Assembly can be seen beginning in 1999. 
Whereas Kazakhstan had previously voted as Iran did on issues related to the Middle 
East and Israel, beginning with the 53rd Session in 1999 that pattern ends.
This shift in Kazakhstan’s voting patters at the 54th Session of the General 
Assembly begins several months before President Nazarbayev made his second 
official visit to Israel, coinciding with the preparations for his visit. One of the 
preparations for Nazarbayev’s visit included Vice Premier and Foreign Minister 
Tokayev’s trip to Israel in September 1999 to discuss mutual relations and CICA. 
While this is not to assert that Tokayev’s visit caused the shift, it does suggest that 
there is a connection between the timing of the preparation for Nazarbayev’s return 
visit to Israel and the Kazakh delegation’s shifting voting pattern. The shift also 
occurs at time when Kazakhstan is beginning to assert its own independent foreign 
policy.
Of the 21 resolutions considered to be hostile to the State of Israel which 
passed in the General Assembly in 1999, Kazakhstan voted in favor of only seven, or 
31.81 percent. The Kazakh delegation abstained five times (23 percent of the time) 
on a range of issues such as the fate of the Golan, UN procedural manners related to 
the Palestinian question, and on issues such as Israeli practices and Palestinian 
sovereignty over natural resources in the Occupied Territories. Kazakhstan had never 
cast so many abstentions on resolutions related to Israel in the General Assembly 
since it had been admitted to the UN in 1992.
Furthermore, the Kazakh delegation cast no ballot on nine out of 21 occasions 
(42 percent). Despite UN voting records showing that Kazakhstan did vote on other 
resolutions on the days in which no Kazakh vote was recorded on resolutions
considered hostile to Israel, it cannot be known with certainty that the Kazakh 
delegation was present for the hostile resolutions’ vote. The last time the Kazakh 
delegation opted not to cast a vote on a Middle East issue related to Israel was in 
October 1992 (A/RES/47/12).
In the last phase of the relationship (1999-2001), Kazakhstan’s position on 
resolutions hostile to Israel softened considerably. The Kazakh delegation either 
abstained or chose no to vote on numerous issues, including the status of the Golan, 
Israeli human rights practices, implementation of the Geneva Conventions, and 
several procedural resolutions regarding the role of Palestine. This marked a 
noticeable departure from the patterns established during the first and second phases 
of the relationship.
O v e r v ie w  o f  U N  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  V o t e s
When Kazakhstan first entered the UN in 1992, it voted in favor of 22 out of 
27 hostile resolutions, while in 2000 the Kazakh delegation voted in favor of only 11 
out of 23 resolutions. Over the course of the ten-year period examined in this chapter, 
Kazakhstan’s voting frequency against Israel (over the nine years in which 
Kazakhstan was a member of the UN) began at 81.48 percent, and then dropped in 
1993 to 54.54 percent (see table 6.7). The pattern that emerges shows Kazakhstan 
increasingly voting against Israel until the frequency with which Kazakhstan voted in 
favor of resolutions critical of Israel rose to 100 percent in 1998. During the 53rd 
Session of the General Assembly Kazakhstan voted in favor of 21 out of 21 
resolutions critical of Israel. This trend then dropped significantly in the two last 
years under examination to 31.81 percent (seven out of 21 votes) and 47.82 percent 
(11 out of 23 votes) in 1999 and 2000 respectively.
Fable 6.7 Kazakh Voting Frequency in Favor of UN General Assembly 
Resolutions Related to the Middle East Considered Hostile to Israel
Year Percentage
1992 81.48%
1993 54.54%
1994 77.77%
1995 66.66%
1996 86.66%
1997 87.50%
1998 100.00%
1999 31.81%
2000 47.82%
Sources: UN Bibliographic Information System; 
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise.
Chart 6.1 Kazakh Voting Frequency in Favor of UN General Assembly 
Resolutions Related to the Middle East Considered Hostile to Israel
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Kazakhstan’s position on several issues has changed over time. On the 
resolutions critical of Israel’s occupation of the Golan, the Kazakh delegation 
abstained for the first two years, and then in 1994 voted in favor of calling for Israel 
to evacuate the Golan. They continued to vote this way until Kazakhstan abstained in 
1999 and 2000. However, on two occasions when additional resolutions were voted
upon which called for Israel to leave the Syrian Golan (A/RES/54/80, 6 December 
1999; A/RES/5 5/134, 8 December 2000), Kazakhstan did not vote. This suggests a 
clearer interpretation of Kazakh support for the yearly Resolution on the Situation in 
the Middle East: Golan was based on reasons other than the issue of Israel’s 
occupation of the Golan; most likely based instead upon the General Assembly’s calls 
for a resumption of the peace process under the land-for-peace formula
On resolutions critical of Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories, from 
1995-1997 and 1999-2000 Kazakhstan either abstained or did not vote. Abstentions 
were also cast on resolutions regarding the Special Committee to investigate these 
practices. This pattern was repeated by the Kazakh delegation on other resolutions on 
such issues as the right to self-determination; the inalienable rights of the Palestinians; 
Palestinian property rights; and Palestinian sovereignty over natural resources in the 
Occupied Territories. On all these resolutions, the Kazakh position went from voting 
in favor of them to casting abstentions and in some cases, not voting beginning in 
1999.
Three trends emerge from this data. First, Kazakhstan softened its position on 
Israel’s human rights practices and the issue of the application of the Geneva 
Conventions by choosing to abstain or not vote on those resolutions as of 1999. 
Second, on the occupation of the Golan, the Kazakh delegation’s position shifted from 
abstaining until 1994, to voting against Israel until 1999. Third, Kazakhstan stopped 
voting to criticize Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. This demonstrates that 
during Israel’s policy of constructive engagement with Kazakhstan, the Kazakh 
position on resolutions critical to Israel moderated. As such, Israel’s policy objective 
of working to ensure that Kazakhstan did not align against Israeli interests proved to 
be successful at the end of the ten-year period under examination in this thesis.
On most of the General Assembly votes considered to be hostile to Israel 
examined for this thesis, Israel and the United States were the only two countries who 
consistently voted against or abstained on the resolutions. While Kazakhstan did not 
adopt the voting habit of Israel or the United States, the Kazakh delegation began to 
exercise its option to abstain on votes with increased frequency beginning with the 
54th Session in 1999. It cannot be known with certainty that this change from voting 
for hostile resolutions to abstaining from many hostile resolutions indicates a decision 
to align with Israel; however, it can be observed that this behavior is in marked 
contrast to the Kazakh voting pattern exhibited in the preceding years. These data 
suggest that the Kazakh delegation decided to moderate their vote on issues related to 
Israel while not going as far as to cast the same vote as the Israelis.
A similar pattern of moderating their position can be seen in the votes 
regarding the Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices in the Occupied 
Territories. From 1999 onwards, the Kazakh delegation abstained (A/RES/54/176 
and A/RES/22/130). On the issue of the Israeli occupation of the Golan, Kazakhstan 
had voted in favor of condemning Israel from 1994 to 1998. However, in 1999 
(A/RES/54/38) and 2000 (A/RES/55/51, the last available vote on this issue covered 
in this study) Kazakhstan abstained. Similarities can be seen in the votes on 
Jerusalem. Kazakhstan had previously voted in favor of the General Assembly’s calls 
for Israeli to evacuate East Jerusalem; however, on 1 December 1999 Kazakhstan did 
not to cast a vote on the resolution (A/RES/54/37). An examination of Kazakhstan’s 
voting record reveals that the Kazakh delegation did vote on other resolutions related 
to the Middle East that day, including the four resolutions that immediately followed 
the one on East Jerusalem. This suggests that Kazakhstan, rather than being not 
present, chose not to vote on East Jerusalem but this cannot be known with certainty.
The shift in Kazakhstan’s voting pattern in the United Nations General 
Assembly demonstrates the successes of Israel’s constructive engagement with 
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, it validates Israel’s initial position that through positive 
links with Almaty, Israel could ensure that Kazakhstan would not devolve into a state 
hostile to Israel’s national security interests. The UN General Assembly voting data 
suggest that over the course of the period examined in this study, Israel’s relationship 
with Kazakhstan improved because during the same period Kazakhstan’s voting in 
favor of General Assembly resolutions hostile to Israel decreased. Moreover, the 
Kazakh delegation’s shift in position occurred while the trends in trade turnover were 
rising and the two states were enjoying a resurgence in political activity and security 
cooperation.
CONCLUSION
In the first ten years of Kazakh independence, Israel built a close relationship 
with Kazakhstan in the diplomatic arena, with respect to economic and commercial 
ties, and regarding security cooperation. This relationship reflected Israel’s strategic 
drive to expand its influence so that the emergence of potential threats to its national 
security were blunted. In this endeavor Israel was successful, in part intentionally and 
in part due to circumstance. Israel’s objectives were all achieved— constructive 
engagement with Kazakhstan ensured Kazakh neutrality on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (by the end of the period examined, despite Kazakh votes in the General 
Assembly before 1999) and helped to guarantee that Kazakhstan did not devolve into 
a state hostile to Israeli interests.
In the first phase of their relationship, Israel was most concerned with how its 
own security could be jeopardized through either a Kazakh failure to safeguard its
nuclear legacy, the development of a pro-Iranian regime in Almaty, or Kazakhstan’s 
position on Palestine. On the nuclear question, we now know that Israel’s fears that 
Iran would further its own weapons program through Kazakh assistance or negligence 
were unfounded. Moreover, Kazakhstan was never in a position to ‘assist’ Iran 
because control over these nuclear devices was always under Russian control. The 
completion of their transfer in April 1995 would signal the end of Israel’s initial 
security interest in Kazakhstan.
For its part, Iran realized early in its involvement with the Central Asian 
republics that the region was not open to emulating Teheran’s style of government. 
The resulting Kazakh-Iranian relationship is therefore as much reflective of Iranian 
realpolitik as it is of Israeli hopefulness. On the issue of support for Palestine, Israel 
was best able to marshal its influence. The successes of Israel’s objective to keep 
Kazakhstan neutral on this issue, however, is also the result of the desires of President 
Nazarbayev and the Kazakh government to balance warm relations with Israel and the 
West with close ties to the Muslim world. A further component of Israel’s success is 
due to Nazarbayev’s desire to be a peacemaker and mediator and his goal of raising 
Kazakhstan’s profile in the international community: this allowed Israel and the 
Palestinians to have discussions that they otherwise would not have had, at 
Nazarbayev’s invitation.
In the absence of a pressing security threat and because its situation vis-a-vis 
the Palestinians seemed to be improving, Israel’s attentions were directed closer to 
home in 1996. As a result, the relationship with Kazakhstan suffered from a lack of 
engagement. Soon, however, until the utility of close ties with Kazakhstan was 
recognized again: in light of the difficulties that Israel experienced implementing the 
Oslo Accords, problems with the Syrian track of the peace process, and Israel’s
withdrawal from southern Lebanon, constructive engagement with non-Arab Muslim 
Kazakhstan held many benefits. It demonstrated that Israel was perfectly able to 
engage a Muslim nation and prosper from the interaction. This had the desired effect 
of dampening international criticism and diluting anti-Israel bias.
Over the three phases examined in this chapter and the preceding one, Israeli 
concerns vis-a-vis Kazakhstan and Israel’s methods of engagement have been well 
documented. Jacob Abadi argues that, compared to the other four Central Asian 
republics, “Kazakhstan seems to have been the most attractive to the Israelis.”799 The 
foregoing chapters have shown, through an expansive and detailed examination of the 
Israeli-Kazakh relationship, that the relationship between Israel and Almaty is both 
complex and multifaceted. For Israel, Kazakhstan represented a unique convergence 
of threats and opportunities: the stark dangers of nuclear proliferation and the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction were coupled with unmatched economic possibilities; 
against the threatening aspirations of Iran in the region were opportunities to advance 
Israeli foreign and strategic policies in the area and contain Iranian influence. In 
short, Israel’s relationship with Kazakhstan in the first decade of Kazakh 
independence proved to be a resounding success for Israel’s strategic policies in 
Central Asia.
799 Abadi, Israel’s Quest for Recognition, p. 436.
Ch a p t e r  Se v e n : Co n c l u sio n s
Throughout Israel’s history, national security has predominated in its foreign 
policy; and as this thesis has demonstrated, Israel’s complex relationships with 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2001 were shaped by a desire to advance 
Israeli national security concerns. Israel was able to create strong and durable 
friendships with these states through constructive engagement in order to safeguard its 
national interests. Over the course of the ten-year period examined, Israel 
successfully achieved its goals in its relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
As a result, Israel succeeded in preventing the emergence of conditions in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan that would have negatively affected Israeli national security.
THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ISRAELI POLICY
Israel’s constructive engagement with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan created 
multifaceted relationships based on diplomatic and political interactions, development 
assistance, economic and commercial relations, and security cooperation. Israel used 
these main four avenues of access to create strong frameworks 011 which to build solid 
relationships. Through these relationships, Israel was able to advance its traditional 
foreign policy objectives and safeguard its national security.
Uzbekistan, the region’s most geopolitically strategic and populous state, did 
not devolve into a hostile regime. In Kazakhstan, the legacy of Soviet nuclear 
weapons never threatened the State of Israel. In neither republic did political Islam
did not take hold, nor did Iran successfully expand its sphere of influence. 
Diplomatically, Israel attempted to use its access and influence in Washington to help 
Uzbekistan. With both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Israel successfully used trade and 
investment to facilitate its political overtures. Through trade meetings and economic 
discussions with the Kazakhs— some of which were held in Jerusalem—the Israelis 
succeeded in gaining de facto recognition of Israeli Jerusalem from a Muslim nation.
Over the course of the three phases of the Israeli-Uzbek and Israeli-Kazakh 
relationships, Israel developed stable and secure ties. These ties benefited Israel in 
the United Nations General Assembly. The voting records of both Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan demonstrate that over the course of the first decade of their relationships 
with Israel, their positions softened on resolutions related to the Middle East 
considered hostile to Israel. This contributed to Israel’s efforts to normalize relations 
throughout the international community and thereby further shore up its national 
security.
Post-Soviet Central Asia was perceived by policy makers in Israel to have the 
potential to adversely affect Israel. Motivated by a fear that the emergence of five 
more Muslim nations would further skew the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, Israel sought to preemptively engage the new republics in order to prevent 
the development of regimes hostile to Israeli national interests. A deep-seated fear of 
Iranian influence, the presence of Soviet-era nuclear weapons, concern that Islamist 
extremism could take hold, and apprehension over the issue of Palestine combined to 
drive Israel to engage the new republics and ensure that the new post-Soviet 
leaderships did not align against Israeli interests. Iran was unable to exclude Israel 
from the region: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not become hostile to Israeli 
interests. Tashkent and Almaty grew to share Israel’s threat perceptions: Soviet-era
weapons, technologies, and materials remained out of the hands of hostile states and 
powers. Teheran was unable to successfully pull Tashkent or Almaty into its sphere 
of influence: militant Islam did not take hold in those republics. The peace process in 
the Middle East was not greatly affected by the independence of the Central Asian 
republics because they stayed neutral on the conflict. Both Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan became secure and stable in their own right. The region’s Jewish 
communities remained safe and immigration to Israel was allowed to continue and 
even expand. These goals were achieved through the creation of complex and 
multifaceted relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These relationships 
created an environment in which Israel was able to influence the policies and mold the 
strategic orientations that these newly independent states would take. On all counts, 
Israeli policy realized what it had set out to achieve.
ISRAEL’S OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA
Among Israel’s objectives were preventing the spread of Iranian influence 
within the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union; curbing the development of 
hostile regimes and the proliferation of WMDs; reducing the emphasis on the Arab 
world in the Middle East; and diverting attention from the Middle East Peace Process. 
Israel was further motivated in its actions and policies by its desire to retain its 
strategic relationship with the United States; to foster the creation of moderate 
Muslim states; to develop further economic markets; to expand arms sales; and to 
ensure the protection of Central Asia’s local Jewish communities. All of these 
objectives were attained; most were achieved by Israel’s implementation of its 
strategic policy in the region, though there were some developments that Israel had 
little impact upon.
S p r e a d  o f  Ir a n ia n  In f l u e n c e
As demonstrated in chapter three, Iran had hoped that the end of the Soviet 
control of Central Asia would mark the successor republics’ return to Islam. Iran had 
ambitiously hoped that it would serve as a model and inspiration for the governments 
of the new Central Asian republics as they created their own independent 
governments. The notion that the Iranian style of government could be adopted by 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and become Islamic Republics was quickly discarded. 
Teheran’s aspirations, it was later acknowledged, were untenable because of Iran’s 
ignorance of Soviet Central Asian history and a complete misunderstanding of what 
the region’s governments and people wished for their future.
The idea that Iran could expand its influence and provide support for radical 
Islamist governments and movements was anathema to Israel. Joint American and 
Israeli aid programs were designed in the early period of the republics’ independence 
to combat Iranian influence, and Israel received American monies specifically to be 
used in funding such programs. Early discussions with Tashkent and Almaty focused 
on the threat from Iran, and both the Uzbek and Kazakh governments agreed with 
Israel that Iranian meddling was unwelcome. The Uzbeks bore the brunt of Iran’s 
anger at Israel’s successes in the region, especially following Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres’ 1994 visit. Throughout their relationship, Israeli leaders highlighted 
the dangers posed by Iran and Uzbekistan came to align very closely with Israel’s 
perspective. When Iranian radio broadcast Uzbek language propaganda by the IMU, 
Uzbekistan was driven even closer towards Israel.
At the end of the period examined in this study, Iran’s goals in Central Asia 
shifted from seeking to export its Islamist revolution to building commercial and
cultural connections with the republics. Kazakhstan did not want Teheran’s Islamist 
revolution but did build commercial connections with Iran. Uzbekistan, with a sizable 
Tajik-speaking population, was more guarded in its dealings with Iran. By 2001, Iran 
had not gained any appreciable influence in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan partially due 
to Israel’s success in implementing its foreign and national security policies, and 
partially because the Uzbek and Kazakh governments were unreceptive to Iran’s 
overtures. In the end, Israel’s perception of Iran was shared by both Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan.
D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  H o s t il e  R e g im e s  a n d  t h e  S p r e a d  o f  W M D s
In the absence of Soviet control, Israeli policy makers feared that governments 
would emerge in Central Asia that were hostile to Israeli interests. Israel successfully 
engaged and supported the new secular governments in Tashkent and Almaty, and 
provided both with critical development assistance, trade, and investment. Israeli 
entrepreneurs and MASHAV supplied essential technologies to improve agricultural 
production, expand communications networks, and upgrade deteriorating industrial 
infrastructures. Israel had an advantage over other countries that could have provided 
development assistance because of the many well-educated Israeli technicians and 
trainers who were fluent in Russian and other Central Asian languages. Coupled with 
government-to-government support in the form of trade and customs agreements, 
generous grants, loans, and direct investment, this vital assistance helped to stabilize 
the new republics in the post-Soviet period.
The possibility that Soviet-ear nuclear weapons would be transferred out of 
the former Soviet territories and into Israel’s enemies’ possession was a veiy real 
threat in the early 1990s. Numerous stories and rumors circulated alleging that Iran
had acquired Soviet strategic warheads from Kazakhstan. These fears were fanned by 
speculation coupled with an absence of understanding of the controls that were in 
place and the level of communal cooperation that existed between Kazakhstan and 
Iran. We now know that the weapons Kazakhstan inherited upon its independence 
were never in danger of being obtained by Islamist extremists, but this should not 
detract from the importance of the concern at that time.
A further concern arose about orphaned special nuclear materials and 
unemployed weapons scientists in the region. Lost, misplaced, and generally 
unaccounted-for industrial radioactive isotopes and the acquisition of such materials 
by a terrorist organization or organized criminal network raised significant and 
serious alarm. The fate of Soviet biological warfare scientists and engineers was also 
troubling. Although much beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that 
Israel and the United States worked to monitor these scientists, although little material 
detailing these programs has been made available.
Israel’s objective of curbing the spread of these technologies was achieved 
during the period examined in this thesis. Iran apparently did not advance its WMD 
programs with Central Asian assistance, although Teheran did maintain a clandestine 
nuclear weapons program throughout the 1990s. Regular surveys of republics— 
especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—to search for remnants of the Soviet weapons 
program have found both Tashkent and Almaty free of any traces of the old weapons 
programs. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not collude with Islamist countries in the 
production of WMDs during the period examined.
T h e  E m p h a s is  o n  t h e  A r a b  W o r l d  in  t h e  M id d l e  E a s t
Throughout its history, the State of Israel has been veiy aware of being 
surrounded and outnumbered by its Arab neighbors. This has placed Israel always on 
the defensive. To mitigate this, Israel has engaged in several methods to 
metaphorically expand the Middle East and to build relationships with those nations 
that lie ‘beyond the Arab fence,’ most famously through its Periphery Policy. In its 
dealings with Central Asia, Israel was partially successful in de-emphasizing the 
position of the Arab world within the context of the Middle East.
Israel did build strong relationships in Central Asia, as demonstrated by the 
ties with Tashkent and Almaty-—in this sense Israel was veiy successful in expanding 
the Middle East to include non-Arab Muslim nations not in Israel’s immediate 
vicinity. However, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan cannot counterbalance the clout and 
power of the Arab states and Iran. Israeli national security policy requires acceptance, 
existential and diplomatic recognition, normalization, and eventually peace with the 
Arab world and Iran. As detailed in chapter two, Israel is bound by its situational 
permanence.
F ocus o n  t h e  M i d d l e  E a s t  P e a c e  P r o c e s s
At the time that Israel established diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, the Madrid Peace Process had yet to begin. As a result, Israeli policy 
toward Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was focused in large part on securing their 
neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the issue of Palestine. Israel was fearful 
that the creation of five new Muslim nations would further tip the regional balance in 
favor of the Arab states, and was especially disconcerted by Kazakhstan’s 
establishment as a de facto nuclear power. Israel was worried that Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan would align against Israel and support the hard-line ‘rejectionist’ states. 
Because of their presumed mineral wealth, Israel dreaded that the new republics 
would become petro-powers which could support the Palestinians financially and 
politically, thus effectively subsidizing what Israeli saw as Arab intransigence.
Israel, however, skillfully marshaled Uzbek and Kazakh sympathy for its 
position. Despite attempts by Yasir Arafat and the PLO, Tashkent and Almaty never 
enthusiastically supported the Palestinians. President Karimov and President 
Nazarbayev were welcomed in Ramallah, and Arafat traveled to the region to build 
support among the Central Asian governments for the Palestinians. However, both 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan remained decidedly neutral, and at times were even pro- 
Israeli throughout the ten years which this thesis examines. The UN General 
Assembly voting patterns of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on resolutions related to the 
Middle East and considered hostile to Israel demonstrate that when presented with 
opportunities to pressure Israel on the issue of Palestine, Tashkent and Almaty 
repeatedly did not. This was a triumph of Israel’s policy of constructive engagement 
because it allowed Israel to engage its Arab neighbors on its schedule. This allowed 
Israel to bypass what it perceived as Arab intransigence and instead engaged with 
other Muslim nations, demonstrating the benefits of ties with Israel, while 
simultaneously working to combat its anti-Muslim image.
S t r a t e g ic  R e l a t io n s h ip  w it h  t h e  U n it e d  St a t e s
Israel feared that the end of the Cold War would result in a reduction in 
Israel’s strategic relationship with the United States, but this did not transpire. If 
anything, Israel’s importance to the United States increased over the course of the ten- 
year period covered in this thesis. A central tenet of Israeli national security policy
has been to secure and retain the patronage of a great power. A relationship such as 
the one Israel has with the United States has allowed Israel great latitude in its 
dealings with its Arab neighbors and has permitted Israel to respond unencumbered to 
threats with little concern for the repercussions. The relationship also provides 
essential financial support, technology transfers, and weapons sales to Israel. This 
helps Israel maintain its qualitative edge over its quantitatively superior adversaries.
In order to preserve this vital and strategic relationship, Israel had to reposition 
itself in order to retain its value to Washington as an indispensable partner in the 
Middle East. Israel was no longer needed to serve as a bulwark against Communism; 
instead, Israel positioned itself to combat the rise of militant Islam. Israel was 
successful: by replacing the Red Menace of Communism with the Green Peril of 
Islam, Israel was able to recast its importance to its primary benefactor. This new role 
for Israel was most obviously useful in Central Asia.
In both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Israel served as a surrogate for American 
interests, at times providing valuable intelligence to the United States on the region. 
Israel attempted to use its relationship with Tashkent and Washington to help mend 
fences in US-Uzbek relations. Further, both Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev 
tried to use Israel’s extensive influence in Washington for their own benefit.
The United States was pleased to have Israel use its assets to advance pro- 
Western policies in Central Asia. Israel and the United States shared many of the 
same concerns about the region and it was here that US-Israeli cooperation reaped 
many successes during the first ten years: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan became free of 
WMDs, Islamists did not come to power, Iran was kept in check, and pro-Western 
policies informed the rule in both Tashkent and Almaty. In this respect, Israel was 
very successful and continued to be of great importance to the United States.
C r e a t io n  o f  M o d e r a t e  M u s l im  St a t e s
One of Israel’s primary concerns about Central Asia was that Islamic republics 
would replace Soviet power in the region. Many of Israel’s strategies to help further 
its national security and foreign policy objectives in the region would have been 
constrained had the newly independent republics chosen to pursue that path. 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not become nations ruled by Islamic law, but not 
because of Israeli actions alone. Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev very firmly 
pursued secular paths. The creation of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as secular states is 
much more the result of their leaders’ and indigenous efforts than it was of specific 
Israeli actions. Israel did contribute in ways that could help create an environment 
conducive to the formation of secular governments.
There was arguably little that Israel could do to dictate to Tashkent and 
Almaty what their forms of government should look like in the post-Soviet period. 
However, what Israel did do is engage the republics in discussions that touched on the 
roles of religion in government. In the case of Uzbekistan, the Israelis strongly 
advised Tashkent against adopting the Arabic script because it was thought that using 
it would facilitate the spread of militant Islam, and Uzbekistan agreed. Of course, 
Israel knew that adopting Arabic script might also help the spread of anti-Semitic and 
anti-Israeli propaganda in the republic. In both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Israel 
fostered institutions, trade, and development that would help steer the republics away 
from Islamic government. By extending international support and assistance to 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Israel tried to direct them away from Islamist extremism 
and rule by Islamic law. Because Israel remained active in the institutions, trade, and
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development of these new states, any Islamist influence in them could be monitored 
and addressed quickly in bilateral dialogues.
The formation of secular governments in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were 
greatly advanced by these republics’ history under the Soviet Union. Decades spent 
under Soviet-led administration led to the formation of secular leadership elites in 
Tashkent and Almaty. The Uzbek and Kazakh leaders were brought up in a system in 
which government was strictly non-religious. Neither President Karimov nor 
President Nazarbayev wanted to lead nations that would become religious states. In 
this regard, then, Israel’s objectives coincided with those of the Uzbek and Kazakh 
governments. Although Israel was not much able to influence the specific course of 
the governments’ formation, Israel took advantage of Uzbek and Kazakh inclinations 
and helped ensure that the republics’ secular governments benefited from their 
relationships with Israel.
D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  F u r t h e r  E c o n o m ic  M a r k e t s
At the time of their independence, one of things Israel could immediately offer 
to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was trade and investment. From a starting point of 
zero, Israeli exports to Kazakhstan rose dramatically; likewise for Uzbekistan. Israel 
very quickly institutionalized this aspect of the relationships. During the first phase of 
the relationship with Kazakhstan, Israel signed several trade and investment 
agreements. Signed agreements and protocols came a little later with Uzbekistan, but 
Israel still achieved numerous trade, investment, and customs accords.
In Kazakhstan, Israeli trade rose quickly and then dropped, before climbing 
steadily again. In Uzbekistan, Israeli trade fluctuated as it rose, averaging out over 
the years. In both cases, Israel secured large new markets for Israeli goods and
services in the agricultural, industrial, and technological sectors. Through these 
economic and commercial links, Israel was able to offer Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
access to many more markets in North America, the European Union, and other 
places. Israeli businesses and commercial entities were able to profit from the new 
markets in Central Asia and the republics’ economies were in turn buoyed in the 
process.
E x p a n s io n  o f  A r m s  S a l e s
Israel’s goal of supporting its own domestic military preparedness through the 
sale of second-generation weapons and systems was partially achieved through its 
relationships in Central Asia. Reliable data on such aspects of the relationships are 
notoriously hard to come by; however, this study has shown that Israel engaged in 
security cooperation with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Sales of military equipment, 
amis, and ammunition comprised 3 percent of Israeli trade with Uzbekistan during the 
latter 1990s. Similar assistance had been provided to Kazakhstan. However, in temis 
of overall sales of military materiel, the Central Asian market during the first decade 
of the republics’ independence was significantly smaller than the markets in Africa, 
Latin America, India, or China. These latter markets and not the markets in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan generated income that was reinvested into research and 
development of newer weapons systems by the Israelis.
These markets provided Israel with different opportunities. In Central Asia, 
Israel used security and intelligence cooperation as diplomatic levers. Israel offered 
the republics coordination and cooperation on a number of issues, including counter­
terrorism, Islamist extremism, nuclear smuggling, and Iran. By providing training 
and equipment to these states, Israel was able to acquire valuable insights into the
national defense establishments of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, through 
such cooperation with Tashkent and Almaty, Israel was able to gain valuable insights 
into and information on developments in nations throughout the region, including 
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.
Israeli cooperation with the Central Asian states was not as great as was 
assumed. Because Israel and Uzbekistan were engaged in battles against militant 
Islam, it was presumed that there must be some grand conspiracy between them. This 
was far from the truth. In fact, such presumptions fuelled anti-governmental 
opposition groups and their actions, in turn, actually contributed to the cooperation 
and collaboration that existed between Israel and Uzbekistan during the ten-year 
period examined in this study.
P r o t e c t io n  o f  L o c a l  J e w is h  C o m m u n it ie s
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it was estimated that some 200,000 Jews 
resided in Central Asia. Their security and the safety of local Jewish institutions was 
a serious concern for the Israeli government, although this topic has been examined 
only briefly in this thesis due to space constraints. Israeli concerns on this issues were 
allayed significantly by the fact that there was virtually no history of anti-Semitism in 
Soviet Central Asia. During the first ten years of independence in Central Asia, this 
continued to be the case, unlike in other areas of the former Soviet Union.
The fate of Jewish communities all over the world is a concern for Israel and, 
as related in chapter two, the Diaspora plays an essential part in Israeli national 
security planning. It was vital to Israel that those Soviet Jews who wished to 
immigrate to Israel were allowed to do so. This was not only important in the
promotion of Jewish rights, but it was also essential to Israel’s national security 
because newly arrived Jews added to Israel’s shrinking population.
Israel had very strong ties to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan that no other nation 
had: ties to the Jewish communities that are part of the Diaspora. Although the Uzbek 
and Kazakh communities in Israel played little part in the formulation of Israeli policy 
towards Central Asia, they were a major resource which Israel drew upon. The ability 
of Israelis to communicate in Russian and Uzbek, Tajik, and Kazakh permitted Israel 
to bypass Moscow, the traditional gatekeeper to the region, and instead go directly to 
the area and deal personally with the governments and populace there. Although 
those immigrant communities did not return to invest in their homelands as their 
former compatriots may have wished, a generation of Russian-speaking, Soviet- 
educated engineers and scientists were able to provide unrivalled development 
assistance and technological help to their homelands.
Israeli leaders were always very aware of the effort that the Uzbek and Kazakh 
peoples had made to accommodate Jewish refugees and evacuees during the Second 
World War. When Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan became independent nations, they 
continued to protect their local Jewish communities, and those Jews who wished to 
leave were allowed to do so. It is now estimated that the Jews in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan have remained not because of a lack of resources, but because they 
simply do not wish to leave. The majority of these are believed to be elderly people 
who are too deeply tied to their own countries and are not inclined to emigrate and 
adjust to a new society, culture, and language. As a result, the size of the local Jewish 
communities that would require Israeli assistance in the event of a crisis is small and 
diminishing more every year. The remaining communities are well organized and
have many institutions that are supported by the Israeli state and Jews throughout the 
Diaspora.
THE LIMITATIONS OF ISRAEL’S RELATIONS
In the examination of Israeli strategic policy in Central Asia presented in this 
thesis, it becomes evident that in the ten-year period following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Israeli policy in Central Asia was at its most successful point and by 
mid-2001 Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was at its peak. It 
appeared that Israeli policy had achieved all its objectives in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan and that Israel would continue to reap benefits from these relationships. 
The strong relationships with both Tashkent and Almaty that Israel had constructed 
since 1991 would have continued were it not for two events. The first event was 
creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 14 June 2001; the 
second event was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
The zenith of Israel’s relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan coincided 
with the creation of the SCO. The SCO was created in June 2001 by the addition of 
Uzbekistan to the original Shanghai Five members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In the following years, the SCO increasingly tried to 
create coordinated security and economic policies among its members. Although the 
SCO was not conceived as a political-military bloc, its creation does mark the 
beginning of a more nuanced and mature foreign policy being asserted by the Central 
Asian states.
The second event that presaged the waning of Israel’s relationship with 
Central Asia was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The international political 
dynamics of Central Asia changed dramatically following al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington, DC. The subsequent massive American military 
presence throughout Central Asia reawakened great power interest in the region. In 
the ensuing ‘war on terror’ and the American-led campaign in Afghanistan to 
overthrow the Taliban, the United States negotiated to establish military bases and for 
over-flight rights with several of the republics in Central Asia. Russia began to re­
establish its relationships in the region shortly after, and China increasingly engaged 
the Central Asian states. These three powers soon began to compete for influence 
among the states of the region.
In this dramatically altered environment, Israel was soon overshadowed. 
Moreover, with the regional dynamics so much in flux after September 11th, many of 
the issues on which Israel had engaged the republics quickly became immaterial. 
Israel was no longer needed as the liaison in the republics’ relationship with 
Washington. Uzbekistan, for instance, soon engaged in a direct dialogue with the 
United States on its own.
Israel, as a result of its close relationship with Washington, found its fortunes 
tied to those of the United States. As the US-led global war on terrorism continued, 
the resulting backlash against the United States that occurred throughout the Muslim 
world was directed at American allies as well, especially Israel. As the opposition to 
the military presence and actions in the Muslim world continued to mount, the 
language of protest has increasingly taken on religiously and culturally inspired 
overtones. Islamist extremism has progressively taken hold in the region. This 
development has had a serious effect on Israel’s policies and will continue to 
complicate its relationships in Central Asia.
LOOKING FORWARD
This thesis has sought to explain in detail some aspects of Israel’s foreign 
policy by examining a specific segment of the international politics of Central Asia 
during the first ten years after the fall of the Soviet Union. This study cannot address 
the future of the region; such a topic would be the subject of an entire thesis in itself. 
Beginning in 1991, Israel created solid relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
that allowed Israel to achieve all its policy goals by the end of the decade examined in 
this thesis. In the period following the first decade, however, those relationships 
would change as a result of new factors and circumstances beyond the control of 
Israel, Tashkent, or Almaty. Although mutually beneficial relations existed from 
1991-2001, the relationships turned out to be insufficiently mature and deep to 
weather the challenges brought by the new international and regional environment in 
the years that followed.
Based on how the relationships evolved over the first ten years, we can 
identify several factors which will have an impact on the future of these relationships. 
Looking forward, Israeli policy in the region must contend with many more factors, 
including the global war on terrorism, the US-led military presence in the region, 
threats from and developments in Afghanistan and Iraq, a looming confrontation with 
Iran, and a greater regional role played by Russia and China. Moreover, the Central 
Asian states are no longer novices in international relations; both Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan have developed their own independent and assertive foreign policies. 
Other factors, such as the pace of the peace process, the level of tensions within 
Israel’s immediate neighborhood, the stability of Israel’s neighbors, and national 
elections in Israel, Central Asia, Iran, and the United States, will have an impact on 
Israeli strategic policy in Central Asia.
Israel’s future relationships with Tashkent and Almaty will also be affected by 
the fact that the leadership elites in both republics are aging. Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan have been led by the same men since the Soviet era. During the time 
period explored in this thesis, Israel dealt primarily with the most senior leadership in 
each republic. When that generation is gone, Israel will have to have its relationships 
with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan based on more than just personality politics. 
Whether these relationships will last will depend on what kind of governments follow 
the Karimov and Nazarbayev administrations. The possibility of a change in the type 
of regime must be considered. In this case, the Iranian case may prove instructive. 
As a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, virtually overnight, Israel’s closest ally in 
the region transformed into its most persistent adversary.
Another dynamic that will affect Israeli policy in the region is Israel’s 
assessment of its national security as assured by its great power patron. Currently, 
Israel’s relationship with the United states is a major component of Israeli national 
security policy. The extent to which Israel feels that its national security is well- 
protected in the future will have an effect on Israel’s relationships with other nations, 
particularly those in the Muslim world. If Israel is forced to take an even more 
proactive approach to the international community, this will influence the ways in 
which Israel interacts with Tashkent and Almaty.
A final factor to consider when contemplating the future of the Israel’s 
relationships in Central Asia is anti-Semitism. Although the region has virtually no 
history of anti-Semitism, it cannot be assumed that this absence of animosity will 
continue indefinitely. Anti-Semitism could result from any number of causes in 
Central Asia, including frustration and dissatisfaction with the ruling orders, anger at 
perceived injustices in the Muslim world, and increasing intercommunal strife. Were
anti-Semitism to develop in either Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, it would severely affect 
Israel’s ability to pursue its policy objectives in these republics. Since 2001, Islamist 
extremism has risen in other areas of Central Asia and will complicate Israeli actions 
in the region in the future.
ISRAEL’S RELATIONSHIPS WITH NON-ARAB MUSLIM STATES
One of the central elements discussed in this thesis has been Israel’s 
relationship with non-Arab Muslim states. The conclusion of this study raises the 
question of what does Israel’s relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan tell us 
about the possibilities of relationships with other non-Arab Muslim states? Are the 
lessons observed from these relationships applicable elsewhere?
The dynamics of Israel’s relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are for 
the most part the result of factors specific to the formation of these republics as 
independent nation-states. The experiences of Sovietization, Russofication, and 
secularization had dramatic impacts on Central Asia. Islam was not proscribed during 
the Soviet era but was co-opted by the state as a method to maintain control and 
prevent the development of alternative systems of rule. The Islam that was practiced 
in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was secularized, culturally specific, and based upon a 
loose understanding of the religion’s basic tenets. The Soviet education and 
patronage systems enforced the usage of the Russian language, and local languages 
were rewritten in the Cyrillic script because of Soviet language policies. Furthermore, 
during the Soviet period, there was relatively little contact with the larger Muslim 
world, pilgrimage opportunities were limited, and Islamic literature from abroad was 
restricted. As a result, the Islam that developed in Soviet Central Asia was unique to
the region. Israel had never interacted with Muslim societies such as those in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
When they became independent, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan had had no 
experience in independent self-government. Their economies were in a dire state and 
in need of major capital investment. Israel was able to offer things the new republics 
needed immediately, and its successes were furthered by three distinctive advantages: 
a large Russian-speaking population, a sizable immigrant community from the former 
Soviet Union, and the substantial Jewish community in Central Asia when the Soviet 
Union fell. Israel was able to offer the new republics trade, investment, development 
assistance, and access to the West. In exchange Israel was able to affect Uzbek and 
Kazakh foreign policies to align them more closely with its own.
However, it must be noted that the positions adopted by Tashkent and Almaty 
were not taken solely as a result of the relationship with Israel. The issues which 
mattered most to Israel— the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Islamist extremism, and 
Iran’s quest for regional influence— intersected with Uzbek and Kazakh concerns. 
Both the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs were worried about the rise of militant Islam and 
Iranian interference. On the issue of Palestine, adopting a neutral position was 
beneficial to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan because it furthered their interests in the 
West and did not complicate relations with either the Arab or Muslim worlds. For the 
republics, positive relations with Israel demonstrated a strong pro-Western 
orientation, and they used their relationships with Israel to advance their own specific 
national agendas. In sum, the conditions that existed at the republics’ independence 
were unique and in large part contributed to Israel’s successes in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan.
Although not explored in this thesis, Israel’s relationships with the 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are largely similar but are significantly less 
developed. Israel is a small state with limited resources and chose to direct the use of 
these resources at the two most critical states for Israel in Central Asia. In the future, 
Israel will likely try to build stronger relationships with these other republics, 
especially Turkmenistan; it is possible that Tajikistan would also receive increased 
attention as Israel continues to jockey with Iran in the region. These relationships 
would probably not come about at the expense of relations with either Tashkent or 
Almaty, but rather in coordination with Israeli policy in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
These are not certainties; however, based on the trends evident in Israel’s 
relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan over the first ten years of their 
independence, they are possibilities.
It is uncertain whether Israel could replicate its successes in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan in other regions’ non-Arab Muslim nations, except perhaps in Azerbaijan. 
Although these three were shaped by their common Soviet experience, a number of 
other factors have had an impact on independent Azerbaijan’s development. The 
Caucasus region is historically and culturally very different from Central Asia; while 
there may be commonalities between Israel’s relationship with Azerbaijan and Israel’s 
relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, they are insufficient to make a 
significant comparison.
One must conclude, therefore, that the methods and tactics employed by Israel 
in building its relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could not be applied 
elsewhere with equal success. Other non-Arab Muslim countries have developed 
under dramatically different circumstances, and the role of Islam in society varies 
widely throughout the Muslim world. The experiences of post-colonialism, struggles
for national independence, and issues of industrialization, nationalism, and the 
developmental status of civil society all contribute to form miique national identities 
and situations. Far from being a model of relationship development that can be 
applied anywhere in the Muslim world, the implementation of Israeli policies that led 
to its mutually beneficial relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were specific 
to the circumstances at that time and in those places.
Israel’s relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2001 were 
very successful in advancing Israel’s traditional foreign policy objectives. Because of 
concerns that the fall of the Soviet Union would compromise its national security, 
Israel, through a policy of constructive engagement, created strong relationships with 
Tashkent and Almaty. As a result o f their successfulness, Israeli fears were assuaged 
and Israel was able to gain two Muslim allies who supported its policies. This, in 
turn, permitted Israel to act with greater latitude and worked to combat Israel’s anti- 
Muslim image. Israel effectively furthered its own goals without much notice from 
the outside world. As the region’s geopolitical importance continues to increase, so 
too does the need to fully understand the motivations, intentions, and desires of all the 
region’s past and present players.
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This Appendix looks at the rise of Israeli-Turkish relations. It is included for several 
reasons: first, because it occurred at the same time as the period covered in this thesis. 
Second, because Turkey is a non-Arab Muslim state, Israeli-Turkish relations mirror 
in many ways the manner in which Israel approached the Central Asian republics. 
Third, the two states focused upon Central Asia in order to expand their areas of 
influence and to confront mutually identified threats. Moreover, Turkey and Israel 
worked with the United States in order to advance the interests of all three countries. 
The final reason for including of this topic is due to the fact that because some of 
Israel’s interactions with the region involved either joint Israeli-Turkish or Israeli- 
Turkish-American programs and projects, failure to briefly examine this area would 
result in an incomplete study of the subject at hand.
The development in the 1990s of expanding strategic relations between Israel 
and Turkey has been termed one of the most significant events to take place in the 
Middle East during the twentieth century. Turkey and Israel have formed a mutually 
beneficial strategic relationship (initially secret though subject to countless criticisms) 
that actively advances the national interests and foreign policy objectives of both 
nations.
A full and detailed analysis of Israeli-Turkish relations and its impact on the 
region is much beyond the scope of this appendix. Indeed, many books have already 
been written on the subject despite the relatively recent development of the expanded 
ties between the two countries. This appendix will instead focus on the role of the 
Turkish alliance in Israel’s policies towards Central Asia. Rail’s relationship with 
Ankara is of particular relevance to Israel’s interaction with the states of Central Asia 
because of Turkey’s special identity as a non-Arab Muslim state. This Turkic identity 
was initially perceived in Israel—and elsewhere— as a useful factor in establishing 
relations with the Central Asian republics.800 Furthermore, because Turkey was the 
first non-Arab Muslim state to have diplomatic relations with Israel, it is worthwhile 
to examine their relationship: echoes of Israel’s relationship with Turkey can be seen 
in Israel’s relationships with the Central Asian republics.
The origins and manifestations of the Israeli-Turkish alliance will be explored 
insofar as they illuminate Ran’s policies regarding the states of the former Soviet
800 It is important to note that Tajikistan is not a ‘Turkic’ state.
South. This appendix will provide an introductory overview and analysis of the 
relationship between the two states and their cooperation in Eurasia in order to 
provide a background and understanding of Israeli policy in Central Asia. Because 
both Israel and Turkey are significant allies of the United States, the role of Central 
Asia within the framework of the Israel-Turkey-United States strategic relationship 
will also be examined. It is hoped that through a more nuanced understanding of the 
ties between Israel and Turkey, Israeli involvement with the states of the former 
Soviet Union will become more lucid.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The relationship between Israel and Turkey has received much attention in 
past ten years since cooperation between them has rapidly expanded. Although there 
are a large number of books and articles that examine the nature of the relationship, 
relatively few explore the historical ties that have existed between Turks and Jews as 
well as between the Republic of Turkey and the State of Israel.801 While a thorough 
exploration of these historic ties is outside the purview of this section, several points 
are worthy of mention because of their impact on the current relationship.
In it ia l  H e s it a t io n s
When the State of Israel was first created, Turkish leaders were initially 
hesitant to extend official recognition to the Jewish state. In fact, Turkey voted 
against United Nations General Assembly Resolution 106 to create the UN Special
801 For an excellent discussion of the historic background to the lsraeli-Turkish relationship, see Amikam 
Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean (London, 1987), 
or £agri Erhan, Turkish-Israeli Relations in a Historical Perspective (London, 2003).
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and they also voted against the UN partition plan 
for Palestine.802
Ankara’s initial apparent backing of Arab and Muslim positions vis-a-vis 
Palestine should not be overstated; nor should it be misconstrued as expressing any 
sort of co-religionist sympathy for the Arab position on the future of Palestine. 
Contemporaneous Turkish politics on issues relating to the Middle East were 
influenced by many other factors, and viewing the Turkish voting record at the United 
Nations solely through the prism of Muslim solidarity would distort the historical 
record. Factors influencing Turkish foreign policy implementation at the time 
included Turkey’s desire to develop closer ties to the West generally and United 
States specifically; Ankara’s objections to the spread of Soviet and Communist 
influence in the region; suspicions of the emerging Jewish leadership’s ideological 
positions as being of a socialist bent; and an intention to prevent the outbreak of open 
hostilities in the Middle East.803
A n k a r a ’s F e a r s  o f  ‘I s r a e l i s o c ia l is m ’
Turkish fears of Communist infiltration in the region and suspicions of the 
emerging Jewish leadership’s ideological positions were based upon many issues. 
These included the new Israeli state’s collective farms (kibbutzim), communal 
cooperative villages (moshavim), collaborative factories, and the power of labor 
unions in domestic Israeli politics.804 Israel’s participation in international forums 
such as International Socialist conferences and meetings of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions further added to suspicions that Israel’s
802 Erhan, Turkish-Israeli Relations, pp. 10-11.
803 Erhan, Turkish-Israeli Relations, p. 12.
804 Erhan, Turkish-Israeli Relations, p. 12.
leadership may be sympathetically inclined to support Moscow’s agenda. Yet these 
Israeli connections would aid the Turkish government several decades later.
In 1995, Turkey’s customs union agreement with the EU was ratified by the 
European Parliament after Israeli diplomats lobbied successfully 011 behalf of 
Ankara.805 (This deliberate strategy of Israeli intervention on behalf of the ‘client 
states’ with which it seeks to gain favor has also happened in the case of 
Turkmenistan, where the Merhav Group has lobbied on behalf of Ashgabat in 
Washington, DC.) Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres— drawing on his contacts 
through the Socialist International-—personally telephoned several European leftist 
leaders in Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom.806 Peres was able to 
successfully lobby Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, German socialist leader 
Rudolf Scharping, and British Labor politician Tony Blair to support Turkey’s bid to 
move towards integration with Western Europe. As a show of gratitude, then-Turkish 
Prime Minister Tansu (filler “publicly thanked Israel for its efforts and sent Peres a 
personal note of gratitude.”807 As this episode illustrates, not only were Turkish 
suspicions of Israeli ideology unfounded, but Israel’s apparent left-leaning policies 
proved very useful to Ankara in achieving its foreign policy objectives.
Other Israeli government programs such as the Gctdna {Gedudei Noar, “Israeli 
youth corps run by Ministry of Defense for pre-military training of teenagers”808) and 
Nahal (N o’cir Halutz Lohem , “Fighting Pioneer Youth, part of the IDF which
805 Alan Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish ‘Periphery Strategy’?” in Reluctant Neighbor:
Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 154.
806 Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations,” p. 154.
807 Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations,” p. 154. Makovsky on p. 239, n. 10 that Israel “did not
publicize Peres’ efforts on Turkey’s behalf.” The Israelis kept this secret, and it was not revealed 
until an MEP complained about the international lobbying and cited Peres’ telephone calls as proof.
808 The Jewish Agency for Israel, Department for Jewish Zionist Education, Zionist Glossary, s.v.
“Gadna,” http://www.jali.org.i1/education/100/gloss/index.html#k.
combines agricultural work and military service”809) added to Turkish suspicions. 
These programs further fueled Turkish misgivings that the emerging Israeli leadership 
was supporting suspect ideological positions and implementing national programs 
reminiscent of a “people’s republic.”810
Interestingly, while the export of the Gadna and Nahal programs to Africa 
were not very successful,811 in part for several of the same reasons that Turkey had for 
viewing the programs with suspicion, these programs may actually have been 
attractive to the peoples of the former Soviet Union. Those reasons that caused the 
Gadna and Nahal to fail in Africa could very well have been selling points among 
Central Asians. The apparent paramilitary-collectivist patina of the Gadna and Nahal, 
including the “long-range social and agrarian transformation”812 that these programs 
sought to initiate, may have been appealing to Central Asians in large part because of 
their experiences as part of the Soviet Union.813 While in fact these Israeli programs 
may have little in common with the Soviet-era Comsomol program, some superficial 
similarities can be discerned between the two.814
S h a r e d  E x p e r ie n c e s : Im p o r t a n c e  O f  P e r s o n a l  A n d  C u l t u r a l  
C o n n e c t io n s
Another very important factor that should not be overlooked when considering 
the development of the relationship between the State of Israel and the Republic of 
Turkey are the deep cultural and personal connections that existed between the two
809 The Jewish Agency for Israel, Department for Jewish Zionist Education, Zionist Glossary, s.v.
“Nahal,” http://www.jafl.org.i1/education/100/gloss/index.html#k.
810 Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, p. 44.
811 Joel Peters, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship (London, 1992), pp. 6-7, 9-10.
812 Peters, Israel and A frica, p. 10.
813 This is based in part on conversations with a former Israeli military intelligence officer, March 2004,
London.
814 This is based in part on conversations with a former Israeli military intelligence officer, March 2004,
London.
countries. These connections defy a systematic categorization yet helped cement the 
relationship between the two states. The fact that “a number of Israeli leaders, such as 
President Yitzhak Ben Zvi, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett, had received their education in Ottoman Turkey, had 
mastered the Turkish language, and were familiar with Turkish traditions”815 is very 
important. This allowed Israeli and Turkish leaders not only to communicate in a 
common language but also to speak the same political and cultural language. Being 
socialized, educated, and brought up in very similar contexts and sharing the same 
experiences allowed Israelis and Turks— Jews and Muslims— to narrow the apparent 
gaps that existed between the two peoples. This shared background not only 
highlighted their similarities but it also worked to reduce their differences. As a 
result, the two leadership elites were able to accomplish much more than two peoples, 
of two different religions, speaking two different languages, coming from two 
different common histories could ever have ever dreamed of accomplishing.
This factor’s role in the development of the relationship between Israel and 
Turkey underscores the significance of leadership influence, interpersonal 
connections, and cultural ties. Just as it helped establish ties between Israel and 
Turkey, the same factor also helps when it came to Israel’s relationship with the 
Muslim states of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia. Israel’s large Russian- 
speaking population,816 composed of many leading Soviet exiles and refuseniks,817 
and large numbers of Jewish emigres from the former Soviet Union, gave Israel a
815 Erhan, Turkish-Israeli Relations, p 18. See also Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, p. 58.
816 Israel has the largest Russian-speaking population in the world outside of Russia itself.
817 ‘Refusnik5 should not to be confused with the current understanding of the word, taken to mean a
member of the IDF— usually a reservist—who refuses to participate in military operations in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.
distinct advantage when it came to developing relationships with the Central Asian 
states.818
This firsthand knowledge of the native languages plus cultural fluency 
allowed Israeli diplomats and businessmen to travel directly to the region and bypass 
Moscow and Russian mediation altogether. Their ability to communicate in Russian, 
Uzbek, and Tajik greatly facilitated the advancement of Israel’s policies in the region. 
An excellent example of this can be seen in the successful visit of Israel’s last 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, and first diplomat to the successor states, Aryeh 
Levin.819 Levin, the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow at the time of the fall of the 
Soviet Union, remembered the Persian he learned as a child and was thus able to 
communicate directly with Tajik speakers while he was in Central Asia.820
THE ‘PHANTOM ALLIANCE’
To date the Israeli-Turkish entente “has reached an unprecedented degree of 
closeness... [and] has become an important element in the politics of the Middle East 
and eastern Mediterranean areas.”821 Israel and Turkey have found many ways to 
cooperate since the establishment of their renewed relationship. Primary 
collaboration has come in the form of joint military training and cooperation, strategic 
dialogues, intelligence and security cooperation and coordination, officer exchanges, 
and military sales and upgrades.822 Such collaborations have also characterized
818 See Hiro, “Uzbekistan.”
819 Levin, Envoy to Moscow ,
820 In his memoirs, Envoy to Moscow, Levin recounts his childhood and recalls that while on his first
official visit to independent Tajikistan as Israel’s highest accredited diplomat to Dushanbe, he spoke 
in Persian on Tajik national television. This interview led to a serious rift between the Tajik and 
Iranian governments.
821 Efraim Inbar, “Regional Implications of the Israeli Turkish Strategic Partnership,” Middle East
Review o f  International Affairs 5, no. 2 (summer 2001): p. 48.
822 Brent Sasley, “Burgeoning Military Co-operation Between Turkey and Israel: Together in Otherness”
(paper presented at First Annual Graduate Symposium, Conference of Defence Associations
Israel’s relationships with the Central Asian republics, at least in part.823 Strategies 
and tactical methods focused largely on security issues that were first tested and 
employed in Israel’s dealings with Ankara have been used as a template for dealing 
with non-Arab, Muslim Central Asia, as shall be demonstrated in later chapters of this 
thesis.
Israel’s ‘Phantom Alliance’ with Turkey has often been the subject of much 
commentary; a complete analysis of this relationship is deserving of a separate thesis 
devoted solely to that subject. Muslim writers and commentators have leveled 
criticism at their co-religionists in Turkey for engaging Israel while it is still 
occupying Palestinian territory. Israel and Ankara have nonetheless made much 
progress in their relationship since rumors about it first began to emerge in 1997.
For all of their apparent differences, Israel and Turkey have much in common. 
This fact has been termed a “‘common sense of otherness’ in a region dominated by 
Arabs and non-democratic regimes.”824 Being located in a region predominantly 
perceived as Arab, Israel and Turkey have both been excluded at times for being non- 
Arab nations. “Both states are pro-West and pro-US, are committed to democratic 
and secular values, have similar views toward terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, 
and are militarily based on US-made equipment.”825 Although Turkey is 
predominantly Muslim, it is considered to be an only nominally Muslim country; 
politics and religion are two very separate notions in modem Turkey as a result of 
Kemal Atatiirk’s massive modernization of the state in the early twentieth century. 
After 70 years of Soviet-forced secularization and imposed atheism, the Central Asian
Institute, 13-14 November 1998), http://cda-cdai.ca/symposia/1998/98sasley.htm (accessed 18 
October 2003).
823 Christopher Boucek, “The Impact of Israeli Foreign Policy in Central Asia: The Case of Uzbekistan,”
Central Asia & the Caucasus 4 no. 28 (2004): pp. 70-81.
824 Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations,” p. 169.
825 Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations,” p. 169.
republics can also be considered only nominally Muslim states,826 where, until very 
recently, politics and religion were kept separate.827
Both Israel and Turkey are powerful, secular nations that perceive themselves 
as being Western, not Eastern. It is significant that Israel and Turkey are 
Washington’s greatest political and military allies in the greater Middle East. Turkey, 
as the only Muslim member of NATO, occupies a special place in American military 
and security planning. Formerly charged with safeguarding the highly strategic 
Bosporus and Dardanelles shipping routes and protecting NATO’s southern flank, 
Turkey remains a significant partner to the United States. During Operations 
Northern Watch over Iraqi Kurdistan (the enforcement of the northern No-Fly Zone) 
and Provide Comfort (delivering assistance to displaced Iraqi Kurds following the end 
of the 1991 Gulf War) Turkey proved invaluable as host to US and coalition forces. 
Turkey has also played an important role in providing Muslim peacekeepers for some 
of the world’s recent conflicts, doing so most often under the auspices of the United 
Nations. Turkish peacekeeping operations have involved major roles in the Korean 
War (1950-1953) and Operation Enduring Freedom (post-Taliban Afghanistan).828 
Turkey has also played a significant part in the UN missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and 
Bosnia (UNIPTF, 1996-2002, and again in 2003);829 Somalia (UNOSOM-II, 1993 to 
1994); Albania; Georgia (UNOMIG); East Timor (UNMISET); Sierra Leone
826 This opinion was related in conversations the author held with a very senior and experienced Saudi
diplomat who argued that the Central Asian stales are not Muslim, and their peoples do not 
understand Islam, do not understand Arabic, and do not even know how to pray properly, 
(discussions held in Washington, DC, during the summer of 2001).
827 There has been a Muslim political resurgence in several Central Asian states, partially because
religious organizations have been the only avenue open to political dissidents and opponents.
828 Interestingly, Ankara’s involvement in Afghanistan predated the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban; it
started when Turkey actively supported the Northern Alliance of Ahmed Shah Massoud. Turkey 
assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in June 2002. Turkey, at 
the time, was the sole Muslim participant in ISAF. For further information, see the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions and Answers, http://www.cfr.org.
829 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Warms up for Peacekeeping, Military Training Missions in Afghanistan,”
Associated Press, 18 October 2001.
(UNAMSIL); Liberia (UNMIL, 2003); Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI); Democratic Republic 
of Congo (MONUC); Haiti (MINUSTAH); and Burundi (ONUB).830 In fact, in 1997 
Turkey created a special dedicated peacekeeping battalion capable of responding 
instantly to requests from the UN Secretariat.831 The Turkish parliament authorized 
the deployment of soldiers and peacekeepers to post-war Iraq following the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein, but this measure met with significant opposition from the Turkish 
people; this has not, however, prevented elite Turkish Special Forces units from 
operating in northern Iraqi Kurdistan,832
Israel and the United States enjoy one of the closest relationships today. Israel 
is the largest receiver of American aid dollars and also a major recipient of US 
military technology and hardware. Israel has been designated a “major non-NATO 
ally” by the United States, enabling Washington to deal extensively with Israel on a 
number of military and security issues. Israel and Turkey are also of the same mind 
when it comes to terrorism. Israel has been relentless in its attempts to eliminate 
Palestinian violence, just as their Turkish counterparts have fought a long civil 
conflict against Kurdish separatists.
The relationship between the State of Israel and Turkey has often been labeled 
the “phantom alliance” by many observers due to the stealthy manner in which the 
two countries developed their ties. The relationship, in many ways, presages the 
relationships Israel has created and nurtured with the Central Asian republics.
830 For more information about UN-sanctioned Turkish peacekeeping operations, see 
http://www.un.in t/turkey/turkey-un.htm#g.
831 For further information, see http://www.un.int/turkey/turkey-un.htm#g.
832 Hacaoglu, “Turkey Warms up.” Also see Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, “Plan B,” 21 June 2004,
and Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, “Offense and Defense,” 7 April 2003.
THE ISRAELI-TURKISH ALLIANCE
The strategic relationship between Israel and Ankara can best be understood 
as a tactical decision made by the leadership of each country in order to advance 
mutually beneficial goals. For both Israeli and Turkish decision makers, the expanded 
relationship represents a natural manifestation of national interests and foreign policy 
goals. Israel seeks additional like-minded allies with which to align itself, while 
Turkey aims to increase its geopolitical reach. Each country views the other as a 
means by which they can achieve their respective goals.
M il it a r y  T ies
Both Israel and Turkey have benefited from joint military operations and 
training exercises,833 and nations employ large quantities of American-made military 
hardware. Turkey offers Israel the strategic depth from which it may to strike at 
targets far from Israel such as northern Syria, Iraq, and even Iran. Israel has also 
signed a $668 million contract “to modernize Turkey’s ageing fleet of American- 
made tanks.”834 Other deals have been concluded for upgrades to Turkish F-4 
warplanes, a deal which has included the controversial transfer of sensitive 
technologies.835
It is also believed that Israel aided Turkish authorities in the capture of the 
PKK’s (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Workers Party) Abdullah Ocalan 
in Kenya in 1999, and it has been reported that Israel had assisted Turkish security 
elements prepare an assassination attempt in 1994 on Ocalan that never came to
833 For example, see Marjorie Miller, “Naval Drill Points to New Mideast Ties,” The Los Angeles Times,
8 January 1998.
834 Louis Meixler, “Turkey Likely to Stay Israeli Friend,” Associated Press, 29 April 2002. See also
“Turkey completes M-60 tank deal with Israel,” Middle East News Line, 11 March 2002.
835 Meixler, “Turkey Likely to Stay.”
fruition. 836 Further intelligence cooperation has come through the “exchange of 
military intelligence” 837 and the creation on Turkish soil of an Israeli “listening post to 
monitor activities in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. ” 838
It should also be noted that Turkey has provided military assistance to Central 
Asia. Military exchanges with Kazakhstan have taken place, and “since 1998, Turkey 
has provided $2.9 million in military aid to Kazakhstan.” Turkish plans for continued 
assistance included training, construction of military facilities, and a planned upgrade 
for “a military base in the Almaty region.” Turkey has also been encouraged by the 
United States to supply “military aid to ... Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. ” 839
ISRAEL AND TURKEY IN CENTRAL ASIA
As previously mentioned, the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of five 
new independent republics in Central Asia caught much of the world off guard. It 
was as much of a surprise to the governments in Israel and Ankara as it was to leaders 
in Washington and London, much less in Tashkent, Dushanbe, and Almaty. The fact 
that Central Asia was an unknown quantity located at the nexus of numerous security 
concerns presented many opportunities to national security planners and policy 
makers in the West, especially in Israel and Turkey.
Turkey shared the American and Israeli perception of an Iranian threat to 
Central Asian security . 840 In all three countries, the possibility that Iran could expand 
its influence was viewed as anathema to their respective governments’ national
836 Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Turkey-U.S.-Israel Triangle: Continuity, Change and Implications for
Turkey’s Post-Cold War Middle East Policy,” Journal o f  South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 
XXII, no. 4 (summer 1999): p. 15, citing Milliyet, 21 January 1998, andM illiyet, 22 January 1998.
837 Miller, “Naval Drill Points.”
838 Miller, “Naval Drill Points.”
839 “Turkey provides military aid to C. Asia,” Middle East News Line, 18 March 2002.
840 “Israel/Turkey— Strategic Ties,” In Perspective, Oxford Analytica Weekly Column, 2 August 2001,
http://www.oxan.com/columns/wkcol_02082001.html (accessed 22 March 2004).
security. If Teheran was given free reign in Central Asia, the security of the State of 
Israel would suffer, as would American and Turkish national interests: “It is obvious 
that the dynamics of the post-Soviet era in the Middle East have drawn Israel, Turkey, 
and the United States under the same interest umbrella. ” 841 The fact that Kazakhstan 
was now an independent republic with nuclear capability certainly raised additional 
concerns throughout Israel’s foreign policy community, as it did in Ankara and 
Washington.
Because of these threats, Israel sought to ensure that Iranian influence would 
not take hold in the region. Israel’s strategic relationship with Turkey thus came into 
play as a means for Israel to engage the ‘Muslim’ republics of Central Asia; Ankara
“is a natural ally in Israel’s struggle against Iran. ” 842 As Neill Lochery writes, Turkey
was “viewed by Israel as the gateway to the newly formed Central Asian republics, 
and more specifically to helping Israel develop political and economic ties with these 
countries. ” 843
For the State of Israel, the relationship with Turkey offered several major 
benefits, most notably in the military, security and intelligence fields as outlined 
above. Yet Ankara’s ethno-linguistic and cultural ties with the Turkic peoples of 
Central Asia were also of great importance to Israeli leaders. At the time, the 
perception that this would facilitate “easier access to the new Central Asian republics, 
particularly economic markets for high tech and agricultural equipment” 844 was very 
significant. Sometimes overshadowed by the other aspects of the burgeoning Israeli- 
Turkish entente, it was held at the time that Turkey’s ethno-linguistic and cultural
841 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 71.
842 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 71.
843 Neill Lochery, “Israel and Turkey: Deepening Ties and Strategic Implications, 1995-98,” Israel
Affairs 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1998): p. 45.
844 Lochery, “Israel and Turkey,” p. 46.
affinities would translate into an advantageous geopolitical posture for Israel within 
the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union . 845 In reality, however, “the emerging 
relationships between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics are 
complex and uneven . ” 846 Moreover, “the relative strengths of these republics in 
comparison to Turkey are being accentuated, as is the desire of these new states to 
establish direct links with the West, rather than indirectly via Ankara. Impatience is 
being expressed at the slow rate of progress in the forging of close ties between 
Turkey and the republics. Some commentators are beginning to suggest that it was all 
an empty sham, that Turkey is too weak to have more than a marginal impact on these 
republics.” 847 The virtues of pan-Turkism and assertions that Central Asia would 
quickly fall under the influence of Ankara appeared to be greatly exaggerated. 848
As early as 1992, Israeli leaders were seeking to portray Israel’s— and 
Turkey’s— importance vis-a-vis Central Asia to political leaders in Washington. This 
led Israel to encourage the United States “to adopt a policy of confrontation with Iran 
in the scuffle for influence in Central Asia and to pursue that policy through Turkey 
and Israel.” 849 At the end of the Cold War, Israel and Turkey felt there was a very 
real fear and possibility that the strategic importance to Washington of having Israel 
and Turkey as allies would decrease. Israel no longer needed to serve as a bulwark 
against Communist influence in the Middle East. Similarly, Turkey was no longer 
needed to guard NATO’s southern flank from a possible Warsaw Pact offensive. For
845 For further information on this understanding, see Ed Blanche, “Israel and Turkey look to extend their
influence into Central Asia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , August 2001, pp. 35-35, and Daniel P. 
Klass, “Turkey’s Ties: Increasing Confidence and Regional Influence,” Middle East Insight, July- 
August 2000, pp. 58-60, 62.
846 Philip Robins, “Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey’s Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the
Central Asian States,” Middle East Journal 47, no. 4 (autumn 1993): p. 609.
847 Robins, “Between Sentiment and Self-Interest,” pp. 593-595.
848 For more on this subject, see Idris Bal, Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics:
The rise and fall o f  the ‘Turkish M odel' (Aldershot, 2000).
849 “US funds Israeli programs in Central Asia,” Israeli foreign affairs VIII, no. 7 (25 August 1992), p. 4.
Israel and Turkey— the first and third largest recipients of US aid money and 
assistance respectively— there was also a very serious likelihood that Washington 
would scale back it foreign aid spending after the fall of the Soviet Union to 
complement the widely expected drawdown in US military spending.
Thus it was a very real priority for these states to maintain their strategic 
importance to the United States. In 1992, the Journal o f Palestine Studies wrote that 
“with Turkey, which like Israel appears to have lost its strategic value to the West as a 
result of the end of the cold war, trying to sell itself as a new pro-American pillar 
against Islamic fundamentalism, the idea of an Israeli-Turkish alliance has been 
integrated into Israeli post-cold war strategy vis-a-vis Washington. ” 850
M u t u a l  In t e r e s t s  a n d  J o in t  V e n t u r e s
As noted above, the collapse of Moscow’s control of the republics of Central 
Asia created new opportunities for both Israel and Ankara. In addition to preventing 
the spread of Iranian influence and Islamic fundamentalism, the opportunity presented 
by the creation of independent states in the region offered very appealing entrees for 
Israel and Turkey to expand their respective areas of influence.
For Israel and Turkey, the newly independent Muslim states of Central Asia 
posed the possibility of not only creating an economic hinterland, but also giving 
them ‘strategic depth’ with which to counterbalance respective geopolitical 
difficulties that both nations were experiencing at the time. Muslim Eurasia 
represented an opportunity for Israel to expand the number of non-Arab Muslim 
nations with which it deals in order to offset the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, 
active involvement in Central Asia gave Turkish leaders the ability to attempt to
850 Leon T. Hadar, “The Last Days of Likud: The American-Israeli Big Chill,” Journal o f  Palestine 
Studies 21, no. 4 (summer 1992): p. 88 .
establish greater influence for itself despite its EU membership dilemma: because it 
was frustrated at not being accepted as an equal member in Europe, conventional 
wisdom at the time held that Ankara could increase its clout by serving as the gateway 
for Western economic and political influence in Central Asia.
Israel and Turkey were active in pursuing collaborative projects in the region 
from the outset: “the cooperation... with respect to the new republics has been limited 
to setting up barriers to the spread of fundamentalism, making joint investments in 
agriculture and related sectors, and mutually contributing to the construction of some
* * * * * 85ltraining facilities.” The Israeli academic Amikam Nachmani has commented that 
the “joint venture the two countries have initiated in Central Asia, in commercial 
fields (as in production and delivery of energy, development of water sources, 
development of all kinds of terra incognita, etc.)—all have deeper implications. ” 852
In June 1994, Israeli Minister of Economics and Planning Shimon Shitrit 
traveled to Turkey with a delegation of Israeli businessmen. More than 70 Israeli 
businessmen accompanied Shitrit to explore investment opportunities in Turkey. 
During their visit, Shitrit*s Turkish counterpart, Minister of Economy Aykon Dogon, 
told reporters that Israel and Turkey were “discussing possible joint ventures in the 
Central Asian republics. ” 853 This dialogue was continued at the head-of-state level 18 
months later when Turkish Premier (filler returned the visit.
When Prime Minister (filler visited Israel in November 1994, one of the 
primary subjects of her visit was “investment in the Central Asian states.” This 
followed up on Dogon’s dialogue with Shitrit. Moscow Radio reported at the time 
that Israel and Turkey sought to “make joint investments in the former Soviet
851 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 71.
852 Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie,” Middle East Quarterly V, no. 2, June
1998, http://www.meforum.org/article/394 (accessed 14 October 2003).
853 George E. Gruen, “Dynamic Progress in Turkish-Israeli Relations,” Israel Affairs 1, no. 4 (summer
1995): p. 56.
republics ranging from agriculture to environmental protection” and that “these 
projects promise much to all sides.” This official dialogue was continued at the 
private sector level in December 1996 when representatives from 30 Israeli and 100 
Turkish businesses met to discuss joint ventures and projects in Central Asia. 854
The Iranian Foreign Ministry noted Israeli-Turkish joint ventures in Central 
Asia. According to the Foreign Ministry’s Iranian Journal o f  Central Asian Studies, 
“the cooperation of Turkey’s Gama firm with Turkmenistan as regards oil involves 
Israel” and goes on to quote an unidentified Israeli diplomat in Turkey as stating that 
“Israel seeks to invest in Central Asia and the Caucasus and thus form an alliance 
with Turkey and hence greater access to the markets of the Newly Independent 
States.” 855
The initial Israeli-Turkish cooperation in Central Asia has been augmented by 
the active involvement of the United States, and Washington has sought to support its 
two key Middle Eastern allies as they became involved in the states of the former 
Soviet Union. As early as August 1992, the United States and Israel were cooperating 
in Central Asia. As part of this cooperation, Washington and Israel “introduced a 
joint project” 856 in the region, “with the United States putting up the required 
financing and Israel providing technology transfer and expertise. ” 857 An Israeli 
foreign minister official termed the US-Israeli “joint aid program in the former Soviet 
Central Asian republics a ‘breakthrough’ and an ‘achievement of international 
dimensions. ’ ” 858 This deal was for the funding of Israeli agricultural and public 
health programs in all five republics and was concluded after several days of
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negotiation between Prime Minister Peres and Richard Annitage, who was then the 
US coordinator for aid programs in the former Soviet Union . 859 Notably, Israel had 
yet to establish diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan at the time.
In relatively short order, Washington expanded this cooperation in the region 
to include Turkey. George Gruen has written that “the United States government 
has... created a framework to support Turkish-Israeli cooperation in joint ventures in 
construction, agricultural technology, rural development, and other fields in the 
Central Asian republics. ” 860 This enlarged scheme was intended to support the 
involvement of both Turkey and Israel, with each partner utilizing its respective 
strengths. In this case, Washington would provide the financing and Israel would 
supply the technology and expertise. The success of these projects would be 
facilitated by Turkish ethno-linguistic ties to the Turkic states of the region. Further 
cooperation among the three countries can be seen in collaborative agricultural 
ventures; together, Washington, Israel, and Ankara have launched several joint 
projects in the region. On 31 October 1994, the three launched a “new agricultural 
project in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. ” 861
As has been illustrated, the three countries have worked together in the region 
to advance their common interests. The success of this cooperation was summarized 
nicely by the US Ambassador to Turkey Marc Grossman in remarks made before the 
American Turkish Council on 15 January 1995: “There is a great potential in the US- 
Turkish-Israeli assistance program in Central Asia.” 862
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